JUDGMENT 1. The instant second appeal has been preferred by the appellant/ plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree dated 12-9-2002 passed by Additional District Judge, Raigarh in Civil Appeal No. 50-A/2002 by which the judgment and decree dated 27-3-2002 passed by the Civil Judge Class I Raigarh in Civil Suit No. 8-A/2002 for eviction has been set aside and the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed. The case of the plaintiff before the trial Court was that he was the owner of the suit property situated in Raigarh which was given to the defendant/respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- for residential purpose. Earlier the plaintiff was residing with his brother Ram Kumar Agrawal. However, with the passage of time as the family grew up and it was not possible for the plaintiff to accommodate all the family members in the said house, he required the suit accommodation bona fidely for his residence. It is further pleaded by the plaintiff that there is no other reasonably suitable alternative residential accommodation available with the plaintiff in Raigarh Town. It was also the case of the plaintiff before the trial Court that the defendant did not vacate the suit premises despite the oral requests and rather he stopped paying rent to the plaintiff. This apart, the plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant made alteration and addition in the suit property without the permission of the plaintiff. He also filed an application under section 25 of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act (hereafter referred to as Act for convenience) and hence the suit was filed by the plaintiff. 2. The defendant denied the plaint allegations and stated that the plaintiff does not require the suit accommodation bona fidely. It was further submitted by the defendant that the when the plaintiff stopped receiving rent through money order, an application under section 25 of the act was filed and the rent was deposited in the Court. It was further submitted by the defendant that the plaintiff is possessed of number of houses in Raigarh Town and the accommodation in which the plaintiff was residing along with his son is sufficient for his residence. Defendant further pleaded that the suit was filed by the plaintiff with a view to enhance the rent and thus harass the defendant. 3. Defendant further pleaded that the suit was filed by the plaintiff with a view to enhance the rent and thus harass the defendant. 3. Subsequently, the defendant amended the written/statement by incorporating paragraph 9-A by which it was pleaded that the rent has been deposited by him in the Court. Written statement was further amended by the defendant on 29-4-1993 by incorporating paragraph 9-B and it was pleaded that during pendency of the suit the plaintiff had obtained vacant possession of another identical house adjacent to the suit house in May 1993. It was further pleaded that during the pendency of the suit itself the plaintiff had given another accommodation measuring 8000 sq. ft. on rent to Adarsh Gyan Ganga School. In addition to this, it was also pleaded by the defendant that during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff had also obtained vacant possession of another suit house which was let out to one Abdul Salam Ansari in execution of the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 61-A/1987, on the ground of bona fide requirement for his residence. 4. However, the plaintiff also amended the plaint and denied the allegations made by the defendant by way of amendment in the written statement, and stated that he had obtained the possession of another suit house in execution of the judgment and decree dated 1-12-1986 passed in Civil Suit No. 152-A/1986 for non residential purpose for the office of his son namely Shiv Kumar and the other accommodation which was let out to adarsh Gyan Ganga School is not fit for his residence as it was used for the purpose of godown in the past. The plaintiff also pleaded that the third house mentioned by the defendant is situated in the third floor which is also not sufficient for the plaintiff for his residence. Apart from the aforesaid accommodations it appears that the defendant has also mentioned certain other accommodations belonging to the plaintiff. The, in addition to the suit accommodation, the' plaintiff was having the possession of number of other accommodations which however has been denied by the plaintiff on the ground that the above accommodations have already been given on rent and the plaintiff is not in possession of those accommodations. 5. The, in addition to the suit accommodation, the' plaintiff was having the possession of number of other accommodations which however has been denied by the plaintiff on the ground that the above accommodations have already been given on rent and the plaintiff is not in possession of those accommodations. 5. Learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff by recording a finding that the suit accommodation is bona fidely required for the residence of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was not in possession of any other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in Raigarh Town except the suit house. The trial Court also recorded a finding to the effect that the defendant made addition and alteration in the suit house without prior permission of the plaintiff and thus on this ground also the plaintiff is entitled for the decree for eviction. 6. The trial Court also held that the plaintiff is residing in the accommodation with his wife, son, daughter in law land three children in the first floor of Arya Niwas building and that the latrine and bathroom are situated in the ground floor and taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff was a heart patient and he underwent by pass surgery, the said accommodation was not suitable for his residence and thus it was held that the requirement of the plaintiff was, bona fide for his own residence. The alternative accommodation available with the plaintiff has been held by the trial court to be unsuitable on the ground that the house adjacent to the suit house was got vacated for the office of his son whereas the other accommodation was very small and the purpose of the plaintiff would not be served with that accommodation and on the aforesaid reasoning it has been held that the plaintiff was a sick person and therefore hb was in bona fide requirement of the suit house. It was also held that the other accommodation available with the plaintiff will not serve the purpose of his residence. Thus it has been held that the plaintiff had no other reasonably alternative suitable accommodation in Raigarh Town. 7. It was also held that the other accommodation available with the plaintiff will not serve the purpose of his residence. Thus it has been held that the plaintiff had no other reasonably alternative suitable accommodation in Raigarh Town. 7. Learned trial Court also recorded a finding that without prior permission of the plaintiff the defendant made alteration and additions by replacing the wooden doors of the house by iron doors as the wooden doors were damaged while fixing the iron angles in place of wooden rafters and further by increasing the height of the boundary wall and constructing a new latrine in the suit house. Thus on this ground the issue No. has been Decided against the defendant. 8. The defendant preferred an appeal before the learned first Additional District Judge against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and the first appellate court allowed the appeal by recording a finding that the plaintiff had equal alternative reasonably suitable accommodation adjacent to the suit house and that the plaintiff himself has admitted the availability of that accommodation. The first appellate has also recorded a finding that the plaintiff in his deposition has not stated that the available accommodation is not fit for his residence and thus the ground of the plaintiff that he does not have any alternative accommodation in his possession in Raigarh Town is not available to the plaintiff. The first appellate has also recorded a finding that the plaintiff in his deposition has not stated that the available accommodation is not fit for his residence and thus the ground of the plaintiff that he does not have any alternative accommodation in his possession in Raigarh Town is not available to the plaintiff. The other ground on which learned trial Court decreed the suit is that the defendant by making substantial changes in the suit accommodation, was liable to be evicted from the suit house has been negatived by the appellate Court on the ground that by the alleged changes i.e. by replacing the damaged wooden doors with the iron doors and wooden rafters with iron angles and raising the height of the boundary wall and by constructing a new latrine, the defendant had not made any such construction which has materially altered of the nature of the accommodation to the detriment of the interest of the landlord or it was likely to diminish the value of the same substantially, which is necessary for eviction under section 12 (1) (m), and it can not be said that by the above act the defendant has caused or permitted to be caused substantial damages to the suit accommodation and thus the findings of the trial court that he decree of eviction should be passed, has been set aside by the first Appellate court. 9. The third ground raised by the appellant that by amending the written statement the defendant has denied the ownership of the plaintiff and thus the plaintiff was not entitled for the decree of eviction under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act has also been negatived by the first appellate Court as also by the trial Court on the ground that the defendant himself has admitted in the written statement the tenancy and he has also admitted the defendant as his landlord in paragraph3 of the written statement and therefore, argument of the plaintiff that the decree under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act ought to have been passed, has not been accepted. 10. 10. Leaned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first Appellate Court has arrived at the erroneous conclusion on the basis of the pleadings contained in paragraph 9-B of the written statement and the reply of the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiff was in possession of another identical accommodation adjacent to the suit house. However, this finding of fact is erroneous inasmuch as the house in question was given on rent by the plaintiff to the District Central Co-operative Printing Press for non residential purposes and the same was got vacated by the plaintiff for the purpose of office of his son which required sufficient repair work and therefore, it can not be said that the plaintiff was in possession of alternative reasonably suitable accommodation and therefore, he does not require the suit accommodation for his residential purpose. 11. In view of the submissions of the counsel for the appellant, the material available on record regarding the availability of alternative suitable accommodation with the plaintiff has to be examined first. From the perusal of the material available on record it appears as under: (a) The fact that the plaintiff was having a vacant accommodation in his possession adjacent to the suit accommodation was brought on record for the first time by the defendant by amending the written statement on 29-4-1993 that the plaintiff was in possession of the said premises from May 1991 in execution of the judgment and decree dated 1-12-1986 vide paragraph 9-B of the written statement. The plaintiff amended the plaint and incorporated a pleading on 17 -6-93 and admitted the vacant possession of the other house but stated that the house in question was let out on rent to the District Central co-operative printing press which had been got vacated for the purpose of non residential purpose for opening the office for his son and the same was lying vacant. The plaintiff in paragraph 9 of his deposition has stated thus: "It is true that the house adjacent to the suit house was given to the Co-operative Bank on rent and vacant possession of the same has been obtained through the Court. It was obtained for the purpose of office of his son namely Shiv Kumar. It is true that the suit house and the adjacent vacant house are equal in measurement. It was obtained for the purpose of office of his son namely Shiv Kumar. It is true that the suit house and the adjacent vacant house are equal in measurement. However, in paragraph 8 of the deposition the plaintiff has stated that his son does not do any business" . 12. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned first Appellate Court has correctly arrived at the conclusion that there was identical suitable accommodation of equal measurement available to the plaintiff at Raigarh town just adjacent to the suit house and for the aforesaid reasons the contention of the plaintiff that he does not have the alternative accommodation available in Raigarh town and therefore defendant should be evicted from the suit accommodation is not made out, is based on correct appreciation of the evidence and the same does not call for any interference. He further submits that even other wise the conduct of the plaintiff is not bona fide, inasmuch as right from the filing of the suit or subsequent thereto the plaintiff never disclosed that he possessed number of accommodations in Raigarh town and possession of some other accommodation was obtained by him during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff did not even state of his own that during the pendency of the suit he had given the accommodation 'on rent to Adarsh Gyan Ganga School. All these facts were however subsequently explained by the plaintiff by way of amendment and in view of the above facts the contention of the plaintiff that he needs the suit accommodation bona fidely for residential purpose is not acceptable. 13. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 14. This appeal had been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: "Whether the first appellate court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial court dated 27-03-2002 and holding that in the facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff/appellant herein has failed to prove the personal reasonable and bona fide necessity of the disputed premises" ? "Whether the first Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court and holding that the plaintiff/appellant herein failed to prove that the defendant/respondent herein has without written permission materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest" ? 15. "Whether the first Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court and holding that the plaintiff/appellant herein failed to prove that the defendant/respondent herein has without written permission materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest" ? 15. Counsel for the appellant relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of P.S. Pareed Kaka and others Vs. Shafee Ahmed Saheb, and in the matter of Akhileshwar Kumar and other Vs. Mustaquim and other, and in the matter of Bhojraj Ramesh Chandra Vs. Ghanshyam Das Agrawal, and submits that once it is proved that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, choice of accommodation which would satisfy his requirement should be left to landlords as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and other (supra). However, the learned first Appellate Court on the basis of material available on record and further on the basis of the statement of the plaintiff that identical accommodation of same measurement adjacent to the Suit accommodation was got vacated for the office of his son and further considering the fact that the said house is lying vacant for last so many years it has been held that the contention of the plaintiff that he requires the suit house bona fidely, is not made out. In the judgment referred to by the appellant in the matter of Akhileshwar Kumar and other (supra); the Supreme court has held that choice of the appellant can not be interfered with, however, the choice must be reasonable and not whimsical. 16. There is no explanation by the plaintiff/landlord in his statement on oath in paragraph 9 as to why the alternative accommodation available in his possession can not satisfy his requirement for the purpose of his residence and under what circumstances the same is lying vacant for last 12-13 years as stated by the defendant. 16. There is no explanation by the plaintiff/landlord in his statement on oath in paragraph 9 as to why the alternative accommodation available in his possession can not satisfy his requirement for the purpose of his residence and under what circumstances the same is lying vacant for last 12-13 years as stated by the defendant. However; the judgment relied upon by the appellant in the matter of Bojraj Ramesh Chandra (supra), the alternative accommodation available with the landlord of that case was an open plot whereas in the present case the alternative accommodation available to the -plaintiff is identical to that of the suit accommodation and that too of the 'same measurement and therefore, the said judgment is of no help to the plaintiff However, in the Case of P.S Pareed Kaka and others (supra) the Issue was not of the availability of the alternative accommodation, 17. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the available alternative accommodation was got vacated by the plaintiff for the purpose of business of his son and as such the same was not residential accommodation. 18. The plaintiff has nowhere stated in his deposition that the alternative accommodation available with him was a non-residential accommodation, On the other hand the defendant has categorically stated in paragraph 15 of his deposition that the house in question was got vacated from the Co-operative Bank but prior to the Co-operative Bank tenants were residing in the said house and It was lying vacant for last 12-13 years: 19. Learned appellate court. relying on the admission of the plaintiff that he, was having alternative suitable accommodation has held that the plaintiff does not require the suit accommodation bonafidely and dismissed the suit. 20. Thus considering the material available on record, the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court, call for no interference and thus the question No.1 is decided against the appellant/plaintiff. 21. As far as the second question of law that the defendant! tenant made material alteration in the suit property without the permission of the plaintiff/appellant is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Court below has correctly arrived at the conclusion that the tenant had raised the height of the boundary wall, replaced the wooden shutters by that of steel shutters, replaced wooden rafters by that of iron angles and. thereby effected material alteration without the written permission of the landlord and for this reason he has been rightly evicted under section 12(1)(m) of the Act. 22. However, learned counsel for the respondent relying upon the judgment in the matter of S.S. Nirmalchand Vs. M/s Munnalal Motilal through Ghasiram Samaiya submitted that the land lord is required to prove that the alteration made by the defendant is detrimental to his interest. It is not enough for the landlord to state that the material alterations were done without his prior permission but it has further to be shown that the alteration had resulted in the detriment to the interest of the landlord or the value of the accommodation has thereby diminished or likely to be diminished substantially. However, the material alterations in the suit accommodation admitted by the defendant in no way can be considered that it has resulted in the detriment to the interest of the landlord. In fact, by the above alteration the value of the suit accommodation has increased. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Pratap Narayan and others Vs. District Judge Ajamgarh and another and submitted that the suit for eviction can not be decreed unless it was found that the alteration resulted in diminishing the value of the accommodation and thus in this case the plaintiff has not been able to make out the ground for eviction under section 12 (1) (m) of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the finding of bona fide requirement of the plaintiff/landlord is a finding of fact and the learned first Appellate court has correctly arrived at theconc1usion that the plaintiff was possessed of alternative suitable accommodation just adjacent to the suit house and the same can not be interfered with by way of second appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dinanath Vs. Puranlal wherein it is held that bona fide requirement of the landlord is a statutory requirement and there must be an actual pressing need, not a mere whim or fanciful desire and it must be in praesenti and also the landlord must not be in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. Thus learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the plaintiff had reasonably suitable alternative accommodation just adjacent to the suit house and therefore his need for the suit house can not be bona fide. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the respondent and his son both are physically handicapped and they are living in the suit accommodation for last 35 years and the plaintiff had filed the instant suit by suppressing the fact of availability of number of other accommodations with him in Raigarh town which was subsequently brought to the notice of the trial Court by the defendant by way of amendment in the written statement. Thus, according to the counsel for the respondent the act of the plaintiff was not bona fide right from the inception. 24. Thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the learned first Appellate Court by the impugned judgment has correctly held that the plaintiff has failed to prove the bona fide requirement of the suit accommodation for his residential purpose and that the material alteration made by the defendant in the suit accommodation without the permission of the landlord is to the detriment of the interest of the plaintiff and thus has not committed any illegality in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, which calls for any interference by this court in the second appeal. 25. As a result, there is no substance in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. 26. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.