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2005 DIGILAW 1000 (PNJ)

Tule Ram v. State Of Haryana

2005-09-20

AMAR DUTT, KIRAN ANAND LALL, RAJIVE BHALLA

body2005
Judgment Amar Dutt, J. 1. On December 16, 2004, after bail had already been granted to the appellant Tule Ram, a Division of this Court had observed as under :- "Bail has already been granted in this case. However, we have also perused the data provided with regard to the pendency or disposal of appeals under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. Copies of this data be supplied forthwith to Mr. Pardeep Singh and Mr. Sanjeev Sheokand personally, so that if possible, some principles can be laid down with regard to the grant or refusal of bail under the Narcotic Act as the pendency of appeals is rather prolonged. Adjourned to 7.5.2005". While examining this question on May 9, 2005, the Bench dealing with the case was of the view that before discussing the issue raised in the order dated December 16, 2004 the Court would be required to go into the question as to what was the extent of the power for suspension of sentence which could be exercised by the High Court while dealing with the applications for suspension of sentence in appeals under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the NDPS Act") that were pending before this Court when seen in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Maktool Singh v. State of Punjab, 1999(2) RCR(Criminal) 130 and Dadu @ Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra, 2000(4) RCR(Criminal) 275 and Section 37 of the NDPS Act. This Bench was constituted to consider and answer this question. 2. We have heard Sarvshri Maharaj Kumar, appearing for the appellant, R.S. Cheema, Advocate General, Punjab, with S.S. Randhawa, Senior Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, B.S. Rana, Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, Gautam Dutt appearing for R.S. Rai, Senior Standing Counsel for U.T. Chandigarh and A.P.S. Deol and are grateful for clarity with which they have assisted in appreciating the legal points, which are involved in this exercise. 3. For appreciating the points involved, it would be but appropriate to refer to the Legislative intent on account of which the NDPS Act was brought on the statute book. The objects and reasons, which were initially sought to be achieved in 1985, were as under :- "The statutory control over narcotic drugs is exercised in India through a number of Central and State enactments. The objects and reasons, which were initially sought to be achieved in 1985, were as under :- "The statutory control over narcotic drugs is exercised in India through a number of Central and State enactments. The principal Central Acts, namely, the Opium Act, 1857, the Opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 were enacted a long time ago. With the passage of time and the developments in the field of illicit drug traffic and drug abuse at national and international level, many deficiencies in the existing laws have come to notice, some of which are indicated below :- (i) The scheme of penalties under the present Acts is not sufficiently deterrent to meet the challenge of well organized gangs of smugglers. The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of 3 years with or without fine and 4 years imprisonment with or without fine for repeat offences. Further, no minimum punishment is prescribed in the present laws, as a result of which drug traffickers have been sometimes let off by the Courts with nominal punishment. The country has for the last few years been increasingly facing the problem of transit traffic of drugs coming mainly from some of our neighbouring countries and destined mainly to Western countries. (ii) The existing Central laws do not provide for investing the officers of a number of important Central enforcement agencies like narcotics, customs, central excise etc. with the power of investigation of offences under the said laws. (iii) Since the enactment of the aforesaid three Centrals Act a vast body of international law in the field of narcotics control has evolved through various international treaties and protocols. The Government of India has been a party to these treaties and conventions which entail several obligations which are not covered or are only partly covered by the present Acts. (iv) During recent years new drugs of addiction which have come to be known as psychotropic substances have appeared on the scene and posed serious problems to national Governments. There is no comprehensive law to enable exercise of control over psychotropic substances in India in the manner as envisaged in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 to which India also has acceded. 2. There is no comprehensive law to enable exercise of control over psychotropic substances in India in the manner as envisaged in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 to which India also has acceded. 2. In view of what has been stated above, there is an urgent need for the enactment of a comprehensive legislation on narcotic drugs and pshcyotropic substances which, inter alia, should consolidate and amend the existing laws relating to narcotic drugs, strengthen the existing control over drug abuse, considerably enhance the penalties particularly for trafficking offences, make provisions for exercising effective control over psychotropic substances and make provisions for the implementation of international conventions relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to which India has become a party." 4. As in the working of the NDPS Act certain difficulties were being faced, Act No. 2 of 1989 through, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 2 of 1989") was passed to achieve the following objects:- "In recent years, India has been facing a problem to transit traffic in illicit drugs. The spill-over from such traffic has caused problems of abuse and addiction. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 provides deterrent punishments for drug trafficking offences. Even though the major offences are non-bailable by virtue of the level of punishment, on technical grounds, drugs offenders were being released on bail. In the light of certain difficulties faced in the enforcement of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the need to amend the law to further strengthen it, has been felt. 2.A Cabinet Sub-Committee which was constituted for combating drug traffic and preventing drug abuse, also made a number of recommendations for strengthening the existing law. In the light of the recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-Committee and the working of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, in the last three years, it is proposed to amend the said Act. 2.A Cabinet Sub-Committee which was constituted for combating drug traffic and preventing drug abuse, also made a number of recommendations for strengthening the existing law. In the light of the recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-Committee and the working of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, in the last three years, it is proposed to amend the said Act. These amendments, inter alia, provide for the following :- (i) to constitute a National Fund for Control of Drugs Abuse to meet the expenditure incurred in connection with the measures for combating illicit traffic and preventing drug abuse; (ii) to bring certain controlled substances which are used for manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances under the ambit of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and to provide deterrent punishment for violation thereof; (iii) to provide that no sentence awarded under the Act shall be suspended, remitted or commuted; (iv) to provide for pre-trial disposal of seized drugs; (v) to provide death penalty on second conviction in respect of specified offences involving specified quantities of certain drugs; (vi) to provide for forfeiture of property and a detailed procedure relating to the same; and (vii) to provide that the offences shall be cognizable and non-bailable." 5. It is through Act No. 2 of 1989 that Section 36 of the NDPS Act was substituted and Section 32-A of the NDPS Act amongst other sections was introduced, which alone would be relevant for the purposes of our discussion. In the NDPS Act, as passed in the year 1985, there was no provision for Special Courts which were constituted only after Amendment 2 of 1989 was brought on the Statute Book. Section 32-A of the NDPS Act reads as under :- "32-A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Section 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted." 6. By introducing Section 32-A of the NDPS Act, the legislature had also sought to abrogate the powers of remission and commutation of a sentence passed under the NDPS Act, which would ordinarily have been available under the Code of Criminal Procedure to the State as well as the powers of suspension of sentence during the pendency of appeals that vest in the Courts of law. It is not disputed before us that the import of Section 32-A of the NDPS Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Maktool Singhs case (supra) and Dadus case (supra) and in the latter case any controversy regarding the scope thereof inasmuch as it effected the powers of the Courts hearing appeals against conviction recorded by the Special Courts under the NDPS Act was set at rest. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after taking into consideration the judgment in Maktool Singhs case (supra) had observed that :- "24. Judged from any angle, the section in so far as it completely debars the appellate Courts from the power to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act cannot stand the test of constitutionality. Thus Section 32-A in so far as it ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to suspend the sentence awarded to convict under the Act is unconstitutional. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Allahabad High Court in Ram Charans case (supra) has correctly interpreted the law relating to the constitutional validity of the section and the judgment of Gujarat High Court in Ishwarsingh M. Rajputs case cannot be held to be good law." Before doing so, their Lordships had observed in para No. 17 as under :- "Not providing atleast one right of appeal, would negate the due process of law in the manner of dispensation of criminal justice. There is no doubt that the right of appeal is the creature of a statute and when conferred, a substantive right. Providing a right of appeal but totally disarming the Court from granting interim relief in the form of suspension of sentence would be unjust, unfair and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution particularly when no mechanism is provided for early disposal of the appeal. The pendency of criminal litigation and the experience in dealing with pending matters indicate no possibility of early hearing of the appeal and its disposal on merits atleast in many High Courts. The pendency of criminal litigation and the experience in dealing with pending matters indicate no possibility of early hearing of the appeal and its disposal on merits atleast in many High Courts. As the present is not the occasion to dilate on the causes for such delay, we restrain ourselves from that exercise. In this view of the matter, the appellate powers of the Court cannot be denuded by Executive or judicial process. This Court in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & others v. State of Gujarat, 1999(2) RCR(Crl.) 770 (SC) : AIR 1999 SC 1859 held that when a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and the Appellate Court finds that due to practical reasons the appeal cannot be disposed of expeditiously, it can pass appropriate orders for suspension of sentence. The suspension of the sentence by the Appellate Court has, however, to be within the parameters of the law prescribed by the Legislature or spelt out by the Courts by judicial pronouncements. The exercise of judicial discretion on well recognised principles is the safest possible safeguard for the accused which is at the very core of criminal law administered in India. The Legislature cannot, therefore, make law to deprive the Courts of their legitimate jurisdiction conferred under the procedure established by law." and in para 22 observed as under :- "A perusal of the agreement of the Convention to which India is claimed to be a party, clearly and unambiguously show that the Courts jurisdiction with respect to the offences relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances was never intended to be ousted taken away or curtailed. The Declaration was made, subject to "constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system prevalent in the polity of a member country." The intentional agreement emphasised that the Courts of the member countries shall always bear in mind the serious nature of offences sought to be tackled by the Declaration while considering the eventuality of early release or partly of persons convicted of such offences. There was no International Agreement to put a blanket ban on the power of the Court to suspend the sentence awarded to a criminal under the Act notwithstanding the constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system. It cannot be denied that judicial review in our country is the heart and soul of our constitutional scheme. There was no International Agreement to put a blanket ban on the power of the Court to suspend the sentence awarded to a criminal under the Act notwithstanding the constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system. It cannot be denied that judicial review in our country is the heart and soul of our constitutional scheme. The judiciary is constituted the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and is assigned the delicate task of determining the extent and scope of the powers conferred on each branch of the Government, ensuring that action of any branch does not transgress its limits. A Constitutional Bench of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, 1987(1) SCC 124, held that "it is also a basic principle of the Rules of Law which permeates very provision of the Constitution and which forms its very core and essence that the exercise of power by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution but also be in accordance with law and it is the judiciary which has to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This function is discharged by the judiciary by exercise of the power of judicial review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for maintenance of the Rule of Law. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no government of laws and the Rule of Law would become a teasing ullusion and a promise of unreality." Again in S.S. Bola and others v. B.D. Sardana and others, AIR 1999 SC 3127 it was reiterated that judicial review is the basic feature upon which hinges the checks and balances blended with hind sight in the Constitution as peoples sovereign power for their protection and establishment of egalitarian social order under the rule of law. The judicial review was, therefore, held to be an integral part of the Constitution as its basic structure. Similarly, the filing of an appeal, its adjudication and passing of appropriate interim orders is concededly a part of the legal system prevalent in our country." 7. The judicial review was, therefore, held to be an integral part of the Constitution as its basic structure. Similarly, the filing of an appeal, its adjudication and passing of appropriate interim orders is concededly a part of the legal system prevalent in our country." 7. However, after holding Section 32-A of the NDPS Act as void qua the rights of the Court to suspend the sentence their Lordships went on to observe that :- "25. Despite holding that Section 32-A is unconstitutional to the extent it affects the functioning of the criminal Courts in the country, we are not declaring the whole of the section as unconstitutional in view of our finding that the section, in so far as it takes away the right of the Executive to suspend, remit and commute the sentence, is valid and intra vires of the Constitution. The Declaration of Section 32-A to be unconstitutional, in so far as it affects the functioning of the Courts in the country, would render the whole of the section invalid, the restriction imposed by the offending section being distinct and severable. "26. Holding Section 32-A as void in so far as it takes away the right of the Courts to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act, would neither entitle such convicts to ask for suspension of the sentence as a matter of right in all cases nor would it absolve the Courts of their legal obligations to exercise the power of suspension of sentence within the parameters prescribed under Section 37 of the Act :- "37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for term of imprisonment for five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or his own bond unless - (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub- section (i) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail." This Court in Union of India v. Ram Samujh and another, 1999(9) SCC 429 : 1999(4) RCR(Crl.) 93 (SC) held that the jurisdiction of the Court to grant bail is circumscribed by the aforesaid section of the Act. The bail can be granted and sentence suspended in a case where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence for which convicted and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail and during the period of suspension of the sentence. The Court further held : "The aforesaid section is incorporated to achieve the object as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Bill No. 125 of 1988 thus : "Even though the major offences are non-bailable by virtue of the level of punishments on technical grounds, drug offends were being released on bail. In the light of certain difficulties faced in the enforcement of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 the need to amend the law to further strengthen it, has been felt." (emphasis supplied). It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits murder of one or two persons while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent, young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be lage stake and illega profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier v. Chief Secretary, Union Territory of Goa, 1990(1) SCC 95 as under : (SCC p. 104; para 24). "24. Reason may be lage stake and illega profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier v. Chief Secretary, Union Territory of Goa, 1990(1) SCC 95 as under : (SCC p. 104; para 24). "24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addition among the sizable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact, on the society as a whole, Parliament in its wisdom has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine." 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely :- (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, are satisfied." 27. Under the circumstances the writ petitions are disposed of by holding that (1) Section 32-A does not in any way affect the powers of the authorities to grant parole; (2) It is unconstitutional to the extent it takes away the right of the Court to suspend the sentence of a convict under the Act; (3) Nevertheless a sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the Appellate Court only and strictly subject to the conditions spelt out in Section 37 of the Act as dealt with in this judgment." The effect of the judgment was that it restored the powers of the Courts dealing with the appeals under the NDPS Act subject to the rider that before doing so they were obliged to ensure due compliance with the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. To this extent the Legislative enactment as contained in Section 32-A of the NDPS Act stood modified as per the decision of the Apex Court in Dadus case (supra) and thereafter the law as declared therein was henceforth required to be enforced as the law declared by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The fact that after this pronouncement the legislature has vide Act No. 9 of 2001 through the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 2001") chosen to intermeddle with the law as declared by the Apex Court in Dadus case (supra) shows legislative acceptance of the interpretation put forth by the Supreme Court. It was on account of this judgment that the High Court once again was able to take up and pass appropriate orders on applications filed by persons convicted under the NDPS Act for suspension of their sentences during the pendency of the appeals which they were entitled to file as the provisions contained in Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been made applicable to appeals and revisions under the NDPS Act by Section 36-B of the NDPS Act. Prior to the judgment such applications, which were required to be dealt with as per the provisions of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been abrogated by the enactment of Section 32-A of the Act. Since, it was only by the law declared by the Apex Court in Dadus case (supra) that the power of suspension of sentence, which normally vests in the appellate Court was revived, we are obliged to abide by the order imposed the judgment itself of scrutinising the application in the light of the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which reads as under :- "37. Offences to be congizable and non-bailable - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) - (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under Section 19 or Section 24 of Section 27-A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless - (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub- section (i) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail." A perusal of these provisions shows that as sub-clause (1)(b)(ii) of Section 37 of the NDPS Act evidently deals with a pre-trial stage, it would be difficult for the Court of appeal to record its satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the convict is not guilty of the offence of which he has been found to have committed at the initial stage before final hearing of the appeal. 9. It is not disputed before us that the purpose for which the NDPS Act was brought on the statute book was to curb the menace that was being faced by the World by uncontrolled and indiscriminate efforts of unscrupulous elements to propagate the consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It was with this end in view that not only deterrent punishments were provided but also an effort was made by the Legislature to reduce the possibility of the person suspected of violations of the NDPS Act go go back into the mainstream until the Court was convinced of the possibility of his being innocent and was reasonably satisfied of his not returning to his undesirable activities during the pendency of the trial. As originally enacted, the NDPS Act did not contain any guidelines of how the request of the appellant for suspension of sentence pending appeal was to be dealt with. As originally enacted, the NDPS Act did not contain any guidelines of how the request of the appellant for suspension of sentence pending appeal was to be dealt with. The Apex Court in Dadus case (supra) while restoring the power of suspension of sentence to Courts of law and holding that provisions of Section 32-A of the NDPS Act did not fetter the powers of the appellate Court to suspend the sentence has imposed restrictions on the exercise of powers by making it subject to compliance with the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. This was probably done because once the Legislature had enacted a provision which curtailed the powers of the executive to intermeddle with the suspension, remission and commutation of the sentence their Lordships of the Supreme Court had placed additional fetters on the inherent power of the appellate Court to suspend the sentence of persons, who had challenged their convictions before the appellate Court. It is with this background in mind that we have to interpret the restrictions incorporated on the powers of the appellate Court. 10. During the course of arguments our attention has been drawn to the interpretation placed by the Apex Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, 2005(2) Apex Crl. 389 (SC) : JT 2005(1) SC 123 wherein their Lordships while interpreting Section 21(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, which reads as under :- "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless : (a) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application of such release; and (b) where the public prosecutor opposes the application the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commity any offence while on bail." which deals with pre-trial stage, had observed as under :- "54. Section 21(4) of MCOCA does not make any distinction between an offence which entails punishment of life imprisonment and an imprisonment for a year or two. Section 21(4) of MCOCA does not make any distinction between an offence which entails punishment of life imprisonment and an imprisonment for a year or two. It does not provide that even in case a person remains behind the bars for a period exceeding three years, although his involvement may be in terms of Section 24 of the Act, the Court is prohibited to enlarge him on bail. Each case, therefore, must be considered on its own facts. The question as to whether he is involved in the commission of organised crime of abetment thereof must be judged objectively. Only because some allegations have been made against a high ranking officer, which cannot be brushed aside, may not by itself be sufficient to continue to keep him behind the bars although on an objective consideration the Court may come to the conclusion that the evidences against him are not such as would lead to his conviction. In case of circumstantial evidence like the present one, not only culpability or mens rea of the accused should be prima facie established, the Court must also, consider the question as to whether circumstantial evidence is such whereby all the links in the chain are complete. 55.The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the Court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not been committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the Court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the Legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA therefore must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the Court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the Court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of the committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in future must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Similarly, the Court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of the committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in future must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the Court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. 56. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail." 11. There can be no dispute with this proposition but one cannot lose sight of the fact that the Apex Court in Brahmajeetsingh Sharmas case (supra) was dealing with a provision which related to grant of bail during trial and not with regard to grant of bail post-conviction. We fail to see how the judgment of the Apex Court would help us to conclude that the law as enunciated by the Apex Court in relation to Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 would be applicable to the appeals filed against conviction under the NDPS Act. Section 37 of the NDPS Act will have to be applied differently when one is dealing with a bail application filed pending trial as against ones filed in appeals. What the Apex Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeesing Sharmas case (supra) has laid down are the guidelines for dealing with the bail applications during trial but these cannot be of any assistance regarding the post-trial stage where the accused already stands convicted. 12. Another angle, which may have to be taken into consideration, is the possibility of the appellant, if he is merely a small fish working as a carrier for the sharks in the trade, after his release going back to his controller and being employed in the same trade as he is now, would be able to avoid the pit-falls faced by him on the earlier occasion in a better manner. Unfortunately, the State does not have in position any machinery which would provide an alternative source of livelihood to such under trials/convicts, which would facilitate their return to the mainstream of civilised society. Thus, as already indicated by us, the magnitude of the menace must have been taken into consideration by the Legislature before providing the restrictions on the unfettered powers of remission, suspension and commutation, which are normally available with the executive and it is in view of this that a strict interpretation will have to be placed to the effect that the NDPS Act, as presently framed, does not provide for any post-conviction suspension of sentence as it would be inappropriate for the High Court to read into the judgment in Dadus case (supra) what is not explicitly provided for therein, even though the present interpretation may tend to render otiose the object sought to be achieved by the Apex Court that is restoring the power of suspension of sentence pending appeals. 13. While giving the interpretation, we are conscious of the fact that according to the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India a speedy trial is guaranteed by the State for all persons falling foul with law. Since an appeal is only an extension of the trial, the Courts of law would be obliged to ensure the expeditious disposal of the appeals and pass appropriate orders as and when they feel that the right of the convict to the guarantee provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is being interfered with. As and when any appellant move this Court, then taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, in case the delay in the disposal of the appeal is not attributable to the appellant himself, the Court may pass such orders as the appellant may be entitled in view of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The reference is answered accordingly. 14. Before parting with the judgment, we would request Honble the Chief Justice to consider the feasibility of constituting special Benches for dealing with cases under the NDPS Act. 15. A copy of the judgment be circulated amongst all the Judicial Officers in the States of Punjab and Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh for information and necessary action. Reference answered