Judgment N.P. Gupta, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the parties at a considerable length of more than one and half hour. 2. The learned Courts below by the impugned decree have decreed the plaintiff’s suit for eviction from the suit shop on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff . 3. Assailing the impugned decrees, the first submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is, that in view of the provisions of Section 14 (3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the act’ the present suit is barred, and, therefore, the learned Courts below were in error in passing the impugned decree. Learned Counsel in this regard placed reliance on the Judgment s of this Court in “Govind Narain vs. Mohan Singh”, reported in 1992 (1) WLC504 (Raj), and “Ashok Kumar vs. Suresh Chand & Anr.,” reported in 1994 (1) RLR 685. 4. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent, relying upon the Judgment of this Court in “Kahtoon Begun vs. Bhagwan Das & Ors.,” reported in 2004 (1) DNJ 280 (Raj), and “Sardar Singh vs. Prakash Singh.” reported in 1987 RLW 701, contended that the objection is not maintainable in view of the fact, that firstly, the objection was not taken before the Court below, and secondly that there is no new tenancy. 5. in rebuttal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted, that factual foundation is there, inasmuch as, execution of the document dated 110.1988, being Exhibit D 7 is not in dispute, and thereby part of the premises was taken from the defendant, thus a new tenancy was created, and, therefore, bar of Section 14 (3) very much attracts. 6. I have considered the submissions. For ready reference, the provisions of Section 14 (3) may be reproduced, which read as under:- “14(3) Notwithstanding contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant.” 7. A bare reading of this section shows; that the suit for eviction from the premises, let out for commercial purposes cannot lie on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity before expiry of five years from the date, the premises were let out to the tenant. The controversy before me precisely is, as to whether the suit is filed within five years from the date, the premises were let out to the tenant. 8. I may first deal with the objection of the respondent against maintainability of the contention of the appellant on the anvil of the defendant having not taken this plea, whether in the written statement, or before the learned lower Appellate Court. A look at the Judgment in Khatun Begum’s case shows that therein this Court in para 18 has noticed the contention about the non-permissibility of raising of such objection for first time in second appeal, but then a look at para 19 shows that the Court proceeded with the assumption that such an objection can be raised in the second appeal and examined the tenability of the contention and then in the end of para 19 it was held that though the provisions of Section 14 (3) are mandatory as they confer protection on the tenant concerned, which protection can be waived by the tenant, and, therefore, it was held that a tenant has waived his right available to him under Section 14 (3). With due respect to the learned Brother Judge, I am not inclined to subscribe to this proposition as an absolute proposition of law, as on the face of the language of Section 14(3), it clearly enacts the bar against the very maintainability of such suit. In that view of the matter, if the bar appears on the face of the record, in that event it would be a pure question of law going to the root of the matter, and can be allowed to be raised for the first time even in the second appeal. In that view of the matter, if the bar appears on the face of the record, in that event it would be a pure question of law going to the root of the matter, and can be allowed to be raised for the first time even in the second appeal. However, if for finding out the bar certain factual averments are needed, which may require investigation and evidence, e.g. though the tenant continues since more than before five years of the institution of the suit, he can claim that his tenancy commenced within five years of the institution of the suit, or should be deemed to have been so commenced, for variety of reasons, in that event of course, as held in Khatun Begums case, the tenant cannot be allowed to raise this objection for the first time in second appeal. Another thing is that in Khatun Begums case the learned Judge had proceeded to examine the objection in detail on its own merit and found that in that case the original landlord had alienated the property in favour of the plaintiff and the tenant claimed the starting point of this period of five years from the date, the plaintiff acquired the rights. This objection was rightly turned down and it is with this finding that the maintainability of the objection was negatived on the ground of having been raised for the first time in second appeal. Thus, if considered on these parameters, in the present case, according to the plaintiff the tenant is under rent note of the year 1982, and from that date the suit has been filed after more than five years, with this now the defendant wants to contend that in view of Exhibit-7, the terms of the tenancy were altered and, therefore, new tenancy came into existence, which obviously is a question of fact as to what was the intention of the parties, and, therefore, the bar against permissibility to raise the objection for the first time in second appeal is attracted. 9. However, since, it might be contended that the bar depends on the interpretation of Exhibit-7, and the interpretation of document may be argued to be question of law, therefore, instead of leaving the question at that, I have chosen to err against myself and have examined the objection on its own merit as well. 10. 9. However, since, it might be contended that the bar depends on the interpretation of Exhibit-7, and the interpretation of document may be argued to be question of law, therefore, instead of leaving the question at that, I have chosen to err against myself and have examined the objection on its own merit as well. 10. In Govind Narains case, this Court had considered the provisions of Section 14(3), and held that mere increase, or reduction, in the rent, by itself , is not sufficient to imply surrender of existing lease and grant of new tenancy, and even if the mode and time of payment is changed, the supersession of existing tenancy cannot be inferred ordinarily. However, if the terms of tenancy have changed, and new tenancy agreement is entered into, or a new lease is executed by tenant, the existing tenancy will be deemed to have been surrendered, and the fact that tenant continued to remain in possession, will be of no consequence. Much stress is laid on this later part of the observation to contend, that in the present case, the terms of tenancy have changed, and a new tenancy agreement is entered into, and new lease deed is executed by the tenant, it is a case, where it should be deemed that the tenant had surrendered, and the mere fact, that the tenant continues in possession, is of no consequence. 11. So far the Judgment in Ashok Kumars case is concerned, that is not of much relevance, for the simple reason, that all that was held therein was, that even if the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity is subsequently sought to be added by way of amendment, still that would relate back to the date of filing of the original suit, and even in that case, the bar of Section 14(3) would be available. From the stand point of this Judgment in Govind Narains case, if the present case is examined, in my view, the parties, all through were ad idem on the question, that there has never been any change in the terms of tenancy, nor any new tenancy agreement has been entered into. From the stand point of this Judgment in Govind Narains case, if the present case is examined, in my view, the parties, all through were ad idem on the question, that there has never been any change in the terms of tenancy, nor any new tenancy agreement has been entered into. In this regard, a look at para 2 of the plaint shows, that therein the plaintiff had specifically come with a case about the defendant being tenant in the premises since 01.08.1982, and in para 2 of the written-statement, this fact of his continuing in tenancy since 01.08.1982 was not disputed, only rate of rent was disputed. Then during trial also, even while in the witness-box, it has never been the stand of the defendant, that there was any change in the terms of tenancy, and new tenancy came into existence, so as to attract the bar of Section 14(3), rather the defendant-appellant has categorically deposed, that the suit shop is with him as tenant since 1966, which was taken on rent by his grandfather from the father of the plaintiff . Then in the year 1972, the rent was increased, then the landlord stopped taking rent, and notice was served, and thereupon, rent was increased to Rs. 195/-since 1982. It has nowhere been deposed that in the year 1988, any terms of the tenancy were changed, or that new tenancy agreement was entered into, inasmuch as, though while making reference to the document Exhibit D.7, it was deposed, that a notice Exhibit D. 8 was served, thereafter new agreement was executed, according to which space was given for parking of the scooter, the agreement is Exhibit D. 7, and though the space was given from the shop, but the rent was not reduced, while it should be reduced to Rs. 125/-. Then my attention was invited to the cross-examination of the defendant, wherein he had deposed that after death of Nazar Ali, in the year 1988 he executed new agreement of tenancy in favour of Yakub Ali. This part of the deposition of executing new agreement of tenancy in favour of Yakub Ali is only in the sequence of the defendant accepting Yakub Ali to be landlord by way of succession or inheritance in view of the death of his father Nazar Ali who was the original landlord under a rent note. 12. This part of the deposition of executing new agreement of tenancy in favour of Yakub Ali is only in the sequence of the defendant accepting Yakub Ali to be landlord by way of succession or inheritance in view of the death of his father Nazar Ali who was the original landlord under a rent note. 12. Then coming to the statement of the plaintiff , the plaintiff , had deposed, that the defendant is tenant since 01.08.1982 under rent note, Exhibit 1. The shop was let out by Nazar Ali, who died on 03.04.1986. Thus, according to the plaintiff , it is his categoric case that the defendant is tenant since 1982. Then in cross-examination, it was suggested and admitted by the plaintiff that the shop was let out by Nazar Ali to the defendants grandfather in the year 1968. In this sequence, the plaintiff was put the document Exhibit D.7 dated 30.08.1988, that an agreement was executed between him and the defendant being Exhibit D.7 contents whereof are correct. Significantly, there is no suggestion whatever to the plaintiff , that the defendants present tenancy commence since this date being 210.1988. However, I have looked at the document Exhibit D. 7 as well, and a bare reading thereof shows, that therein it was recited, that the defendant is continuing as tenant in the shop of Nazar Ali, Kasam Nath, while the first party to the agreement being Yakub Ali is son of Nazar Ali, and the other LRs of Nazar Ali have executed a registered release deed in favour of Nazar Ali, information whereof has been given to the defendant, whereby Yakub Ali is the owner of the property. Then the requirement of the landlord for parking of the scooter was narrated, and realising that the defendant agreed to give some part of the shop on certain conditions enumerated in the agreement, and the conditions are, that the part being taken by the plaintiff will not be let out, nor will be used for any commercial purpose by the landlord, that the size would be reduced only by 7 inch for the pillar and the shutter, and from inside, the wall will be straightened, no other alteration shall be made, all the expenses for this, will be borne by the landlord, and the landlord will never ask for any increase in the rent. The last stipulation is, that the rent upto 30th November, 1988 has been paid against receipt. 13. In my view, even the closest reading of the document makes it clear that it, neither stipulates, nor even contemplates to stipulate, the supersession of the existing tenancy, and creation of new tenancy. In that view of he matter, irrespective of the question, as to whether the tenant continued to be in possession, the main purport of the document is only to recognise, that Yakub Ali is landlord, consequent upon the death of Nazar Ali, and to provide 7 inch wide space, to enable the plaintiff to park the scooter, but there does not appear to be any intention of the parties to create a new tenancy, so as to attract the bar of Section 14(3) of the Rent Control Act. Thus, the submission does not hold good. 14. The next submission made is, that the finding of the learned Courts below on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff is bad, inasmuch as, the plaintiff has not pleaded that the shop to be required for his own need, and as on the date of filing of the suit, the need of his younger son, Shabbir did not arise, and even in the evidence, the plaintiff , Yakub Ali has not deposed, that the shop is required for his own use. Therefore, the findings are bad. 15. I have read the plaint, in para 5 whereof , after amendment, it was clearly pleaded, that the suit shop is required by the plaintiff for himself , and his son Shabbir, who is in final year of graduation, and the plaintiff wants him to do the business. With this, the plaintiff , in the examination-in-chief , has clearly deposed, that he wants to put his sons in business in the suit shop, that he has no other shop, then the suit shop, and that if the defendant is not evicted, he will be rendered jobless, as he has no other means. Significantly, on this aspect of the statement of the plaintiff , there is no cross-examination whatever. Significantly, on this aspect of the statement of the plaintiff , there is no cross-examination whatever. With this, when the two Courts below have concurrently found the plaintiff s reasonable and bona fide requirement for the suit shop to be proved, I do not find any sufficient ground to interfere with this finding, which is a pure finding of fact, in appellate jurisdiction, as it is not shown to be vitiated on any other grounds available under Section 100, CPC. This submission, therefore, has also no force. 16. Thus, the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law, and the same is, therefore, dismissed summarily. 17. At this stage, at the request of the learned Counsel for the appellant, the appellant is given one years time to vacate the suit premises on the condition that the defendant gives an undertaking before the learned trial Court within one month from today that on or before the expiry of the above period, he will peacefully hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff and that during this period, he will not, in any manner, transfer the possession of the suit premises to anybody. Likewise, the entire decreetal amount, so also all arrears of rent, if any, shall be deposited by the appellant in the trial Court within one month from today and shall further continue to deposit amount equal to the monthly rent by way of damages for use and occupation by 15th of each succeeding month, till the actual delivery of possession. In case the appellant fails to comply with any of the above conditions, the respondent will become automatically entitled to execute the decree forthwith.