ORDER 1. LEAVE GRANTED. 2. THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT. ONE OF THE CLAUSES OF THE CONTRACT READS AS UNDER: "EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT AND SUBJECT TO THE POWERS DELEGATED TO HIM BY UNIVERSITY UNDER THE CODE RULES THEN IN FORCE THE DECISION OF THE ESTATE OFFICER FOR THE TIME BEING SHALL BE FINAL, CONCLUSIVE AND BINDING ON ALL PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT UPON ALL QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MEANING OF THE SPECIFICATIONS, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED AND AS THE QUALITY OF WORKMANSHIP; OR MATERIALS USED ON THE WORK, OR AS TO ANY OTHER QUESTION, CLAIM, RIGHT, MATTER, OR THING WHATSOEVER, IF ANY WAY ARISING OUT OF, OR RELATING TO THE CONTRACT, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS, SPECIFICATIONS, ESTIMATES INSTRUCTIONS ORDERS, OR THOSE CONDITIONS, OR FAILURE TO EXECUTE THE SAME WHETHER ARISING DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK, OR AFTER THE COMPLETION OR ABANDONMENT THEREOF." 3. IT APPEARS THAT DISPUTES AROSE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE RESPONDENT MOVED AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT, 1940 (FOR SHORT "THE ACT") SEEKING APPOINTMENT OF AN ARBITRATOR. THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT. IN APPEAL PREFERRED BY THE APPELLANT, THE HIGH COURT HAS CONFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT. FEELING AGGRIEVED THEREBY, THE APPELLANT HAS PREFERRED THIS APPEAL BY SPECIAL LEAVE. 4. THE SOLE CONTENTION RAISED BY THE LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT IS THAT CLAUSE 30 QUOTED HEREINABOVE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO AN "ARBITRATION AGREEMENT" WITHIN THE MEANING OF CLAUSE (A) OF SECTION 2 OF THE ACT AND, THEREFORE, NEITHER THE RESPONDENT COULD HAVE FILED AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ACT NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRE THE JURISDICTION TO MAKE AN ORDER THEREUNDER. 5. THE LAW STANDS SETTLED BY THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN SHARAT SHUSHAN BANSAL V. U.P. SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPN. LTD.1 WHEREIN AN IDENTICAL CLAUSE CAME UP FOR CONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT. PLACING RELIANCE ON EARLIER TWO DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, IT WAS HELD THAT SUCH A CLAUSE DID NOT AMOUNT TO AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION. THE INTENTION OF SUCH A CLAUSE WAS TO VEST THE ESTATE OFFICER WITH SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE WORK. THE ESTATE OFFICER DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS UNDER SUCH A CLAUSE IS ACTING ADMINISTRATIVELY AND NOT JUDICIALLY. 6. THE INTENTION OF SUCH A CLAUSE WAS TO VEST THE ESTATE OFFICER WITH SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE WORK. THE ESTATE OFFICER DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS UNDER SUCH A CLAUSE IS ACTING ADMINISTRATIVELY AND NOT JUDICIALLY. 6. INASMUCH AS THE CLAUSE DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY ARBITRATION, THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ACT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT WAS MISCONCEIVED. 7. THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED. THE IMPUGNED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HIGH COURT ARE SET ASIDE. THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ACT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT IS DIRECTED TO BE DISMISSED. 8. THE RESPONDENT IS AT LIBERTY TO PURSUE SUCH OTHER REMEDY AS MAY BE AVAILABLE TO HIM UNDER THE LAW STAKING HIS CLAIM. 9. NO ORDER AS TO COSTS.