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2004 DIGILAW 998 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra v. Namdeo s/o. Dago Golhar

2004-08-08

B.R.GAVAI, P.S.BRAHME

body2004
P. S. BRAHME, J. :- Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the records. Since the respondent no.1 died during pendency of this appeal, the appeal stood abated. So far as respondent no.5 is concerned, he is reported to be dead during pendency of the trial. 2. This Criminal appeal by the State is against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur in the Session Case No.36 of 1987 passed on 5-3-1991 acquitting the accused persons-respondents of the offences punishable u/Ss.147, 302 and 452 r/w. Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The respondents were tried before the learned Sessions Judge for having committed murder of one Shantabai w/o. Pandurang Golhar, in furtherance of common object of unlawful assembly of which the respondents were members and also for having committed criminal trespass in her house with the intention to commit the offence arising out of the incident that took place on 13-1-1986, at about 4.00 P.M. to 5.00 P.M. at her house, which is admittedly situated in the agricultural land that was in her occupation and possession. 4. Pandurang (since deceased) was having two wives namely: (1) victim Shantabai and (2) Janabai. After his death, Shantabai (the victim in this case) was in possession of 14½ acres of agricultural land and respondent no.1, who was paternal cousin brother of Pandurang, was insisting Shantabai to transfer half of the land, in the name of his sons. However, Shantabai was not prepared to accept his demand and therefore, Pandurang, joining hands with rest of the respondents, tried to harass Shantabai in order that she would yield to his wishes. Shantabai was required to lodge reports at Police station, Gumgaon when there used to be harassment to her by Pandurang and others accompanying him. Shantabai had also filed a Civil Suit against her co-wife Janabai and it is said that it was respondent no. 1 who was backing Janabai, Meerabai (P.W.1) is elder daughter of Shantabai. Respondent no.2 Rama Duff is daughter of first wife Janabai of Pandurang. Respondent nos.4 and 6 all sons of respondent no.2, while respondent no.7 is a relation of respondent no.2. Respondent no.8 is sister-in-law of respondent no.2 and respondent no.9 is the wife of respondent no.2, while respondent no.10 is daughter of respondent nos.2 and 9. Respondent no.11 is the daughter-in-law of respondent no.7 and respondent no.3 is the neighbour of Meerabai (P.W.1). Respondent no.8 is sister-in-law of respondent no.2 and respondent no.9 is the wife of respondent no.2, while respondent no.10 is daughter of respondent nos.2 and 9. Respondent no.11 is the daughter-in-law of respondent no.7 and respondent no.3 is the neighbour of Meerabai (P.W.1). 5. It is the case of prosecution that, on the day of occurrence, deceased Shantabai and her daughter Meerabai were alone in the house when respondents had come there and they assaulted Shantabai with hands and fists blows and then they went out of the house in the field i.e. adjacent to the house and tried to damage the standing crops and then returned to the house of Shantabai and that they all set on fire the compound of reeds that was surrounding the field and then having returned to her house, they ransacked her belongings in the house and also threw away the belongings outside the house. It is further alleged that the respondents caught hold of Shantabai and had gone to the boundary of the land and then set her on fire on pouring kerosene on her person and lighting a lighted match stick. It is claimed by prosecution that witness Meera when returned home and saw that her mother Shantabai had suffered burn injuries, inquired with her when all the respondents had left the house and ran away. At that time, she told that accused nos.3 to 11 had held her and accused no.2 had poured kerosene on her person and accused no. 1 had set her on fire by a lighted match stick. After the fire was extinguished, Meerabai made Shantabai to sit on a swing and after having applied some honey and cream to the burn injuries on her person, she left to the house of Sarpanch of their village Namely Nana Jagannath Deotale (P.W.3) .as nobody in the Police Station, Gumgaon, where she had gone first, met her. She narrated the incident to witness Nana, who accompanied her to her house and on inquiring with Shantabai about the incident that took place, Nana then informed police. PSI Udgikar (P.W.4), who was then attached to the Police Control room, visited the house of Shantabai on receiving message and on making queries with her, recorded her statement which is at Exh.75, relied upon by the prosecution as the first written dying declaration. PSI Udgikar (P.W.4), who was then attached to the Police Control room, visited the house of Shantabai on receiving message and on making queries with her, recorded her statement which is at Exh.75, relied upon by the prosecution as the first written dying declaration. After that statement was recorded, the Police Officer PSI Udgikar immediately removed Shantabai to the Medical College hospital, Nagpur and then sent a written requisition Exh.83 to the Taluka Executive Magistrate. Accordingly, Wamanrao s/o. Tatobaji Kombade (P.W.8), who was working as a Taluka Executive Magistrate, rushed to the Government Medical College and met the Medical Officer on duty and on learning from him that Shantabai was fit to give her statement, recorded her dying declaration (Exh.99) of Shantabai. Police H.C. Chute (P.W.s), who was then attached to the Police Station, Hingna, after receiving the dying declaration (Exh.99) and the report (Exh.86) registered the offence vide crime no.5 of 1986, u/Ss.147, 149 and 452 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. On 15-1-1986, Shantabai succumbed to her injuries and inquest panchanama (Exh.31) was drawn. Dr. A. P. Dongare and Dr. A. M. Keotiva, Reader in Forensic Medicene, Medical College, Nagpur conducted autopsy on the dead body of Shantabai and prepared post-mortem report (Exh.s7). As per the report, Shantabai had suffered 77% bums. They have opined that she died of shock due to burns. After the investigation was over, the charge-sheet was sent up against the accused persons in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, who in turn committed the case to the court of Sessions, Nagpur. Before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, charge vide Exh.38 was framed against the accused persons who pleaded not guilty to the charge. Their defence is that Shantabai' s clothes had accidentally caught fire and one Gourabai (defence witness no.2), who happened to have gone to her house on hearing her shouts, rescued her by wrapping a quilt. That she also gave first aid and left her house after police had arrived. The respondents further stated that, thereafter, at the instance of witness Nana, Shantabai has falsely implicated the accused by disclosing a false story in her dying declarations alleging that the appellants, having entered her house, set her on fire. 7. That she also gave first aid and left her house after police had arrived. The respondents further stated that, thereafter, at the instance of witness Nana, Shantabai has falsely implicated the accused by disclosing a false story in her dying declarations alleging that the appellants, having entered her house, set her on fire. 7. At the trial, prosecution examined in all eleven witnesses including Meerabai w/o. Pandurang Golhar (P.W.1), Nanasaheb s/o. Jagannathrao Deotale (P.W.3), PSI Chandrakant s/o. Namdeorao Udagikar (P.W.4), Executive Magistrate Wamanrao s/o. Tatobaji Kombade (P.W.8), Ganesh s/o. Vithal Patil (P.W.10) - a neighbour of Shantabai to whom, it is claimed by prosecution that, she made oral declaration as to the incident that took place and PSI Nagesh s/o. Ganpatrao Ghodaki (P.W.11) - who carried out investigation in the matter and filed chargesheet. After the prosecution evidence was over, the accl,lsed were examined u/s.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they have denied the prosecution evidence and more particularly, the evidence and circumstances against them. Thereafter, on behalf of the accused persons, one Ashok s/o. Vinayakrao Patil (D.W.1) and Gourabai w/o. Maroti Sawarkar (D.W.2) were examined as defence witnesses. 8. The evidence before the trial Court comprised of deposition of witness Meerabai (P.W.1), who claimed to be an eyewitness to the incident of setting on fire her mother by the accused. She also claimed that her mother disclosed her that the accused, after having assaulted her, set her on fire on pouring kerosene on her person. This disclosure made by Shantabai to witness Meerabai was relied upon by the prosecuti9n as oral dying declaration. Then there is evidence of Nana to whom it is claimed by prosecution that Shantabai disclosed about the incident in which she was set on fire by the accused persons. This was relied open by the prosecution as oral dying declaration made by the victim. The prosecution also placed reliance on the evidence of PSI Udgikar (P.W.4) who claimed that, after having visited the house of Shantabai, he recorded her dying declaration (Exh.75) in which she has disclosed that she was set on fire by the accused persons. This is the dying declaration first in time. The dying declaration made by Shantabai to the Executive Magistrate Wamanrao Tatoba (Exh.99) was also relied upon by the prosecution. This is the dying declaration first in time. The dying declaration made by Shantabai to the Executive Magistrate Wamanrao Tatoba (Exh.99) was also relied upon by the prosecution. The prosecution also placed reliance on the oral dying declaration alleged to have been made by victim to witnesses Nana (P.W.3) and Ganesh Patil (P.W.10). The trial Court, however, on appreciation of evidence of dying declaration, found that the written dying declarations (Exh.75 and 99) were not consistent. The trial Court found both the dying declarations (Exh.75 and 99) doubtful as the prosecution has led no evidence to show that the victim Shantabai was physically and mentally fit to give statement when the statements were recorded. It is found that because of non-examination of the Medical Officer, who made endorsement on the dying declarations, created inherent infirmity making the dying declarations doubtful. So far as oral dying declarations by the victim to witnesses Meerabai, Nana and Ganesh is concerned, the trial Court found the claim in that regard is not clinchingly established on the evidence of these witnesses and it is found that the claim made by these witnesses as to disclosure statement made by the victim to them, is inherently improbable and narration by the victim to these witnesses was found to be inconsistent which made the claim very doubtful. The trial Court also discarded the claim of witness Meerabai as to being eyewitness to the incident. Thus, the trial Court having totally rejected the prosecution evidence, reached to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove that victim Shantabai was done to death by the respondents-accused. Consequently, the trial Court acquitted the respondents-accused of the offences with which they were charged. Hence, this appeal. 9. We have gone through the evidence on record with ~he assistance of 'he learned Counsel for the parties. It is not disputed that victim Shantabai died of the bum injuries sustained by her. The fact that she sustained bums on the date of occurrence when she was at her house is not disputed. In this context, we may refer to the evidence of defence witness Gourabai, wherein she has stated that, on hearing shouts when she went to her house and peeped, through the window, she found Shantabai burning in flames and that on entering the house, she put out the fire by throwing quilt and gave first aid to her. In this context, we may refer to the evidence of defence witness Gourabai, wherein she has stated that, on hearing shouts when she went to her house and peeped, through the window, she found Shantabai burning in flames and that on entering the house, she put out the fire by throwing quilt and gave first aid to her. In her evidence before the Court as defence witness, she has stated that she had taken a quilt and had thrown on the person of Shantabai. It has come in her evidence that when she went to the house of Shantabai no one was present there. Her evidence, therefore, goes to show that at the time when Shantabai was burning in flames in the house and raising shouts for rescue, the door of the house was shut and there was none except Shantabai in the house. She has further stated that Meerabai was not at home and she had come subsequently and she had also applied honey and cream to her wounds. What is surprising is that though Gourabai was subjected to cross-examination by the prosecution side, her claim to have been there to the house of Shantabai on that day and having tried to extinguish fire to rescue her, has not been challenged. It was suggested to her in the cross-examination that Meerabai was present when she had reached Shantabai's house. However, witness Gourabai has stoutly denied the suggestion and emphatically stated that when she went to the house of Shimtabai, she found Shantabai alone in the house striving for her survival by raising shouts when she was burning in flames. It was also suggested to witness Gourabai that on the following day of incident police had made inquiries with her and that she told police that she knew nothing about the incident. The witness has denied the suggestion. It is, therefore, seen that the claim of witness Gourabai that she visited the house of Shantabai on the day of occurrence and that she saw Shantabai burning in flames in her house is not denied. 10. Mr. Loney, the learned A.P.P. submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in rejecting the evidence of witness Meerabai when her presence at the time of occurrence in the vicinity of the house of Shantabai is borne out. 10. Mr. Loney, the learned A.P.P. submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in rejecting the evidence of witness Meerabai when her presence at the time of occurrence in the vicinity of the house of Shantabai is borne out. He submitted that though Meerabai was subjected to cross-examination by the defence, her claim that the accused persons came and assaulted her mother is not controverted. That the witness has stood the testimony of cross-examination and at least her claim which remained uncontroverted by the defence inspires confidence and if that is accepted, involvement of the respondents accused in commission of crime is established, which lends assurance to the statement made by victim in her dying declarations Exhs.75 and 99. He further submitted that, on the evidence on record of PSI Udgikar (P.WA) coupled with that of witness Nana, who acted as a panch, the dying declaration (Exh.75) is duly proved. The trial Court has committed an error in discarding the dying declaration (Exh.75) on very flimsy grounds. He submitted that inconsistency as regards the statement in the dying declaration (Exh.75) vis-a-vis the dying declaration (Exh.99) cannot be a reason to discard the dying declaration (Exh.75). Once it is found that the dying declaration (Exh.75) was truthful and inspires confidence and it is much more so, there is nothing to show that the said statement in the dying declaration (Exh.75) was outcome of the influence and tutoring to the victim. Mr. Loney, A.P.P. submitted that competency and fitness, physical and mental of Shantabai to make statement as recorded by PSI Udgikar is borne out on the evidence of PSI Udgikar who has stated that he verified from the Medical Officer who had come to the house of victim Shantabai for treatment and he has candidly stated that she was conscious and he could record her statement. He, therefore, submitted that the findings recorded by the trial Court for discarding the evidence of witness Meerabai and the dying declaration (Exh.75) is perverse and it is against the weightage of material evidence. He submitted that apart from disparity as to involvement of number of accused persons in commission of crime as appearing in the oral dying declarations as well as written dying declarations (Exh.75 and 99), the fact remains that involvement of accused nos.1 and 2 is clinchingly borne out showing that they did the act of setting on fire Shantabai. He submitted that apart from disparity as to involvement of number of accused persons in commission of crime as appearing in the oral dying declarations as well as written dying declarations (Exh.75 and 99), the fact remains that involvement of accused nos.1 and 2 is clinchingly borne out showing that they did the act of setting on fire Shantabai. 11. Mr. Loney, learned A.P.P. placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in AIR 2003 SC 2859 : [2003 ALL MR (Cri) 1792 (S.C.)], P. V. Radhakrishna Vs. State of Maharashtra. He urged that the view taken by the trial Court is not reasonings and possible and that the reasonable and findings being perverse and not sustainable-in-law, this Court is within its limits to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and as such, the order of acquittal so far as it relates to accused nos.l and 2, should be set aside and they be convicted for the offence u/s.302 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of victim Shantabai. 12. Mrs. S. W. Desphande, learned counsel for the respondents-accused submitted that, admittedly, in this case the Medical Officer who made endorsement on the dying declaration (Exh.75) was not examined at the trial. That it is borne out in the evidence on record and more particularly, that of witness Nana and PSI Udgikar that no endorsement of fitness of Shantabai was made by the Medical Officer before the dying declaration was recorded and that the Medical Officer was not present at the time when dying declaration was recorded. The trial Court has found that the statement in the dying declaration (Exh.75) about involvement of the respondent accused persons was inconsistent with what witness Meerabai has stated before the Court in her evidence, as also statement of victim in the dying declaration (Exh.99). There is inconsistency about the involvement of the accused persons and also about the act they performed if the evidence of witness Nana, Ganesh, Meerabai and dying declaration Exh.99 is seen. Therefore, the trial Court was right in holding that the dying declaration (Exh.75) was doubtful and that there is no corroboration to it. In such circumstances, the reasons assigned by the trial Court are found to be reasonable and therefore, it is to be said that the view taken by the trial Court is possible and reasonable with the state of evidence on record. In such circumstances, the reasons assigned by the trial Court are found to be reasonable and therefore, it is to be said that the view taken by the trial Court is possible and reasonable with the state of evidence on record. There is nothing to show that the trial Court has ignored the material evidence to reach the conclusion that the dying declaration (Exh.75) is doubtful. She, therefore, submitted that if that is the position then as held by the Apex Court, interference by the High Court in the appeal against acquittal is not permissible. 13. Mrs. Deshpande, Adv. placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court (1996)4 SCC 203 , Betal Singh Vs. State of M. P., wherein it is held that the dying declaration should be scrutinized very carefully and if the Court is satisfied that after such scrutiny that the dying declaration was true and was free from any effort to prompt the deceased to make such a statement and is coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in founding the conviction on it. The learned counsel submitted that in case at hand the statement made by Shantabai in the dying declaration (Exh.75) is not corroborated by other evidence and when the dying declaration (Exh.75) itself was found to be doubtful, incoherent and inconsistent on the material aspect of involvement of culprits amongst the respondents accused, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the said dying declaration. 14. Mrs. Deshpande, Adv. also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court, in 2003(1) SCC 112 : [2003 ALL MR (Cri) 998 (S.C.)], Chacko Vs. State of Kerala, wherein it is held that when genuineness of dying declaration was doubtful and no reliance can be placed thereon, conviction of accused cannot be based on such dying declaration. 15. Mrs. Deshpande, Adv. also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in 1994 Supp(3) SCC 463, Jagga Singh Vs. State of Punjab, wherein it is held that the dying declaration when recorded by the Police Officer in the presence of doctor who testified to the fitness of deceased to make statement, but no endorsement was made by such doctor on the dying declaration, that brings out infirmity and as such, no reliance can be placed on such dying declaration. State of Punjab, wherein it is held that the dying declaration when recorded by the Police Officer in the presence of doctor who testified to the fitness of deceased to make statement, but no endorsement was made by such doctor on the dying declaration, that brings out infirmity and as such, no reliance can be placed on such dying declaration. She, therefore, urged that no interference is called for in the order of acquittal and that the appeal should be dismissed. 16. Prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of witness Meerabai (P.W.1), wherein she gave eye-witness account of the incident in which her mother Shantabai was done to death by burning her by the accused persons. She also claimed that she entered the house after the accused persons left and her mother, when inquired with her, disclosed as to what was done to her by the accused persons. This narration of disclosure made by Shantabai to witness Meerabai was relied upon by prosecution as oral dying declaration made by the deceased. We are required to scrutinize and re-assess the evidence of witness Meerabai as the trial Court had discarded her claim. 17. Witness Meerabai (P.W.1), in her evidence, stated that the accused nos. 1 and 2 on 13-11-1986 at about 4.00 P.M. to 5.00 P.M. had been to the house of Shantabai and they assaulted her with hands and fists blows and then these accused had gone to the field and after seeing the standing crop, they returned to the house and then accused no.1 set on fire the compound of reeds and accused nos.2 to 11 were with him and all the accused persons then entered in the house and threw away the house hold articles in the courtyard of the house and then the accused had caught hold of Shantabai and then all the accused set her on fire. She further stated that her mother started shouting and when this witness had gone to the house after the accused ran away, she found her mother lying in the house having suffered burn injuries and then Meerabai threw the quilt on her person. She further stated that her mother started shouting and when this witness had gone to the house after the accused ran away, she found her mother lying in the house having suffered burn injuries and then Meerabai threw the quilt on her person. She further stated that when she asked her mother as to what had happened, she told her that accused nos.3 to 11 had held her and accused no.2 had poured kerosene on her person and accused no.1 had lighted a match stick and set her on fire. This was the account of incident given by the witness Meerabai in her evidence before the Court. Meerabai was subjected to cross-examination by defence and as conceded by the learned A.P.P. Mr. Loney, defence has succeeded in brining out the material contradictions and omissions in her evidence vis-a-vis the statement she made before the Investigating Officer. 18. Witness Meerabai has stated that when the accused had entered the house, she kept herself out of the house and claimed to have witnessed the incident by standing near the boundary of their agricultural land. It has come in her evidence that the accused assaulted her mother when she was in the field and then the accused followed her mother when she went inside the house. Thereafter, according to her, the incident of burning her mother took place inside the house. It has come in her evidence that large number of persons had collected and she has also disclosed before the police that one pan shop keeper namely Raju, another shop keeper Ambedkar and one Balaji Kawadugi and one Gourabai and many others had witnessed the incident. She has stated in her statement that amongst them was Gourabai who has been examined by the defence as defence witness. In such a situation, in all probability, witness Meerabai would have dared to enter the house to save her mother. It was on her own saying that when the accused persons assaulted her mother outside the house and also followed her mother when she entered the house, it was obvious that the intention of accused persons was to assault her mother and that witness Meerabai was well aware about the strained relations between her mother and accused persons. It was on her own saying that when the accused persons assaulted her mother outside the house and also followed her mother when she entered the house, it was obvious that the intention of accused persons was to assault her mother and that witness Meerabai was well aware about the strained relations between her mother and accused persons. In this background, the claim of Meerabai that she kept standing outside the house and was watching from outside the house from standing there in the agricultural land does not stand probable. That is much more so when, as stated by her, many other persons had collected outside the house on hearing the shouts. If at all Meerabai was outside the house, as so many persons who were simplicitor on-lookers, then her claim, to have witnessed the incident squarely falls' to the ground. It is pertinent to note that we have in the earlier part of the judgment referred to the evidence of defence witness Gourabai wherein she has stated that she visited the house of Shantabai on the day of occurrence on hearing cries-shouts of Shantabai and she claimed that Shantabai alone was in the house burning in flames and struggling for survival. She has also stated that witness Meerabai came there subsequently in the house and she also assisted her in providing first aid to her mother. Therefore, in the background of evidence of defence witness Gourabai Sawarkar (D.W.2), which has not been shattered by prosecution, the claim of witness Meerabai to have witnessed the incident cannot be accepted. 19. According to witness Meerabai w/o. Pandurangji Golhar (P.W.I), accused nos.1 to 11 set fire to the compound of reeds of her house. However, witnesses Nana (P.W.3) and PSI Nagesh s/o. Ganpatrao Ghodaki (P.W.11) had deposed that there was no compound of reeds around the house of Shantabai. If at all the claim of witness Meerabai to have witnessed the incident of setting on fire by the accused was true and acceptable, then one does not understand as to why it was necessary for witness Meerabai, after having entered the house, to inquire with her mother as to what had happened to her or what was done to her and by whom. In addition to this, the prosecution has not examined the persons who were present outside the house where witness Meera was standing and watching the incident. In addition to this, the prosecution has not examined the persons who were present outside the house where witness Meera was standing and watching the incident. It is concede that the names of these persons were not given as eyewitnesses to the actual incident immediately after the incident when PSI Ghodki (PW 11) recorded the statement of witness Meerabai and further it is again striking as to why none of them was examined by prosecution. In such a situation and in absence of any material evidence that was available, it is unsafe to place reliance on the evidence of witness Meerabai when she claimed that she had witnessed the incident. 20. This takes us to consider the oral dying declaration alleged to have been made by the victim Shantabai to witnesses Meerabai, Nana and Ganesh. According to witness Meerabai, when she entered the house and inquired with her mother, she told her that accused nos.3 to 11 had held her and accused No.2 poured kerosene on her persona and it was accused No.1 who actually lighted the match stick and set her on fire. In her cross-examination, on this aspect of alleged disclosure alleged to have been made by her mother to her, she claimed that she had told the police about said disclosure made by her to her mother. But if we consider the evidence of PSI Ghodki who recorded her statement, it is crystal clear that witness Meerabai has not stated before him as to what she claimed to have been stated by her mother Shantabai. She has not stated that Shantabai told her that accused nos.3 to 11 had held her and accused no.2 poured kerosene on her person and accused no.1 set her on fire. It is, therefore, crystal clear that witness Meerabai, for the first time in her evidence before the Court, made a statement about the oral dying declaration made to her by her mother. In the nature of things, if really there had been oral dying declaration by Shantabai to Meerabai, Meerabai would not have omitted to state that fact when she had first opportunity when her statement was recorded by police. It is only after the period of four years that, for the first time, she made disclosure about the same in her evidence before the Court. It is only after the period of four years that, for the first time, she made disclosure about the same in her evidence before the Court. In needs no reason to discard her claim in the evidence regarding the oral dying declaration being after thought. In other words, the omission in that regard is so glaring that it amounts to contradiction which materially affects her credibility. That apart, if read in the context of the claim made by witnesses Nana and Ganesh regarding the oral dying declaration made to them, it is found that the claim made by Meera is doubtful as the disclosure claimed to have been made to her is thoroughly inconsistent with what was claimed by witnesses Nana and Ganesh. 21. According to witness Nana, Shantabai told him that accused nos.1 and 2 and his wife accused no.9, his two sons (accused nos.4 and 6), his daughter (accused no.10), accused no.5 and his wife (accused no.8), accused no.7 and her daughter-in-law (Accused no.11) and accused no.3 had assaulted her and by pouring Kerosene on her person, they had set her on fire, while witness Ganesh, who is admittedly residing in the neighborhood of Shantabai, stated in his evidence that Shantabai told that 2-4 persons had burnt her and told him names of accused nos.1 and 2 and rest of the names he did not remember. So, as per the version of witness Ganesh, it is the accused nos. 1 and 2 only and two other persons, whose names he did not remember, who were the persons who had set on fire Shantabai, which shows that the oral dying declaration given to witness Meerabai, Nana and Ganesh is inconsistent. As stated earlier, basically the claim of witness Meerabai regarding the oral dying declaration made to her by Shantabai is doubtful as she failed to subscribe at the earliest opportunity when her statement was recorded by police. The oral dying declaration given to witnesses Nana and Ganesh cannot be accepted as they have given different versions of what was disclosed to them by Shantabai. The oral dying declaration given to witnesses Nana and Ganesh cannot be accepted as they have given different versions of what was disclosed to them by Shantabai. The trial Court has observed that if Shantabai gave dying declaration before witness Nana and just sometimes thereafter, on seeing the crowd when witness Ganesh entered the house and at that time on inquiry with Shantabai, she makes a disclosure about the incident which is found to be at variance, then it is very difficult to place reliance on such dying declarations. The claim of witnesses regarding the oral dying declarations made to them must inspire confidence of the Court. In the case at hand, due to the glaring inconsistency as to involvement of the accused persons in commission of the act of setting on fire deceased Shantabai and absence of direct evidence showing complicity of the accused persons, it is very difficult to place reliance on the oral dying declarations. The trial court has, in our considered opinion, rightly rejected the claim of prosecution witness Meerabai regarding the oral dying declaration. The trial Court has also rightly discarded the claim of witnesses Nana and Ganesh about the dying declaration alleged to have been made by Shantabai. 22. This takes us to consider and scrutinize Exhs.75 and 99. The trial Court has on appreciations of evidence of P.S.I. Udgikar and Executive Magistrate Wamanrao (PW 8) found both these dying declarations doubtful. In the earlier part of judgment, we have referred to the submissions made by Mr. Loney, learned A.P.P. challenging the findings recorded by the trial Court rejecting the dying declarations. The factual position in respect of dying declaration (Exh.75), which was admittedly first in time, is that it was recorded by PSI Udgikar on 13-1-1986 at about 7.30 P.M. when he visited the house of victim Shantabai. He claimed in his evidence that he ascertained from the Medical Officer, who attended the victim at her house for burning injuries suffered by her, as to physical fitness of Shantabai to make the statement and then in the presence of two witnesses as panch as, he recorded the statement on which signature of victim was taken. The statement (Exh.75) shows that it bears the signatures of panchas as well as victim Shantabai and that of PSI Udgikar, so also endorsement by Medical Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur as "the statement is given before me. The statement (Exh.75) shows that it bears the signatures of panchas as well as victim Shantabai and that of PSI Udgikar, so also endorsement by Medical Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur as "the statement is given before me. She has signed statement but she cannot sign it properly due to the injuries which she has got on the right hand". The Medical Officer who made this endorsement on the dying declaration (Exh.75) is not examined. PSI Udgikar in his evidence has candidly stated that before recording the dying declaration endorsement by the Medical Officer about the fitness of the victim was not sought. Witness Nana (P.W.3) who happens to be witness on the dying declaration (Exh.75) has stated in his evidence that when his signature was taken on Exh.75 there was no endorsement on the dying declaration. PSI Udgikar did not give clinching evidence as to when the endorsement by the Medical Officer on the dying declaration was obtained and as to when the dying declaration was handed over to the Investigating Officer. There is no record, much less any entry in the station dairy about the fact of recording the dying declaration Exh.75 by P.S.I. Udagir. To crown this all, nothing is brought on the record in the evidence to indicate that the Medical Officer who made the endorsement was present at the time when the dying declaration was recorded. This has significance and also far reaching consequences as in the endorsement it is stated that the statement was made before me. Meaning thereby, the Medical Officer was present when the statement was recorded. But then, neither P.S.I. Udagir nor witness Nana has clearly stated that the Medical Officer was present at the time when the dying declaration (Exh.75) was recorded. On the other hand, if the evidence of P.S.I. Udagir is scrutinized minutely and admissions given by him in the cross-examination are taken into consideration, it goes without saving that the Medical Officer was not present at the time when the statement was recorded. It is in this factual position, we have to appreciate and scrutinize, authenticity of the dying declaration (Exh.75). 23. But before we go to decide truthfulness and authenticity of Exhs.75 and 99, it would be appropriate to refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in relation to the nature of proof required for ascertaining authenticity and truthfulness of the dying declaration. 23. But before we go to decide truthfulness and authenticity of Exhs.75 and 99, it would be appropriate to refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in relation to the nature of proof required for ascertaining authenticity and truthfulness of the dying declaration. The Apex Court in AIR 2003 SC 2859 (supra) held that the dying declaration can be sale basis for conviction. That clause (1) of Section 32 makes relevant what is generally described as dying declaration, though such an expression has not been used in any statute. It essentially means statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death. The grounds of admissions are: firstly, necessity for the victim being general1y the only principal eye-witness to the crime, the exclusion of the statement might deflect the ends of justice; and secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a sanction equal to the obligation on oath. The Apex Court observed :"The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so lawful is consideration by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of justice. The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim "nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri - a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth." 24. The Apex Court while laying down that the dying declaration can be sale basis for conviction observed "The situation in which a person is on death bed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of .his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worth while to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. 25. Therefore, this is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant was given. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. Therefore, it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. 26. The Apex Court dealt with the case in which the declaration was recorded by police official. Deceased had sustained 85% burn injuries. There was absence of certification as to state of mind of the declarant. The Apex Court found that it was not fatal when the police official recorded statement of the deceased in presence of the doctor. There was no material to show that the dying declaration was the result of product of imagination, tutoring or prompting. It was found to be trustworthy and has credibility. Mr. Loney, the learned A.P.P. placing reliance on this decision of the Apex Court vehemently submitted that in the case before hand absence of the evidence of the Medical Officer, who made endorsement on the dying declaration (Exh.75), is not fatal when PSI Udagir in his evidence has verified and satisfied about the fitness of victim Shantabai to give statement. It is very difficult to agree with the submission of Mr. It is very difficult to agree with the submission of Mr. Loney in accepting the dying declaration (Exh.75) merely because the Medical Officer has made endorsement and the PSI has recorded the dying declaration on verifying about the physical condition of the victim from the Medical Officer. The position before the Apex Court was entirely different in the sense that though the Medical Officer did not certify as to the mind of the declarant either independently or on the dying declaration, he was present at the time when Police Officer recorded the dying declaration. In the case at hand, admittedly, the Medical Officer who made the endorsement was not present at the time when PSI Udagir recorded the statement. But what we get from the decision of the Apex Court is that the Court should be satisfied on the basis of evidence and material before it about truthfulness and authenticity of the declarant in making the dying declaration. That the certification as to the fit state of mind of declarant is one of the mode to ascertain that the declarant was physically and mentally fit to make a declaration. If the declaration is recorded by the Police Officer in the presence of the doctor, then absence of certification as to the state of mind of declarant is not fatal. The reason being the presence of Medical Officer at the time or recording the statement is itself an assurance of fitness, physical as well as mental of the declarant. 27. In the case at hand, therefore, had the prosecution examined the Medical Officer who made endorsement on Exh.75, all doubts regarding fitness of the victim to make statement would have been made clear. That is much more so when on the evidence on record there is nothing to show that the Medical Officer was present at the time when PSI Udagir recorded the statement of victim. Iris to be noticed that in the case before the Apex Court, the Medical Officer who did not make the endorsement was present at the time of recording the dying declaration and he was examined as a witness at the trial. 28. The Apex Court in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 242 (supra), in an appeal against conviction of the appellant therein, found that declaration cannot be assailed on the ground that it was not by way of question and answers. 28. The Apex Court in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 242 (supra), in an appeal against conviction of the appellant therein, found that declaration cannot be assailed on the ground that it was not by way of question and answers. On facts it was held that the declaration was otherwise corroborated and does not suffer from any infirmity. It was found that the other dying declarations were also to the same effect. Therefore, none of these dying declarations suffer from any infirmity. There was also corroboration by the Medical Evidence and other circumstantial evidence as to truthfulness of the statement made by the declarant in the dying declaration. Mrs. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on this decision when she pointed out that the statement of victim Shantabai in the dying declaration (Exh.75) was not consistent with her statement in the dying declaration Exh.99 as also oral dying declarations made by the victim to witnesses. She further submitted that the Medical Officer who made endorsement on the dying declaration (Exh.75) was not examined and as such, when the dying declaration was not recorded in presence of Medical Officer, the endorsement made by the Medical Officer on Exh.75 itself becomes doubtful and if that is so, then the statement made by the victim cannot be said to be trustworthy inspiring confidence and because of inconsistency in the narration, particularly about involvement of the accused persons in commission of the act of setting on fire, the dying declaration cannot be accepted. 29. The Apex Court in AIR 2002 SC 2973 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2259 (S.C.)] Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra, while considering the authenticity of the dying declaration u/s.32 of the Indian Evidence Act has observed thus: "Normally, the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. But where the eye-witnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular Case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the Court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." 30. From this decision of the Apex Court, what we understand is that there is no specified statutory form for such recording of the declaration and also there is no requirement of law to have certification by the Medial Officer to determine fitness of the declarant. It is in that sense that the certification by the doctor about fitness of the declarant is a rule of caution. It is in that sense that the certification by the doctor about fitness of the declarant is a rule of caution. If in a case it is proved by testimony of Officer who has recorded the statement of declarant that he was physically and mentally in a fit state to give statement and when the Court is satisfied on the basis of his evidence that the declarant was fit when his statement was recorded, then that is sufficient to hold that the statement made by the declarant was voluntary. Therefore, in absence of any medical evidence, the voluntary and truthful nature of declaration can be established otherwise on the basis of other evidence and circumstances attending the case. 31. It is also useful to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in (1999)6 SCC 545 , Harjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab. In this case, two dying declarations were recorded, in that, first dying declaration was made before the Police Officer and the second one was made before the Magistrate. In the first dying declaration, the deceased stated that she received burns as a result of accident. The finding of Courts below was that the first dying declaration was made to save her husband and in-laws, as she was not free person then. Before the Apex Court, conviction recorded by the trial Court was challenged in the appeal wherein submission was made that inconsistency between the two dying declarations makes both the dying declarations unworthy of credit. The Apex Court found that the reasons given by the Courts below for not accepting the first dying declaration was found convincing. The second dying declaration was found more probable and natural. Therefore, the Apex court held that, in the circumstances, the second dying declaration cannot be recorded as untrue merely because it is contrary to her statement made earlier. This decision is relevant to consider in the case before hand as apparently there is inconsistency between the narration of the incident by the victim. The trial Court, while rejecting the dying declaration (Exh.75), has found that the statement made therein is inconsistent with the other dying declarations including the dying declaration Exh.99. In that context, Mr. This decision is relevant to consider in the case before hand as apparently there is inconsistency between the narration of the incident by the victim. The trial Court, while rejecting the dying declaration (Exh.75), has found that the statement made therein is inconsistent with the other dying declarations including the dying declaration Exh.99. In that context, Mr. Loney, the learned A.P.P. submitted that inconsistency per se between two dying declarations by itself is not sufficient to discard the dying declaration when truthfulness and voluntariness of the dying declaration is established on the evidence on record. Accepting the contention raised by Mr. Loney, I have no hesitation in saying that if the dying declaration (Exh.75) is found to be trustworthy and truthful, there would be no justification in discarding the same merely because there is some inconsistency as to the narration regarding the incident that took place. But at the same time we make it clear that if the inconsistency is glaring in nature and if it goes to the root of the claim of declarant as to the involvement of the accused persons, then there is justification for discarding the dying declaration (Exh.75). 32. As stated in the earlier part of the judgment, P.S.I. Udagirhas not stated anything about the physical and mental fitness of the victim when he recorded the statement. All that he stated is that, he inquired with the Medical Officer who attended the victim at home about fitness of victim and that the Medical Officer told that he can record the statement. There is nothing in the evidence of P.S.I. Udagir to show that he himself ascertained by putting some questions to the victim that she was conscious physically and mentally to make statement. We leave apart the lacuna as to endorsement made by the Medical Officer. But then, the Medical Officer was not examined. The result is that there is no authenticated evidence and material on record to show that the victim was in fact fit to give statement. We have already referred to the inconsistency about the statement made by the victim in the dying declaration (Exh.75) vis-a-vis the oral dying declarations and the second written dying declaration (Exh.99). This disparity or inconsistency was not insignificant. It directly relates to involvement of the accused persons rather number of accused persons who were actually involved in commission of the act of setting on fire. This disparity or inconsistency was not insignificant. It directly relates to involvement of the accused persons rather number of accused persons who were actually involved in commission of the act of setting on fire. But in the dying declaration (Exh.99), it is stated that after belongings were thrown out of the house, she had concealed herself in the house and then the door was knocked and the accused persons had entry in the house. Accused nos. 1 to 5 had poured kerosene on her person and accused nos. 1 and 2, Jagoba Golhar and Govinda had lighted one match stick and had set on fire. It is to be noted that this Jagoba Golhar and Govinda are not accused before the Court. The investigating officer Ghodaki had stated that he has made efforts to trace out Govinda, but no such person was traced. So mentioning of the names of Jagoba Golhar and Govinda who had no role in commission of the offence, raises doubt about the mental state of Shantabai to give statement. It is again pertinent to note that, according to the victim Shantabai, when she was working in the field 10 women had gone into her house and dragged her out. This statement carries no sense as when she was working in the field then how she could be dragged out of the house. In Exh.99 it is found that some words have been interpolated and some words have been scored out. The Executive Magistrate Mr. Wamanrao was cross-examined at length on this aspect of the matter, but he could not give satisfactory explanation as to the scorings in the dying declaration. It has come in his evidence that he asked Shantabai about names of those 10 to 12 women, but she could not tell their names. The witness had candidly stated that he had scored the words in Exh.99 which were uttered by Shantabai in order to see that the sentence is made readable. 33. There is glaring disparity in the dying declarations Exhs.75 and 99. The Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration EVt.99 stated that Shantabai had told him that she could not sign. So he had taken her thumb impression on Exh.99. There is no endorsement on Exh.99 by the Medical Officer. The Medical Officer who made endorsement on requisition has not been examined as witness by the prosecution. The Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration EVt.99 stated that Shantabai had told him that she could not sign. So he had taken her thumb impression on Exh.99. There is no endorsement on Exh.99 by the Medical Officer. The Medical Officer who made endorsement on requisition has not been examined as witness by the prosecution. The Executive Magistrate did not claim that the Medical Officer was present when he recorded the statement. On the other hand, the evidence shows that when the statement was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, the Medical Officer was not present. It has come, in the evidence that he made endorsement in his cabin on the requisition. There is nothing on the record to show that the Executive Magistrate met the Medical Officer before recording statement to ascertain that the victim was in a fit mental and physical state. Now so far as the dying declaration (Exh.75) is concerned, PSI Udagir has stated that he has obtained signature of Shantabai, on the dying declaration. We fail to understand as to how the signature of victim was obtained on the dying declaration Exh.75 when, as stated by the Executive Magistrate who recorded the statement Exh.99, found that her signature could not be obtained because of burn injuries and he was required to take thumb impression of victim on Exh.99. 34. It would appear from Exh.75 that after Shantabai was dragged out of the house she was set on fire by accused nos.1 and 2. But then it is the prosecution case that it was inside the house that the incident of setting on fire Shantabai had taken place. It is the matter of record that half burnt pieces of clothing and tin of kerosene and bottle of kerosene were all recovery from inside the house, as could be seen from the panchanama of scene of offence (Exh.75). If that is so, then in Exh.75 the scene of offence has been totally changed from inside the house to outside the house and if that is accepted, then that materially falsifies the claim of witness Meerabai that setting on fire of her mother had taken place inside the house. That apart, as pointed out earlier, after considering the dying declarations at hand, there is discrepancy as to the number of accused persons involved in commission of crime. That apart, as pointed out earlier, after considering the dying declarations at hand, there is discrepancy as to the number of accused persons involved in commission of crime. If that is so, then it is very difficult to fix responsibility on the respondents-accused for commission of crime. It is in that sense that acceptance of dying declaration becomes very difficult. Therefore, the inconsistency in the dying declarations Exhs.75 and 99 is not relating to insignificant factors or as to narration of incident by the victim. If that is so, then it materially makes doubtful truthfulness of the statement in the dying declaration Exh.75 as well as Exh.99. It is not that merely because of discrepancy in narration in these dying declarations that the dying declarations are to be discarded. The trial Court has, after taking into consideration the oral evidence of witnesses and particularly, the Police Officer Udagir and Executive Magistrate Wamanrao and attending circumstances, come to the conclusion that in absence of evidence of Medical Officer who issued certificate, it is not clinchingly established that the victim was fit to make statement and therefore, as observed by the trial Court, there was disparity as to involvement of the respondents-accused in commission of crime. . It is in this sense that we have no hesitation in holding that both the dying declarations Exh.75 and 99 suffer from truthfulness and also do not inspire confidence and therefore, it has to be said that the disclosure made by the victim in both the dying declarations cannot be said to be voluntary and truthful. The trial Court has, therefore, committed no error in discarding both the dying declarations. 35. The evidence of Meerabai claiming to be eye-witness to the incident is far from satisfactory. The evidence of witnesses Meerabai, Nana and Ganesh on oral dying declarations is found to be not satisfactory to establish the factum of declaration. Both the dying declarations (Exhs.75 and 99), for the reasons stated above, cannot be accepted and placed reliance on. In such state of evidence, when there is no other evidence, it has to be said that the prosecution has utterly failed to establish that the offence has been committed by the respondents accused. The trial court has taken a view that considering the evidence on record, prosecution has not established the guilt of the accused on the evidence on record. The trial court has taken a view that considering the evidence on record, prosecution has not established the guilt of the accused on the evidence on record. We have found that the view taken by the trial Court is reasonable. If that is so, then as rightly submitted by Mrs. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the respondents-accused that this Court in appeal against the order of acquittal has no reason to interfere. In this context, we may refer to the decision of our High Court in 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1220, State of Maharashtra Vs. Tukaram Nivrati Mane and another, wherein it is held that: "the interference by the High Court when findings and reasons given by the trial Court are reasonable, is not warranted." 36. This case was arising out of the appeal against the acquittal of accused persons. That appeal was decided by one of us (per P. S. Brahme, J.) and the legal position as to power of High Court for interference in appeal against acquittal has been stated referring to the decision of the Apex Court in 2003 ALL MR (Cri) 2080 (SC), State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajaram. The Apex Court in that case observed thus; "Generally, order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in Criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to guilt of accused and other to innocence, the view which is beneficial to the accused is to be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is not less than from the conviction of an innocent. In case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. The principle to be followed by the appellate court, considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. The principle to be followed by the appellate court, considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. It the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. " 37. We may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in 2004 Crl.L.J. 640, Ramanand Yadav Vs. Prabhu Nath Jha and other, wherein the Apex Court held that there is no embargo on appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Interference by the appellate Court is permissible only when there are convincing and substantial reasons for doing so." 38. In the decision reported in 2003 Crl.L.J. 3639, State of Maharashtra Vs. Haribhau Krishnaji Deshmukh and others, the Divisions Bench of our High Court held that: "Power of interfering with the order of acquittal is equal to that of interfering with the order of conviction and it can be one for substantial and compelling reasons or it may be said that sufficient and cogent reasons or for strong reasons. Unless appeal has strong reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal it need not be done'. Where two views are possible on appreciation of evidence and the Court ordering acquittal, has taken one view, it is reasonably possible and the appellate court enquiring into the correctness of the acquittal on re-appreciation takes another view, but according to the criminal jurisprudence, benefit must go to the accused and the High Court should retrain from interfering with such acquittal." 39. This makes the position clear in the sense that when the view taken by the Court acquitting the accused is found to be reasonable and there are no compelling reasons to take another view than convicting the accused persons, then even on re-appreciation by the High Court, other view than convicting the accused is possible, no interference is called for as according to the criminal jurisprudence benefit must go to the accused. 40. In the decision of the Apex Court in 1993 Supp(2) SCC 714, Mool Chand Vs. 40. In the decision of the Apex Court in 1993 Supp(2) SCC 714, Mool Chand Vs. Jagdish Singh, while dealing with the appeal against acquittal, the Apex Court has held that in an appeal against the order of acquittal by the High Court what is to be considered is whether the approach by the High Court is wrong or the view taken by the High court is unreasonable. If the evidence is of such a nature that two views are possible and the view in favour of the accused weighed with the High Court in acquitting them, then the Supreme Court will be slow to interfere with the order of acquittal. If only the High Court has committed grave error in appreciation of the evidence and mis-directed itself by ignoring legal principles or misreading the evidence and arrived at the conclusion, the decision can be characterised as perverse or illegal requiring interference by the Apex Court. 41. The Apex Court in 2003 ALL MR (Cri) 2633 (SC), Kunju Muhammed and Khumani and another Vs. State of Kerala held that the order of acquittal can be interfered with only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of accused upon the evidence on record. The Apex Court held that though the High Court has full power to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusion whether the appeal is against conviction or acquittal. While doing so it ought to bear in mind; first, that there is a general presumption in favour of the innocence of the person accused in criminal cases and that the presumption is only strengthened by the acquittal. Secondly, it should bear in mind that every accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding his guilt and when the trial Court acquitted him, he would retain that benefit in the Appellate Court also. It is further held that the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal, unless the same is found to be perverse. 42. It is further held that the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal, unless the same is found to be perverse. 42. Bearing in mind the principles laid down by the Apex Court which have been followed by this Court time and again and considering the fact the finding recorded by the trial Court are reasonable and that no other view is possible, we are of the opinion that the respondents-accused are entitled to retain the order of acquittal passed in their favour by the trial Court. We do not find any substantial and justifying reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal. The learned A.P.P. Mr. Loney though exhaustively dealt with the judgment passed by the trial Court, could not make out that the finding recorded by the trial Court was perverse in acquitting the accused nor he could show that any other view indicating conviction of the respondents-accused is possible. If that is so, then we have no reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the trial Court. The appeal, therefore, merits no consideration at all and the same has to be dismissed. Hence, the order. ORDER The appeal is dismissed. The bail bonds executed by the respondents-accused shall stand cancelled. Mrs. Deshpande, counsel appearing for the respondents-accused as an Advocate appointed by the Legal Aid Committee shall be paid her remuneration, which we quantity as Rs.2000/-.