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2004 DIGILAW 984 (PNJ)

State of Haryana v. Joginder Kumari

2004-08-31

G.S.SINGHVI, VIRENDER SINGH

body2004
ORDER This appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against judgment dated 27.2.1989 vide which the learned Single Judge while dismissing Regular First Appeal No. 2459 of 1980 filed by the appellant under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act), declared that the respondent is entitled to statutory benefits under amended Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act. 2. A perusal of the record shows that vide notification dated 20.9.1977/1.11.1977 issued under Section 4 of the Act and notification dated 9.5.1978 issued under Section 6 thereof, the State Government acquired 2.88 acres of land situated in village Manka Manki, Tehsil and District Ambala including 1 kanal 10 marlas land belonging to respondent-Joginder Kumari for a public purpose, namely, construction of Ambala-Jagadhari Road upto Azizpur. Land Acquisition Collector, Ambala, P.W.D., B&R Branch (hereinafter described as the Collector) determined the compensation payable to the land owners at the following rates:- 1. Rs. 9,920/- per acre for Chahi land. 2. Rs. 8,800/- per acre for Barani land. 3. Rs. 4,000/- per acre for Gairmumkin Garah Khal. 4. Rs. 2,160/- per acre for Gairmumkin Johar, Naddani. 3. Feeling dissatisfied with the award of the Collector, the respondent submitted an application under Section 18 of the Act for making a reference to the District Court by asserting that the market value of the acquired land is more than Rs. 15,000/- per acre. On receipt of the reference, Additional District Judge, Ambala issued notice to the parties. The respondent filed statement of claim to which a reply was filed on behalf of the appellant. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :- "1. Whether the claimant is entitled to enhanced compensation over and above the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector to her, if so, how much ? 2. Relief." 4. After affording opportunity to the parties to adduce oral as well as documentary evidence and hearing their counsel, Additional District Judge, Ambala vide his award dated 28.8.1980 enhanced the compensation payable to the respondent from Rs. 9,920/- per acre to Rs. 12,000/- per acre. She was also held entitled to costs of the reference and solatium at the rate of 15% and interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced compensation. 5. 9,920/- per acre to Rs. 12,000/- per acre. She was also held entitled to costs of the reference and solatium at the rate of 15% and interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced compensation. 5. The State of Haryana challenged the award passed by Additional District Judge, Ambala in Regular First Appeal No. 2459 of 1980. While dismissing the appeal, the learned Single Judge suo motu held that the respondent is entitled to the statutory benefits in terms of amended Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act. 6. Shri Jaswant Singh, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana argued that the direction given by the learned Single Judge for grant of benefits to the respondent in terms of the amended provisions of Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act is per se illegal and is liable to be set aside because reference made under Section 18 of the Act had been decided before the specified date i.e. 30.4.1982. He further argued that even if the respondent was entitled to the benefits of the amended provisions, the learned Single Judge could not have given the impugned direction because she had not challenged the award passed by Additional District Judge, Ambala. 7. No one has appeared on behalf of the respondent. 8. We have thoughtfully considered the arguments of the learned Senior Deputy Advocate General. The amended provisions of Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 28 and 30(2) of the Act have been subject matter of several decisions. The conflicting views expressed by different Benches of the Supreme Court on the ambit and scope of these provisions have been finally resolved by the judgments of the Constitution Benches in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc., AIR 1989 SC 1933; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1995 SC 1012. 9. In Raghubir Singhs case (supra), the Constitution Bench considered the conflicting judgments on the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Act and held that the benefit of that section is not available to the landowners where the reference made under Section 18 of the Act had been decided before 30.4.1982. Paragraphs 32 and 33 of that judgment, which contain discussion on the subject, read as under :- "32. Paragraphs 32 and 33 of that judgment, which contain discussion on the subject, read as under :- "32. The question is : what is the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award ?" Are they limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30 April, 1982. We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against "any such award." The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words "any such award" mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30 April, 1982. To our mind, the words any such award cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of fora (forum ?) contemplated in the parent Act these appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words any such award are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. The words any such award are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words, Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (dead) by Lrs. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1985 SC 576 (supra), and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 1576 (supra). It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word such in the collocation any such award in Section 30(2). Due significance must be attached to that word and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. 33. We find substance in the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, as he says, the terms in which Section 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of Section 30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium. The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory enhancement. It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1), and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium. Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis inter alia, of the market value of the land on that date and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value." 10. In K.S. Paripooranans case (supra), another Constitution of Bench of the Supreme Court, by a majority judgment, resolved the controversy relating to the applicability of Section 23(1-A) of the Act to the awards made before the appointed date i.e. 30.4.1982 and held as under ;- "The provisions of Section 23(1-A) have to be construed in the light of the aforementioned principles. If thus construed, it would be evident that under Section 23(1-A) an obligation to pay an additional amount by way of compensation has been imposed. Such an obligation did not exist prior to the enhancement of the said provision by the amending Act. If the said provision is applied to the acquisition proceedings which commenced prior to its enactment and an additional obligation in the matter of payment of compensation is imposed for such acquisition the effect would be that the said provision would be operating retrospectively in respect of transactions already past. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed in Zora Singh, 1992(1) SCC 673 (supra) that Section 23(1-A) would only operate prospectively and will not have retrospective operation if it is construed as applying to proceedings which were pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and in which the Reference Court makes the award after the commencement of the Amending Act. The next question which needs to be considered is whether any indication has been given by Parliament that Section 23(1-A) will have retrospective operation so as to be applicable to acquisition proceedings which were commenced prior to the date of the enactment of the said provision. The learned counsel for the claimants have urged that such an indication has been given by the words "in every case" used in Section 23(1-A). We are, however, of the view that Parliament has given a clear indication of its intention in this regard in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act. Since express provision is contained in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act indicating the intention of Parliament as to the extent to which the provision of Section 23(1-A) would apply to pending proceedings there is no scope for speculating about the said intention of Parliament by reading Section 23(1-A) in isolation without reference to Section 30(1) of the Amending Act." 11. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal and others, JT 2000 (Suppl. I) SC 251, the Supreme Court held that interest in terms of the amended provisions cannot be given to the landowner in a case where the award had been passed by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Reference Court before 30.4.1982. 12. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal and others, JT 2000 (Suppl. I) SC 251, the Supreme Court held that interest in terms of the amended provisions cannot be given to the landowner in a case where the award had been passed by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Reference Court before 30.4.1982. 12. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, it must be held that the learned Single Judge gravely erred in extending the benefit of amended Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act to the respondent ignoring the fact that the reference sought by her under Section 18 of the Act had been decided before 30.4.1982. 13. We are further of the view that the learned Single Judge committed a jurisdictional error by granting the benefits of the amended provisions of the Act to the respondent ignoring the fact that she had not appealed against award dated 28.8.1980 passed by Additional District Judge, Ambala. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside to the extent of the direction given for payment of benefits of the amended provisions of Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act to the respondent. Costs made easy. Appeal allowed.