D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material placed before me. ( 2 ) THIS revision is directed by the petitioner against the order dated 6. 12. 2004 passed in CFR No. 3046 of 2004 in an unregistered CMA, which was filed under order XLIII Rule l (j) of CPC, on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge, nandikotkur, aggrieved by the order and decree passed on 29. 10. 2004 by the Trial court in EA No. 148 of 2004 in E. P. No. 70 of 2003 in O. S. No. 31 of 2001. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case appear to be that the petitioner filed an application before the Executing Court under Order XXI rule 90 CPC and the same was dismissed by an order dated 29. 10. 2004 after conducting an enquiry. The said order was challenged by way of an appeal before the lower Appellate Court under Order 43 rule 1 (j) CPC, but, it seems that the same was rejected on the ground that no appeal lies against the order passed in an application under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC. Order XLIII Rule 1 (j) reads as under:"an appeal shall lie from : (j) an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale;" ( 4 ) IT is obvious from the above provision that Rule 90 was not mentioned, in which event, a bare reading of the said provision gives an impression that an appeal is not maintainable as objected to by the lower Appellate Court. ( 5 ) NOW the question is whether an appeal is maintainable under Order XLIII rule l (j) when the application filed by the petitioner before the Executing Court under order 21 Rule 90 CPC was dismissed. ( 6 ) THIS question is no longer resintegra in view of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sheikh mastan v. Guba Atchayya and others, air 1959 AP 667 (V 46 C 195 ). The important excerpts thereof are extracted hereunder for ready reference. ( 6 ) THIS question is no longer resintegra in view of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sheikh mastan v. Guba Atchayya and others, air 1959 AP 667 (V 46 C 195 ). The important excerpts thereof are extracted hereunder for ready reference. The pertinent question for decision is whether an order dismissing a petition under order XXI, Rule 90, CPC consequent upon the failure to comply with the direction contained in the proviso to that rule, comes within the ambit of Order XLIII, Rule 1 (j), cpc which provides:"an appeal shall lie life from (j): An order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale;"the answer to this question depends upon the interpretation of the words "refusing to set aside a sale". There is no separate provision in the Civil Procedure Code conferring a right of appeal upon an aggrieved party whose petition was dismissed in circumstances similar to those as in the present case. It is relevant to note that the proviso which enables the Court to demand the deposit of money into Court before admitting the petition was introduced in October, 1936, i. e. , long after Order XLIII rule 1 was enacted. It is, therefore, clear that at the time when that rule was framed, such a differentiation could not have been in contemplation. That apart, whatever might be the reason for the dismissal of the petition, there can be little doubt that it amounts to a refusal to set aside a sale. (Para 3) as already remarked, the Civil Procedure code does not contain any provision giving a right of appeal against an order rejecting an application in limine for not making the required deposit. We feel that even a case where an application is dismissed on the ground of non-compliance with the direction to make the deposit, comes within the sweep and range of Order XLIII, R l (j), c. P. C. We are re-inforced in our opinion by the judgment of Varadachariar J. in marudamuthu Mudaliar v. Venkatarama fyar, 1939-2 Mad LJ 132; ( AIR 1939 Mad 482 ). The learned Judge has adduced valid reasons in support of his conclusions, if we may say so with respect. This was followed by King J. in an unreported case (C. R. P. No. 1208 of 1937 ). The learned Judge has adduced valid reasons in support of his conclusions, if we may say so with respect. This was followed by King J. in an unreported case (C. R. P. No. 1208 of 1937 ). It follows that an appeal against such an order is competent. ( 7 ) THE above decision directly applies to the facts of the present case. By reason of dismissal of the application of the j. Dr, for setting aside the sale, the Court has to confirm the sale automatically under rule 92. Consequently the appeal will lie under Order XLIII Rule 1 (j) CPC. The court below erred in rejecting the appeal on the ground that there is no mention of order XXI Rule 90 or Order XLIII rule 1 (j ). Order XXI Rule 90 is an enabling provision for a party to apply for setting aside the sale. Rule 92 gives power to the court to confirm or set aside the sale. Therefore, the cause of action in reality will arise only out of Rule 92 but not Rule 90. Therefore, viewed in this angle, I am of the clear opinion that an appeal lies against the order refusing to set aside the sale under Rule 92, filed by the J. Dr under order XLIII Rule 1 (j ). ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, the revision is allowed. The order of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and the appeal be restored to its file for passing appropriate orders, after hearing both sides. No order as to costs.