Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. The landlord-petitioner has filed the instant petition seeking ejectment of the tenant-respondent under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity, the Act). The grounds of ejectment set up by the landlord-petitioner are that tenant-respondent 1 has raised unauthorised construction in the demised premises and has also demolished the existing/semi furnished quarters. It has been alleged that on the entire area of the plot including the passage, the unauthorised construction has been raised and that there are material alterations impairing the value and utility of the demised premises. A copy of the ejectment petition has been placed on record as Annexure P1. There are further allegations of subletting to the effect that tenant-respondent 1 has parted with exclusive possession in favour of sub-tenant - respondents 2 to 4 without the- consent of the landlord-petitioner and has also changed the user of the demised premises which was let out for manufacturing of electronics items like transistor and radios. The ground of non payment of rent has also been pleaded by the landlord-petitioner. During the pendency of the proceedings, he moved an application before the Rent Controller for appointment of a local commissioner to visit the spot and report regarding existing state of affairs including existing structure, occupation of various persons in the building and nature of business being carried out in the demised premises. The aforementioned application is claimed to have been filed as Local Commissioner was considered necessary and essential; and it was to facilitate the Rent Controller in adjudicating upon the controversy raised. The application was contested by the tenant-respondent and reply dated 17.7.2003 (Annexure P4) to the application was filed. However, the Rent Controller has dismissed the application by observing as under:- "After giving my considered thought to the rival contentions I find force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent. Petitioner has taken the ground of sub-letting as one of the ground of eviction. He has further alleged the ground of change of user and material impairment. This fact has to be proved by the petitioner by adducing evidence. This function cannot be delegated to a local commissioner. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case because the facts are totally different in the present case. This fact has to be proved by the petitioner by adducing evidence. This function cannot be delegated to a local commissioner. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case because the facts are totally different in the present case. The petitioner is yet to conclude its evidence. He can prove the grounds by way of evidence on which the court shall record a finding of fact. The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable cause for the appointment of local commissioner. Therefore, the application filed by the petitioner is without any merit and the same stands dismissed." 2. Mr. Kulbhushan Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the appointment of local commissioner is necessary to give a report with regard to the existing construction on the demised premises. He has also pointed out that there is vital difference between the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 15(6) of the Act for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on various judgments of this Court in the cases of Hari Chand of Ladwa (Kuruksheta) V/s. Shanti Devi, 1984 H.R.R. 336; Prem Sagar V/s. Darbari Lal and Anr., (2000-2)125 P.L.R. 132 and Hukam Chand V/s. The Financial Commissioner, Haryana, Chandigarh, (1983)85 P.L.R. 306. 3. Mr. A.S. Chadha, learned counsel for the respondent has challenged the very maintainability of the instant petition urging that the order refusing to appoint a Local Commissioner cannot be challenged in a revision petition and he has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the cases of Pritam Singh and Anr. V/s. Sunder Lal and Anr., 1996(2) R.L.R. 46 and Smt. Harminder Kaur V/s. Jodha Ram and Anr., A.I.R. 1979 (P&H) 76. He has placed reliance on paragraph 3 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India V/s. Gokal Chand, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799 wherein observations have been made which are consistent with the view that interlocutory orders are the steps taken towards final adjudication of the rights and liabilities of the parties. These orders regulate the procedure only and do not affect their right or liability. These orders regulate the procedure only and do not affect their right or liability. The Supreme Court has further observed that the parties are not to be subjected to unnecessary litigation by permitting revision or appeal from such interlocutory orders. 4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that ordinarily an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller cannot be subjected to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(6) of the Act. It may be true that Section 15(6) of the Act is widely worded inasmuch as it confers jurisdiction on this Court to examine the record relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under [the] Act for the purposes of satisfying itself as to legality or propriety of such order or proceedings. However, it cannot at the same time be construed to mean that all orders including the procedural order which do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties could also be subjected to revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India (supra) on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondents has considered the provisions of Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and has opined that no intention could be imputed to the legislature that the parties were to be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeal/revision from such procedural order. The Supreme Court placed reliance on its earlier judgment in the case of Shankarlal Aggarwal V/s. Shankarlal Poddar, AIR 1965 SC 507 and observed as under:- "The object of Section 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of Section 38(1), the words "every order of the Controller under this Act", through very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders Sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders Sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding, they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under Section 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under Section 38(1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an exparte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal." 5. In view of the above enunciation of law by the Supreme Court, I find that the instant petition is not maintainable and the view taken by two Division Benches of this Court in the cases of Pritam Singh (supra) and Smt. Harvinder Kaur (supra) is consistent with the view taken by the Supreme Court. 6. The argument of learned counsel for the landlord-petitioners to the effect that an order declining the application for appointment of Local Commissioner is revisable by placing reliance on the judgments in the cases of Pram Sagar (supra) and Hukam Chand (supra) is devoid of any merit because in both these cases this Court was considering the legality and propriety of the final order passed by the Courts below. It was not an interlocutory order. The other judgment in Hari Chand Ladwas case (supra) does not in fact laid down any proposition of law that interloctory order can be subjected to the revisional jurisdiction. It was not an interlocutory order. The other judgment in Hari Chand Ladwas case (supra) does not in fact laid down any proposition of law that interloctory order can be subjected to the revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, I have no hesitation in concluding that the argument raised by the learned counsel is bereft of any merit and the same is liable to be rejected. 7. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, the landlord-petitioner shall be at liberty to challenge the impugned order dated 28.8.2003 passed by the Rent Controller at an appropriate stage of proceeding in appeal under Section 15(2) to (4) of the Act, if such a necessity arises.