R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER-BANGALORE Metropolitan Transport Corporation is before me challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 24-5-2000 passed in ID. No. 7 of 1992 ( 2 ) RESPONDENT-WORKMAN was taken as a badli conductor on daily wages w e f 1-2-1971 He was placed on probation from 18-11-1976. His performance was not satisfactory. He was discharged from service on 19-3-1980. This discharge was not challenged by the workman. Thereafter, he was appointed as a fresh candidate and he was placed on probation w. e. f. 28-8-1987. Respondent-workman accepted the appointment order as a fresh candidate. Thereafter, he raised a dispute in the year 1992 under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') with regard to extension of the benefit of time-scale of wages w. e. f 1-8-1971. He also sought for continuity of service and other monetary benefits flowing therefrom in terms of the reference made to the Labour Court. Parties filed their statements and counter statement, issues were framed and evidence was recorded. Thereafter, the Labour Court chooses to pass the following award:"the Reference under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial disputes Act is accepted. The order of discharge dated 19-3-1980 issued by the II party Corporation in KST:bts:est:g-2:13491:79-80 is ordered to be set aside. The I party is held to be deemed to have been reinstated back into service as probationer. The n party is directed to treat the I party as having been appointed to a permanent post on the date on which his immediate junior in the select list was appointed to a permanent post and refix his salary. On that date onwards, services of the I party shall count for all purposes for annual increments, seniority and consequential benefits etc. , I party is not entitled to any monetary benefits upto 17-8-1992 the date of reference. Consequential benefits are granted from 17-8-1992 to the I party. The II party shall verify the records and pass necessary order with regard to such deemed date of appointment of the I party i. e. , the date on which immediate junior of I party was appointed to a permanent post within one month from the date on which the award comes into force. The monetary benefits so calculated shall be paid to the I party within two months thereafter". The monetary benefits so calculated shall be paid to the I party within two months thereafter". This award is challenged by the workman in the case on hand. ( 3 ) SMT. Tapsi v Subbaiah, learned Counsel appears for the petitioner. Respondent is represented by Sri S. B. Mukkannappa, learned Counsel. Smt. Tapsi invites my attention to the material facts to say that the impugned award requires my interference. The learned Counsel says that the workman has accepted Annexure-A1 the re-employment order and that therefore, he cannot subsequently turn round and challenge the earlier order and seek benefits in the case on hand. Her further submission is that when the Labour Court as a matter of fact has chosen to answer the reference against the workman, it ought not to have granted any relief in the given circumstances. So also delay is fatal in the case on hand. ( 4 ) PER contra Sri Mukkannappa was at great pains to point out that the respondent workman is entitled for certain benefits in terms of the circular and he is entitled to benefits as applicable to other workmen. Notwithstanding Annexure-A he is entitled for benefits and that is what has been granted by the Labour Court. He supports the award. ( 5 ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel for the respective parties, I have carefully perused the impugned award and the material placed on record. ( 6 ) ADMITTED facts would reveal that the workman raised a dispute under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act questioning the fresh appointment w. e. f. 28-8-1987. When this reference was made, the Management challenged the said reference on various grounds including delay in the matter. Evidence was recorded. Labour Court in the impugned award has chosen to answer issue No. (i) in terms of the order of reference in para 7 holding that as far as time scale of wages is concerned, a local candidate or badli workman would be absorbed to the extent of permanent post subject to satisfactory service. Thus on 1-8-1971, the I party was not entitled to the time scale of wages as the said two requirements were not established. Having held so, the Labour Court has further chosen to consider the validity of the order of discharge dated 19-3-1980 for the purpose of grant of relief. Law is well-settled that Labour Courts and Tribunals are statutory bodies. Having held so, the Labour Court has further chosen to consider the validity of the order of discharge dated 19-3-1980 for the purpose of grant of relief. Law is well-settled that Labour Courts and Tribunals are statutory bodies. They are bound by the orders in reference. ( 7 ) SUPREME Court in Express Newspapers Limited v Their Workers and Staff and Others , has categorically ruled as under:"it is hardly necessary to emphasise that since the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in dealing with industrial dispute referred to it under Section 10 is limited by Section 10 (4) to the points specifically mentioned in the reference and matters incidental thereto, the appropriate Government should frame the relevant orders of reference carefully and the questions which are intended to be tried by the Industrial Tribunal should be so worded as to leave no scope for ambiguity or controversy". ( 8 ) IN the case on hand, there is no ambiguity in the reference. Reference is only with regard to time scale of wages w. e. f. 1-8-1971. Labour Court having answered in terms of para 7 ought to have gone through the circular to consider whether the discharge dated 19-3-1980 is justified or not. The subsequent finding/relief is beyond the scope of reference and the Labour Court could not have granted the relief in terms of Section 10 (1) (c ). In the circumstances, the learned Counsel is right that the impugned order is without jurisdiction. Her submission is accepted. ( 9 ) EVEN otherwise, admittedly the present petitioner, was taken back to duty in terms of appointment order in the year 1987. That order is not challenged. Benefits have been provided and the benefits have been accepted by the workman in terms of Annexure-A1. Having accepted annexure-A1 it is now not open to the workman to seek relief in terms of the benefit granted by the Labour Court. Labour Court even on merits has committed on error in granting the relief despite Annexure-Al. It is also seen that the petitioner has chosen to claim benefits from the year 1971 in a reference of the year 1992. Law is fairly well-settled that such claims cannot be entertained in terms of various judgments on the point. Labour Court even on merits has committed on error in granting the relief despite Annexure-Al. It is also seen that the petitioner has chosen to claim benefits from the year 1971 in a reference of the year 1992. Law is fairly well-settled that such claims cannot be entertained in terms of various judgments on the point. Supreme Court has recently considered stage claims in The Nedungadi bank Limited v K. P. Madhavankutty and Others and ruled that if no time-limit was prescribed, it did not mean that power can be exercised at any point of time. In the case on hand, the Labour Court comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient delay in the matter. Even thereafter, the Labour Court by misdirecting itself in regard to the issue regarding validity of the order dated 19 has chosen to grant the relief in the case on hand. Looking at it from any angle, the award does not stand the test of law. The award has to be set aside and I do so in the case on hand. In the result, this petition is accepted The impugned order is set aside. However, liberty is reserved to the workman to work out his remedy insofar as any benefits made available under the circular dated 1-10-1986. Ordered accordingly. No costs. --- *** --- .