JUDGMENT S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J. 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 20th June, 2003, passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 2966 of 1995R. whereby and whereunder. the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, as was preferred by the 1st respondent (writ petitioner), and set aside her order of termination with a direction to the appellant to reinstate tier in service with all consequential benefits. The only question arises for consideration is as to whether the appellant-Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, can terminate the services of the 1st respondent, a probationer, after giving one months notice or not. 2. The brief fact of the case is that the 1st respondent Dr. Mrs. Nupur Chandan was selected for appointment as a Lady Medical Officer and was appointed vide letter dated 23rd June, 1994 against a permanent non-plan sanctioned post. She was placed on probation for a period of two years from the date of her joining the duty and some other condition of service was also mentioned in the order of appointment. While she was on probation, her services were terminated on payment of a sum, equivalent to the amount of her pay + allowances, as admissible to her, for one month, in pursuance of sub-rule (i) and (ii) of Rule 7(A) of the Bye-laws, by an order dated 29th September. 1995. The 1st respondent challenged the letter of termination on three grounds, namely, (a) the power under Rule 7(A) of the Bye- laws could not have been exercised as the same is applicable to temporary employees; (b) her appointment, having been made on a permanent post in a permanent capacity, though with the condition that she would be on probation for a period of two years, the procedure for termination of a permanent employee was necessarily required to be followed and (c) the order of termination is punitive in nature. 3. 3. So far as the last contention i.e. whether the order of termination is punitive or not, is concerned, the learned single Judge has refrained from making any comment because reading the order as a whole it was not found to be punitive or that it was resorted to ay a measure of punishment- The first and 2nd grounds, taken on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, were accepted by the learned single Judge, who held that Rule 7(A) of the Bye-laws could not have been made applicable as that relates to temporary employee, Laking into consideration the nature of post i.e. the post was permanent against which she was appointed. The learned single Judge held that the petitioner had right to continue till the age of her superannuation i.e. 58 years. 4. For determination of the issue, it is necessary to discuss the relevant conditions of service of the 1st respondent (writ petitioner), mentioned m her letter of appointment dated 23rd June. 1994, as quoted hereunder : "1. Nature of appointment.-(a) Appointment is on two years probation with effect from date of joining duty at the Indian School of Mines. 2. Nature of post/vacancy.-The post is permanent. The appointment being offered is in a clear vacancy. xxxx xxxx xxxx 9. Termination of services.-Appointment may be terminated on one months notice or one months salary in lieu thereof on either side and without any cause assigned during the period of probation or in a temporary appointment." 5. Similar provision for termination of services of temporary employee, employee on probation: permanent employee has been laid down under Rule 7 of the "Bye-laws in the matter of Classification and method of appointment and terms and conditions of service in respect of non-teaching employees of the Indian School of Mines. Dhanbad" relevant provisions of which are as follows ; "7(A) : (i) during the period of probation following the first appointment, at any time without notice : and (ii) if the post is temporary, at any time by a notice of one month in writing given by the appointing authority to the employee, or, at any time without notice on payment of one months pay." 6. Admittedly, the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) was appointed against non-teaching post of Lady Medical Officer. Initially her appointment was on two years probation with effect from the date of joining the duty. Admittedly, the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) was appointed against non-teaching post of Lady Medical Officer. Initially her appointment was on two years probation with effect from the date of joining the duty. Though the nature of post was shown to be permanent in the letter of appointment dated 23rd June, 1994. The nature of appointment was on probation. Rule 4 of the Bye-laws provided "Probation of confirmation." While sub-rule (b) to Rule 4 stipulates the action, required to be taken by the appointing authority, if an employee does not complete his period on probation satisfactorily, sub-rules (c) and (d) to Rule 4 stipulate confirmation on completion of the period of probation, as quoted hereunder : "4(B) Where a person appointed to a post under the society on probation is, during his period of probation, found unsuitable for holding that post or has not completed his period of probation satisfactorily-the appointing authority may : (i) In the case of a person appointed by promotion revert him to the post held by him immediately before such appoint: and (ii) in the case of a person appointed by direct recruitment terminate his services under the Society without notice. (C) Every person appointed to a permanent post under the society by promotion or by direct recruitment shall on satisfactorily completing his period of probation, be eligible for confirmation in that post. (D) No employee shall be confirmed in any post unless ; (i) such post is permanent and no one else holds a lien on the post, (ii) The service of the employee under the society is approved by the appointing authority." 7. It is a settled law that on completion of probation, confirmation is not automatic. Probation does not transform itself into confirmation unless there is a specific order. But it is open to the appointing authority to confer a status other than (.hat of confirmed status on the termination of probation, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of K.A. Barot v. State of Gujrat, reported in 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 287. 8. Though the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) was appointed against a permanent vacancy, she had not completed the period of probation. The services of the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) was not approved by the appointing authority in terms with sub-rule (D)(ii) of Rule 4 of the Bye-laws. 8. Though the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) was appointed against a permanent vacancy, she had not completed the period of probation. The services of the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) was not approved by the appointing authority in terms with sub-rule (D)(ii) of Rule 4 of the Bye-laws. Therefore, the appointment of 1st respondent cannot be held to be permanent in nature, even though she was appointed against a permanent post. She| had no right to continue in the service till the age of superannuation, unless a specific order of confirmation has been issued by the competent authority. 9. So far as termination of service is concerned, as per the condition, laid down in the letter of appointment dated 23rd June, 1994 (Clause 9), it was open to the appellant to terminate the services of the 1st respondent on one months notice or one months salary in lieu there of, without any cause assigned, during the period of probation or temporary appointment. Under sub-rule (A)(i) of Rule 7 of the Bye-laws it was open to the competent authority to terminate her service al: any time, without notice during the period of probation. 10. Such being the Rule, prescribed by the appellant, and the condition of service, laid down in the letter of appointment of the 1st respondent. It was well within the competence of the appellant to terminate the service of the 1st respondent on payment of one months salary during the period of probation. The learned single Judge having found that the reading of the order of termination as a whole, is not suggestive of the same being punitive or that it has been resorted to as a measure of punishment, there was no occasion for the learned single Judge to interfere with the letter of termination on the ground that the appointment of the 1st respondent was not a pure and simple temporary appointment. The learned single Judge has also erred in holding that sub-rule (A)(l) of Rule 7 of the Bye-laws was not applicable in the case of a probationer. 11. In the facts and circumstances, this Court has no option but to set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 20th June, 2003, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2966 of 1995R, which is, accordingly, set aside. The Letters Patent Appeal is hereby allowed. However, there shall no order as to costs.