ORDER 1. This order shall decide an application tiled by the appellant under Order 41, Rule 3(A) r/w section 151 CPC and section 5 of the Limitation Act alongwith the appeal memo against the judgment and preliminary decree vide dated 3.5.2000 passed by District Judge, Bhopal, in Civil Original Suit No. 57-A/99. 2. The material facts for disposal of this application are that the respondents No.1 to 5 being plaintiffs had filed a suit against appellant for declaration, possession and perpetual injunction in respect of landed property situated at village Chuna Bhatti, Bhopal. The same was decreed by the trial Court vide aforesaid judgment, in pursuance of it preliminary decree was also drawn up. It is not in dispute that appeal against the same was not preferred within prescribed limitation while it is preferred at belated stage alongwith IA No. 4282/02, the application for condonation of delay. 3. According to its contention, on passing of the aforesaid decree appellant approached her counsel for filing the appeal, he then advised no appeal is provided under the law against such decree so appeal was not preferred within time. But at subsequent stage, on consulting Senior Advocate Shri S.C. Godha, she was advised to file the appeal as such decree was appealable then appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment and decree on 2.7.2002, the same was obtained on 3.7.2002 and given to said senior counsel for tiling the appeal. The appeal alongwith this application is preferred after more than two years. As per appellant, the delay was caused due to wrong advice of the counsel. If the same is not condoned then appellant has to suffer irreparable loss. As per further averments of it, the said cause is bona fide and sufficient for condoning the delay. Some other contentions regarding merits of the matter have also been mentioned in it. The application is further supported by an affidavit of appellant. Said application and affidavit have been signed on 10.11.2002. 4. After filing the reply of it on behalf of the respondents appellant has submitted in addition two more affidavits one of herself and another of Shri C.R. Dutta which were sworn on 2.1.2004. In both the affidavits some more factual matrix have been described which were not mentioned in the application and earlier affidavit. 4. After filing the reply of it on behalf of the respondents appellant has submitted in addition two more affidavits one of herself and another of Shri C.R. Dutta which were sworn on 2.1.2004. In both the affidavits some more factual matrix have been described which were not mentioned in the application and earlier affidavit. As such subsequent affidavit have been submitted just to rebut the objection of the respondents as raised in reply. 5. By filing reply to it dated 19.3.2003, respondents have stated that the grounds for condonation of delay in tiling the appeal as mentioned by the appellant are not cogent or sufficient to grant the relief as prayed by the appellant. It is also said that grounds made by the appellant in application are very vague as appellant has not mentioned the specific date on which he approached the then counsel who advised her that the appeal is not provided under the law. The affidavit of such counsel and the said senior counsel who advised for appeal have also not been tiled in support of the contention. The averments of the appellant are misconceived and devoid of any substance. It is further contended that in pursuance of the said decree respondents initiated an execution proceedings before the trial Court, registered as 57-A/1994 in which counsel for the appellant has given appearance on 8.12.2000 subsequent to it in execution of decree the commission was directed and executed which is evident from the proceedings of execution dated 28.2.2002. The photocopy of such proceedings has also been annexed with reply. This reply is further supported by affidavit of Jairam Yadav, the respondent No.3. 6. Subsequent to this reply on filing additional affidavits by the appellant these respondents have also tiled an affidavit of said Jairam Yadav dated 12.2.2004 to rebut the averments of additional affidavits of the appellant. 7. On hearing learned counsel for appellant has advanced all aforesaid grounds and circumstances as mentioned in the application and affidavits. In addition to that he also submitted that delay has not been caused voluntarily or with mala fide intention but the same was caused due to wrong advise of her counsel. He also submitted that due to mistake or fault of her Advocate she should not be deprived from hearing on merits of the appeal. In addition to that he also submitted that delay has not been caused voluntarily or with mala fide intention but the same was caused due to wrong advise of her counsel. He also submitted that due to mistake or fault of her Advocate she should not be deprived from hearing on merits of the appeal. It was also said that appellant has put forth entire account and explanation in respect of delay in filing the appeal. The sufficient cause for condonation of delay be construed with liberal and justice oriented approach. He also cited decided cases of this Court (a) in the matter of Union of India v. Poorti Metal Industries reported in 2005(2) Vidhi Bhasvar 15=2005(2) MPLJ Page 474(b) in the matter of Jahur Bi (Smt.) v. Altaf Hussain reported in 2003 Volume (II) MPWN 6 (N), (c) in the matter of Ashok v. Bank of India and others reported in 2005(2) MPLJ 340 . 8. While, other hand, senior counsel for the respondents Smt. Shobha Menon has submitted that at the initial stage in the impugned application no specific factual circumstance with all necessary particulars like dates of events just to show as sufficient cause for condonation of delay has not been mentioned, the initial affidavit in support of it is also vague. The appellant has not put forth the account or explanation regarding day to day delay till filing the appeal. Even after obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree on dated 3.7.2002 this appeal was preferred on 12.11.2002 such period have also not been explained and whatsoever explanation has been given by subsequent affidavit is firstly not bona fide and secondly even on consideration of the same those do not explain or give any account regarding day to day delay after obtaining the said certified copies. She also submitted although the law for condonation of delay is liberal as settled by various authorities but it is not so liberal up to such extent where the initial application itself do not speak or explain the sufficient cause regarding delay inspite it the party like appellant may be benefited by condoning the delay only on the basis of liberal view of the Court. Every provision of law has its own effect and no provision of law could be ignored. Every provision of law has its own effect and no provision of law could be ignored. As per her submission, as soon as the limitation for tiling the appeal was expired immediately thereafter a legal right has been accrued in favour of the respondents and such right could not be disturbed in the absence of any cogent, explained and considerable sufficient cause. She also referred the factual matrix of the case that the judgment and impugned decree was passed on 3.5.2000 subsequent to it an execution proceeding was initiated by the respondent in which on 8.12.2000 the counsel for the appellant has given appearance and participated in all further proceedings. As per appellant on 27.6.2002 she consulted to Senior Advocate Shri Godha why she has not consulted earlier for this no reason has been supplied. Thus, the reason mentioned by the appellant that due to wrong advice or lack of proper advice of the counsel (who is still contesting the execution proceedings) could not be a ground for sufficient cause in the absence of the affidavit of such Advocate in this regard. The same has not been filed to show the bona fide of the appellant. The delay in between 27.6.2002 to 12.11.2002 the period from consultation to senior advocate and tiling the appeal has also not been explained. Even the affidavit of such counsel has also not been filed to show the bona fide of the appellant. In the absence of it such averments relating to advocates could not be relied mere on contention of the appellant and her deponent D.R. Dutta. As such, the appeal has been filed hopelessly barred by time without showing any sufficient cause for condoning the same and prayed for dismissal of this application and consequently the appeal also. 9. In view of the submissions of the respective counsels for the parties for its proper consideration I have carefully gone through the averments of the application and all the affidavits as submitted by appellant as well as reply and all affidavits of respondents. It is not in dispute that the preliminary decree was passed on 3.5.2000 thereafter within prescribed limitation for tiling the appeal no steps were taken by appellant to tile the same. It is not in dispute that the preliminary decree was passed on 3.5.2000 thereafter within prescribed limitation for tiling the appeal no steps were taken by appellant to tile the same. On dated 8.12.2000 in the execution proceedings, initiated by respondents, the appearance was given on behalf of the appellant through Advocate Shri Awadh Narayan who was her advocate in original suit also. Appellant has participated through advocate in the execution proceedings even on all subsequent dates as it is evident from the proceedings, why the advice was not taken from senior counsel in between 3.5.2000 the date of decree up to 27.6.2002 the date of consultation of senior advocate. I have not found any explanation on record regarding aforesaid period. 10. Thus, merely the allegation against the Advocate that he advised that appeal is not provided under law against the preliminary decree could not be a sufficient cause. The ignorance of law is not excused as per settled position of the law. Besides this, in the absence of the affidavit of Shri Awadh Narayan Advocate, who remained counsel for the appellant even in execution, such reason could not be believed because by alleging something against Advocate without prima facie proof like hia ffidavit appellant could not get any relief or benefit. 11. Apart from this, appellant has not shown any sufficient cause regarding delay from 3.7.2002 on which she obtained said certified copies to 12.11.2002 on which appeal was preferred which is also a period of more than 3 months. Even if the limitation is counted from the date of obtaining copies then the appeal is not preferred within time. It is also notable that in support of the contention regarding consultation with Senior Advocate on 27.6.2002 and subsequent consultation to him by the appellant have not been supported by the affidavit of such counsel. So such averments are also not reliable. Thus, the cause or reason as mentioned and argued by the appellant are not found to be correct or bona fide much less the sufficient cause in the absence of it the Court has no option except to dismiss the application for condonation of the delay in tiling the appeal. 12. This case is also examined in view of the provision under Article 116 of the Limitation Act which reads as under: 116. 12. This case is also examined in view of the provision under Article 116 of the Limitation Act which reads as under: 116. Under the Code of Procedure, 1908 -- (a) to a High Court from Ninety days The date of the decree any decree or order or order (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx 13. In view of the aforesaid provisions, this appeal ought to have been filed within ninety days from the date of the decree, which was very well in the knowledge of the appellant from the very day on which it was passed. Thus, in the absence of sufficient cause no delay can be condoned as prayed by appellant. 14. So far citation as cited by appellant are concerned the aforesaid case M/s. Poorti Metal Industries (supra) is based on Arbitration Act in which implied consent was given by other side for condonation of delay subject to filing the application and imposing of the costs. In the case of Jahur Bi (Smt.) (supra), the delay was condoned due to old age of the appellant who was under the medical treatment and the ex parte decree was passed against her but in the case at hand neither other side has given consent for allowing the application nor ex parte decree has been passed. In the case of Ashok (supra), the appeal was preferred against ex parte decree and notice of the suit was not found to be served on appellant in accordance with procedure and the case was decided. Such circumstances are not available in the case at hand. Thus, the aforesaid all cases are distinguishable not only on factual circumstances but also on law as laid down in those case. Thus, these are not helping to the appellant. 15. In the available circumstances the principles laid down by the apex Court in the matter of Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 is very relevant in which it is held as under: "7. In construing S.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In construing S.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan [ILR 18 Mad. 269]. Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood, the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputation to the appellant." 16. In view of the aforesaid decision of the apex Court the valuable right which has already been accrued in favour of the respondent on expiry of limitation for appeal cannot be disturbed on the basis of flimsy or baseless or unexplained grounds. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the negligence and inaction of the appellant are apparent who tiled the appeal after more than two years without showing proper and cogent explanation of delay while she was remained under the advice of the counsel as execution proceedings was contesting by her. 17. Thus, in view of the foregoing aforesaid reasons, I have not found any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Thus, the aforesaid IA 4282/02 tiled by appellant under Order 41 Rule 3(A) read with section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 151 CPC deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Consequently, this appeal is also dismissed as barred by time. Thus, the aforesaid IA 4282/02 tiled by appellant under Order 41 Rule 3(A) read with section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 151 CPC deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Consequently, this appeal is also dismissed as barred by time. There shall be no orders as to costs.