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2005 DIGILAW 1055 (MP)

Sanjay @ Oondar v. State of M. P.

2005-10-06

S.K.SETH

body2005
ORDER S.K. Seth, J. 1. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 14-3-2005 passed by the State Government rejecting his appeal preferred against the order dated 24-11-2004 passed by the District Magistrate, Ratlam under the provisions of M.P. (Rajya) Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (for short the Act). By the said order, the District Magistrate Ratlam has ordered experiment of the petitioner from the limits of Ratlam Revenue District and the contiguous districts of Mandsaur, Jhabua, Dhar and Ujjain for a period of one year. 2. Superintendent of Police submitted a report to the effect that the petitioner has a past criminal history since 1988. It was stated in the said report that despite various prohibitory measures taken by the police, there was no improvement in the conduct of the petitioner and his criminal activities were on the increase. It was also stated that witnesses were not willing to come forward to given evidence in public against petitioner by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. After getting report from the S. P. Ratlam, D. M. Ratlam issued a show cause notice seeking explanation of petitioner. After getting the reply, D. M. Ratlam examined witnesses in camera and came to a prima-facie conclusion that petitioner should be removed outside the limits of the revenue district of Ratlam as well as from limits of revenue districts as mentioned above for a period of one year. Said order of removal was passed on 24-11-2004. Petitioner preferred an appeal as provided under section 9 of the Act, which too has been dismissed by the order impugned, hence the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner vehemently argued that petitioner is employed as peon in the L.I.C. and has no past criminal history inasmuch as out of 18 criminal cases cited against him, he has been acquitted in 16 of them. It was also contended that no criminal case relating to case covered under Chapters XII, XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code is pending against petitioner. The order of removal, therefore, has been passed mechanically without any application of mind. It was also contended that statements of witnesses were recorded in-camera proceedings behind the back of petitioner and no opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses was afforded to petitioner. The order of removal, therefore, has been passed mechanically without any application of mind. It was also contended that statements of witnesses were recorded in-camera proceedings behind the back of petitioner and no opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses was afforded to petitioner. Next submission was that the petitioner had given the list of defense witnesses and without recording statement of those witnesses the order of removal was passed by the D.M. Lastly, it is contended that petitioner is a free citizen of India and has fundamental rights of liberty, residence and free movement throughout the territory of India as enshrined in the Chapter III of Constitution of India and the order impugned imposes unreasonable restriction on the said fundamental rights. In the light of these submissions, learned counsel for petitioner urged that order impugned passed by the appellate authority as well as by the District Magistrate, Ratlam cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. 4. After notice respondents have filed reply and supported orders passed by the appellate authority as well as the D. M. Ratlam. It was contended that procedure prescribed under the provisions of Act, was duly observed before passing the order of removal and as such no procedural infirmity can be attributed either to the order passed by the D. M. Ratlam or the appellate authority. It was also contended that petitioner had no absolute right of liberty and in the public interest reasonably restriction can be put on the said fundamental right in view of the provisions contained in the Act. Thus, according to learned G.A. there is no merit and substance in the writ petition; and the same deserves to be dismissed. 5. After having heard learned counsel for parties at length and going through the material available on record, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no merit and substance in the writ petition. Perusal of section 5 of the Act reveals that statements of witnesses can be recorded in-camera proceedings if in the opinion of the D.M. those witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the petitioner. Obviously giving evidence in public; means giving evidence in the open Court of Law. In the present case the D. M. has recorded a finding in this regard and the satisfaction of the D.M. on this account, cannot be scrutinized by this Court as an appellate Court. 6. Obviously giving evidence in public; means giving evidence in the open Court of Law. In the present case the D. M. has recorded a finding in this regard and the satisfaction of the D.M. on this account, cannot be scrutinized by this Court as an appellate Court. 6. So far as right to cross-examine witnesses is concerned, in the context of provisions of the Act, the right of hearing cannot be stretched to cross-examine witnesses otherwise the very purpose of the Act to provide security and maintenance of public order, would be defeated. The Act is directed against the anti social and criminal elements in society who have placed themselves beyond the pale of rule of law. 7. In view of the above, it cannot be said that right of hearing would include right of cross-examining of the witnesses who were examined in camera before passing the order of removal. The right of movement enshrined in Art. 19(1)(d) is subject to the reasonable restriction and is not absolute. The law in this regard is very well settled. 8. From the record it is clear that the D.M. as well as appellate authority were right at the conclusion that the petitioner has a past criminal history and it was necessary to take appropriate action against the petitioner under the Act. In the considered opinion of this Court, neither the order of the D.M. nor the appellate order suffers from any illegality, irregularity or procedural infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. This can be ordinarily be done when Court is sitting in appeal and in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but that is not the case here. 9. In view of aforesaid I find no merit and substance in the writ petition; the same is dismissed. However there shall be no order as to costs.