JUDGMENT By the Court.- This is defendants second appeal arising from regular civil suit No. 39 of 1974. 2. The parties hereto shall be referred to in the names as they appear in cause title of the suit. 3. The plaintiff filed the said civil suit against the defendants, inter alia, praying for a declaration that the suit 'Pedda' belongs exclusively to the Devalaya of God Betal of Fatorpa and for declaration that the defendants had no right or interest to interfere in any manner with the management, administration and/or regulation of the suit Pedda. 4, The suit came to be decreed by judgment dated 6th August, 1986 by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division at Margao, who held that the suit Pedda belonged exclusively to the Devalaya of God Betal of Fatorpa and who had exclusive right, title and interest to regulate, manage and administer the affairs of the suit Pedda. Consequently, the learned Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division at Margao, held that the defendants had no right to interfere in the management and the administration of the suit Pedda and consequently directed the defendants to remove three articles namely 'fund petti’, one metallic stand and one tin from the suit Pedda which was kept by the defendants. 5. The defendants preferred an appeal being regular civil appeal No.63 of 1986, However, the appeal came to be dismissed on 17th September, 1998, by the learned Additional District Judge (II), South Goa, Margao. 6. This appeal was admitted on a substantial question of law, which according to the plaintiff does not arise at all. The said question reads as follows :- "Whether a simple entry in the books of assets of the Devasthan made by its Managing Committee constitutes a document or title and a declaration can be granted by the Court based on such entry. 7. Before adverting to the rival claims, it is necessary to make a brief reference to the provisions of law which is commonly known as Devasthan Regulation (Act of Legislature No. 645 dated 30.3.33). 8. The plaintiff is a Devasthan governed under the said Regulation and its bye-laws (Comprisso) was approved on 10th January, 1934 and was published in Gazette dated 16th March, 1934. 8. The plaintiff is a Devasthan governed under the said Regulation and its bye-laws (Comprisso) was approved on 10th January, 1934 and was published in Gazette dated 16th March, 1934. Prior to the approval of the said bye-laws, the plaintiff had an inventory made of their assets in the year 1924, a copy of which was produced by the plaintiff. 9. Article 12 of the said Regulation provides that the rural and urban properties belonging to the mazanias which were not registered in the Office of the Land Registrar of the respective Judicial District should be registered within the time limit of one year from the promulgation of the said Regulation in the Official Gazette. 10. Admittedly, the plaintiff had not registered their properties as required by the said Article 12. 11. The case of the plaintiff was that the affairs of Devalaya were being administered and managed in accordance with the said Regulation and that the Devalaya of God Betal had a history running over centuries. The plaintiff had further stated that he owned several properties in and outside the village of Fatorpa which had been administered and managed by the Administrative Committee of the said Devalaya and one such property was the suit Pedda situated in the bazaar locality at Assolna which formed part and parcel of the main Devalaya of God Betal and that it is the Administrative Committee of the said Devalaya that regulated the matters of the said Pedda. The plaintiff had stated that the Deity of God Betal which was found installed at Fatorpa was found located at Assolna bazaar along with other deities also installed at Fetorpa with the compound of which the suit Pedda exists and that the suit Pedda was found duly recorded in their Book of Inventory which also shows all the holdings of Devalaya of Betal. 12. 12. The plaintiff had stated that in keeping with the traditions, the idol of God Betal was being brought in a Palaquin from Fatorpa to the suit Pedda on the occasion of Shigmo festival and all the religious ceremonies were performed thereon and that the suit Pedda was the only religious centre in the village of Assolna and none but only the 'Saraswat' community of Assolna enjoyed the privilege of being Mahajans of the said God Betal and being so, it is only the Administrative Community who had the exclusive right .of regulating, managing and administering all the affairs concerning the said Devalaya of God Betal and all its holdings situated at Assolna bazaar. 13. The plaintiff had also stated that the suit Pedda was a place where the devotees and Mahajans made offering of coconuts, oil, flowers, etc., which were used in the suit Pedda and all the excess of such offering together with coconuts and oil so collected were being taken to the main Devalaya of Fatorpa by the Mahajan family of Navelkar on whom it was obligatory. 14. The plaintiff stated that the defendants are not the Mahajans of the said God and they have no right to interfere in any manner with the matters connected with the regulation, management and the administration of the said Devalaya and/or any of its holdings or the belongings including the suit Pedda and also did not have any right to meddle in any manner with the offering made to the suit Pedda by its devotees or Mahajans though none of the defendants are forbidden to worship and offer their prayers at the suit Pedda. 15. On the other hand, it was the case of the defendants that the suit Pedda of God Betal including the property was Government property. The defendants denied that the suit Pedda located in the bazaar at Assolna was owned and formed part and parcel of the main Devalaya of God Betal or that the Administrative Committee of the said Devalaya regulated the matters connected with the suit Pedda. The defendants denied that the suit Pedda located in the bazaar at Assolna was owned and formed part and parcel of the main Devalaya of God Betal or that the Administrative Committee of the said Devalaya regulated the matters connected with the suit Pedda. The defendants stated that God Betal was being brought from Fatorpa to the Pedda situated at Orel near the ancestor's house of Shri Venktesh Pai Kane and the house of Shri Ram Budhalkar, and all the religious ceremonies were being performed there but very recently with the permission of the defendants' Association Committee, plaintiffs Mahajans started performing their "Shigmo" near the suit Pedda at a distance of about 15 metres, keeping God Betal at such distance. The defendants stated that the entire management and administration of all the affairs are being exclusively done by the defendants' Association Committee. The defendants stated that the devotees offer few offerings such as coconuts and fruits like bananas, which are distributed among people and oil is always used for the purpose of keeping burning the flame in the suit Pedda so also the agarbathis, and, a tin full of 18 litres of oil once or twice in a year was voluntarily offered by the defendants' Association to the God Betal at Fatorpa, through one Keshav Narayan Navelkar but the said Navelkar never collected any offerings as of right and if he has done at all, he did the same without the knowledge of the defendants' Association. The defendants stated that the coins were found unaccounted as they were taken away by passers by and for this purpose the defendants thought of fixing a coin box therein and for the purpose of collection of oil, a tin was placed, with a metallic stand. 16. The defendants, having against them, two concurrent findings of facts, this second appeal was admitted, as already stated on a substantial question of law which has already been reproduced hereinabove. 17. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr. Usgaonkar, learned senior counsel has submitted, and in my view rightly, that the said question is not a substantial question of law as it did not find a place either in the pleadings of the defendants nor in the issues framed or for that matter the findings of both the Courts below. 17. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr. Usgaonkar, learned senior counsel has submitted, and in my view rightly, that the said question is not a substantial question of law as it did not find a place either in the pleadings of the defendants nor in the issues framed or for that matter the findings of both the Courts below. The Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 has discussed the matter as to what is a substantial question of law in detail and has observed that 'a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter (Emphasis supplied). It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not. In the case at hand, the question as framed and admitted for the purpose of deciding this second appeal cannot be a substantial question of law. I say so because the findings given by both the Courts below are not based only on that entry in the Book of Inventory of the Devasthan but the said findings have also been rendered with the aid of other documents as well as oral evidence led in the case. On this count alone, the second appeal deserved to be dismissed. 18. However, the controversy is not allowed by the defendants to end there. On this count alone, the second appeal deserved to be dismissed. 18. However, the controversy is not allowed by the defendants to end there. The defendants have filed an application and have submitted before this Court that they had raised other substantial questions of law which may also be decided since it is in the province of this Court to decide the same for a just decision of the case. 19. In this context. Mr. M.B. D'Costa, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Bapu Khanu Dhangar and others v. Gundu Santu Dhangar and others, 2001 (3) Mh LJ 521, wherein this Court has held that by virtue of the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and even otherwise also it is clear that this Court has power to hear the appeal on substantial questions of law not formulated by it. if it is satisfied that the case involves such a question, after framing such questions. 20. On the other hand. Mr. Usgaonkar, learned senior counsel has submitted that the remaining questions are not substantial questions of law as they concern to matters of appreciation of evidence, being matters of inferences to be drawn relating to some facts of the ease. Mr. Usgaonkar, in this context has placed reliance on the case of Shakir Hussain v. Administrator, Nagar Palika, Mandsaur, AIR 1999 SC 2872 . In my opinion, question Nos. (ii), (iv) and (v) are not at all substantial questions of law to be decided in this second appeal as they pertain to matters of evidence which could have been led or inferences which could have been drawn from the facts. As far as question (vi) both the Courts below have given a finding that the disputed Pedda or the suit Pedda is the one which is situated in the bazaar area of Assolna. 21. I, therefore, proceed to consider question Nos. (iii) and (vii) which read as follows : "(iii) Whether a declaration of ownership can be granted without any document of title or claim and proof of acquisition of title by adverse possession. (vii) Whether in the absence of declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff, the remaining prayers cannot be granted." 22. (iii) and (vii) which read as follows : "(iii) Whether a declaration of ownership can be granted without any document of title or claim and proof of acquisition of title by adverse possession. (vii) Whether in the absence of declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff, the remaining prayers cannot be granted." 22. In support of the proposition that no declaration could have been granted in favour of the plaintiffs, the defendants have placed reliance on the case of Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Pur;" AIR 1965 SC 1506 , the case of Ami Mega Visvasveshraswami v. R.V. Venkatrama, 1997 (1) CLJ 639 and the case of MTW Tenzing etc. v. Motilal Lakhotia, etc., 2003 5 SCC 1 . Without going through all the details of the said cases. it must be noted that in the case of Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Puri (supra) a party had laid his claim to the office of a Mohunt on the strength of an usage and it is in this context that the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail. In the case of Arul Mego Visvasveshraswaini v. R.V. Venkatrama (supra) the suit was filed claiming that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property and the second defendant was a tenant in possession. The first defendant had filed a written statement wherein it was contended that the plaintiff was a trustee of the temple and before him his father was the trustee of the temple and the suit property belonged to the temple. In that context, the Madras High Court observed that in order to get a decree for declaration the plaintiff has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant has no title to the suit property. In the case of MTW Tenzing. etc. In the case of MTW Tenzing. etc. (supra) the suit was filed for recovery of possession of land on the basis of title and not on the basis of previous possession and it is in this situation that the Supreme Court observed that the trial Court was bound to inquire into the question of title and could not decree the suit merely on the basis of entries in the revenue records. 24. In my view, the context in which the said observations were made in each of the cases are certainly not relevant to the case at hand. 25. On the other hand. Mr. Usgaonkar has submitted that the plaintiff irrespective of the claim of title, had also claimed possession of the suit Pedda which they expressed by stating that they were regulating, managing and administering the same and the defendants themselves having not claimed to be the owners of the suit Pedda, the plaintiff was entitled for an injunction against the defendants since such an injunction could be granted in their favour against everyone else except the true owners of the property. In fact, Mr. Usgaonkar has submitted that it is the plaintiff who has been in continuous possession of the suit Pedda for a number of years and it was not necessary for them to seek for a declaration as such in the suit filed by them. Mr. Usgaonkar has placed reliance on a number of decided cases. 26. The first is an unreported decision of this Court dated 6th April, 2004. in first appeal No. 89 of 1996 in the case of Shri Gopal Balcrishna Fallary and another v. State of Goa and others, wherein the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Corporation (If the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah and another, AIR 1989 SC 1809 was referred to in support of the proposition that the suit could not be dismissed on the ground that the relief of declaration of title and possession was not specifically mentioned in the plaint. Reference was also made in that case to the case of Uchhab Gouda v. Ganesh Panda, AIR 1963 Orissa 71, wherein it was observed that it is not in the least necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for possession to claim a declaration. It was further observed that indeed declarations in the true sense are rarely required. Reference was also made in that case to the case of Uchhab Gouda v. Ganesh Panda, AIR 1963 Orissa 71, wherein it was observed that it is not in the least necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for possession to claim a declaration. It was further observed that indeed declarations in the true sense are rarely required. The plaintiff should only allege the facts necessary to establish his title and that the defendant is wrongfully in possession. If, he goes on to claim, in the manner so beloved of pleaders a declaration of title in addition to an order for possession, the Court may and should treat the case as a claim for possession, pure and simple and ignore entirely the claim for a declaration to title. 27. The second is the case of Fakirbhai Bhagwandas and another v. Maganlal Haribhai and another, AIR (38) 1951 Bombay 380. In the case, a Division Bench of this Court relying upon a decision of the Privy Council in Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous, held that lawful possession of land was sufficient evidence of right as owner, as against a person who had no title whatever and who was a mere trespasser. The former could obtain a declaratory decree and an injunction restraining the wrong-doer. The Division Bench took note of the ratio of the judgment of Their Lordships of the Privy Council, which is as follows : "It appears to their Lordships that there is a misapprehension of the nature of the plaintiffs case upon the facts stated in the judgment. The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By Section 9, Specific Relief Act (I [1] of 1877), if the plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, he could, by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession. have recovered possession, notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrong-doer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrong-doer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession. The appellate Court in accordance with the judgment above quoted, has dismissed the suit. Consequently, the defendant may continue to wilfully, improperly, and illegally interfere with the plaintiffs possession, as the learned Judges say he has done and the plaintiff has no remedy. Their Lordships are of opinion that the suit should not have been dismissed and that the plaintiff was entitled in it to a declaration of his title to the land. It was not necessary for him to negative that the land was dedicated to religious and charitable purposes, a question upon which the Original and appellate Court have differed, and which as the only defendant was not entitled to maintain the Wakfnama and other persons would not be bound by an adverse decision, their Lordships do not decide." 28. The Division Bench further proceeded to observe that the decision of Their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down that it was not necessary for a person claiming injunction to prove his title to the suit land. It would suffice. if he proves that he was in lawful possession of the same and his possession was invaded or threatened to be invaded by a person who had no title whatever. 29. The above decision of the Division Bench of this Court found favour with the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa, (2004) 1 SCC 769 . In this case, the Supreme Court (a Bench of 3 Judges) observed that "it is thus clear that so far as the Indian Law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land' may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land' may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also be restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession in itself evidence of title. (Emphasis supplied). 30. The Supreme Court referring to the case of Fakirbhai Bhagwandas and another v. Maganlal Haribhai And another (supra) stated that they respectfully agreed with a view. taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the said case. 31. In the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singryi Deo of Maihar and others etc., AIR 1975 SC 1810 , the Supreme Court observed that Section 42 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42. The Supreme Court further observed that the circumstances in which a declaratory decree under Section 42 should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon the facts of each case. No doubt a complete stranger whose interest is not affected by another's legal character or who has no interest in another's property could not get a declaration under Section 42 Specific Relief Act, 1877 with reference to the legal character or the property involved. 32. It has been contended on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff never claimed possession of the suit Pedda and their right was one of management which is a right of, a custodian. This contention cannot be accepted. 32. It has been contended on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff never claimed possession of the suit Pedda and their right was one of management which is a right of, a custodian. This contention cannot be accepted. As already stated when the plaintiff claimed the right of regulating. managing and administering the suit Pedda as one of the properties all that they meant to convey was that they being the owners in possession of the suit Pedda they had right to regulate and administer the affairs of the same. 33. Here was a case where the suit Pedda was claimed to be the seat of God Betal whose seat had to be shifted because of religious persecutions of those times from the bazaar area of Assolna to Fatorpa though later on it remained as a visiting seat of God Betal on occasions of Shigmo festivals. The suit Pedda was shown as a property belonging to the plaintiff way back in the year 1924 when they had prepared a list of the assets belonging to them and it was their claim that they had always been in possession of the suit Pedda. The defendants did not at all claim any title to the suit Pedda and their Association itself came to be formed in the year 1973 or thereabout. Not only the suit Pedda was shown as the property of the plaintiff almost half a century back but the plaintiff had shown that they were in possession and management of the same. The defendants themselves did not claim any title to the same. Being so, the plaintiff was certainly entitled to the reliefs of the declaration as well as injunction as rightly granted to them by both the Courts below. 34. Consequently, from whatever angle one looks at the present appeal, the same is bound to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.