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2004 DIGILAW 969 (SC)

SRINIVASAS v. STATE BY SANTEBENNUR POLICE

2004-08-12

A.R.LAKSHMANAN, K.G.BALAKRISHNAN

body2004
ORDER 1. This is an appeal preferred by three appellants challenging their conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Deceased Sujatha was married to the first appellant Srinivasa on 4-5-1994. It is alleged that at the time of marriage dowry was given to the appellants. After the marriage deceased Sujatha started living in her husbands house. Thereafter, Sujatha alleged that she was being ill-treated by her husband and she returned to her parents house. There was some settlement between the parties and pursuant to that settlement Sujatha again started living with her husband. Thereafter, it is alleged that she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty and the appellant had persuaded her to bring the balance amount of dowry agreed to be paid by her parents. She alleged that the appellant wanted to sell the 2 acres of land which she would have got as her share from her parental property. While staying in the husbands house, on 5-11-1999, deceased Sujatha sustained serious bum injuries. The appellants took her to the hospital and while undergoing treatment she died on 18-11-1999 at about 8.15 a.m. 2. On 5-11-1999, when she was in the hospital she gave a dying declaration. PW 8, the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of deceased Sujatha. In the dying declaration she alleged that her husband Srinivasa, father-in-law Satyanarayana and mother-in-law Ramalakshmi had beaten her and had forced her to bring more dowry from her father by selling off 2 acres of land in Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh. The deceased pleaded with them that her parents would come within 10 days and would make some arrangements, despite this pleading, the appellants attacked her and poured kerosene and lit the fire. The deceased Sujatha had given a statement on the next day i.e. on 6-11-1999 to police constable, PW 18 who recorded her statement which was marked as Exhibit P-13. In the Exhibit P-13 statement she alleged that her husband accused her that she was not interested in selling the land and bringing money to him and so saying he started beating her with sticks and her father-in-law and mother-in-law poured kerosene and her husband lit the fire and her clothes caught fire and her entire body was burnt with injuries. They took her to a private hospital and as per their advice she was admitted in a government hospital. 3. The Sessions Court accepted these two dying declarations as true and correct and found these appellants guilty as aforesaid. The appellants challenged the finding of the Sessions Court before the High Court and the High Court confirmed the findings of the Sessions Court. The appellants challenged their conviction and sentence. 4. We heard learned counsel for the appellants and counsel for the respondent. 5. The counsel for the appellants contended that Ext. P-4 dying declaration is not true and genuine and it must have been tutored version given by the deceased at the instance of PW 21 Nageswara Rao. It is contended that Nageswara Rao had put his signatures on Ext. P-4 and he was present at the time when Ext. P-4 was recorded. It was argued by the appellants counsel that deceased Sujatha was not able to speak Kannada whereas PW 8 who recorded the statement was not able to read or write Telugu language and PW 21 Nageswara Rao translated the statement given by deceased Sujatha in Kannada and thereby he manipulated the version of the deceased. We find no force in the contention raised by the appellants counsel. PW 8 deposed before the court that he asked the questions in Kannada and PW 21 translated the same and explained it to deceased Sujatha and thereafter she gave the answers in Telugu and the answers were repeated by PW 21 and confirmed by the doctor who was present and who knew both Kannada and Telugu languages. It is also to be noted that the appellants had no case that PW 8 recorded the statement wrongly and no suggestion was put to this witness to show that PW 21 had in any way interfered with the truthful recording of the statement of PW 8. The counsel for the appellants also pointed out that Ext. P-4 allegedly contains signatures of deceased Sujatha whereas in Ext. P-13 statement recorded by PW 18, the signature of the deceased Sujatha does not find place. 6. Ext. P-13 was recorded on the next day and at that time burn injuries must have aggravated and she must have not been in a position to put her signature. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that PW 17, the father of the deceased admitted that Ext. 6. Ext. P-13 was recorded on the next day and at that time burn injuries must have aggravated and she must have not been in a position to put her signature. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that PW 17, the father of the deceased admitted that Ext. P-4 recorded the statement as per the narration given by PW 21. We do not find much force in this contention as evidently he was also helping in translating the version given by deceased Sujatha. 7. The crucial question for decision is whether the two dying declarations given by deceased Sujatha are truthful or not. The counsel for the appellants submitted that there is defence evidence to show that the deceased sustained accidental burn injuries when she was preparing food and Appellants 2 and 3 suddenly reached the kitchen and even put the blanket on her body and she was taken to the hospital for immediate medical aid and these facts indicate that the deceased must have sustained burn injuries due to the accident. 8. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellants counsel. In both the dying declarations she implicated all the appellants and stated that Appellants 2 and 3 poured kerosene on her body and the first appellant lit the fire and she sustained burn injuries. The fact that she was taken to the hospital or her body was covered with a blanket might have been immediate reaction made by these appellants, and it would not absolve them of the criminal conduct spoken to by deceased Sujatha. 9. There is also other contemporaneous evidence to show that the appellants caused the death of the deceased by burn injuries. The police visited the scene of occurrence and prepared the inquest and prepared a mahazar and kerosene was found in the kitchen. The prosecution witness also deposed that the first appellant was causing harassment to the deceased a by demanding dowry and the evidence adduced in this case clearly establishes that on account of demand of dowry the deceased Sujatha was subjected to physical and mental torture which resulted in causing her death. 10. We do not find any reason to interfere. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.