JUDGMENT A.K. Shrivastava, J. 1. These two appeals were preferred by plaintiff Mst. Shyam who died during the pendency of the second appeals and present appellants, who are her legal representatives, have been brought on record. Undisputedly the deceased plaintiff/appellant Mst. Shyam Bai was widow of Chhota Chhamar and after the death of Chhota she re-married with present appellant No. 1 Punna Chamar s/o Nandu Chamar and other appellants are her son and daughter born from her second husband Punna Chamar. 2. Deceased plaintiff Shyambai filed civil suit for declaration and injunction in respect to certain agricultural land which is the subject matter of the suit. According to plaint averments, plaintiffs late husband Chhota Chamar was Bhumiswami of the suit property and it was his self acquired property. According to her, the suit land was allotted by the Government to her husband Chhota 40 years prior to the date of filing of the suit (suit was filed on 23-12-1983). Chhota had died 20 years prior to filing of suit i.e. in the year 1963 and since she is the class-I heir of deceased Chhota Chamar, Bhumiswami rights are devolved in her. The plaintiff in alternative also pleaded, acquiring of Bhumiswami right by adverse possession. According to her, defendant No. 2 namely Kanchhedi is not the brother of Chhota nor he is the son of Mangaliya Chamar and he without any authority, after the death of her husband Chhota Chamar, got his name mutated along with her in revenue record, which came into the knowledge of plaintiff in the month of November, 1983. It has also been pleaded that the defendant No. 2 Kanchhedi never possessed the land in question and at present also he is not possessing the same. 3. The plaintiff further pleaded that defendant No. 1 Baldua in collusion with defendant No. 2 Kanchhedi started saying that survey No. 962, 963 and 964 which are the part of suit land is of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 Kanchhedi also started saying that he is the Bhumiswami of rest other survey numbers of suit land. Defendants No. 1 and 2 are giving threat to dispossess her. They also filed application before the Tehsildar and the decision rendered by Tehsildar dated 2-11-1983 is contrary to law and is not binding on her. 4. Defendants No. 1 and 2 are giving threat to dispossess her. They also filed application before the Tehsildar and the decision rendered by Tehsildar dated 2-11-1983 is contrary to law and is not binding on her. 4. On the basis of these premised pleadings, it has been prayed that by decreeing the suit it be declared that plaintiff is Bhumiswami of land in question having possession over it and defendants be restrained from interfering in her possession. 5. The defendants filed joint written statement and denied that the suit property was self acquired property of Chhota. This fact has also been denied that the suit land was allotted to him by the Government. According to defendants, the suit property was ancestral property of Mangaliya whose sons are defendant No. 2, Chhota and Baba. After the death of Mangaliya, the suit property was mutated first in the name of Baba then Chhota as "Karta Khandan". 6. Before the death of Chhota Chamar who was the husband of plaintiff, he (Chhota Chamar) fell ill and suffered the disease of T.B. and his medical treatment expenses were borne by Baldua and in lieu of the expenses which he (Baldua) incurred, Gumania, who was the mother or Chhota, with the consent of Chhota delivered possession of survey No. 962, 963 and 964 to defendant No. 1 Baldua and since then he is possessing those lands. 7. The defendant admitted that Chhota died 20 years prior to filing of the suit. It has been further pleaded that after the death of Chhota, defendant No. 2 Kanchhedi being his heir became Bhumiswami of land in question. This fact has been denied by the defendants that plaintiff had perfected her title by adverse possession. The defendants further pleaded that after the death of Chhota, plaintiff got re-married with one Punna Chamar and had divested her right. On the basis of these pleadings it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 8. The trial Court, after framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties, partly decreed the suit and declared that plaintiff is the Bhumiswami of Vi portion of the suit land and directed defendants not to interfere in V2 portion of the plaintiff. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of trial Court both the parties preferred two separate appeals. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of trial Court both the parties preferred two separate appeals. The defendants filed civil Appeal No. 16-A/88 against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff and plaintiff filed civil appeal No. 29-A/89 against that part of the decree by which her suit was partly dismissed. The first appellate Court decided both the appeals by a common judgment and allowed the appeal filed by the defendants and dismissed the appeal of plaintiff. Hence these two appeals are preferred by plaintiff Shyam Bai. 10. During the pendency of these two second appeals Shyam Bai died and her second husband as well as her son and daughter born from her second husband were brought on record as her legal representatives. 11. this Court on 2-12-1991 admitted these second appeals on the following substantial question of law : Whether the appellant can be held to be entitled to any part of the land of her late husband Chhota, in view of facts and circumstances of the case ? It is no more in dispute that after the death of Chhota Chamar deceased appellant Shyam Bai had re-married with one Punna Chamar. Indeed when the suit was filed by her, she already got re-married with said Punna Chamar. 12. The First appellate Court after appreciating the evidence came to hold and recorded a finding of fact that the suit land was not self acquired property of Chhota Chamar but it was ancestral property. It was further held that Chhota, Kanchhedi and Baba were real brothers and were sons of Mangaliya. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Chhota died issueless. The first appellate Court further recorded a finding that since the suit property was ancestral property of Mangaliya and after the death of Mangaliya, the ancestral property devolved in Chhota, Baba and Kanchhedi, who were the sons of Mangaliya as such they became joint owner of the suit property. The property was never partitioned. Since the property was never partitioned, therefore, the plaintiff though was entitled for equal share if the property would have been partitioned, but, since the property was not partitioned and plaintiff being widow of Chhota could not have filed a suit for partition as such disputed property continued to remain joint Hindu family property. 13. The property was never partitioned. Since the property was never partitioned, therefore, the plaintiff though was entitled for equal share if the property would have been partitioned, but, since the property was not partitioned and plaintiff being widow of Chhota could not have filed a suit for partition as such disputed property continued to remain joint Hindu family property. 13. According to me, under Mitakshra School of Hindu Law, a wife cannot herself demand for partition, but, if a partition does takes place between her husband and other co-parcener or his sons she is entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold to enjoy that share separately even from her husband. It is also well settled in law that where a partition has been effected and the wife was not allotted any share, she is entitled to re-open the partition. Similarly, under the Mitakshra School of Hindu Law a widow cannot compel a partition so long as the sons and other co-parcener remain united. However, if a partition takes place she is entitled to a share equal to that of a son in the co-parcenary property. She is also entitled to a similar share on partition between the sons and her husband. In the present case, since no partition was effected between Mangaliya (father) Chhota, Baba and Kanchhedi (sons) during the lifetime of Mangdiiya and the partition never took place even after the death of Mangaliya, therefore at the time of filing of suit, the family was joint Hindu family and the proper was also joint Hindu property. Thus, though plaintiff Shyam Bai was having equal share, but, she could not under the law, compel or ask for the partition. Indeed she did not file suit for partition. 14. In the present case, when the suit was filed by plaintiff she was not having any right in the suit property because after the death of Chhota she remarried with Punna Chamar and this is an admitted fact. If she would not have re-married after the death of her husband Chhota, she could have claim a declaration of her equal share in the suit property but since she had re-married after the death of her husband, she had totally divested her right from the estate. 15. If she would not have re-married after the death of her husband Chhota, she could have claim a declaration of her equal share in the suit property but since she had re-married after the death of her husband, she had totally divested her right from the estate. 15. It be seen that Chhota died somewhere in between 1967-72, since it has come in the evidence of plaintiff Shyam Bai that Chhota died 15-20 years ago. The plaintiff was examined on 27-7-1987. Thus, plaintiff-Shyambai became widow after the commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and after the death of Chhota she got re-married after 5-6 years of his death, which would mean that this lady re-married somewhere in between 1972-75. 16. The crucial question is whether the property inherited by a Hindu widow like plaintiff-Shyam Bai is divested on account of her subsequent remarriage. 17. The complete answer has been given by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhondu vs. Ramdayal, 1959 MPU (F.B.) 1173 = 1960 JU 36 in which the Full Bench of this Court by overruling two earlier decisions held that a Hindu widow is, upon her remarriage, divested of her husband's property which she has already obtained by inheritance. In the said case it was held by the Full Bench of this Court in para-4 interpreting section 2 of Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856 that all rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors shall upon her re-marriage cease and determine if she had then died. According to the Full Bench section 2 is restricted in operation to the property of a Hindu which his widow has already inherited either directly from her husband or through his lineal descendants before her remarriage. Thus, the remarriage of a widow though legalise by Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856, divests the estate inherent by her from her deceased husband. By her second marriage she forfeits the interest taken by her in her husband's estate and on account of her marriage her right passes to the next heir of her husband in the same manner as she was dead. Though the case of Bhondu (supra) pertains to the son's property inherited by widow mother, who latter on remarried, but it would not make any difference. 18. Though the case of Bhondu (supra) pertains to the son's property inherited by widow mother, who latter on remarried, but it would not make any difference. 18. All the schools of Hindu Law are unanimous in holding that the widow's life interest in husband's estate is founded on the theory, which is basic in Hindu thought, that she continues her husband's personality even after his death. This right to the husband's property is itself one of the many corollaries following from the theory, and it exactly similar to the right (in Bombay) to inherit as Gotraj Sapinda and the right to adopt a son to her husband, where customs or statutes (Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856) does allow the widow to re-marriage, it only recognizes her right as an independent personality. It is for her to choose between exercising this right, and thereby severing the notional continuity of her husband's personality, or to remain unmarried, and retain the latter. But cannot do both. In this regard I may profitably rely the decision of this Court in the case of Shree Krishna vs. Arjun, 1958 MPU 723 : 1958 MPU 723 : 1959 JU 73. Similar view was taken by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mst. Manabai vs. Mst. Chandanbai, 1954 NLJ 608 : AIR 1954 Nag 284 which was later on followed and relied by this Court in the case of Birmani vs. Bhojraj, 1986 MPU 551. 19. I may also take into consideration that the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856 has been repealed by the Hindu Widows' Remarriage (Repeal) Act, 1983 but the repealing Act would not affect the merit of this case for the simple reason that plaintiff-Shyambai got remarried in between 1972-74 and, therefore, the provisions of section 2 of the Act of 1856 was applicable to her and the moment she got remarried, she divested herself from the estate of her husband's property and, thus, her right passes to the next heir of her husband as she was dead. 20. 20. On the basis of aforesaid reasonings, though plaintiff Shyam Bai was having right in the suit property which is of joint Hindu family property, being widow of co-parcener Chhota, but, since she had re-married after the death of her husband Chhota, she divested her right from the suit property and, therefore, she is not entitled to any part of the land of her late husband Chhota. The substantial question of law framed by this Court while admitting the appeal is answered accordingly. According to me, the first appellate Court did not commit any error in passing the impugned judgment, dismissing the suit of plaintiff. 21. Ex-consequenti, these appeals are found to be devoid of any substance and the same are hereby dismissed. No costs, since none has appeared on behalf of the respondents.