JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. By this order I would dispose of the two Applications IA No. 7379/2005 under Order 22 Rule 3' of the Code of Civil Procedure for bringing on record the legal representatives of plaintiff No. 2, Col. Prithipal Singh Malik; who died on 29th April, 2003 due to cardiac arrest and IA No. 7380/2005, an - application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in filing IA No. 7379/2005. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 32,18,800 being the balance sale consideration with interest@ 18% p.a. till realisation, a further relief for the recovery ofRs. llakh on account of damages, and for declaration / in relation to property No. 43, Rajpur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi. The plaintiffs along with their father were members of the HUF styled as 'Malik Mukhbain Singh HUF'. In that capacity, they were owners of property No. 43, Rajpur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, which was purchased vide registered sale deed dated 6th December, 1948. The property was occupied by the family till the family partition took place on 31st March, 1981. The portions divided between the parties were duly shown in the site plan prepared by the parties at that time. Defendants No.1 to 8 entered into seven agreements of purchase with the plaintiffs and Malik Mukhbain Singh on 22nd April, 1985. The intending purchasers had agreed to sell part of the said lancl and the total area covered by different agreements to sell to defendants No.1 to 8 was 2969 sq. mts. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants were not paying the balance sale consideration despite their repeated requests and defendants No.9 to 14 are the persons whom defendants No.1 to 8 conveyed their rights title and interest in the said property while defendants No. 15 to 23 are the person who are living in different portions of the said disputed property. The plaintiffs also claims to have served a notice dated 30th June, 1988 on the defendants and an insertion to this effect was also got published in the daily 'Statesman' dated 3rd July, 1988 and as such the defendants were not entitled to act on behalf to the plaintiff without completing their obligations in terms of the said agreement. The defendants having failed to pay the balance consideration to the extent of Rs. The defendants having failed to pay the balance consideration to the extent of Rs. 32,18,800, the plaintiffs have filed this suit with the afore-stated reliefs. 3. The suit was contested and the defendants pray that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief and are not entitled to recover the said amount with interest @ 18% per annum, and that the defendants had not committed anyoreach of the terms of the agreement. 4. It may be noticed at this stage that during the course of hearing, the parties were negotiating for a settlement and it was also stated on behalf of the plaintiffs that they would be willing to execute a sale deed in favour of the defendants after receiving the balance sale consideration. It was at that " point of time that it was brought to the notice of the Court that plaintiff No. 2 had died during the pendency of the suit on 29th April, 2003 and on/or about 6th September, 2005 the applications under. consideration were filed by the plaintiffs. 5. In the application for condonation of delay it has been stated that Prithipal Singh died on 29th April, 2003 at Chandigarh due to cardiac arrest and power of attorney was given earlier to Daljeet Singh Malik, brother of the deceased, who was 80 years old and was quite unwell. He also suffered a heart attack and a problem with regard to Hernia. He was admitted to Apollo Hospital and then was operated upon under the advice of the doctors. After operation he even lost his memory to some extent and was not able to communicate with his counsel and inform the correct position with regard to the death of the deceased. The other plaintiff, Mr. K.J.S Malik was living in Bombay since 1967 and had shifted to Chandigarh just couple of years back and was not in touch with the counsel. In fact, it was during the course of compromise talks, when the statement was made before the Court that plaintiffs were willing to settle the matter, that it could be noticed that legal representatives of the deceased had not been brought on record. Thereafter, the present applications were moved. In fact, it was during the course of compromise talks, when the statement was made before the Court that plaintiffs were willing to settle the matter, that it could be noticed that legal representatives of the deceased had not been brought on record. Thereafter, the present applications were moved. The averments made in the applications have been controverted by the non-applicants by filling a reply wherein it is stated that the applicant has been misleading the Court and had not brought the correct facts to the notice of the Court as such they are liable to pay heavy costs to the non-applicants. According to the non-applicant, no sufficient reason much less a good cause has been given in the application for condonation of delay. The counsel appearing for the applicant relied upon various Judgments of the Supreme Court and High Court to contend that the legal representatives should be brought on record and the delay in filing the said application should be condoned. While relying upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Swaroop and others v. Mool Chand and others AIR 1983 Supreme Court 355 it is argued that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 is basically a procedural device for advising justice and not imposing the same. In this suit for partition and possession of intended shares, an application under Order 22 Rule 4 read with Order I, Rule 10 filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court while allowing the said application. held as under: "Held that the order of High Court disclosed a hyper technical approach' which if carried to end may result in miscarriage of justice. If the trend is to encourage fair play in action in administrative law, it must all the more inhere in judicial approach. Such applications have to be approached with this view whether substantial justice is done between the parties or technical rules of procedure are given precedence over doing substantial justice in Court. Undoubtedly justice according to law; law to be administered to advance justice. The application of appellant as well as that of legal representatives was allowable," 6. Reliance has also been placed on another Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others etc. Undoubtedly justice according to law; law to be administered to advance justice. The application of appellant as well as that of legal representatives was allowable," 6. Reliance has also been placed on another Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others etc. AIR 1972 Supreme Court 749, where the Supreme Court had held that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice particularly when there is no motive. Reliance was also placed upon Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Day a Ram and Ors. v. Shyam Sundari and Ors. NR 1965 Supreme Court 1049. 7. The law enunciated in the above Judgments of the Supreme Court clearly indicates that the provisions of Order 22 as well as the construction of the expression 'sufficient cause for condonation of delay' should be construed in a liberal manner unless there were compelling circumstances before the Court to deny such a relief. The law of procedure is intended to attain the ends of justice and merely because the legal representatives of one of the co-owners of the property were not brought on record within the stipulated time in a suit for recovery for specific performance of contract, would not be a sufficient ground for declining condonation of delay and holding that the suit had abated in its entirety. There is apparently no motive or gross negligence on the part of the plaintiffs to tile such an application. Apparently, no prejudice would be caused to the defendants as all the plaintiffs are co-owners of the property and have a joint and collective cause of action. The very purpose of filing the 'suit is to compel the defendants to perform his part of the obligations arising from the agreement to sell. Subsistence of a cause of action would be one of the relevant consideration that Court would consider while dealing with the application of the present kind. While there cannot be any dispute to the fact that the plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property, even one of them could have instituted the suit. Subsistence of a cause of action would be one of the relevant consideration that Court would consider while dealing with the application of the present kind. While there cannot be any dispute to the fact that the plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property, even one of them could have instituted the suit. In the case of Ram Niranjan Das and another v. Loknath Mandal and others AIR 1970 Patna 1 (V57 C1) Full Bench the Full Court of the Patna High Court had taken the view that a co-owner could institute a suit even for recovery of possession of the entire property, and this would not affect the right of the other co-owners, which would remain intact. The right of a co-owner would further indicate that there will not be abatement for non-substitution of his legal representatives as the suit is maintainable even by some of the co-owners (Refer: AIR 1970 Patna 258). A similar view was also taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramnarain and another v. Kishorelal AIR 1964 Rajasthan 19 (V 51 C 25). The law of procedure undisputedly takes in its ambit and scope, the need for a party to act expeditiously and not to delay the progress of the legal proceedings. Though the applicants have been somewhat negligent, but such negligence is not of the nature and kind which would invite a fatal result like abatement of the suit. The Courts have interpreted such procedural provisions to achieve the ends of justice and not to throttle the adjudication of disputes on merits so that the disputes between the parties could be finally adjudicated rather than such matters leading to multiplicity of litigation. The Courts have interpreted such procedural provisions to achieve the ends of justice and not to throttle the adjudication of disputes on merits so that the disputes between the parties could be finally adjudicated rather than such matters leading to multiplicity of litigation. In the case of Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti (D) by LRs v. Sah1jeevprasad Jamnaprasad Chourasiya and another AIR 2004 Supreme Court 4158, while upsetting the view of the High Court wherein an application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record, was not filed within time, and when filed was not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay the High Court took the view that the suit had abated, the Supreme Court held as under: "But, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the original defendant had not accepted the decree passed by the trial Court and had preferred an appeal before the District Court which was pending and as soon as the appeal was placed for hearing and the advocate had addressed a letter to the appellants, prompt actions were taken by them, the lower appellate Court ought to have granted the prayer for substitution. We are also of the view that after dismissal of application Exh. 22 the appellants had filed three applications Exh. 29, Exh. 31 and Exh. 33 which ought to have been allowed considering overall and attenuating circumstances of the case. The doctrine of res judicata could not be applied when the Court felt the applications were not maintainable. In our considered view, this is not a case of inaction or negligence on the part of the appellants. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the Extra Joint District Judge, Jalgaon on October 13, 1999 and confirmed by the High Court on December 18, 2003, are set aside and the applications stand allowed. the facts and circumstances, however, the appellants will pay an amount of Rs. 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand only) to the plaintiff-respondent No.1 by way of costs." 8. There has been some delay in filing the present applications, but gross negligence can hardly be attributed to the applicants as delay is free of any mala fide intent. The Court has to keep the facts and circumstances of the case in mind. 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand only) to the plaintiff-respondent No.1 by way of costs." 8. There has been some delay in filing the present applications, but gross negligence can hardly be attributed to the applicants as delay is free of any mala fide intent. The Court has to keep the facts and circumstances of the case in mind. The plaintiffs, as already noticed, have come to the Court requiring the defendants to discharge their obligations under the agreement to sell and want to put an end, to the prolonged litigation. In the circumstances aforenoticed, it cannot be said that the applications are void of merits or suffer from the evil of gross negligence. 9. In view of my above discussion, both the applications are allowed. Delay in filing IA No. 7379/2005 is condoned and the legal representatives of deceased, plaintiff No. 2, are permitted to be brought on record. Amended memo be filed within one week from today. 10. IAs No. 7380/2005 and 7379/2005 stand disposed of accordingly. 11. List the case before the Joint Registrar for directions on