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2004 DIGILAW 989 (PNJ)

State Of Haryana v. Ram Kumar

2004-09-02

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, VINEY MITTAL

body2004
Judgment J.S.Khehar, J. 1. Respondent No. 1 was inducted into the service of Haryana Roadways, Rohtak as a conductor in 1969. Consequent upon, the issuance of a charge-sheet dated 30.1,1992, the services of the respondent-workman were terminated by an order dated 9.7.1992. Dis-satisfied with the order of has termination, the respondent-workman issued a demand notice under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 21.1.1999. On the failure of conciliation proceedings, the dispute raised by the respondent-workman was referred for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Panipat (hereinafter referred to as the Labour Court). The reference Court answered the reference in favour of the respondent-workman by holding that the services of the respondent-workman had been terminated without holding a regular domestic enquiry. The aforesaid conclusion drawn by the Labour Court is not subject matter of challenge before us. 2. The only contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner, while impugning the award of the Labour Court dated 13.5.2002 is that, no industrial dispute existed between the petitioner-management and the respondent-workman at the time the dispute raised by the respondent-workman was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. In this behalf, reliance has been placed on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in The Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 839. The solitary contention in order to support the aforesaid claim of the petitioner-management is that while services of the respondent-workman were terminated on 9.7.1992, he had issued a demand notice under Section 2-A of the Act only on 21.1.1999 i.e. about seven years after his services have been terminated. It is the vehement contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner-management, that no industrial dispute can be deemed to have been subsisting at the lime when the dispute was raised by the respondent-workman. 3. In order to repudiate the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is submitted by learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, that the respondent-workman had filed a statutory appeal challenging the order of his termination dated 9.7.1992 on 17.10.1992 and that the aforesaid appeal was disposed of on 20.10.1997, therefore, without any delay the respondent-workman had served a demand notice under Section 2-A of the Act on 21.1.1999. Learned Counsel for the respondent-workman has also invited our attention to the observations rendered by the Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1351 as follows : "It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages." 4. In view of the factual position noticed hereinabove, it is not possible for us to accept that the dispute raised at the hands of the respondent-workman had been raised belatedly. We arc satisfied that the respondent-workman challenged the action of the petitioner-management in terminating his services soon after the statutory appeal filed by the respondent-workman was disposed of. Additionally, in view of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Ajaib Singhs case (supra) it is clear that in case of delay in initiating proceedings under the Act, the Labour Court is to mould the relief by keeping in mind the delay at the hands of the workman in raising the dispute. So far as the present controversy is concerned, it is apparent, that by the award dated 13.5.2002, the Labour Court has held the respondent-workman entitled to back-wages only with effect from the date he had issued the demand notice i.e. only with effect from 21.1.1999. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the Labour Court moulded the relief granted to the respondent-workman in the manner expressed by the Apex Court in Ajaib Singhs case (supra). 5. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the Labour Court moulded the relief granted to the respondent-workman in the manner expressed by the Apex Court in Ajaib Singhs case (supra). 5. In view of the above, we find no infirmity in the impugned award of the Labour Court.