Judgment Dinesh Maheshwari, J.-Civil Second appeal No. 5/1981 Madan Gopal & Ors. vs. Shri Krishan, and Civil Second Appeal No. 20/1981 Niranjan Singh vs. Shri Krishan although arise from two separate civil suits but were heard together and are taken up for decision by this common Judgment for the peculiar reasons: (i) both the appeals were admitted on 12.08.1981 for determination of identical substantial questions of law; (ii) both the cases involve almost similar facts; and the Judgment and decree impugned in both the cases proceed on similar facts and common questions; (iii) both the appeals were directed to be heard together by the order dated 20.10.1987. 2. The appeals arise out of two civil suits filed by the same plaintiff-respondent Shri Krishan against two different defendants for eviction from the respective suit shops on the ground of default in payment of rent and reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff . Both the suits were dismissed by similar Judgment and decree dated 19.09.1978 by the learned Munsif , Bikaner and the respective appeals filed by the plaintiff-landlord were allowed by the learned Civil Judge, Bikaner again by similar Judgment and decree dated 211.1980. 3. Both the appeals were admitted on 12.08.1981 while formulating following identical substantial questions of law:- “(1)Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it can be said that the appellant (tenant) was always ready and willing to pay the rent and if so, on the date of the suit, he had not defaulted in payment or tender of the rent for six months ? .(2) Whether the application dated 28.02.1974 of the appellant was one under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and if so, unless on that application orders would have been passed by the Court, the appellant could not have been called upon to deposit the amount of arrears of rent and also could not have been called upon to continue depositing rent month by month by the 15th of subsequent month? .(3) Inview of the facts that prior to October, 1973, there was no notice to the appellant about the transfer of the suit property by the earlier owner to the respondent, the fact that the appellant deposited five months rent, when only four months rent was due under Section 19-A of the Act goes to show that the appellant was always ready and willing to pay the rent due, and if so, what is its effect on the suit ? .(4) Whether the Court, under Section 19-A as well as the trial Court in the present case was the same and whether it was permissible for that Court to have looked into the record of the case under Section 19-A of the Act. If so, what is its effect on the suit ? 4. While hearing these appeals, another question was formulated by this Court on 07.02.2005 as follows:- “(5) Whether the finding on issue No. 4 on the question of comparative hardship by the Courts below is perverse and cannot be sustained ?” Civil Second Appeal No. 5/1981 5. This appeal arises out of Civil Suit No. 392/1973 filed by the plaintiff -respondent on 012.1973 for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against defendants-Shankerlal and Madan Gopal. Plaint: 6. The plaintiff averred in the plaint that a shop described in para 1 of the plaint was taken on rent by the defendants from its previous owner, Jagdish Narain at a monthly rent of Rs. 16/-and the rent was payable on the last day of every month, the tenancy commencing on first date of every English month and ending with the last. The plaintiff pleaded that house in which shop was situated had been purchased by him from Jagdish Narain by a sale-deed dated 12.03.1973. The ground of default was pleaded in the manner that defendant has not made payment of rent and damages from 01.03.1973 and, therefore, by withholding the rent for six months, the defendant has became defaulter who neither was nor is entitled for the benefit of the transfer of property law or Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction), Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The other ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement was pleaded with the averment that the plaintiff was not having any shop and has reasonable and bona fide necessity of the shop for his business of grains and coal, therefore, he has purchased the house after spending so much of amount. 7. The plaintiff further pleaded that tenancy of the defendant was terminated with effect from the month ending on 30.11.1973 by way of a notice dated 30.10.1973 and the defendant has received the notice but neither made payment of rent and damages for use and occupation nor vacated the shop. According to the plaintiff , the cause of action arose on 30.11.1973 on the expiry of the period of notice and on 012.1973 on total refusal to vacate the shop. The suit was valued at Rs. 144/-for the arrears of rent and damages and at Rs. 192/-for the relief of eviction. As noticed above, the suit was instituted by presentation of the plaint on 012.1973. Initial suit proceedings 8. The suit was registered on 10.12.1973 and the defendants Shanker Lal and Madan Gopal were summoned. Both of them were served with the summons on 07.02.1974 for appearance on 28.02.1974. 9. It may be pointed out that at the relevant time, in a suit based on the ground of default, Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act required a tenant on the first day of hearing (or before such other date as extended by the Court on an application not exceeding two months), either to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the tenant might have made default and including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the previous month of making payment or deposit, together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum; and thereafter to continue to deposit or pay month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month the monthly rent. Sub-section (5) required that if in any suit as referred to in Sub-section (4), there be any dispute as to the amount payable by the tenant, the Court was to determine the amount to be deposited or paid by the tenant. 10. Sub-section (5) required that if in any suit as referred to in Sub-section (4), there be any dispute as to the amount payable by the tenant, the Court was to determine the amount to be deposited or paid by the tenant. 10. 28th February, 1974 was the first date of appearance and on this date, the defendants moved an application stating that they had been tendering and making payment of rent to the erstwhile landlord or his representative. The rent for the period 01.03.1973 to 31.07.1973 at the rate of Rs. 16/-per month of Rs. 80/-was tendered and upon refusal it was sent by money order and yet on the landlord not accepting the rent, defendant No. 1 had deposited the rent in Civil Misc. Case No. 52/1973. The notice sent by the plaintiff through his lawyer was received by the defendants on 011.1973 by which he informed the defendants that the shop was purchased by him on 12.03.1973 and that he would adopt the proceedings for eviction on the ground of default also. It was further stated that defendant No. 1 had also moved an application in Civil Misc. Case No. 52/1973 that deposited amount of Rs. 80/-be paid to the present plaintiff by joining him as non-applicant No. 2 and the said case was posted for orders on 02.03.1974. It was also stated that after receipt of the notice, defendant No. 1 sent a reply and informed about the aforesaid deposited rent and also sent due rent by money order every month till receiving of the summons in the suit, but the rent sent by money order was not accepted by the plaintiff . The following prayer was made in the said application:- ^^01-03-1973 ls 28-02-1974 rd dk 12 ekg dk p<+k gqok fdjk;k 16@& izfrekg ds fglkc ls dqy 192@& oknh vFkok mlds odhy dks cv[kt jlhn ysus ds fy;s VsUMj fd;k tkrk ftls mUgsa Lohdkj djus ds fy, dgk tkos ;fn os mls Lohdkj uk djsa rks ;g jde fely ua- 52@73 eqa tek 5 r-nh- esekg dk 80@& ckn nsdj fnukad 01-08-1973 ls 28-02-1974 rd dk 7 ekg dk fdjk;k 112@& bl a tek djkus dh vkKk nh tkosA rFkk izfrekg dk fdjk;k 16@& gj eghus bl fely esfely esa tek djk; s tkrs jgus dh vkKk iznku dh tkosA 11. The defendant offered the amount of Rs. The defendant offered the amount of Rs. 192/-on this very date of 28.02.1974 and the same was accepted by the Counsel for the plaintiff `without prejudice’. It appears that on 28.02.1974, the learned Presiding Officer of the Court was not available, and, therefore, following order-sheet was drawn:- ^^28-02-1974 odhy oknh gkftj gSaAj ls jk/ksizfroknh dh vkS’;ke odhy us odkyrukek o ,d nj0 ds lkFk 192@& #- is’k fd;AsLV ysodhy oknh us vUMj izksVsdj jlhn nkf [ky dh xbZ tks jlhn rLnhd dh tkdj kkfey fely dh xbZA okLrs tokc nkok o gqde nj0 26-03-1974 dks is’k gksosA Jheku equlhQ lkgc ’kgknr ij i/kkjs gqos gSaA 12. On the next date i.e., 26.03.1974, the learned Munsif took up the aforesaid application dated 28.02.1974 and passed the following order:- ^^26-03-1974 odwyk; s QjhdSu gkftj gSaA odhy izfroknh dh nj- rk- 28-02-1974 ds ckjs esa vkns’k fn;k tkrk gS fd vxj oknh fdjk;k u yoss rks gj eghus dh 15 rkjh[k dks fu;ekuqlkj tek vnkyr esa djok nsosA fely okLrs tckonkok 26-04-1974 dks is’k gksA 13. Therefore, on the first date of appearance, the amount of Rs. 192/-was paid to the Counsel for the plaintiff towards the rent for the period of twelve months, i.e., 01.03.1973 to 28.02.1974, and thereafter the learned trial Court ordered on 26.03.1974 that if the plaintiff was not accepting the rent, then the defendant would deposit the rent in the Court by the 15th of every month in accordance with law. Written Statement 14. Thereafter, the defendants submitted the written statement admitting to have taken the shop from Jagdish Narain at the rent of Rs. 16/-per month. The averment regarding purchase of the house by the plaintiff was not admitted for want of knowledge. The averments regarding default and reasonable and bona fide necessity were denied. The receipt of the notice was admitted and it was stated that notice was baseless and its reply was sent by the defendant. 15. The defendants made additional submissions that they were in possession of suit shop for over 30 years and had been enhancing the rent also from time to time. The shop was taken on rent from Jagdish Narain and at his instructions, the rent was being recovered by his nephews Suresh Chandra and Ashok as Jagdish Narain was residing at Delhi. The defendants made additional submissions that they were in possession of suit shop for over 30 years and had been enhancing the rent also from time to time. The shop was taken on rent from Jagdish Narain and at his instructions, the rent was being recovered by his nephews Suresh Chandra and Ashok as Jagdish Narain was residing at Delhi. When the rent for the month of December, 1972 was not accepted by the aforesaid nephews, the same was sent to Jagdish Narain by money order who accepted the same. Later on, rent for the months of March, April and May was also tendered to those nephews and upon their refusal it was sent by money order to Jagdish Narain who refused to accept the same but he did not inform that the house in which the suit shop was situated had been sold to the plaintiff . Therefore, the rent for the months of March, April, May, June and July was deposited in the Court under Section 19-A of the Act. The defendants averred that upon receiving the notice from the plaintiff , they came to know that the house comprising of the suit shop had been purchased by the plaintiff from Jagdish Narain. Reply to the notice was sent in which it was pointed out that they were not informed of the change of the ownership earlier and, therefore, the rent was deposited in the Court and he could obtain the same, and, if not interested in accepting the rent from the Court, then for those very five months, the rent was sent by money order but the plaintiff did not accept the same. Further rent of three months of 01.08.1973 to 310.1973 had also become due and that was also sent to the plaintiff by money order but he refused the same. The plaintiff was being sent money orders every month but he did not accept them nor received the rent deposited in the Court and the rent was not sent after receiving of the summons. The defendants averred that they were not informed of the transfer of property on time nor the rent sent by money orders was accepted and the plaintiff wanted to artificially create the ground of default. The defendants averred that they were not informed of the transfer of property on time nor the rent sent by money orders was accepted and the plaintiff wanted to artificially create the ground of default. The defendants also pointed out that a copy of reply to the notice was sent to Jagdish Narain and he was requested for information but he did not send any reply. The ground of bona fide necessity was also denied with the averments that plaintiff was working on the oblique motive of enhancing the rent. Further proceedings in the suit 16. On the pleadings of the parties, three issues first on the question of default, second on bona fide requirement and third regarding relief were framed by the Court on 13.02.1975. For recording the evidence of the plaintiff , a Commissioner was appointed who recorded the statements of plaintiff Shri Krishan and his witness Naraindas on 07.08.1975 and produced the same before the Court. On this day itself , the plaintiff closed his evidence keeping the right of rebuttal reserved. While the suit was pending for defendants’ evidence, on 08.04.1976 defendants moved an application seeking amendment in the written statement to incorporate the plea in relation to the aspect of comparative hardship. 17. It may be pointed out that this amendment in the written statement was sought by the defendants in keeping with amendment to Section 14 of the Act, by which the restriction on eviction with reference to comparative hardship was introduced by the Amendment Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 (with effect from 29.09.1975) (later on replaced by the Amendment Act No. 14 of 1976), seeking to plead that by granting a decree for eviction, they would suffer more inconvenience and injury in comparison to the plaintiff . The defendant (singular refers to Shankerlal-defendant No. 1) was carrying on tailoring job in the shop in question and the shop was the only source of his livelihood and he was not getting any other shop in this locality comprising of his customers. This amendment application was not opposed by the plaintiff and was allowed on 8.4.1976 and, accordingly, para 17 was added to the written statement. 18. Thereafter, on 05.07.1976, learned trial Court framed additional issue No. 4 on the question of comparative hardship. As noticed above, prior to it, the plaintiffs evidence had already been completed. This amendment application was not opposed by the plaintiff and was allowed on 8.4.1976 and, accordingly, para 17 was added to the written statement. 18. Thereafter, on 05.07.1976, learned trial Court framed additional issue No. 4 on the question of comparative hardship. As noticed above, prior to it, the plaintiffs evidence had already been completed. However, with the framing of issue No. 4, the plaintiff had an opportunity and right to lead evidence but it was specifically given out by the plaintiff that he did not wish to lead any evidence in that respect, and, therefore, the case was posted for defendants’ evidence. 19. The defendants examined DW. 1 Suganchand, Postman of Indraprastha Head Post Office, New Delhi in relation to delivery of letter dated 211.1973 to Jagdish Narain; DW. 2 Bahadur Singh (brother of the other tenant in the adjoining shop); DW. 3 Rahim Bux (carrying on tailoring job in other locality) and DW. 4 Shanker Lal (defendant No. 1). The defendants closed the evidence on 24.07.1978 but before closure of the evidence moved an application on 12.04.1978 with reference to the amended provisions of Section 13 (3) of the Act requesting the Court to make a provisional determination of the rent as envisaged by the newly substituted Section 13 (3) of the Act. However, this application was kept pending by the trial Court and was decided while finally deciding the suit itself . 20. In the documentary evidence, the plaintiff produced postal receipts dated 30.10.1973 of the notice sent to the defendants as Exhs. 1 and 2, acknowledgment thereof as Exhs. 3 and 4, and a copy of the notice dated 30.10.1973 as Exh. 5. On the other hand, the defendants produced money order coupons dated 111.1973 carrying endorsement of refusal dated 211.1973 as Exh.A/1, dated 211.1973 carrying endorsement of refusal dated 211.1973 as Exh.A/2, dated 112.1973 carrying endorsement of refusal dated 112.1973 as Exh.A/3, dated 08.01.1974 carrying endorsement of refusal dated 10.01.1974 as Exh.A/4, the acknowledgment of the Counsel for the plaintiff of the reply to the notice as Exh.A/5, the acknowledgment dated 211.1973 of the registered letter sent to the previous landlord-Jagdish Narain as Exh.A/6, a certified copy of Vakalatnama filed on behalf of the present plaintiff in Misc. Case No. 52/1973 as Exh.A/7 and a copy of order-sheet in Misc. Case No. 52/1973 as Exh.A/8. Judgment and Decree dated 19.09.1978 21. Case No. 52/1973 as Exh.A/7 and a copy of order-sheet in Misc. Case No. 52/1973 as Exh.A/8. Judgment and Decree dated 19.09.1978 21. The learned Munsif after hearing the parties, by the Judgment dated 19.09.1978 proceeded to decide the issues involved in the case. While dealing with the ground of default as involved in issue No. 1, the learned Munsif considered the evidence of the parties and proceedings of the suit and found with reference to the application moved by the defendants on 28.02.1974 on the first date of hearing that the defendant has deposited the rent for five months upto the month of July, 1973 under Section 19-A of the Act and, therefore, it can be treated to be the payment of rent. The suit was filed in the month of December and at that time, the rent for only four months was due and all these amounts were sent by way of money orders and even the amount deposited under Section 19-A was also sent by the money order. With reference to the order-sheet Exh.A/8, it was found that both the Counsel agreed that Rs. 192/-were paid in the suit, and, therefore, Rs. 80/-(deposited under Section 19-A) were permitted to be withdrawn by the defendant. The learned Munsif was of opinion that at the time when the amount of Rs. 192/-was paid under Section 13 (4) of the Act, Rs. 80/-were paid extra because this amount was already in deposit under Section 19-A which had been withdrawn later, hence when only Rs. 112/-were to be paid by the defendant and thereupon interest of four months was only to be paid, extra payment was made of Rs. 80/-and this excess payment could be adjusted towards the interest even if the interest amount had not been quantified. The learned Munsif also referred to the fact that plaintiff never served any notice of purchasing of house upon the defendant and he was impleaded party in the application under Section 19-A also and the rent was regularly sent by money orders. The amount deposited under Section 19-A was withdrawn with the consent of both the parties and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said amount could not be adjusted against interest. The amount deposited under Section 19-A was withdrawn with the consent of both the parties and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said amount could not be adjusted against interest. The learned Munsif also referred to the application under Section 13(3) of the Act filed by the defendant at the fag end of the trial and found the same to be incompetent for the reason that the amendment to the scheme of Section 13 of the Act was applicable prospective only and rent could not be determined in this suit under Section 13(3) of the Act. The defendant was held not to be a defaulter. 22. The learned Munsif decided both the issues No. 2 and 4 together. The learned Munsif formed the opinion that plaintiff has purchased the entire property in which the business was being carried on and he was suggesting his intention to start business but his motives were not bona fide. Three shops were alleged to be on rent with his brother but it was not established that they were not of the joint family and it was also not clear as to whether shops were with the plaintiff or his brother? The learned Munsif found the preponderance of probabilities lying against the plaintiff . Issue No. 2 was, therefore, decided against the plaintiff finding no reasonable and bona fide necessity with him. The learned Munsif further referred to the want of the pleadings by the plaintiff on the question of comparative hardship and also referred to the fact that plaintiff has not led any evidence on this aspect. On the contrary, the defendant has adduced the evidence that he was carrying on business for 30 years in this shop and his son was also carrying on business there only. He has his established business and clientele and would suffer closure of the entire business if evicted. The learned Munsif also referred to the case sought to be set up by way of cross-examination by the plaintiff of new shops having been constructed in the area and the availability of other shops to which the defendant replied that demand of rent was beyond his capacity and for the new tenancy, premium was also demanded. The learned Munsif also referred to the case sought to be set up by way of cross-examination by the plaintiff of new shops having been constructed in the area and the availability of other shops to which the defendant replied that demand of rent was beyond his capacity and for the new tenancy, premium was also demanded. While weighing the comparative position of the parties, it was found that plaintiff has not shown any hardship and financially also he was well set having purchased the entire property and he could carry on business at any place and the plaintiff having not led any evidence, the hardship would be construed in favour of the defendant. 23. In view of the findings aforesaid, the suit filed by the plaintiff was ordered to be dismissed with costs. Judgment and decree dated 211.1980 (Appellate Court) 24. The Judgment and decree so passed by the learned Munsif , Bikaner dated 19.09.1978 were challenged in appeal by the plaintiff . During pendency of the appeal, Shankerlal-defendant No. 1 expired and an application for substitution of his legal representatives was made by the plaintiff upon which notices were issued but it seems that formal order of substitution of legal representatives was not passed. Be that as it may, the substitution has never been in question and one of his legal representatives, Madan Gopal was already on record as defendant. It appears that the appeal was finally heard on 211.1980 and then on 211.1980 two applications were moved on behalf of the respondent-tenant pointing out that during the course of hearing, it transpired that nothing was available on record in relation to the money order sent to the previous landlord but before the learned Munsif , record of the application under Section 19-A was available which has been referred in the Judgment but as no such record was available before the appellate Court, the said record may be called. The copy of cash challan dated 27.07.1973 of the deposit of the amount of Rs. 80/-by the defendant in the said application under Section 19-A was produced with another application and the same was prayed to be taken on record. The learned Appellate Judge passed an order on the application that the copy of the tender was considered proper to be taken on record subject to payment of costs of Rs. 30/ -. 80/-by the defendant in the said application under Section 19-A was produced with another application and the same was prayed to be taken on record. The learned Appellate Judge passed an order on the application that the copy of the tender was considered proper to be taken on record subject to payment of costs of Rs. 30/ -. The application was allowed to that extent only. Other application for summoning of the record was, however, rejected. 25. Thereafter, the learned Appellate Judge proceeded to decide the questions involved in the appeal by the impugned Judgment dated 211.1980. The learned Appellate Judge referred to the respective cases of the parties and operation of Section 13(4) of the Act and formed the opinion that the tenant failed to comply with the requirements of Section 13(4) of the Act. The learned Appellate Judge observed that Section 13(4) did not provide for such imaginary adjustment of the amount of interest as adopted by the learned Munsif . The learned Appellate Judge also referred to the fact that even during pendency of the suit, there had been two defaults of not making payment of rent for the month of July, 1974 and April, 1976 within 15 days of the end of the month of the tenancy. The learned Judge also referred to the proceedings under Section 19-A of the Act and observed that the said proceedings were entirely different and were not brought on record of the present suit and the learned Munsif could not have looked into those proceedings; the application or money order in relation thereto were not on record; and, therefore, it could not be said if the defendant deposited the amount under Section 19-A of the Act in accordance with law or not? With reference to the money order coupons Exhs. A/1 and A/2 showing respectively the tender of rent of three months on 111.1973 and of five months on 211.1973 and the endorsement of refusal thereat, the learned Appellate Judge formed the opinion that in the month of November, 1973 when the amount was so tendered, the rent for eight months had already fallen due from March, 1973 to October, 1973 and, therefore, the tenant was rendered a defaulter being liable for eviction. On these considerations as contained in paras 10 to 17 of the impugned Judgment , the learned Appellate Judge decided issue of default against the defendants. 26. On these considerations as contained in paras 10 to 17 of the impugned Judgment , the learned Appellate Judge decided issue of default against the defendants. 26. In respect of the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity, the learned Appellate Judge observed that landlord was the best Judge of his own need and then referred to the fact that the plaintiff has filed two different civil suits seeking eviction from two shops but in both the plaints has not spelt out the extent of the requirement. The learned Appellate Judge then observed that facts of one civil suit cannot be looked into the other and the defendants never attempted to bring the facts of one case on the record of the other and, therefore, no conclusion could be drawn on that basis. But thereafter, the learned Judge recorded the finding that so far the need of one shop was concerned, that need appeared to be genuine. The allegation of the defendant of the oblique motive of enhancement of rent was rejected and issue No. 2 on reasonable and bona fide requirement was decided in favour of the plaintiff . 27. Despite finding reasonable and bona fide necessity in favour of the plaintiff , the learned Appellate Judge while considering the question of comparative hardship referred to the fact that plaintiff had purchased the entire property only some time ago and on the basis of his financial strength, he had a clear option available with him to have purchased such property which would have provided him with immediate place for starting the business. The learned appellate Judge also referred to the facts stated by the defendant that other shops were not available on reasonable rent and the premium was also demanded and that the plaintiff failed to controvert these assertions. The learned appellate Judge also referred to the facts stated by the defendant that other shops were not available on reasonable rent and the premium was also demanded and that the plaintiff failed to controvert these assertions. The learned Judge referred to the scheme of Section 14(2) of the Act and found that the Court was required to look at all the aspects, facts and circumstances in detail and referred to the comparative financial strength of the parties where the plaintiff has purchased a big property with five shops and open land at the back side, whereas, defendant was quite poor a person and comparative position of the parties was judged to the effect that hardship that would be caused by not granting the decree for eviction would be less than the hardship that would be caused by uprooting the defendant from the shop in question. The findings on issue No. 4 were affirmed. 28. Therefore, the issue of comparative hardship was decided by both the Courts below against the plaintiff and the decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement was refused. However, the Appellate Court, in view of finding of issue No. 1 granted the decree for eviction against the defendant-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. Second Appeal before the Court: 29. As aforesaid, the tenants-defendants submitted second appeal before this Court under Section 100, CPC. It may be pointed out that plaintiff-respondent appeared in caveat on 05.01.1981 in this appeal and on 30.01.1981 a memorandum of objection was submitted by the plaintiff-respondent in respect of finding on issue No. 4 (on the question of comparative hardship). However, till that time, the appeal itself was not admitted. Leaving that aside, it is found that ultimately on 12.08.1981 after hearing both the parties, this Court admitted the appeal while formulating the aforesaid four substantial questions of law, all essentially dealing with the ground of default only. However, during the course of arguments in this appeal, learned Counsel for the respondent emphatically pressed his cross-objections and in view of questions involved in the case and for effective and complete adjudication of the entire matter in controversy, cross-objections were taken into consideration and another substantial question of law, aforesaid, was formulated dealing with the finding on the question of comparative hardship. Question No. 4. 30. Question No. 4. 30. Before dealing with the other questions involved in this case, it shall be worthwhile to deal with formulated Question No. 4 which primarily relates to the procedure to be adopted by the Court in relation to the record of other case. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not laid much emphasis on this Questions No. 4 except