ORDER S.L. Jain, J. 1. Invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') petitioners have filed this petition for quashing and setting aside the order dated 24-4-2003, passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar in Criminal Revision No. 16/2003 and also order dated 23-5-2003 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sagar. 2. Facts leading to filing of this petition succinctly narrated are thus:- i. Applicant No. 1 Sharad Dave on the relevant date was posted as Superintendent, Central Jail, Sagar and applicant No. 2 K. P. Baghel was posted as Assistant Jailor, Central Jail, Sagar. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a complaint against the applicants before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sagar alleging that on 10-12-2001, a tender for supply of vegetables in Sagar Jail was to be opened at 11 AM. At about 11.45 AM applicant No. 1 called the complainants in his chamber where 2-3 members of the purchase committee were present. The said members decided that as the representative of Collector, Sagar has not come, it will be appropriate to postpone the opening of the 3 tenders. It was decided that the tenders shall be opened on 13-12-2001 at 12 Noon. The complainant protested against this decision on the ground that it is contrary to the rules but the members of the purchase committee did not pay any heed to the protest of the complainants and the members of the committee left the chamber, ii. After the departure of other members, applicant No. 1 told the complainant that in future also, they will get a rough deal in the similar manner and tenders will never be opened at the notified time. The complainants informed applicant No. 1 that they will make complaint to the higher authorities regarding the proceedings which took place on that day. On hearing this, the applicant No. 1 was furious and he started abusing and intimidating the complainants saying . At this moment applicant No. 2 who was standing at the spot caught hold of the collar of respondent No. 2 Mahesh Gupta and gave him two Fist blows and also gave threats. iii. On the date of incident itself, the complainants went to the police station Gopal Ganj, Sagar to lodge a report but the report was not written and they were asked to give the report in writing. iii. On the date of incident itself, the complainants went to the police station Gopal Ganj, Sagar to lodge a report but the report was not written and they were asked to give the report in writing. Accordingly a written report was sent to police station Gopal Ganj, copies of which were also sent to the superior authorities. As no action was taken by the police; a complaint was filed by the complainants in the Court of CJM, Sagar. iv. Learned CJM recorded the statements of complainants. He called for the report of the police. The police submitted a report along with the statement of Dr. Subhash Jain. Learned CJM after going through the statements of complainants and the report of the police found that no prima-facie case is made out against the applicants and vide order dated 17-9-2002 dismissed the complaint. v. Against the order of the CJM, Sagar dated 17-9-2002; respondent Nos. 1 and 2 preferred a Criminal Revision before the Court of Session in which the applicants were impleaded as respondent Nos. 2 and 3, State being respondent No. 1. Learned Additional Sessions Judge admitted the revision and directed issuance of notice to the applicants. However, without issuing any notice Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 29-4-2003, allowed the Criminal Revision filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and remanded the case to the Magistrate to decide the matter afresh after hearing the complainants. vi. In compliance of the aforesaid order in revision, CJM decided the matter afresh and registered the case against the present applicants for the offences punishable under sections 294, 506-A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and directed for the issuance of bailable warrant against the applicants. 3. It is the case of the applicants that one U.K. Gandhi, Supdt., Central Jail, Satna had filed a case before the State Administrative Tribunal challenging the seniority and promotion of the applicant No. 1. The Tribunal decided the case in favour of applicant No. 1. Thus, the counter-part of applicant No. 1 at Satna had an axe to grind against the applicant No. 1. Respondent No. 2 Ram Gopal Gandhi is none but the brother of said U. K. Gandhi. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had been making false, frivolous and vexatious complaints against the applicants from time to time. Thus, the counter-part of applicant No. 1 at Satna had an axe to grind against the applicant No. 1. Respondent No. 2 Ram Gopal Gandhi is none but the brother of said U. K. Gandhi. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had been making false, frivolous and vexatious complaints against the applicants from time to time. Shri M. C. Dahia, Commissioner and Incharge Secretary, Sagar Division vide letter dated 26-12-2001 addressed to the Principal Secretary, Jail requested for proper action against the respondents. On 13-6-2002 IG, Jail also wrote a letter to Collector, Sagar bringing to his notice the illegal activities of respondents and recommended blacklisting of respondent Ram Gopal Gandhi as he had been making false, frivolous and vexatious complaints against the applicants without any justification. 4. The applicants have averred that with a view to wreck vengeance and blackmail them a false, frivolous and vexatious complaint was filed against them. 5. I have heard Shri P. S. Nair, learned senior counsel with Ms. Jasbir Kaur Chana, for the applicants. Shri Yogesh Dhande, Panel Lawyer assisted by Shri Manish Datt, counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants first contended that, after giving the directions for the issuance of notice to the applicants, the learned Additional Sessions Judge could not have decided the revision in the absence of the applicants. 7. A perusal of the copy of the order sheets of Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar in Criminal Revision No. 16/2003 reveals that despite the directions that notices be issued to the present applicants and despite the fact that no process fee was paid by the applicant without service on the applicants, the revision petition was heard and decided. When the applicants were the party in the revision petition and were having right to oppose the petition, the revision petition could not have been decided without hearing them. On the principle of audi alteram partem the revision petition could not have been decided against the applicants without giving them opportunity of hearing. Therefore, on this ground alone, the order of revisional Court is nonest and not sustainable in law. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant next submitted that on merit also the order of the revisional Court is liable to be set aside. CJM, Sagar after proper appreciation of material before him passed a well reasoned order. Therefore, on this ground alone, the order of revisional Court is nonest and not sustainable in law. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant next submitted that on merit also the order of the revisional Court is liable to be set aside. CJM, Sagar after proper appreciation of material before him passed a well reasoned order. There was no illegality in his order. Therefore, the revisional Court could not have set aside the order by reviewing or re-assessing the evidence. 9. This contention also is acceptable. The jurisdiction of the revisional Court is limited. The revisional Court can interfere with the impugned order of subordinate Court only when it is unjust and unfair. The examination of the record is limited in scope. In a case where the order of inferior Court does not suffer from any infirmity merely because of equitable considerations a revisional Court is not competent to call upon the inferior Court to re-consider the matter. It is only where the finding arrived at by subordinate Court is perverse or such that no reasonable person would have arrived at that conclusion on the evidence adduced; the interference in the revisional jurisdiction can be justified. The revisional Court cannot interfere with an order of inferior Court which is reasonable and proper and no illegality is involved. It is the duty of the Magistrate to come to the conclusion about prima-facie case and the revisional Court should not interfere in his discretion without any reasonable cause. 10. It is true that the power of revision confers wide discretion to be exercised fairly by the revisional Court according to the exigencies of a case but it is too well settled that such exercise is normally done only in exceptional cases where there is glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The revisional Court is not expected to act as if it is hearing an appeal and its jurisdiction is not to be ordinarily invoked or used merely because the Magistrate has taken a wrong view of the law or even mis-appreciated the evidence on record. An order of the subordinate Court should not be set aside simply because the revisional Court takes a different view on the evidence. 11. An order of the subordinate Court should not be set aside simply because the revisional Court takes a different view on the evidence. 11. On the facts alleged and after considering the evidence on record, particularly, the report of Dr. Subhash Jain, the trial Court came to the conclusion that no offence is made out against the applicants and a false case has been foisted on the accused persons. I do not find any irregularity or manifest error in the order of Magistrate which has resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. A Court of Session should interfere in a revision only when there is a failure of justice and not otherwise. Therefore, the revisional Court in the present case could not have interfered in the order of the Magistrate in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code and the order of the revisional Court is not sustainable. 12. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants further contended that applicants are public servants of the kind mentioned in section 197 of the Code i.e. public servants not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the State Government and the offence is alleged to have been committed by them while acting as public servants and the offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, therefore, no Court could have taken cognizance against them except with the previous sanction of the State Government. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the alleged acts of the applicants cannot be said to be one authorised by a statute or law. They are not intimately and integrally connected with their official or statutory duties and thus have no reasonable nexus to the discharge of duty. It is known to all that it is no part of official duty to commit offences. An official is not expected to give abuses or threats; therefore, no sanction under section 197 of the Code in the present case was necessary. 14. I find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. In view of the allegations in the complaint, at this stage, it cannot be said that sanction under section 197 of the Code was essential. 15. 14. I find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. In view of the allegations in the complaint, at this stage, it cannot be said that sanction under section 197 of the Code was essential. 15. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant next contended that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute any offence under sections 294, 506-11 or 323 of the Indian Penal Code. 16. This contention also appears to be acceptable. The utterance of obscene words in or near public place is one of the essential ingredients of section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and in whose ears the words may fall. The use of the term 'obscenity' is restricted to sexual immorality. Therefore, the word should be such which excite sexual desires and lascivious thoughts. Only lewd comments can be said to be obscene. 17. In Om Prakash v. State of M.P. 1989 MPLJ 657 , it has been held that no literal significance can be attached to the abuses. The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. Mere platitudinous utterances signifying the enraged state of the person's mind would not be sufficient to attract the application of the provisions of section 294, of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, mere 'vulgar abuses' do not constitute offence under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. 18. In colloquial language, the abuses like are often used and nobody understands such abuses in their literal sense. They only show the enraged state of mind. Such abuses which people do not hesitate in uttering even in the presence of their children or other family members do not have the tendency to deprave and corrupt those who listen such words. 19. In order to constitute an offence under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, the words must be uttered in or near public place. In the present case, admittedly the words were uttered in the close chamber of applicant No. 1. Therefore, it cannot be said that obscene words were uttered in or near the public place. 20. 19. In order to constitute an offence under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, the words must be uttered in or near public place. In the present case, admittedly the words were uttered in the close chamber of applicant No. 1. Therefore, it cannot be said that obscene words were uttered in or near the public place. 20. So far as the offence under section 506-11 is concerned, it is alleged in the complaint that the applicants told the complainants . Such words do not constitute offence under section 506-11 of the Indian Penal Code. It is a notorious fact that the people of this country use words and utter threats at the slightest provocation but which are well understood to be mere epithets of vulgar abuse. Such are threats affecting one's female relations, to set fire to one's house, bury one alive, twist one's neck like a chicken, and words too numerous to mention but all of which are mere terms of opprobrium and convey no well formed determination to carry the threats into execution. 21. In the circumstances of the case in which the words imputed to the applicant had been uttered, it was clear that the words had more sound and fury than substance and it cannot be concluded that applicants committed an offence punishable under section 506-11 of the Indian Penal Code. 22. Similarly, on the basis of the report of Dr. Subhash Jain, the trial Court rightly concluded that no offence under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code is made out. 23. Thus, the facts alleged in the complaint even if accepted as true, do not constitute an offence under section 506-11 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code. From the evidence no offence under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code also is made out. Therefore, the order of the revisional Court cannot be allowed to stand. It could not have interfered in the order of CJM, Sagar dated 17-9-2002. 24. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 29-4-2003 passed by Revisional Court is liable to be quashed. Order dated 23-5-2003 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sagar, having been passed in compliance of the order of the Revisional Court also cannot be allowed to stand on the principle of sublata causa tollitur effectus (The cause being removed the effect ceases). Consequently, the petition is allowed. Order dated 23-5-2003 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sagar, having been passed in compliance of the order of the Revisional Court also cannot be allowed to stand on the principle of sublata causa tollitur effectus (The cause being removed the effect ceases). Consequently, the petition is allowed. Order dated 29-4-2003 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar and the order dated 23-5-2003 passed by CJM, Sagar are hereby quashed and the order of CJM, Sagar dated 17-9-2002 refusing to register the complaint is restored.