ORDER 2.02.2005 Heard Mr. J. Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. J. Mohanty, learned counsel for the Opp.Party. By Means of this writ petition, the petitioners are claiming party with the Revised Pay Scale granted to Mechanic Grade-I under the establishment of opposite party. The petitioners are working as Fitter Grade-I in Orissa Mining Corporation. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that earlier the Pay Scale to Fitter Grade-I was Rs.370/- to Rs.630/- and the same Pay scale was granted to the post of Grade-I Mechan¬ic and the same was revised in the year 1985 from Rs.935/- to Rs.1530/-. But later on when another revision of Pay scale was made, the post of Fitter Grade-I was not given the pay scale equivalent to the revised pay scale of Mechanic Grade-I. Being aggrieved they have made representation, but in vain. Thereafter the instant writ petition has been filed. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the nature and duties of both the posts i.e. Fitter Grade-I and Mechanic Grade-I are different. They also do not form one cadre. Further the post of Mechanic Grade-I is a promotional post while the post of Fitter Grade-I is a promotion¬al post filled up by direct recruitment as per Orissa Mining Corporation Recruitment and Promotion Rule 1976. He has further submitted that the quali¬fications of these posts are also different and as such the petitioners cannot claim parity with the pay scale granted to Mechanic Grade-I. He has also submitted that the pay scales have been revised on the basis of the recommendation of the Anomaly Committee that was an expert body in the field of revision of pay scale and the opp.party on principle had agreed to implement the recommendation of the Anomaly Committee. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the educational qualification for the post of Fitter Grade-I is Matric while for the post of Mechanic Grade-I is only under Matric.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the educational qualification for the post of Fitter Grade-I is Matric while for the post of Mechanic Grade-I is only under Matric. On this the learned counsel for the opposite party has drawn the attention of this Court towards paragraph 10 of the Counter Affidavit in which it has been specifically mentioned that for the post of Fitter Grade-I the minimum qualification prescribed is ITI trade certificate with five years experience but for the post of Mechanic Grade-II the minimum requisite qualification is ITI trade certificate with 7 years experience and for Mechanic Grade-I it is ITI Trade certificate with 12 years experience and that too not on direct recruitment, but on promotion. Therefore, the learned counsel for the Opp.party has submitted that there can be no parity of the pay scale of Fitter Grade-I and Mechanic Grade-I. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the case of M.P. Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Association Vs. State of M.P. and Another reported in (2004) II LLJ III 4 SC in which the Apex Court has held that the applicability of doctrine of equal pay for equal work on the touch stone of Article 39(d) with Article 14 of the Constitution of India will have to be considered for the purpose of the present case on the premise that save and except disparity in educational qualification, the nature of work performed by Extension Officers is identical and they had undergone a similar training. It has been further laid down that when the recommendations are made by a Pay Commission, evaluation of job must be held to have been made but the same by itself may not be a ground to enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto and made rules to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot be said to arbitrary or discriminatory. In the instant matter, the opposite party has on principle accepted the recommendation of the Anomaly Committee in toto and therefore the above mentioned case law cited by the learned coun¬sel for the petitioners is of no support to the case of the peti¬tioner.
In the instant matter, the opposite party has on principle accepted the recommendation of the Anomaly Committee in toto and therefore the above mentioned case law cited by the learned coun¬sel for the petitioners is of no support to the case of the peti¬tioner. In the case of State of U.P. and others-vs.- J.P. Chaurasia and others reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 19 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “17. The first question regarding entitlement to the pay scale admissible to Section Officers should not detain us longer. The answer to the question depends upon several factors. It does not just depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secretaries. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts. More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance. The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by relying upon aver¬ments in affidavits of interested parties. The question of posts or equation of pay must be left to the Executive Government. it must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commissioner. They would be the best judges to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the Court should normally accept it. The Court should not try to tinker with such equivalent unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration. 18. In the present case, it is true that at one time, Bench Secretaries were paid more emoluments than Section Officers. But it is not known on what basis they are paid in the higher pay scale and treated as a superior class to Section Officers. The successive Pay Commissions and even Pay Rationalization Commit¬tee, however, found no support to their superior claim. The commission and Committee have evaluated the respective duties and responsibilities of the two posts. It was found that Section Officers perform onerous duties and bear greater responsibilities than Bench Secretaries. We cannot go against the opinion and indeeed we must accept that opinion. The Bench Secretaries, therefore, cannot claim as of right the pay scale admissible to Section Officers.” 28. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work”.
It was found that Section Officers perform onerous duties and bear greater responsibilities than Bench Secretaries. We cannot go against the opinion and indeeed we must accept that opinion. The Bench Secretaries, therefore, cannot claim as of right the pay scale admissible to Section Officers.” 28. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work”. This article and other like provisions in the Directive Principles are “conscience of our Constitution.” They are rooted in social justice. They were intended to bring about a socio-economic transformation in our society. As observed by Hedge and Mukherjee, JJ. in Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Karalla (1973) 4 SCC 225 at Para 712: ( AIR 1973 SC 1451 at Para 728): The Constitution seeks to fulfill the basic needs of the common man and to change the structure of society.” In the words of Shelat and Grover, JJ. (At Para 596) (Of SCC) : (at Para 613 of AIR): “The dominant objective in view was to ameliorate and improve the lot of the common man and to bring about a socio-economic justice”. In matters of employment the Government of a socialist State must protect the weaker Sections. It must be ensured that there is no exploitation of poor and ignorant. It is the duty of the State to see that the under privileged or weaker Sections get their dues. Even if they have voluntarily accepted the employment on unequal terms, the State should not deny their basic rights of equal treatment. it is against this background that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” has to be con¬strued in the first place. Second, this principle has no mechani¬cal application in every case of similar work. It has to be read into Art. 14 of the Constitution. Art.14 permits reasonable classification founded on different basis. It is now well estab¬lished that the classification can be based on some qualities or characteristic of persons grouped together and not in others who are left out. Those qualities or characteristics must, of course have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration. He or she learns also by experience as much as by other means.
Those qualities or characteristics must, of course have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration. He or she learns also by experience as much as by other means. It cannot be denied that the quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is superior than the work of newcomers. Even in Randhir Singh’s case ( AIR 1982 SC 879 ), this principle has been recognized. O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that the classifica¬tion of officers into two grades with different pay based either on academic qualification or experience on length of service is sustainable. Apart from that, higher any scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very common in career service. There is selection grade for District Judges. There is senior time scale in Indian Administrative Service. There is super time scale in other like services. The entitlement to the higher pay scales depends upon seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority. The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination. The classification based on experience is a reasonable classification. It has a rational nexus with the object thereof. To hold otherwise, it would be detrimental to the interest of the service itself. In the case of Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union-v-Union of India and others reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1173 the Apex Court has laid down. “While considering the principle of equal pay for equal work it is not necessary to find out similarity by mathematics formula but there must be a reasonable similarity in the nature of work, performance of duties, the qualification and the equality of work performed by them. It is permissible to have classification in services based on hierarchy of posts, pay scale, value of work and responsibility and experience. The classification must, however, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and another -v.- M.R. Alagappan and others etc. reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2006 the Apex Court has held that the Deputy Agricultural Officer and the Agricultural Officer though they discharged the similar duties, but they found distinct and separate category of em¬ployees.
In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and another -v.- M.R. Alagappan and others etc. reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2006 the Apex Court has held that the Deputy Agricultural Officer and the Agricultural Officer though they discharged the similar duties, but they found distinct and separate category of em¬ployees. In the first place the Deputy Agricultural Officers are recruited by promotion from the lower category of Assistant Agri¬cultural Officer, but the Agricultural Officers are directly selected through Public Service Commission. Therefore, the Apex Court while setting aside the judgment and order of the Tribunal held that the Tribunal erred in applying the doctrine of equal pay for equal work to the facts of that case and the decision of the Tribunal amounts to giving equal treatment to totally distinct and unequal categories of employees. In the case of Shiba Kumar Dutta and others-v-Union of India and others reported in AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2911, the Apex Court held : “The petitioners who are working as Fitters (T & G) had sought to be fused in the category of, and to be on par with, Jig Borers. They sought equal pay on par with them. They contend that they were drawing higher pay scales than the Fitter, instead of elevating their cadre and placing them in the higher pay scales, they have been brought them down in the category as a Fitter after removing the two nomenclatures. Thereby, it is arbitrary on account of invidious discrimination. The Third Pay Commission had gone into that aspect of the matter and fixed the scale of pay. Thereafter, admittedly, Expert Classification Committee and Anoalies Removal Committee had also gone into the matter and made distinction between them. Subsequently, nomencla¬ture of all of them was removed and fused into one category, namely, Fitter. Nomenclature and figment is one of executive policy of the Government. Unless the action is arbitrary or there is invidious discrimination between persons similarly situated, doing same type of work, as is pointed out, it would be difficult for the Courts to go into the question of equation of posts or figment into a particular scale of pay. They must be left to be decided by the Expert Committees and Government. The Courts cannot go into them and evaluate the job criteria and scales of pay prescribed for each category.
They must be left to be decided by the Expert Committees and Government. The Courts cannot go into them and evaluate the job criteria and scales of pay prescribed for each category. Under those circumstances, the Tribunal is justified in reusing to go into the question.” Since in the instant case the two posts carry different cadre, different duties and different channel of recruitment, the post of Fitter Grade-I is the post under the direct recruitment procedure while the post of Mechanic Grade-I is the post under promotion quota, this Court is of the view that the petitioners who are the Fitter Grade-I is the post under promotion quota, this Court is of the view that the petitioners who are the Fitter Grade-I cannot claim parity as to pay scale with the pay scale of Mechanic Grade-I. In the result, the writ petition fails and is therefore, dismissed. No order as to cost. Urgent certified copy of this order may be granted on proper application. Petition dismissed.