JUDGMENT Abhay M. Naik, J. 1. The appeal was admitted on 8-10-2003 on the following substantial question of law :- Whether the reasoning given by the lower Appellate Court is hypothetical as the plaintiff himself has not based the case on adverse possession? 2. On perusal of the plaint, it is seen that the plaintiff/respondent pleaded that the suit land, bearing survey No. 1709, in area 1.84 acres, situated at village Bagauta (Narsinghgarhpurva), District Chhatarpur was owned by Mahadeo Prasad father of the plaintiff in his 'Bhumiswami' rights. It was entered in the revenue records in the name of Mahadeo Prasad as 'Bumiswami'. 0.53 decimal of land out of the aforesaid was sold by Mahadeo Prasad to one Chhedilal Gupta on 18-5-1945. The remaining land, in area 1.31 acres continued in the possession of Mahadeo Prasad during his life time. The subject-matter of the suit giving rise to the present appeal is described as suit land hereinafter. The suit land devolved upon the plaintiff/respondent after the death of Mahadeo Prasad, being his son. It is further pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff/respondent has been continuously in possession of the suit land from the lifetime of his father. The suit land was wrongly recorded as Government land which came into notice of the plaintiff in the year 1984. An application for correction of the revenue record was submitted by the plaintiff with respect to the suit land, which was dismissed by the Tahsildar on 20-4-1984. On appeal, the S.D.O. Chhatarpur vide his order dated 20-6-1988 set aside the order of the Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Again an order was passed on 10-11-1995 against the plaintiff. Appeal preferred against the same was also dismissed by the S.D.O., Chhatarpur on 30-9-1997. Consequently, the plaintiff/respondent instituted a suit for declaration of title. In the alternative, it was pleaded that in case he is found to be not in possession of the suit land, a decree for restoration of possession be passed in his favour. 3. As regards the land in area 0.53 decimal sold to Chhedilal Gupta, it was pleaded in the plaint that in Case No. 168-A/77-78, a proceeding under section 248 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code was initiated against son of Chhedilal Gupta, namely, Pannalal on the basis of a fictitious report about encroachment and a fine of Rs. 1500/- was imposed on him. 1500/- was imposed on him. An order of ejectment against him was also passed which was challenged in a civil suit by Pannalal Gupta for declaration of title. This suit was decreed in Civil Appeal No. 16-A/90 by the Court IVth A.D.J., Chhatarpur and the piece of land sold to Chhedilal Gupta was respondents have no right, title or interest in the suit land and the decree passed in favour of Pannalal Gupta is binding on the defendants also with respect to the suit land. 4. State of Madhya Pradesh submitted its written statement and denied the claim of the plaintiff/respondent. The defence of the defendant State was that the suit land was entered in the record of settlement as Government land, and the State of M. P. is its owner. It was further contended that Mahadeo Prasad was not the 'Bhumiswami' of the suit land and it was never in his possession. The possession of the plaintiff/respondent has also been denied. It is further contended that the judgment passed in the suit instituted by Pannalal Gupta against the State of Madhya Pradesh has no bearing on the present case as it was in respect of only 0.53 decimal of the land. Moreover, the encroachment of Pannalal Gupta was duly removed. Since the suit land is a Government land, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. After recording the evidence, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit of plaintiff with a finding that the suit land belongs to the State of Madhya Pradesh and the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. 6. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff, which has been allowed by the learned lower Appellate Court on 10-5-2000. The learned A.D.J, has allowed the suit and granted a decree for declaration of title in favour of plaintiff/respondent. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant/appellant has preferred the present appeal which was initially admitted on 8-10-2003 on the abovementioned substantial question of law. 7. During the hearing of the appeal both the Learned Counsels for the parties admitted that the suit of the plaintiff/respondent is not based on adverse possession and the substantial question of law formulated on 8-10-2003 does not arise. 7. During the hearing of the appeal both the Learned Counsels for the parties admitted that the suit of the plaintiff/respondent is not based on adverse possession and the substantial question of law formulated on 8-10-2003 does not arise. After giving an anxious consideration to the aforesaid substantial question of law and also after perusal of the record, this Court found that an additional substantial question of law deserved to be formulated. Accordingly, the same was formulated as mentioned below :- Whether lower Appellate Court has acted with perversity in reversing well reasoned judgment and decree of the trial Court? 8. Learned Counsels for the parties were apprised of the abovementioned substantial question of law and were directed to address this Court also on the same. Learned Counsels were co-operative and have made their submissions also in the light of the additional substantial question of law. 9. Shri Sudesh Verma, learned Government Advocate submits that the Trial Judge had rightly dismissed the suit after proper appreciation of evidence on record and the learned lower Appellate Court has acted with perversity in reversing the same. 10. Shri M. L. Choubey, Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that this being a civil matter proceeds on preponderance of probabilities and in view of the documents on record, specially the judgment Ex. P-3 passed by the Civil Court in favour of a transferee from plaintiff/respondent, the impugned judgment is liable to be maintained. 11. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary for this Court to consider the evidence on record. The oldest Khasra entry on record is Ex. P-11 which pertains to the period 1943-44. Names of the plaintiffs are not recorded in this Khasra in any capacity whatsoever in the relevant columns. On the contrary, the column meant for the name of 'Kastkar' and his status is marked by cross sign which shows that it is not a private land. Nature of land is shown as 'BANJAR RASTA'. Heading of the fifth column is missing and instead, the name of the plaintiff is mentioned at that place. Khasra used to be in a prescribed format and every column was given a particular heading as per the prescribed format. In the fifth column of Ex. P-11, its head is missing, so the same cannot be construed to confer any kind of title on the plaintiff. Khasra used to be in a prescribed format and every column was given a particular heading as per the prescribed format. In the fifth column of Ex. P-11, its head is missing, so the same cannot be construed to confer any kind of title on the plaintiff. It be further seen that in Khasra Ex. P-12 (corresponding year 1951-52) the name of the plaintiff is not mentioned at all in any capacity. Thus, it is for plaintiff to establish that in what manner and by what process known to law, the name of the plaintiff was recorded in the succeeding year i.e. 1953-54. In Ex. P-4, name of the plaintiff is recorded in column No. 7 whereas column No. 8 was meant to show the name of the cultivator occupying the land with his father's name and place of residence. Moreover, the nature of land is not shown to be cultivable but is shown to be as 'Khadan' i.e. mines. Similarly, the name of the plaintiff is not shown to be recorded in any capacity in the Khasra Ex. P-13 (year 1954-55), Ex. P-14 (year 1955-56), Ex. P-15 (year 1963-67) and Ex. P-16 (year 1968-69). In the Khasras contained in Ex. P-13 to P-16, the name of Pannalal Gupta is shown to be entered with respect to land in area 0.53 acres which was purchased by him from the plaintiff/respondent. However, the name of the plaintiff is not recorded at all with respect to the remaining land in area 1.31 acres comprised in Survey No. 1079 which is the subject-matter of the present suit. So, on the basis of these Khasra's, the plaintiff/respondent cannot be held to be Bhumiswami as was rightly found by the learned trial Judge. As regards, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent with respect to Ex. P-3, it is quite apparent from the perusal of the document that 0.53 acres of the land comprised in Survey No. 1079 was the subject-matter of that litigation and the disputed property involved in the present litigation was not at all the subject-matter of Ex. P-3. P-3, it is quite apparent from the perusal of the document that 0.53 acres of the land comprised in Survey No. 1079 was the subject-matter of that litigation and the disputed property involved in the present litigation was not at all the subject-matter of Ex. P-3. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Mitthulal and another v. State of M.P. reported as 7975 MPU (SC) 137 : 7975 JU 432 has held that it is mandatory that each case must be decided by the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. Even in the Civil Case this cannot be done, unless the parties give consent that evidence of case may be treated as evidence of the other. Considering the aforesaid, it is clear that Ex. P-13 has no binding effect on the suit land which was not the subject-matter of Ex. P-3. Learned A.D.J, has thus erred in ignoring the failure on the part of the plaintiff to prove his title with respect to the suit land and, instead, relied upon the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 16A/1990 contained in Ex. P-3 which was in respect of another piece of land. Merely, because the title of a purchaser in respect of a particular land was upheld by the Civil Court, it does not empower another Civil Court to give a finding in favour of the title of the predecessor-in-title transferor in respect of the remaining land which form the subject-matter of another suit. Obviously, the later suit comprising another piece of land is to be necessarily decided on the basis of the evidence recorded in such later suit. The suit property involved in the present appeal was not the subject-matter of Ex. P-3 and there was no occasion for the Court while rendering the judgment contained in Ex. P-3 to give a finding about the land beyond the subject-matter of Ex. P-3. Thus, Ex. P-3 is not found to have any binding efficacy in the present litigation and reliance of the learned A.D.J, on it has given rise to a perversity. Moreover, learned A.D.J, has committed a legal error in passing the impugned judgment in ignorance of sections 40, 42 and 43 of Indian Evidence Act. These provisions are quoted below :- 40. P-3 is not found to have any binding efficacy in the present litigation and reliance of the learned A.D.J, on it has given rise to a perversity. Moreover, learned A.D.J, has committed a legal error in passing the impugned judgment in ignorance of sections 40, 42 and 43 of Indian Evidence Act. These provisions are quoted below :- 40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial - The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial. 42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41.- Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state." "43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42 when relevant.- Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. 12. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions goes to show that Ex. P-3 was not relevant under section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 41 of the said Act makes a final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, relevant which is passed in exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction. Section 42 makes relevant the judgment, order or decree if it relates to matter of public nature. Section 43 of the Evidence Act makes the judgment, order or decree relevant if it is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provision of Indian Evidence Act. Ex. P-3 is not shown to have been covered by any of the aforesaid provisions and reliance on it by the lower Appellate Court for reversal of the well reasoned judgment of the learned trial Judge is not permissible at all. 13. As regards, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the respondent about the preponderance of probabilities, it be seen that the stray entry contained in Ex. 13. As regards, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the respondent about the preponderance of probabilities, it be seen that the stray entry contained in Ex. P-4 is not a proper entry and is not shown to be based on any order of competent Revenue Officer. The discrepancies in the form of Ex. P-4 ought to have been explained by the plaintiff by getting summoned the original Record which was not done. So, the stray entry contained in Ex. P-4 cannot be made a basis for reversal of a well reasoned judgment of the learned trial Judge. 14. Shri Sudesh Verma, learned Government Advocate submitted that the suit land is stated to have been inherited by the plaintiff from his father and the same is not described as ancestral property. So, the plaintiff was under an obligation to prove that wherefrom and in what manner it was acquired by his father. There is absolutely no iota on record to show that the suit land was ever recorded in the name of plaintiffs ancestors i.e. grand father, great grand father etc. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff referred to the relief clause contained in the plaint wherein a mention is made that the disputed land is an ancestral property of the plaintiff. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has failed to show that the relief clause falls within the ambit of pleadings. The term 'pleadings' has been defined in Order 6, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code as 'plaint or written statement'. Rule 2 of Order 6 of Civil Procedure Code prescribes that "every pleadings shall contain and contain only, a statement in the concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be but not the evidence by which they are to be proved." Thus, pleading is in the nature of foundation in the concise form of the material facts which, if established, will make the plaintiff entitled for the relief claimed in the plaint. The relief clause being beyond the ambit of the material facts forming foundation for the relief, cannot be necessarily said to be a pleading. 15. The relief clause being beyond the ambit of the material facts forming foundation for the relief, cannot be necessarily said to be a pleading. 15. For the sake of arguments, even if the relief clause is treated as pleading, the plaintiff was required to establish that the suit land was infact his ancestral property and was so recorded at any point of time during the lifetime of his ancestors. The plaintiff having failed to discharge this obligation was rightly non-suited by the learned trial Judge. 16. Shri M. L. Choubey, Learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent further submitted that there is no cross-examination on the witnesses of the plaintiffs on the question of title. It be seen that it is a trite law that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction is required to prove his case by his own evidence and cannot be given advantage of the weakness of the defendant's evidence. The plaintiff having failed to prove his title, the suit was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Judge on correct appreciation of evidence on record. The learned lower Appellate Judge has acted with perversity in reversing the same in a manner not permissible in law and also with essentially a wrong approach. The impugned judgment and decree are thus, not sustainable in law and are hereby set aside. Additional substantial question of law formulated by this Court on 22-8-2005 is answered in favour of the appellant. 17. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and decree are set aside being bad in law and thus, findings of the learned Trial Judge are hereby restored. Suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed. No order as to costs.