S. N. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) IMPUGNED herein is the order-dated 23. 2. 2005 whereby the Board of Revenue has allowed the revision and set aside the order of Addl. Commissioner dated 25. 10. 2004 attended with direction to the trial court to afford opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence and decide the suit on merits. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the order mainly on the ground that some of the plaintiff were represented as Caveators while other plaintiffs were not represented; that judgment was rendered without having trial court record and without issuing notices to all the plaintiffs and ultimately, it is canvassed that the Board of Revenue erred in law in allowing revision, setting aside the order of Additional Commissioner while affirming the order of trial court dated 13. 1. 2003. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. ( 4 ) THE case has got a chequered history. The litigation in the case erupted with the institution of suit under Section 229-B of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act on 26. 4. 1975 for the relief of declaring co-tenancy rights. The first order was passed issuing notices to defendants fixing 23. 5. 1975. On 5. 5. 1975, the case stood transferred from the court of Sub Divisional officer to the Court of asstt. Collector (Revenue ). Thereafter, the case proceeded exparte. The evidence in case was recorded on 25. 5. 1975 and the case culminated in exparte judgment on 27. 5. 1975. It would transpire from the record that in the after-math of judgment, an application under Order IX, Rule 13 C. P. C. dated 19. 9. 1975 was filed which was rejected by Deputy Collector (Revenue) by means of order dated 23. 8. 1976. An appeal preferred against the aforesaid order was dismissed on 31. 12. 1976 Revision preferred against the said order by the respondents before the Board of revenue also came to be dismissed on 2. 11. 1979. 9. 1975 was filed which was rejected by Deputy Collector (Revenue) by means of order dated 23. 8. 1976. An appeal preferred against the aforesaid order was dismissed on 31. 12. 1976 Revision preferred against the said order by the respondents before the Board of revenue also came to be dismissed on 2. 11. 1979. Thereafter, the matter came to this Court by means of Writ Petition No. 140 of 1980 and in ultimate analysis, this Court allowed the petition and quashed all the orders impugned therein passed by the authorities below and the matter was remitted to the trial court for deciding application under Order IX, Rule 13 C. P. C. Upon matter received on remand, the Deputy Collector (Revenue) allowed the restoration application by means of order dated 13. 1. 2003 holding that no summons were served to the defendants. In revision preferred against the order, the Additional Commissioner by means of order dated 25. 10. 2004 allowed the revision and set aside the order passed by Asstt. Collector (Revenue)Varanasi against which revision was preferred by defendants which was allowed. It would further transpire from the record that matter went up to the Apex Court by filing S. L. P. , which was dismissed on 8. 4. 1982. The record further reveals that during pendency of the proceeding, mahadeo, Sahdeo and Gukhla breathed their last. A substitution application was instituted but the proceeding of restoration application was ordered to have abated vide order dated 8. 6. 1987. This order came to be set-aside in appeal and thereafter the matter was taken to Board of revenue, which passed order-dated 18. 1. 1996 by which the order of abatement was finally set aside. Review application filed against the said order was also rejected by means of order-dated 30. 5. 1997. Having traversed through all these stages, the defendants moved an application dated 36. 5. 2000 before the trial court attended with the prayer to hear on the question of maintainability of restoration application on which the trial court passed an order observing that all matters including the question of maintainability of restoration application will be heard and decided together. The self same order was passed by the trial court on subsequent application of defendants. 2000 before the trial court attended with the prayer to hear on the question of maintainability of restoration application on which the trial court passed an order observing that all matters including the question of maintainability of restoration application will be heard and decided together. The self same order was passed by the trial court on subsequent application of defendants. It would appear that aggrieved by the order, a revision was filed by the plaintiff which ended up in rejection and against the said order in revision, the defendants preferred writ petition which was dismissed on 16. 11. 2000. The proceeding again revived before the trial court which on 21. 7. 2001 ordered substitution of the heirs of deceased Mahadeo, Sahdeo and Gukhla. This order was again taken in challenge by the plaintiff before the Board of Revenue which passed an order directing the trial court to decide the restoration application on merits. Pursuant to this order the trial court allowed restoration application on 13. 1. 2003 and set aside the exparte decree dated 27. 5. 1975. ( 5 ) IN the galaxy of the above facts, it is crystal clear that the plaintiff having obtained exparte order in the year 1975, fiercely slugged out the matter avowedly to prevent and protract decision on merits. ( 6 ) FROM a perusal of the record, it is evident that the restoration application against exparte decision was preferred by the defendant respondents which was founded on the grounds that no notice was served and the summons do not bear signatures or thumb impression of any of the defendants and further that the entire proceedings pertaining to service of notice are forged. This fact finds mention in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in the writ petition. On the other hand, the averments that summons alleged to have been served to the defendants do not bear signatures or thumb impression of the defendants and that the proceedings are forged have not been specifically repudiated in the counter affidavit by the plaintiffs. I have scanned the order of the trial court from all angles and am of the view that the trial court rightly believed the case of the defendants and restored the suit to its number by setting aside the exparte order/decree. I have scanned the order of the trial court from all angles and am of the view that the trial court rightly believed the case of the defendants and restored the suit to its number by setting aside the exparte order/decree. ( 7 ) THE case may also be looked into from another angle, that is, it is clear from the record that the Asstt. Collector proceeded in the matter with undue haste. From a scrutiny of the record, it would appear that suit having been instituted on 26. 4. 1975, summons were ordered to be issued fixing 23. 5. 1975 by the Sub Divisional Officer Varanasi. However the case stood transferred on 5. 5. 1975 to the Court of Asstt. Collector (Revenue) Varanasi. It would appear from further scrutiny of the record that the summons were received back in the court of Sub Divisional officer on the date fixed i. e. 23. 5. 1975. In between the period 23. 5. 1975 to 25. 5. 1975, the entire evidence was recorded and verdict was pronounced on 27. 5. 1975. The speed with which the trial court proceeded in the matter is quite alarming and leaves anyone in doubt about dispassionate and disinterested approach of the trial court considering that normally, a decision in the revenue courts entails several years. Another aspect which throws considerable doubt on the manner is that at it is clear from the record that the defendants were not represented in the case and in the circumstances, it was imperative for the court to have issued summons to the defendants before proceeding furthering the case. This having not been done, throws discredit on the disinterestedness of the court and leads to irresistible conclusion that the trial court proceeded in the matter with lop-sided view in order to give an undue edge in the matter to the plaintiff. Besides, it is also note-worthy that summons which were alleged to have been issued and served to the defendants, do not bear signatures or thumb impressions of any of the defendants and further that the defendants were not represented before the trial court and also no counter affidavit wad filed by any of them and as such, it was rightly held that the service of notice was forged proceeding. The trial court has clearly held on the basis of reliable evidence on record that no summons were served and the entire proceedings having been held exparte without any opportunity or service of notice on the defendants were vitiated in law. On the other hand, revisional court reversed the order of the trial court on invalid ground without appreciating the materials on record in correct perspective. It would not be too much to say that it was beyond the bounds of revisional court to have recorded any finding on the question of maintainability. ( 8 ) THE next limb of argument centers on the order of Additional Commissioner, no application was moved for condonation of delay. From a perusal of the record it would appear that application for condonation of delay. From a perusal of the record it would appear that application for condonation of delay was made on 18. 9. 1975. It would further appear that the trial court noticing that plaintiffs came to know only on 17. 9. 1975 for the first time held the application to have been filed within time. The position in law is that in case a composite application is made for restoration as well as for condonation of delay in which delay has been fully explained and the court entertaining the application passes appropriate order believing the explanation in the application, it is then not necessary to passes appropriate order believing the explanation in the application, it is then not necessary to pass separate order for condonation of delay. In the circumstances, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not commend to me for acceptance. ( 9 ) THE next aspect emphasised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the plaintiffs were snot represented before the Board of Revenue allowed the revision and therefore the impugned order is not sustainable. Having considered the matter in entirety, I am of the view that the interest of all the plaintiff was represented by Caveator-plaintiffs before the Board of Revenue who were afforded opportunity of hearing and thereafter the order was passed in accordance which law. It is also explicit that the trial court had allowed the trial court had allowed the restoration application on close scrutiny of each and every shred of evidence on record. However, the Addl. It is also explicit that the trial court had allowed the trial court had allowed the restoration application on close scrutiny of each and every shred of evidence on record. However, the Addl. Commissioner allowed the revision on technical ground which did not commend to the Board of Revenue for acceptance. Without disavowing existence of technical mistake if any, committed by the Board of Revenue, I do not see any valid reason to interfere with the order of the Board of Revenue in that by means of the impugned order, the parties have been accorded opportunity to complete pleading and adduce evidence for the first time in a span of 30 years and the case has resumed journey onward towards disposal on merit inasmuch as any inference on technical ground will again stall the proceedings and matter would again linger on for years together pending proceeding pursuant to restoration application and in my considered view, the technical flaw must be viewed in diminished light in the fact situation of the present case and interference at this stage on technical ground under Article 226 of the Const. would visit upon the parties with graver detriment and would not be conducive to expeditious disposal of the case on merit. ( 10 ) IT is disquieting feature in the case that the matter has been languishing for the last 30 years the proceeding having been sidetracked by allied and less importance issues and taking all these aspects, the Board of Revenue relegated the matter the trial court as a result of which the parties have been allowed to complete their pleadings, adduce evidence and of hearing and therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order on mere technicality which does not in any way occasion injustice to any of the parties. It is apparent from the record that the plaintiff petitioner has unnecessarily dragged the matter to superior courts including High Court and the apex Court hindering proceeding before the trial court on flimsy grounds and therefore, I am inclined to repair the harassment to the defendants by awarding costs which I quantify at Rs. 10,000/ -. ( 11 ) IN the above conspectus, there is no error of law apparent on the face of record and therefore the petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed with costs. 10,000/ -. ( 11 ) IN the above conspectus, there is no error of law apparent on the face of record and therefore the petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed with costs. Accordingly writ petition is dismissed with cost, which I peg at Rs. 10,000/ . .