( 1 ) CRLA. MP (SR ). NO. 16440 of 2004 in Crl. A (SR ). No. 16438 of 2004 is preferred praying for leave to file an appeal as against an acquittal, along with an application in Crl. MP. No. 6156 of 2004 seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. ( 2 ) LIKEWISE, Crl. M. P. No. 4642 of 2004 in Crl. A (SR ). No. 18604 of 2003 is filed by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A. P. Hyderabad, with an application seeking condonation of delay of 213 days in presenting the appeal. Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as hereunder:378. Appeal in case of acquittal: (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in Revision]. (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or Sub-Section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Sub-section (3) is a new provision. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. Sub-section (3) is a new provision. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertain by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. (6) If, any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2 ). ( 3 ) IN the light of sub-section (1) of Section 378 and also Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter in short referred as Code for the purpose of convenience) especially in the light of the language employed in Sub-Section (5) of Section 378 of the Code, which reads as hereunder: shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. This Court felt the necessity of hearing the learned Counsel on record and also the learned Advocate General and the President of High Court Advocates Association and in view of the importance of the question, general importance of the question involved relating to the applicability or otherwise of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to such cases, a request also was made to the learned Senior Counsel, Sri. C. Padmanabha Reddy to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae in this regard. All the Counsel were heard at length. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate General placed reliance on short note decision in The Commissioner, Narasaraopet Municipality v. K. Koti Reddy (1975 (1) AW 28) decided on 31-03-1975 in Sr. Nos. 2201 and 2202 of 1975. C. Padmanabha Reddy to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae in this regard. All the Counsel were heard at length. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate General placed reliance on short note decision in The Commissioner, Narasaraopet Municipality v. K. Koti Reddy (1975 (1) AW 28) decided on 31-03-1975 in Sr. Nos. 2201 and 2202 of 1975. The learned Advocate General also placed reliance on a decision reported in The Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, Gannavaram (1976 (2) A. P. L. J. 171) in Crl. A. S. R. No. 22513 of 1975. Reliance also was placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Public Prosecutor, High Court of A. P. , Hyderabad v. Adunuthula Krishna Murthy (AIR 1975 A. P. 54 ). The learned Advocate General would contend that in the light of the views expressed by the learned Single Judges and also the Division Bench of this Court, the balance of view appears to be in favour of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to the applications praying for special leave being preferred under Section 378 of the Code. ( 5 ) THE learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State also placed strong reliance on Tiruvengalam v. Ammanna (AIR 1967 A. P. 206) and State (Delhi Administration), v. Dharampal ( AIR 2001 SC 2924 ) and would contend that though this matter was decided under the old Code, the same principle is applicable, and hence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the facts of the present case too. ( 6 ) SRI. T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, representing the High Court Advocates Association also had advanced similar contentions and would submit that since certain provisions of the Limitation Act are made applicable, it should be taken that even Section 5 of the Limitation Act inclusive should be made applicable and hence, in principle also the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act definitely can be filed along with applications praying for special leave under Section 378 of the Code. ( 7 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel Sri. C. Padmanabha Reddy, Amicus Curiae, who assisted this Court made elaborate submissions. ( 7 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel Sri. C. Padmanabha Reddy, Amicus Curiae, who assisted this Court made elaborate submissions. The learned Counsel would contend that the view expressed by a three-Judge Bench under the old Code in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh ( AIR 1964 SC 260 ), had been explained in a subsequent decision in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi ( AIR 1976 SC 105 ), and hence, there need not be any doubt about the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to special leave applications which are being preferred under Section 378 of the Code. The learned Senior Counsel, no doubt, in all fairness submitted that this decision in Mangu Rams case (7-supra) also had been decided in the context of the corresponding provisions under the old Code i. e. , 417 (3) of the Code of 1898. The learned Senior Counsel also placed strong reliance on Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Putanpurayil Aboobacker ( AIR 1995 SC 2272 ) and would contend that though this decision arose in the context of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the principle laid down in the said decision is squarely applicable to the present case too. The learned Senior Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the appeals which would be preferred by the State under Sub-section (1) of Section 378 of the Code and the appeals which would be preferred otherwise as specified under Sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Sec 378 of the Code. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to a decision in Agricultural Market Committee v. Sri Sankar Rao and Company (2004 (2) Crl. L. J. 1291), which was decided in the context of Sections 138 and 142 (b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and would contend that the observations made therein would amply support the view that in cases of this nature, the principle that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to be made applicable may have to be accepted. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of a Division bench of Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Sreekumar (2001 Crl. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of a Division bench of Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Sreekumar (2001 Crl. L. J. 4146) and the learned Counsel would submit that this is the only decision available which had been decided by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court, while deciding a matter under Section 378 of the present Case. Reliance also was placed on M/s. India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani ( AIR 2003 SC 2084 ). Heard Sri Govardhan Veny and also Sri. D. Suryanarayana and Sudhakar Rao, at length. Sub-section (5) of Section 378 of the Code, no doubt, specifically says that no application under Sub-section (4) for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complaint is a public servant and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. ( 8 ) IN State (Delhi Administration)s case (5-supra), it was held that Section 378 makes a distinction between an appeal filed by the State Government or the Central Government who only need to obtain leave, and an appeal by a complainant who needs to obtain special leave. The limitation provided in sub-section (5) is only in respect of applications under sub-section (4) i. e. application for special leave to appeal by a complainant. A complainant may be either a public servant or a private party. If the complainant is a public servant then the period of limitation for an application for special leave is 6 months. If the complainant is a private party then the period of limitation for an application for special leave is 60 days. The period of 6 months and or 60 days do not apply to appeals by the State Government (under sub-section (1) ). Appeals by the State Government or the Central Government continue to be governed by Art. 114 (a) of the Limitation Act. In other words, those appeals must be filed within 90 days from the date of the orders appealed form. Appeals by the State Government or the Central Government continue to be governed by Art. 114 (a) of the Limitation Act. In other words, those appeals must be filed within 90 days from the date of the orders appealed form. ( 9 ) IN Kaushalya Ranis case (6-supra), the Apex Court while dealing with application for leave to appeal against an acquittal by a private complainant in the context of Section 417 (4) of the old Code held as under: it will appear that the section, which was recast by Act XXVI of 1955, for the first time made provision for an appeal by a private complainant from an order of acquittal, if he obtained special leave to appeal from the High Court. Previous to the Amending Act aforesaid, it was only the State Government which could come up in appeal from an order of acquittal. The section, thus, provides for an appeal by the State Government, as also by the complainant in a case instituted upon a complaint, provided that special leave of the Court is obtained. So far as appeal by the State Government is concerned, S. 417 itself does not provide for any period of limitation. The period of limitation for such an appeal is laid down in Art. 157 of the Limitation Act. Previous to the amendment of 1955 the period of limitation for such an appeal by the State Government was six months, which was reduced to three months by the Act XXVI of 1955 with effect from January 1, 1956. Hence, so far as an appeal by the State Government is concerned, the period of limitation thus reduced is a part of the general law of limitation and is amenable to the operation of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. But the provisions of sub-secs. (3) and (4) of S. 417 are in the nature of special provision introduced for the first time by the Amending Act XXVI of 1955. Sub-section (4), in terms, is very precise and mandatory, prohibiting the High Court from entertaining any application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal after the expiry of 60 days from the date of such an order. Sub-section (4), in terms, is very precise and mandatory, prohibiting the High Court from entertaining any application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal after the expiry of 60 days from the date of such an order. On a perusal of the bare previsions of the section and the history of the law on the subject, two things are clear; namely, (1) that the legislature thought it expedient in the interest of justice and public policy that the period of six months allowed to the State Government to appeal from an order of acquittal should be curtailed by half, thus evicting its clear intention to cut short the duration of the litigation which had already resulted in an order of acquittal; and (2) that in certain cases the High Court should have the power of granting special leave to a complainant, as distinguished from the State Government, to come up in appeal from an order of acquittal, but at the same time indicating in clear and unambiguous terms that such an application must be made within 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal. This rule of 60 days bar of time has been specifically provided for in the section itself, unlike the general rule of limitation applicable to an appeal against acquittal, at the instance of the State Government. In our opinion, therefore the position is clear that so far as appeal by the State Government is concerned, the law of limitation is the general law laid down in the Limitation Act (Art. 157) to which S. 5 would apply by its own force. But in so far as appeal by a private prosecutor is concerned, the legislature was astute to specifically lay down that the foundation for such an appeal should be laid within 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal. In that sense, this rule of 60 days bar is a special law, that is to say, a rule of limitation which is specially provided for in the code itself, which does not ordinarily provide for a period of limitation for appeals or applications. It is the general law of limitation, as laid down in the Limitation Act, which governs appeals ordinarily preferable under the Code, vide Arts. 150, 154, 155 and 157. To such appeals the provisions of S. 5 would apply. It is the general law of limitation, as laid down in the Limitation Act, which governs appeals ordinarily preferable under the Code, vide Arts. 150, 154, 155 and 157. To such appeals the provisions of S. 5 would apply. ( 10 ) IT has been observed in some of the cases decided by the High Courts that the Code is not a special or a local law within the meaning of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, that is to say, so far as the entire Code is concerned because it is a general law laying down procedure, generally, for the trial of criminal cases. But the specific question with which we are here concerned is whether the provision contained in S. 417 (4) of the Code is a special law. The whole Code is indeed a general law regulating the procedure in criminal trails generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for particular class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a Land Revenue Code may be a general law regulating the relationship between the revenue-payer and the revenue-receive or the rent-prayer and the rent-receiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it may contain special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation. Such a law will be a special law with reference to the law generally governing the subject-matter of that kind of relationship. A special law therefore, means a law enacted for special cases in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated by S. 417 (3) and (4), read together, it will be special law contained within the general law. As the Limitation Act has not defined special law, it is neither necessary nor expedient to attempt a definition. As the Limitation Act has not defined special law, it is neither necessary nor expedient to attempt a definition. Thus, the Limitation Act is a general law laying down the general rules of limitation applicable to all cases dealt with by the Act; but there may be instances of a special law of limitation laid down in other statues, though not dealing generally with the law of limitation. For example, rules framed under Defence of India Act, vide Surya Mohan v. State of Bihar, ILR 30 Pat 126: ( AIR 1951 Pat 462 ) and Canara Bank Ltd. V. The Warden Insurance Co. , ILR (1952) Bom 1083: (AIR 1953 Bom 53) dealing with the special rule of limitation laid down in the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bom XXXIII of 1948 ). These are mere instances of special laws within the meaning of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Once it is held that the special rule of limitation laid down in sub-sec. (4) of S. 417 of the Code is a special law of limitation, governing appeals by private prosecutors, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that S. 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly out of the way, in view of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. ( 11 ) BUT the question is whether it can be said that even though the provisions of S. 417 (4) are a special law, they prescribe a different period of limitation from that prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, because S. 29 (2) applies where there is a difference between the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and that prescribed by the special law. It is said that the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of Limitation for an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor. In the first instance, the Limitation Act, Art. 157, has prescribed the rule of Limitation in respect of appeals against acquittal at the instance of the State. Hence, it may be said that there is no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for an appeal against an order of acquittal at the instance of the State. In the first instance, the Limitation Act, Art. 157, has prescribed the rule of Limitation in respect of appeals against acquittal at the instance of the State. Hence, it may be said that there is no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for an appeal against an order of acquittal at the instance of the State. Hence, it may be said that there is no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for an appeal against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor. Thus, there is a difference between the Limitation Act and the rule laid down in S. 417 (4) of the Code in respect of limitation affecting such an application. Section 29 (2) is supplemental in its character in so far as it provides for the application of S. 3 to such cases as would not come within it purview but for this provision. And for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special law, it has made the provisions of the Limitation Act, referred in cl. (a) of sub-section (2) of S. 29 applicable to such cases to the extent to which they are expressly excluded by such specials or local law, and cl. (b) of that sub-section expressly lays it down that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply to cases governed by any special or local law. In our opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Code supplemented by the provisions of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application for special leave to appeal under S. 417 (3) of the Code. ( 12 ) IN a subsequent decision in Mangu Rams case (7 supra), the Apex Court had distinguished this decision in Kaushalya Ranis case (6-surpa) while arriving at a conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to special leave under Section 417 (3) of the Code of 1898; held as under: there is an important departure made by the Limitation Act 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, sub-section (2) is concerned. Whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Section 29 sub-section (2), cl. Whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Section 29 sub-section (2), cl. (b) provide that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit appeal or application by any special for local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would conclude Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. S. 29, sub-s. (2), cl. (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Ranis case can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29 (2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Ranis case AIR 1964 SC 260 = (1964) (1) Cri LJ 152) the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-section (4) of section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Ranis case AIR 1964 SC 260 = (1964) (1) Cri LJ 152) the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-section (4) of section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5. It is true that the language of sub-section (4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appear from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provisions of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. ( 13 ) IN the light of the subsequent pronouncement of the Apex Court distinguishing the prior decision in Kaushalya Ranis case (6-surpa), the learned Senior Counsel Sri. C. Padmanabha Reddy, advanced submissions at length that the later view would be binding decision especially in view of the change in law. ( 13 ) IN the light of the subsequent pronouncement of the Apex Court distinguishing the prior decision in Kaushalya Ranis case (6-surpa), the learned Senior Counsel Sri. C. Padmanabha Reddy, advanced submissions at length that the later view would be binding decision especially in view of the change in law. In M/s. India Houses case (11-surpa), the Apex Court observed as follows: it is well-settled that by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act the provisions of Section 12 are applicable for computing the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law (See D. P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma and another (1970) 2 SCC 369 and Malojirao Nar-singhrao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1969) 2 SCC 723 ). The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from for equitable considerations. At the same time full effect should also be given to those provisions which permit extension or relaxation in computing period of limitation such @ page-SC2087 as those contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The underlying purpose of these provisions is to enable a litigant seeking enforcement of his right to any remedy to do so effectively and harsh prescription of time-bar not unduly interfering with the exercise of statutory rights and remedies. That is why Section 12 has always been liberally interpreted. To wit, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the impugned decree, sentence or order has been held liable to be excluded from computing the period of limitation although such copy may not necessarily be required to be filed along with appeal, application or memo of representation of review. No distinction is drawn between decrees or orders pronounced on the original side or the appellate or revisional side. No application is required to be made seeking the benefit of Section 12 of Limitation Act; it is the statutory obligation of the Court to extend the benefit where available. No distinction is drawn between decrees or orders pronounced on the original side or the appellate or revisional side. No application is required to be made seeking the benefit of Section 12 of Limitation Act; it is the statutory obligation of the Court to extend the benefit where available. Although the language of sub-section (2) of Section 12 is couched in a form mandating the time requisite for obtaining the copy being excluded from computing the period of limitation, the easier way of expressing the rule and applying it in practice is to find out the period of limitation prescribed and then add to it the time requisite for obtaining the copy the date of application for copy, and the date of delivery, thereof both included- and treat the result of addition as the period of limitation. The underlying principle is that such copy may or may not be required to accompany the petition in the jurisdiction sought to be invoked yet to make up ones mind for pursuing the next remedy, for obtaining legal opinion and for appropriately drafting the petition by finding out the grounds therefore the litigant must be armed with such copy. Without the authentic copy being available the remedy in the higher forum or subsequent jurisdiction may be rendered a farce. All that sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act says is the time requisite for obtaining the copy being excluded from computing the period of limitation, or, in other words, as we have put in hereinabove, the time requisite for obtaining the copy being added to the prescribed period of limitation and treating the result of addition as the period prescribed. In adopting this methodology it does not make any difference whether the application for certified copy was made within the prescribed period of limitation or beyond it. Neither it is so provided in sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act nor in principle we find any reason or logic for taking such a view. ( 14 ) THE observations made by the learned Judge of this Court in Agricultural Market Committees case (supra) also had been specifically brought to the notice of this Court. Neither it is so provided in sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act nor in principle we find any reason or logic for taking such a view. ( 14 ) THE observations made by the learned Judge of this Court in Agricultural Market Committees case (supra) also had been specifically brought to the notice of this Court. In Lal ram v. Hari Ram ( AIR 1970 SC 1093 ), while dealing with Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 417 (4) of the old Code and after referring to Kaushalya Ranis case (6-supra) and Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatrao ( AIR 1961 Bom 154 (F. B.), had arrived at a conclusion that Section 417 (4) of the Code itself prescribes the period of 60 days limitation for application for special leave under Section 417 (3) of the Code and it is a period of limitation within the meaning of Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the legislature could provide for such period in the Code itself and insertion of separate. Article in Limitation Act, was not necessary. It also further held that shall be entertained the word entertain means file or received by the Court. There is no reference to actual for hearing of application for special leave to appeal. The meaning of the case within the meaning of Section 417 (3) of the Code had been well explained in Bhimappa Bassappa Bhu Sannavar v. Laxman Shivarayappa Samagouda ( AIR 1970 SC 1153 ). ( 15 ) THE learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed strong reliance on State (Delhi Administration)s case (5-supra) already referred to supra to draw a dichotomy in between the appeals preferred by the state under Sub-section (1) and the other appeals as against an order of acquittal. The same view was expressed even in State of Rajasthan v. Ramdeen ( AIR 1977 SC 1328 ). ( 16 ) IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Amrit Lal (1981 Crl. The same view was expressed even in State of Rajasthan v. Ramdeen ( AIR 1977 SC 1328 ). ( 16 ) IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Amrit Lal (1981 Crl. L. J. 422 (D. B.) of the Delhi High Court held that where the accused was acquitted under the complaint petition filed by the municipal prosecutor on behalf of the Municipal Corporation, the Corporation being a corporate body, could not be said to be a public servant within meaning of Section 21, I. P. C. Therefore the Municipal Corporation would not be entitled to get benefit of the extended period of 6 months in filing appeal against the acquittal order under Section 378 (5 ). Further, the Corporation would not be allowed time to file application for condonation of delay when in an earlier case by it, it was held to be the complainant by the Supreme Court. Time would also not be allowed because the law does not favour that an order of acquittal should remain in jeopardy longer than what is prescribed by the law of limitation for that purpose. ( 17 ) THIS view relating to the drawing of dichotomy in between the appeal preferred by the State as against an order of acquittal and the other appeals also had been dealt with by a learned Single Judge in State of Maharashtra v. Deepchand Khushalchand Jain (1983 Crl. L. J. 561) and in Kosana Ranganayakamma v. Pasupulati Subbamma (AIR 1967 A. P. 208 ). A learned Single Judge of this Court after referring to Kaushalya Ranis case (6-surpa) and also Anjanabais case (13-supra) had arrived at a conclusion that schedule to Limitation Act though does not prescribe the period of limitation for application under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. , Section 417 (4) of Cr. P. C. , prescribing that the limitation is special law prescribing different limitation within Section 29 (2), and hence, Section 3 applies with the result that Sections 4 to 24, inclusive of Section 5, apply to applications under Section 417 (3) of the old Code. P. C. , Section 417 (4) of Cr. P. C. , prescribing that the limitation is special law prescribing different limitation within Section 29 (2), and hence, Section 3 applies with the result that Sections 4 to 24, inclusive of Section 5, apply to applications under Section 417 (3) of the old Code. ( 18 ) A Division Bench of this Court in Public Prosecutor, High Court of A. P. , Hyderabads case, (3-supra), while dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal by the Government and leave of Court and prayer for leave of the Court can be made in the appeal petition itself, held as under: the question that still remains is whether the public prosecutor, in order to have the appeal entertained, should come up once with an application seeking leave or permission of the Court to present the appeal and again, if leave is granted, present the petition of appeal seeking entertainment of the appeal. While we are of the view that the public prosecutor must seek the leave of the Court before the appeal can be entertained, we do not see any force in the view put forth by Mr. K. Jaganatha Rao that the public prosecutor will be entitled to present a petition of appeal only after leave is granted, that is to say, he must cross one hurdle after the other. We do not think that it was the intention of the parliament to prescribe two separate stages. The object of the new Code is to see that there are no avoidable procedural delays and at the same time ensure a fair trail to the accused. It should be borne in mind that Section 378 lays down only the procedure in the matter of presentation of appeals against orders of acquittal. There is nothing in sub-section (3) which is susceptible of being constructed as providing two stages: (1) making an application for leave and (2) then, if leave is granted, presenting the petition of appeal. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 378 when read together, will make it clear that there are no two stages and that the Court can grant leave and entertain the appeal at one and the same time. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 378 when read together, will make it clear that there are no two stages and that the Court can grant leave and entertain the appeal at one and the same time. It will be open to the public prosecutor, in the appeal petition itself which he presents, to seek leave of the High Court without having to file another application in that behalf. There is no prohibition in seeking two prayers in one and the same petition. ( 19 ) WHILE we are in agreement with the learned Judge, Kondaiah, J. that leave of the Court has to be obtained for the appeal being entertained, we are, however, unable to endorse his opinion that there should be a separate application for leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378. It will be open to the public prosecutor to file a separate application for leave along with the memorandum of grounds or seek both the prayers in the appeal petition. We must express our thanks to Mr. K. Jagannatha Rao for the assistance given by him. ( 20 ) IN the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, Gannavarams case (2-supra) in Crl. A. S. R. No. 22513 of 1975, the learned Single Judge of this Court held as under: under Article 114 (a) of the Limitation Act, an appeal by the State against an order of acquittal has to be presented within 90 days from the date of the order of acquittal. In so far as an appeal against acquittal in a case instituted on a complaint is concerned, while prescribing the period of limitation for filing an application for special leave under sub-Section (5) of Section 378 Cr. P. C. 1973, a distinction is drawn between a complaint who is a public servant and other private individuals. No such distinction was made under Section 417 (3) Cr. P. C. (old ). Where the complainant is a public servant, the period of limitation for preferring an appeal is Six months under section 378 (5) Cr. P. C. 1973. In the case of others, it is only sixty days. The decisive factor that should determine the applicable of the period of six months limitation prescribed by Section 378 (5) Cr. P. C. 1973, is whether the complaint in the case which ended in acquittal was made by a public servant. P. C. 1973. In the case of others, it is only sixty days. The decisive factor that should determine the applicable of the period of six months limitation prescribed by Section 378 (5) Cr. P. C. 1973, is whether the complaint in the case which ended in acquittal was made by a public servant. If the case was instituted on a complaint and the complainant was a public servant and the case ended in acquittal, the agency through which the appeal against acquittal was presented-Whether it be by the Public Prosecutor or by a private advocate-is of no consequence and the benefit of the longer period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (5) of section 378 Cr. P. C. 1973 cannot in such cases, be denied. The statutory right to invoke extended period limitation of six months is given to the public servant that preferred the complaint and not the counsel that presents the appeal of the complainant. ( 21 ) RELIANCE was also placed on a short note judgment, in S. R. Nos. 2201 and 2202 of 1975, reported in The Commissioner, Narasaraopet Municipalitys case (1-supra), wherein it was held as under: a Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act, to condone the delay has to be filed by the Public Prosecutor for filing an appeal under Section 378 (3) and (1) of the Code beyond the period of limitation against a case instituted on a complaint of a public servant. Placing reliance on the short note judgments and whether these to be treated as binding precedents, this trend on the part of the Courts no doubt had been deprecated. But, however, it is needless to observe that the principle enunciated in the said decision would definitely support the contention that in cases of this nature the benefit under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, definitely can be invoked. ( 22 ) STRONG reliance was placed on State of Keralas case (10-supra) wherein the Division Bench of Kerala High Court, while dealing with Section 378 (3) of the present Code and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 specifically held that where an appeal as against an order of acquittal is preferred belatedly by the State and an application for condonation of delay had been filed and unavoidable administrative delay of 117 days had been explained by the Public Prosecutor by filing an affidavit, delay has to be condoned. The Division Bench also had dealt with Section 378 (1) (3) and (5) of the Code and also held that Limitation for filing an appeal under Article 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be applicable. ( 23 ) IT is no doubt true that the language employed in Sub-section (5) appears to be imperative. But in the light of the view expressed by the Apex Court in Mangu Rams case (7-supra), where the prior decision in Kaushalya Rani case (6-supra), had been specifically referred to and also in the light of the view expressed by the learned Judges of this Court and also the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court referred to supra, despite the language employed in Sub-section (5) of Section 378, this Court is of the considered opinion that the provisions of Section 378 of the Code may have to be harmoniously construed in the light of the language of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 378 of the Code along with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963), and in the absence of any specific exclusion thereof it would be advisable and desirable to bring in suitable clarificatory amendments to the aforesaid provisions, and hence, this Court has no hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that for special leave applications filed beyond the period of limitation under Section 378 of the Code, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable and such applications are maintainable. ( 24 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion since there is a private party, notice may have to be served, and accordingly, in Crl. M. P. No. 6156 of 2004 notice is hereby ordered returnable within two weeks and the learned Counsel for the petitioner/appellant is also permitted to take out notice and file proof of service. As far as Crl. MP. No. 4642 of 2004 is concerned, in the light of the detailed reasons which had been explained in paragraphs 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is a fit matter, where the delay may have to be condoned and accordingly the same is hereby condoned. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. This Court records its appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the learned Senior Counsel Sri. C. Padmanabha Reddy as Amicus Curiae.