JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. By means of this writ application, the Petitioner, a widow belonging to reserved category (SC), has challenged the decision of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter called HPCL) to allot the Retail Outlet Dealership (ROD) in question to the Respondent No. 4. The facts leading to filing of the instant writ petition are as follows: 2. Pursuant to an advertisement for ROD at a place called Dabaka issued on 11.09.2000 under open category, the husband of the Petitioner submitted his application for the dealership. According to the Petitioner on an earlier occasion also her husband (Late Sibakanta Medhi) submitted his application for such dealership in response to an advertisement dated 30.12.97. However, the said advertisement was not acted upon by the Respondents. In the advertisement dated 11.09.2000, the following requirements were indicated under the head of IMPORTANT NOTE: a) The applicant should furnish alongwith application details of land which he/she may make available for the dealership, (b) Considering the location of the land from the point of view of commercials angle, Appellant willing to transfer the land on ownership/long lease to the oil company at the rate acceptable to the oil company would be given preference, (c) If an applicant, after selection is unable to provide indicated by him/her earlier within a period of 2 (two) months, the allotment of the dealership made to him/her would be cancelled. 3. The Dealer Selection Board (DSB) conducted an interview for selection of dealer from amongst the applicants. The selection was held on 21.06.01 and the Petitioner was recommended as the 1st nominee, while the Respondent No. 4 and Anr. as the 2nd and 3rd nominee respectively. 4. As per the assertion made in the writ petition, the Respondents No. 1 and 2, after the aforesaid selection of the Petitioner's husband, deputed the field Officer namely Shri Abhijit Bhattacharyee for field verification regarding credentials of her late husband as well as the commercial viability of the land offered by him. The field verification was conducted in the 3rd and 4th week of July, 2001 by the Respondents No. 1 and 2 through their said Field Officer. After the field verification, her husband was asked to develop the land and get the same ready for installation of ROD. According to the Petitioner the land was taken on long term lease. 5. The field verification was conducted in the 3rd and 4th week of July, 2001 by the Respondents No. 1 and 2 through their said Field Officer. After the field verification, her husband was asked to develop the land and get the same ready for installation of ROD. According to the Petitioner the land was taken on long term lease. 5. When the matter rested thus and the Petitioner's husband was waiting for formal Letter of Indent (hereinafter called LOI), some controversy has arisen by a decision of the Central Government whereby allotment of all new dealerships was proposed to be cancelled. Such decision of the Central Government was challenged in various High Courts of the country including this Court and eventually the controversy was resolved by the Apex Court whereby the decision of the Central Government was set aside and quashed. 6. According to the Petitioner, her husband after his selection for the dealership invested a huge sum of money for setting up the same. However, the Respondents delayed the matter towards issuance of LOI and unfortunately her husband expired on 18.02.03 leaving the Petitioner as his sole legal heir. On 02.06.03 the Petitioner made a representation to the Respondents for issuance of LOI in her favour on account of the death of her husband. When the Petitioner was waiting for reply from the Respondents, she received a caveat application filed by the Respondent No. 4 wherefrom she could come to know that it was the Respondent No. 4 and not the Petitioner who had been issued with the LOI under reference No. SM/RTNEW/RO-DAB/LOI dated 18.07.03 offering her ROD at Dabaka, in view of the death of the husband of the Petitioner. Simultaneously she also received a letter of the same date informing her that since no LOI was issued in the name of her husband, there was no question of approval of the same in her favour and accordingly, the request contained in her representation dated 02.06.03 was rejected. 7. In view of the above development, the Petitioner submitted Anr. application on 26.07.03 before the Respondent No. 2 praying for furnishing a copy of the LOI dated 18.07.03 issued in favour of the Respondent No. 4. However, no reply was furnished to her. 7. In view of the above development, the Petitioner submitted Anr. application on 26.07.03 before the Respondent No. 2 praying for furnishing a copy of the LOI dated 18.07.03 issued in favour of the Respondent No. 4. However, no reply was furnished to her. It is under these circumstances the Petitioner filed the writ petition making a challenge to the issuance of the LOI in favour of the Respondent No. 4 instead of her and praying for a direction to the Respondents to grant the dealership in her favour. 8. According to the Petitioner, even otherwise also the Respondent No. 4 is not qualified to be granted the dealership in terms of the eligibility criteria prescribed in the advertisement dated 11.09.02. According to her the Respondent No. 4 at the time of filing the application on 31.10.2000 was a student studying at Dabaka Higher Secondary School. Even on the date of the writ application she was a student of degree course. Further stand of the Petitioner is that the Respondent No. 4 does not have any known source of income and she is entirely dependent on her father Md. Abdul Barbhuyan. Referring to clause 2 (e) of the advertisement in terms of which the applicant should not have a gross family income of more than Rs. 2,00,000/- in the financial year 1999-2000. It is the case of the Petitioner that the father of the Respondent No. 4 being the principal of Haji Anfar Ali College, Dabaka was drawing the gross salary of Rs. 2,81,730/- per annum. The Petitioner has also enacted certain other assets of the father of the Respondent No. 4 in terms of which the gross annual income of the father exceeds the limit indicated in clause 2 (e) of the advertisement. 9. The Petitioner asserts in the writ petition that the Respondent No. 4 is also the proprietor of M/s. River Valley Stone Crusher Machine set up as industry at village Nahargaon in the District of Nagaon and the annual income from the said industry is more than Rs. 4,00,000/-. According to the Petitioner the Respondent No. 4 is also the owner of a public carrier Tata Truck bearing registration No. ASU 5616. 10. 4,00,000/-. According to the Petitioner the Respondent No. 4 is also the owner of a public carrier Tata Truck bearing registration No. ASU 5616. 10. While questioning the very eligibility of the Respondent No. 4 for the dealership, the Petitioner asserts that the dealership of retail outlet of petroleum products is heritable by the successor in interest of any person who is vested with dealership or is entitled for being vested with such dealership under the Respondents No. 1 and 2 and for that matter any nationalized petroleum company/corporation. It is the case of the Petitioner that her husband being chosen and selected as the first nominee for being granted the dealership, had the right to be offered the dealership and the right so accrued to her husband does not get extinguished merely on his death in absence of any finding to the contrary regarding eligibility criteria of her husband. According to Petitioner her husband having been selected for the dealership and he having acted as per the requirements of the advertisement and the field survey having been conducted by the officer of the Corporation, the delay on the part of the Respondents towards issuance of the LOI cannot deprive her of the dealership on account of the death of her husband during the intervening period. According to the Petitioner the delay of about 2 years from the date of selection of her husband towards issuance of the LOI cannot take away the right accrued to her husband. 11. Thus, in a nutshell, it is the case of the Petitioner that inaction on the part of the Respondents contrary to their own guidelines for issuance of LOI due to premature death of he husband in the intervening period cannot takeaway the right accrued to him and to the Petitioner after the death of her husband. Her case is that the same very conditions relating to eligibility and credential exist in favour of the Petitioner and thus there is no earthly reason as to why she being the sole legal heir of her husband be not issued with the LOI. According to the Petitioner, her husband accumulated the entire resources of the family and even by mortgaging all valuables belonging to her and secured the land to be used for establishing the retail outlet and even now she has been paying the monthly rent for the lease hold land. According to the Petitioner, her husband accumulated the entire resources of the family and even by mortgaging all valuables belonging to her and secured the land to be used for establishing the retail outlet and even now she has been paying the monthly rent for the lease hold land. She asserts violation of Article 14, 19 and 21 read with Article 300A of the Constitution. 12. The writ petition was entertained by order dated 07.08.03 and in the interim the status quo was directed to be maintained by the parties. It is thus, the interim order which has prevented the Respondent No. 4 and the official Respondent to act upon the impugned LOI issued in her favour. The stand in the counter affidavit of the HPCL is that after the selection of the Petitioner's husband and before the LOI could be issued, the Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad made a complaint before the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas questioning the eligibility of her husband for the dealership and the matter was handed over to the Anti Adulteration Cell for investigation and taking decision. The matter attained its finality only on 28.04.03 after which the Ministry directed the Respondents No. 1 and 2 to issue the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband. However, by that time the husband of the Petitioner expired. He expired on 18.02.03. Hence the LOI could not be issued and instead of the same had to be issued to the Respondent No. 4 as per the guidelines framed by the Respondents in such matter. 13. Thus, the only stand of the Respondents in their affidavit for non issuance of LOI to the Petitioner is that, at the first instance the LOI could not be issued to her husband in view of the complaint lodged by the Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad on the basis of which an investigation was carried out. When the investigation was over and the dock for the Petitioner's husband was cleared through intimation dated 28.04.03, he was no more to be issued with the LOI having expired on 18.02.03. In such a situation, as per the guidelines formulated by the Corporation there was no option left for the Respondents to issue LOI in favour of the second nominee, i.e. the Respondent No. 4. 14. The Respondent No. 4 has also filed a counter affidavit supporting the stand of the official Respondents. In such a situation, as per the guidelines formulated by the Corporation there was no option left for the Respondents to issue LOI in favour of the second nominee, i.e. the Respondent No. 4. 14. The Respondent No. 4 has also filed a counter affidavit supporting the stand of the official Respondents. She has also questioned the lease deed executed by the Petitioner's husband. According to her there was no requirement to obtain land etc. by the Petitioner's husband before issuance of LOI. She has denied the allegations regarding the assets of her father and her stone crusher business and possessing a Tata Truck bearing registration No. ASU 5615. According to her the income of her parents is less than Rs. 2 lakhs. Her stand in the affidavit is that the dealership is not heritable and that it is only in the event of issuance of LOI in favour of the selectee and his death thereafter, the legal heir can claim the dealership. She asserts that in pursuance to the issuance of LOI, she has proceeded in the matter by procuring land and making application for no-objection certificate etc. However, no particulars have been disclosed in the affidavit in the regard. 15. I have heard Mr. A.M. Mazumdar, learned Sr. counsel for the Petitioner assisted by Mr. M. Nath, learned Counsel. I have also heard Mr. G.C. Nath, learned Counsel representing the Respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 and Mr. S.N. Samah, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. Y.S. Mannan, learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondent No. 4. Mr. Mazumdar in his elaborate argument reiterated the stand in the writ petition. He submitted that although the matter was delayed on the basis of so called complaint filed by the organization, the Petitioner's husband was never intimated anything about the same. He submitted that the organization who allegedly lodged the complaint is in fact, a non existent one. Mr. Mazumdar in his elaborate argument reiterated the stand in the writ petition. He submitted that although the matter was delayed on the basis of so called complaint filed by the organization, the Petitioner's husband was never intimated anything about the same. He submitted that the organization who allegedly lodged the complaint is in fact, a non existent one. Placing reliance on the Citizen Charter issued by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, he submitted that as against the requirement of issuance of the LOI within 15 days of receipt of the merit penal, the Respondents held the matter for two years on the basis of the so called complaint and such delay being not attributable to the Petitioner and for that matter to her husband, the right accrued to her husband could not have been defeated by the Respondents in the manner and method in which the same has been sought to be done. He submitted that in any case the Ministry having cleared the dock for the Petitioner's husband, the things would relate back to the date of the selection of her husband and the death of her husband in the interregnum due to the delay caused by the Respondents cannot deprive the Petitioner from her right. 16. Mr. G.C. Nath, learned Counsel for the official Respondents, on the other hand submitted that whatever had been done by the Corporation was strictly in accordance with the guidelines holding the filed. He submitted in tune with the stand in the affidavit that the Petitioner's husband having not been issued with the LOI and although the Ministry cleared the case of the Petitioner's husband, but he in the meantime having expired, no option was left with the Corporation than to issue the LOI in favour of the second nominee, i.e. the Respondent No. 4. 17. Mr. S .N. Sarmah, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 4 made elaborate submissions justifying the action of the official Respondents towards issuance of LOI in her favour. He submitted that no fault could be attributed to the Respondents for the happenings during the interregnum, when the investigation was on against the Petitioner's husband. 17. Mr. S .N. Sarmah, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 4 made elaborate submissions justifying the action of the official Respondents towards issuance of LOI in her favour. He submitted that no fault could be attributed to the Respondents for the happenings during the interregnum, when the investigation was on against the Petitioner's husband. According to him unless and until the LOI is issued to a nominee, no right is accrued to him and in the instant case the Petitioner's husband having expired before issuance of the LOI, the Petitioner cannot claim the right of inheritance in as much as it was her husband and not the Petitioner who was selected by the DSB. 18. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. Mr. G.C. Nath, learned Counsel for the official Respondents have produced the records and I have gone through the same. By order dated 23.11.04, Mr. Nath was requested to furnish the following information and documents: 1) The original complaint dated 12.07.01 2) Nature of investigation carried out for long two (2) years. 3) The results of such investigation 4) Investigation report. 19. The records produced by the learned Counsel for the Corporation indicate the following: Date Nature of documents 12.07.01 Allegation made by Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad addressed to MOP&NG. (received at Calcutta on 18.07.01) 25.07.01 Complaint was forwarded to the DG, AAC 15.10.01 Sri S.K. Medhi’s representation to Hon’ble Minister 27.11.01 HPCL’s letter to DG, AAC seeking their advice 14.01.02 DG, AAC’s letter directing for investigation by an officer (received on 17.01.02) 21.01.02 HPCL, Bombay wrote to HPCL, Calcutta to get complaint investigated by an officer (received at Calcutta on 24.01.02) 11.02.02 Investigation Report forwarded by the Officer after investigation done on 02.02.02 20.02.02 Investigated Report forwarded to the DG, AAC 28.04.03 MOP & NG’s letter directing HPCL to issue LOI to Sri S.K. Medhi (received on 02.05.03) 02.06.03 HPCL informed MOP & NG about expiry of S.K. Medhi 02.06.03 Representation made by Smti Kunti Medhi 06.06.03 Representation to Hon’ble Minister through Sri Rajen Gohain, MP 01.08.03 Sri Rajen Gohain, MP, forwarded the representation to the Hon’ble Minister 21.08.03 Ministry’s letter to HPCL seeking comment (received on 29.08.03) 16.09.03 HPCL’s reply to the Minister. 20. In the reply to the Ministry's letter dated 21.08.03, HPCL highlighted the above aspects. 20. In the reply to the Ministry's letter dated 21.08.03, HPCL highlighted the above aspects. However, in the said letter dated 16.08.03 the stand of the HPCL in the affidavit that as per the guidelines, in the event of death of the first nominee before issuance of LOI, it is the second nominee who is to be allotted with the dealership is not discernible. By their letter dated 21.08.03 the Ministry asked for a report/comment in the matter and in response to the same the letter dated 16.09.03 was sent by the HPCL to the Ministry. I have perused the said letter and the same does not in any manner refer to the guidelines as indicated in the counter affidavit. However, the letter indicates that the HPCL wrote the letter to the Ministry on 02.06.03 intimating about the death of the first nominee, i.e. the husband of the Petitioner and the proposed steps for issuance of LOI to the next empanelled candidate, i.e. the Respondent No. 4 for the dealership. 21. Selection for the dealership was made on 21.06.01 and the Petitioner's husband was placed at serial No. 1 of the panel as per merit. There is no denial about the same. As per the records produced by the learned Counsel for the Corporation, the complaint was lodged on 12.07.01, i.e. after the expiry of 15 days from the date of selection. If one is to follow the Citizen Charter as produced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the sequence of procedure followed in the selection of dealership/distributionship, requires issuance of LOI within 15 days of receipt of the merit panel. Clause 3.12.1 of the said Citizen Charter reads as follows: 3.12.1 After receipt of merit panel, the Executive Director/General Manager of the zone will get the Field Investigation Report (FIR) completed within 10 days and issue the LOI within 15 days of the receipt of the merit panel from DSB. 22. In clause 7.5 of the Citizen Charter the sequence of procedure followed in the selection of dealerships/distributorships have been expressed in the form of table for public information. As per the said table also the LOI is issued within 15 days of the selection. 22. In clause 7.5 of the Citizen Charter the sequence of procedure followed in the selection of dealerships/distributorships have been expressed in the form of table for public information. As per the said table also the LOI is issued within 15 days of the selection. In the instant case although the selection was made on 21.06.01 the LOI was not issued to the Petitioner's husband within the stipulated period much projected by the official Respondents in their Citizen Charter. 23. From the information furnished by the learned Counsel for the Corporation as indicated above, it will be seen that the complaint of Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad was forwarded to the DG, Anti Adulteration Cell on 25.07.01 and it was on 14.01.02 the DG, Anti Adulteration Cell directed investigation by an officer. By that time the stipulated period of 15 days had long expired. The investigation report exonerating the Petitioner's husband from the allegations made against him was forwarded on 11.02.02 and it took long 14 months for the Ministry to issue the direction to the HPCL to issue LOI to the Petitioner's husband. Unfortunately, the Petitioner's husband expired on 18.02.03. Although the Ministry's clearance by the letter dated 28.04.03 was received by the HPCL on 02.05.03, they did not do anything in the matter by way of issuance of the LOI to the Petitioner's husband till 02.06.03 when the Petitioner submitted representation for issuance of LOI to her and intimating about the death of her husband. It was only on receipt of the said representation dated 02.06.03, the HPCL hurriedly acted upon the matter and issued the LOI in favour of the Respondent No. 4 by their letter dated 18.07.03 and simultaneously informed the Petitioner that there was no question of transferring the LOI in her name. Thus, no other reason but the apathy of the Respondents which delayed the issuance of LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband, but for which the present situation would not have arisen. 24. In the complaint dated 12.07.01 allegedly lodged by Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad which was a hand written one, certain allegations were made against the Petitioner's husband. There is no identification of the signatories of the letter. It is on that basis the matter relating to issuance of LOI to the Petitioner's husband was delayed by more than two years. 24. In the complaint dated 12.07.01 allegedly lodged by Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad which was a hand written one, certain allegations were made against the Petitioner's husband. There is no identification of the signatories of the letter. It is on that basis the matter relating to issuance of LOI to the Petitioner's husband was delayed by more than two years. As per the own revelation made by the Respondents the investigation against the Petitioner's husband was finalized by way of furnishing the report on 11.02.02. Even thereafter also the matter was delayed by about 14 months and it was only on 28.04.03 the Ministry directed the HPCL to issue the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband. In the meantime, the Petitioner's husband expired on 18.02.03. The matter was firstly delayed by not adhering to the stipulated target of issuance of LOI projected by the Respondents themselves. Secondly, the LOI was withheld on account of so called complaint lodged by the Youth Parishad without there being any identification of the signatories and finally even after submission of the investigation report dated 11.02.02, the matter was further delayed by 14 months. Amidst such inaction and delay on the part of the Respondents the Petitioner's husband expired on 18.02.03. It is now the expiry of the Petitioner's husband which is the centre of controversy as has been raised by the Respondents leaving aside all other attending circumstances. As will be evident from the letter dated 27.11.01 and the records produced by Mr. Nath, learned Counsel for the HPCL about which mention has been made above, the issuance of the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband was withheld in view of the aforesaid complaint. Thus LOI was ready to be issued in favour of the Petitioner's husband but was withheld from such issuance in view of the complaint without any prompt verification of the veracity or otherwise of the same. 25. Mr. S.N. Sarmah, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 4 produced a copy of the letter dated 29.05.97 issued by the Govt. of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas on the subject of transfer of LOI to next kin of the deceased LOI holders. By the said letter the decision of the Ministry was conveyed in the form of guidelines. of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas on the subject of transfer of LOI to next kin of the deceased LOI holders. By the said letter the decision of the Ministry was conveyed in the form of guidelines. The said guidelines read as follows: If the LOI holder had made substantial investment towards acquisition of land and/or creating infrastructure, but expired or killed before the commissioning of the dealership/distributorship. Or If the LOI holder had made substantial progress in putting up the facility, but became totally paralyzed or mentally unsound etc. which rendered him/her ineligible for the dealership/distributorship. 26. Mr. S.N. Sarmah, learned Sr. Counsel for the Respondent No. 4 also produced a copy of the letter dated 02.05.01 issued by the Govt. of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas on the subject of processing of complaints against the selection process of dealer/distributor for RO dealerships/LPG distributorships/SKO-LDO) dealerships. By the said letter decision of the Ministry was conveyed regarding holding of enquiry in respect of complaints received in the matter of selection process. The whole letter speaks of complaints against the DSBs or the dealer selection process received by the Ministry or complaints against the Chairman and/or members of DSBs received by the Ministry and Oil Marketing companies. The relevant clause in the said letter dated 02.05.01 is reproduced below: All complaints against the DSBs or the dealer selection process received by the Ministry or complaints against the Chairman and/or Members of DSBs received by the Ministry and the marketing companies will be forwarded to the Office of Director General, Anti Adulteration Cell. Director General, Anti Adulteration Cell will then inquire into the complaints that are against the Chairpersons of DSBs or against the officials or the oil companies. The complaints against the empanelled candidates or against the process as such, received by the oil marketing companies and such complaints received by the Director General, Anti Adulteration Cell will be forwarded by the Office of Director General, Anti Adulteration Cell to the oil marketing companies, to be dealt with in terms of procedure laid down in the guidelines circulated by the Ministry vide letter No. P-39012/1/ 99-IOC dated 09.10.2000. 27. The aforesaid letter of the Ministry is primarily on the irregularities committed by the Chairman and/or members of the DSBs. 27. The aforesaid letter of the Ministry is primarily on the irregularities committed by the Chairman and/or members of the DSBs. In the instant case the complaint was purportedly lodged by the Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parisad. There was no allegation against any of the members of the DSB. Some vague and indefinite allegations made against the Petitioner were only in respect of his gross annual income. According to the complaints the gross annual income of the Petitioner's husband is more than Rs. 2 lakhs. As noticed above, the complaint was hand written one without disclosing the identification of the signatories. Acting on such a complaint which was also lodged and forwarded after the expiry of stipulated period of 15 days of issuance of LOI, the issuance of LOI to the Petitioner was withheld. The matter was investigated through the authorized officer who submitted his report on 20.02.02. Nothing has been disclosed as to what prevented the Respondents from taking a decision in the matter when the report fully absolved the Petitioner from any irregularity. Instead the matter was delayed by 14 months and by the time the Ministry issued its letter on 28.04.03 asking the HPCL to issue LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband, unfortunately he expired on 18.02.03. 28. It is the above backdrop, the whole assertion made by the official as well as the private Respondents is that the husband of the Petitioner having expired before LOI could be issued, no inheritable right has accrued in favour of the Petitioner. Placing reliance on the aforesaid two letters dated 29.05.97 and 02.05.01, it is their case that at the first instance the LOI could not be issued to the Petitioner's husband due to on going investigation and at the second instance, the LOI having not been issued to the Petitioner's husband, there is no question of transferring the LOI to the Petitioner. While faithfully following the contents of the said two letters dated 29.05.97 and 02.05.01 as per their own interpretation of the same, the Respondents have not even obliquely stated the reasons behind the delay in deciding the matter relating to issuance of the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband. As observed above, the official Respondents withheld the issuance of LOI only on the basis of complaint as will be evident from their aforesaid letter dated 27.11.01. As observed above, the official Respondents withheld the issuance of LOI only on the basis of complaint as will be evident from their aforesaid letter dated 27.11.01. Thus, as per the own case of the Respondents the whole difficulty would have been met, had the LOI been issued in favour of the Petitioner's husband. The Respondents delayed the matter towards issuance of the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband and after his expiry they have taken the stand of the situation being created by such expiry of the Petitioner's husband and for that they projected the aforesaid letter dated 29.05.97. 29. Even in the said letter dated 29.05.97 the transfer of LOI to the next kin of the deceased LOI holder has been recognized. The condition precedent for the same is the substantial investment, i.e. acquisition of land and/or creating infrastructure by the LOI holder, but either has expired or has become totally paralyzed or mentally unsound. Thus the whole emphasis is on the progress made towards installation of the dealership by the LOI holder. In the instant case the circumstances leading to the delay of issuance of the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband have been noticed above. There was no fault on the part of the Petitioner's husband in respect of the delay caused by the Respondents themselves. The Respondents firstly delayed the matter towards issuance of the LOI in favour of the Petitioner's husband and then issued the same to the second nominee, i.e. the Respondent No. 4 on the ground of expiry of the first nominee. 30. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition the Petitioner has made categorical statement that after the selection of her husband for the dealership he entered into lease agreement with one Shri Rejaul Karim Choudhury in terms of which a plot of land measuring 5 bighas, 4 kathas and 4 Lechas covered by periodic patta No. 87, Dag No. 418 of Bhagiram Gaon under Jamunamukh Mauza, Dabaka Town was taken over by her husband for use of the same as the venue of the retail outlet. The lease deed was executed on consideration of payment of Rs. 4,000/- per month with effect from August, 2001. According to the Petitioner, the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- is being paid to said Shri Rejaul Karim Choudhury regularly even now. 31. The lease deed was executed on consideration of payment of Rs. 4,000/- per month with effect from August, 2001. According to the Petitioner, the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- is being paid to said Shri Rejaul Karim Choudhury regularly even now. 31. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition it is the definite case of the Petitioner that the Respondents No. 1 and 2 deputed their field Officer one Shri Abhijeet Bhattacharjee for field verification regarding credentials of the Petitioner's husband as well as the commercial viability of the land acquired by her husband. The field verification was conducted in the 3rd and 4th week of July, 2001 by the Respondent No. 1 and 2 through their deputed officer who in turn asked the Petitioner's husband to develop the land and get the same ready for installation of retail outlet. 32. The official Respondents in their affidavit have not denied the averments made in paragraph 6 of the writ petition. The assertions made by the Petitioner about acquiring the land and payment of monthly rent of Rs. 4,000/- go unrefuted. As regards the visit of the field officer etc. as asserted by the Petitioner, same also go unrefuted in the counter affidavit filed by the official Respondents. Only a general denial has been made in the affidavit as regards the statements made by the Petitioner in paragraph 7 of the writ petition for denying that the Petitioner was asked to develop the land. However, as regards the visit of their field Officer for field verification regarding the credentials of the Petitioner's husband as well as commercial viability of the land acquired by the Petitioner has not been denied. Even as per the advertisement, one of the requirements was that the applicant should furnish alongwith the application, details of land which he/she might make available for the dealership. 33. Thus, the assertion made by the Petitioner which go unrefuted is that the Petitioner's husband acquired the aforesaid plot of land at monthly rent of Rs. 4,000/- starting from August, 2001 and the rent is being paid till date. The question which arises for consideration is whether such investment made by the Petitioner's husband can be said to be a kind of investment as visualized and emphasized in the aforesaid letter dated 29.05.97 issued by the Ministry. 4,000/- starting from August, 2001 and the rent is being paid till date. The question which arises for consideration is whether such investment made by the Petitioner's husband can be said to be a kind of investment as visualized and emphasized in the aforesaid letter dated 29.05.97 issued by the Ministry. As per the said letter the LOI can be transferred to the next kin of the deceased LOI holders if he had made substantial investment towards acquisition of land and/or creating infrastructure. In the instant case the Petitioner's husband acquired the land measuring more than 5 bighas description of which have been fully given in paragraph-6 of the writ petition and started paying a monthly rent of Rs. 4,000/- from August, 2001. 34. The factum of conducting field verification by the deputed officer of the HPCL by visiting the land has also not been denied by the official Respondents. Thus there is no dispute that the Petitioner's husband made investment towards installation of the dealership and if the monthly rent of Rs. 4,000/- is taken into account, same stood accumulated to Rs. 96,000/- from August, 2001 to August, 2003 when the writ petition was filed. If that is not substantial investment as envisaged in the letter dated 29.05.97, what else could it be. There was also advice from the field officer to get land further developed by the Petitioner's husband. Thus, there is no denial that substantial investment was made by the Petitioner's husband. Now taking recourse to the inaction and/or delayed action on the part of the Respondents towards issuance of LOI which was withdrawn from such issuance on account of the so called complaint lodged by Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad, the Respondents have refused to offer/transfer the LOI to the Petitioner giving their own interpretation to the letter dated 29.05.97. 35. The Respondent No. 4 in her affidavit has also not denied the facts disclosed by the Petitioner in paragraph 6 and 7 of the writ petition about which discussions have been made above. However, she has questioned the validity of the lease agreement and stated that there was no need to enter into any lease agreement by the Petitioner's husband before issuance of the LOI. However, she has questioned the validity of the lease agreement and stated that there was no need to enter into any lease agreement by the Petitioner's husband before issuance of the LOI. The Petitioner has made specific allegations against the Respondent No. 4 that she was a student at the time of filing of the application on 31.01.2000 and that she was entirely dependent on her father whose annual income is more than Rs. 2 lakhs to which there is no denial on the part of the official Respondents. In paragraph-9 of the affidavit dealing with the allegations made by the Petitioner against the Respondent No. 4, the stand of the official Respondents is that the DSB looked into the eligibility of the candidates and when the said Board selected the Respondent No. 4 as second qualified candidate, the official Respondents had no alternative than to accept her as second qualified candidate. 36. Thus, the whole basis of the claim of the official Respondents to favour the Respondent No. 4 is the recommendation made by the DSB which according to them is the competent authority to look into the eligibility of the candidates. It is not understood as to why the same parameter and yardstick could not be applied to the case of the Petitioner's husband. The Respondents did not take the same very stand in respect of the Petitioner's husband when the alleged complaints was lodged against him. The allegations made in the complaint and the allegations made against the Respondent No. 4 are of similar nature. The official Respondents resorted to an investigation so far as the Petitioner's husband is concerned, but in respect of the Respondent No. 4 their stand is that they had no option than to accept the Respondent No. 4 as the second nominee on the basis of the recommendation made by the DSB irrespective of the allegations against him. 37. Thus, there has been double standard in respect of application of yardstick towards judging the complaints against the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 4. Had there been no investigation against the Petitioner's husband or timely action even after the investigation and submission of report by the deputed officer, the present situation would not have arisen. 37. Thus, there has been double standard in respect of application of yardstick towards judging the complaints against the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 4. Had there been no investigation against the Petitioner's husband or timely action even after the investigation and submission of report by the deputed officer, the present situation would not have arisen. As noticed above, even after submission of the report by the investigating officer clearing the dock of the Petitioner's husband, the Respondents delayed the matter by about 14 months. Even after the issuance of clearance letter by the Ministry, the HPCL delayed the matter by more than one month towards issuance of LOI. But for the information furnished by the Petitioner about the expiry of her husband on 18.02.03 the LOI would have been issued in the name of her husband. 38. The Respondent No. 4 has also not denied that she was a student at the date of making the application for the dealership as specifically agitated by the Petitioner in paragraph 14 of the writ petition. Even in respect of other allegations except the allegations relating to the (sic)cership of the Respondent No. 4 of a stone crusher and a Tata Truck, she has not categorically denied the same. The question necessarily arises why the official Respondents without investigating the matter on the basis of the allegations made by the Petitioner have defended the issuance of the LOI in favour of the Respondent No. 4 and that too immediately within one month of the intimation given by the Petitioner relating to death of her husband. This question naturally comes up for consideration and creates doubt on the genuineness of the dealings made by the HPCL in the entire episode, more so when the matter relating to issuance of LOI to the Petitioner's husband was delayed by more than 2 years on the basis of so called complaint allegedly lodged by an organization through unidentified signatories. 39. The interpretation of the aforesaid letter dated 29.05.97 as has been projected by the Respondents so as to defeat the just claim of the Petitioner cannot be allowed. The whole basis of the idea behind the issuance of the letter dated 29.05.97 is to benefit the next kin of the deceased LOI holder. 39. The interpretation of the aforesaid letter dated 29.05.97 as has been projected by the Respondents so as to defeat the just claim of the Petitioner cannot be allowed. The whole basis of the idea behind the issuance of the letter dated 29.05.97 is to benefit the next kin of the deceased LOI holder. As per the said letter, the LOI may be transferred to the next kin of the deceased LOI holder if he/she had made substantial investment towards acquisition of land etc. In the instant case there is no dispute that the Petitioner's husband made substantial investment towards acquiring the land for installation of dealership. The only difference is in respect of the actual issuance of the LOI. As per the aforementioned letter dated 27.11.01, the issuance of the LOI and not the LOI itself was withheld in view of the so called complaint lodged by the Dabaka Anchalik Youth Parishad. The said course of action was adopted by the Respondents without any verification of the complaint. They gave uncalled for importance to the complaint, the signatories of which did not disclose their identification. Even after completion of the investigation by way of furnishing the report giving clearance to the case of the Petitioner's husband, the matter was kept pending and delayed for 14 months, but for which the present situation would not have emerged. 40. It is in the above backdrop the application of the aforesaid letter dated 29.05.97 to the case of the Petitioner will have to be judged. Same will have to be judged coupled with the duty enjoined on the official Respondents towards issuance of LOI. After creating the kind of situation as in the instant case by the official Respondents by their sheer inaction, they cannot be allowed to fall back on the strict and restrictive interpretation of the said letter dated 29.05.97 as has been projected by them. 41. Legal formulations and the administrative guidelines cannot be divorced from the fact situation of the case. Rules of procedure are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not to defeat the same. In the instant case the kind of interpretation sought to be projected by the Respondents in respect of the letter dated 29.05.97 cannot be accepted. There has to be rationality in the implementation of formulation. The criteria has to be formulated keeping the aims and safeguards in view. In the instant case the kind of interpretation sought to be projected by the Respondents in respect of the letter dated 29.05.97 cannot be accepted. There has to be rationality in the implementation of formulation. The criteria has to be formulated keeping the aims and safeguards in view. The keynote thought behind the exercise should not be lost sight of. The very purpose is defeated if the end result is anything else. Primary objective of the guidelines laid down in the letter dated 29.05.97 will have to be considered. A strict, rigid and restrictive interpretation to the contents of the letter will lead to manifestly absurd and inequitable results. Having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the case, too literal an adherence to the said letter will result in absurdity and injustice. Even in the case of interpretation of statute, endeavour would be to avoid absurdity or unintended unjust results by applying the doctrine of purposive construction. Writ Court being a Court of equity cannot be obvious of the ground realities and the demand of the situation towards promoting justice and equity. 42. The Apex Court in the case of Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal reported in AIR 2002 SC 33 observed that the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it. No man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. In the said case the Apex Court observed that if justice became the by product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. 43. Similarly in the case of Dwaraka Nath v. ITO reported in AIR 1966 SC 81 , the Apex Court observed that our Constitution designedly used wide language in Article 226 to enable the Courts to "reach justice wherever found necessary". 44. In the case of Controller and Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan and Anr. reported in (1986) 2 SCC 679 dealing with the jurisdiction and power under Article226 of the Constitution of India observed follows: 20. 44. In the case of Controller and Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan and Anr. reported in (1986) 2 SCC 679 dealing with the jurisdiction and power under Article226 of the Constitution of India observed follows: 20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the government or has exercised such discretion malafide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion. 45. In the instant case also I am of the considered opinion that the kind of interpretation sought to be projected by the Respondents in respect of the letter dated 29.05.97 is not acceptable. If the LOI is transferable under the given circumstances as indicated in the said letter, I see no reason as to why the provision can not be made applicable to the case of the Petitioner under the given circumstances of the instant case. Except the formal issuance of the LOI to the Petitioner's husband which was admittedly withheld on account of the so called complaint against him, the Petitioner fulfilled all other conditions as envisaged in the said letter dated 29.05.97. Except the formal issuance of the LOI to the Petitioner's husband which was admittedly withheld on account of the so called complaint against him, the Petitioner fulfilled all other conditions as envisaged in the said letter dated 29.05.97. In such a situation, the Respondents taking a pragmatic approach to the matter, ought to have issued/transferred the LOI to the Petitioner which was already prepared in favour of her husband, but was withheld from issuance in view of the complaint lodged against him. On the overall consideration of the entire matter, I am of the considered opinion that interference in the matter is called for by way of exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the manner and method as enjoined by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions. 46. For the foregoing reasons, I am inclined to grant the prayers made in the writ application. Consequently, the writ petition stands allowed setting aside and quashing the impugned LOI dated 18.07.03 issued in favour of the Respondent No. 4 and the Annexure-6 communication dated 18.07.03 made to the Petitioner by the HPCL. The retail outlet dealership in question for which the Petitioner's husband was selected as the first nominee and the LOI thereof shall now be issued/transferred in favour of the Petitioner after observing all necessary formalities. The entire exercise shall be carried out within two months from today. 47. The writ petition stands allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.