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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 1085 (MP)

S. S. Shrivastava v. State of M. P.

2005-10-20

A.K.PATNAIK, R.K.GUPTA

body2005
ORDER Patnaik, c.... -- 1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the notification dated 1st May 1998 of the State Government of Madhya Pradesh by which the M.P. Public Health Engineering (Gazettcd) Service Rules. 1980 were amended. 2. The facts briefly arc that the M.P. Public Health Engineering (Gazelled) Service Rules. 1980 (for short 'Rules of 1980') were published by notification dated 6th February. 1981. The Rules of 1980 inter alia, provided that promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department would be made from amongst Chief Engineers (Civil). By a notification elated 28th May 1994, certain amendments were made to the Rules of 1980. By the said amendments in Schedule-IV of the English version of the Rules the following provisions were made: "SCHEDULE-IV (See Rule-l3) ______________________________________________________________________ Name of the Name of Minimum Name of Name of the Department service and period to service or member the post from qualify posts to Departmental which promotion which Promotion promotion to the next promotion is Committee is to be made higher post to be made vide Rule-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Public Health Madhya Pradesh Engineering Public Health Department Engineering Service Chief Engineer Engineer-in- 1.Chief Secretary (Civil) Chief to Government of Pradesh Chairman 2. Senior most Chief Engineer Secretary most (Electrical and Government Mechanical Member." ________________________________________________________________________ The aforesaid provisions in Schedule-IV introduced by the amendment vide notification dated 28th May 1994 gave an impression that for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department, Chief Engineers (Civil) as well as Chief Engineers (Electrical & Mechanical) would be considered. The aforesaid amendment by notification dated 28th May 1994 was to be effective from 15.10.1987. One K.K. Morab, who was the Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) in the Public Health Engineering Department was however not considered for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department and instead one VK. Jain, Chief Engineer (Civil) was considered and promoted as Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department. One K.K. Morab, who was the Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) in the Public Health Engineering Department was however not considered for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department and instead one VK. Jain, Chief Engineer (Civil) was considered and promoted as Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department. Aggrieved, K.K. Morab filed OA No. 76 of 1993 before the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal, Bhopal Bench and by order dated 19.11.1997, the Tribunal inter alia held that K.K. Morab was entitled to be considered for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-chief in the Public Health Engineering Department in terms of the Rules of 1980 as amended by the notification dated 28th May 1994 and directed that his case shall be considered by the State of M.P, or promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department in accordance with the inter-se seniority as determined in the said order of the Tribunal. Thereafter by a notification dated 1st May 1998, the aforesaid provisions to Schedule IV of the rules of 1980 were amended. By the amendment, the expression 'Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical)' from Column 2 of the aforesaid, entries in Schedule-IV was deleted so as to make it clear that the Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) will not be eligible for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department and only Chief Engineer (Civil) would be considered for promotion to the said post of Engineer- in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department. In the meanwhile, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) in the Public Health Engineering Department with effect from 17.10.1996 and when his turn as per his seniority came for being considered for promotion as Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department in 200 I, he could not be considered as the Rules of 1980 had been amended by notification dated 1st May 1998 excluding Chief Engineers (Electrical & Mechanical) from consideration for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department. Aggrieved, the petitioner tiled OA No. 1944 of 2001 before the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, challenging the said amendment to Schedule IV of the Rules of 1980 by notification dated 1st May 1998. Aggrieved, the petitioner tiled OA No. 1944 of 2001 before the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, challenging the said amendment to Schedule IV of the Rules of 1980 by notification dated 1st May 1998. The M.P. State Administrative Tribunal was subsequently abolished and the said OA has now been transferred to this Court and has been numbered as WP No. 17589 of 2003. 3. At the hearing of the said writ petition, the petitioner, who appeared in person, submitted that the impugned amendment to the Rules of 1980 is discriminatory and violative of right to equality under Arts 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He submitted that the law is well settled that although Article 14 of the Constitution permits classification of persons, such classification must be based on an intelligible differentia and the intelligible differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned statute. He argued that there was no substantial difference between the post of Chief Engineer (Civil) and Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) inasmuch as the duties of Chief Engineer (Civil) and Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) are similar and almost the same. He submitted that in the post of Engineer-in-Chief, an Engineer with knowledge and experience in civil engineering and an Engineer with knowledge and experience in electrical and mechanical engineering can both be promoted because there will be no substantial difference between the performance of an Engineer having knowledge and experience in civil engineering and an Engineer having knowledge and experience in electrical and mechanical engineering. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Krishna Murthy and other [ AIR 1973 SC) 1146 ], wherein the Supreme Court has held that inequality of opportunity of promotion though not unconstitutional per se must be justified on the strength of rational criteria correlated to the object for which the difference is made and where the difference in promotional opportunities of those who were wrongly divided into two classes for this purpose could not be justified on any rational grounds, Article 14 of the Constitution would be violated. He also cited the decision of Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1995 SC 299 ] in which the Supreme Court has held that for the post of Chief Engineer, not only Superintending Engineer (Civil) but also Superintending Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) can be considered for promotion. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Swapan Kumar Choudhary and others v. Tapas Chakravorty and others [ AIR 1996 SC 662 ) in which the Supreme Court held that Inspectors of Factories in West Bengal Factories service belonging to General, Chemical and Medical wings were held to perform similar duties and should form pan of one cadre. 4. Mr. Sanjay Yadav, learned Government Advocate relied on the averments in paragraph 9 of the reply tiled on behalf of the State of M.P. and submitted that there is a rationality behind the decision taken by the rule making authority to exclude Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) for promotion as Engineer-in-Chief inasmuch as Public Health Engineering Department is the principal agency for the State of M.P. for preparation and execution of water supply and sanitation projects in the State and water supply and sanitation project in the State are basically civil works and the Engineer-in-Chief being the principal professional advisor of the Government in the Public Health Engineering Department must have knowledge and experience in civil engineering. He further submitted that Electrical and Mechanical Engineers are employed in. the Public Health Engineering Department of the State only for purposes of maintenance of equipment and machines and they have comparatively less work than the Civil Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department. In this context, he submitted that the cadre strength of Civil Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department is as high as 447 whereas the cadre strength of Electrical and Mechanical Branch in Public Health Engineering Department is only 86. Mr. Yadav submitted that it is for these reasons that the rule making authority has all along been of the view that the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department should be filled up only by promotion from amongst Chief Engineers (Civil) and not by promotion from amongst Chief Engineers (Electrical & Mechanical). Mr. Yadav submitted that it is for these reasons that the rule making authority has all along been of the view that the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department should be filled up only by promotion from amongst Chief Engineers (Civil) and not by promotion from amongst Chief Engineers (Electrical & Mechanical). He further submits that this was the position not only when the Rules of 1980 were first framed but also when the Rules of 1980 were amended by notification dated 28th May 1994 and this would be evident from the Hindi version of the notification dated 28th May, 1994. He submitted that in English version of the notification dated 28th May, 1994, a confusion has crept in to give an impression that Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) will also be considered from promotion as Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department and when Mr. K.K. Morab, taking advantage of this confusion, approached the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal in OA No. 76 of 1993 and when the Tribunal passed the order dated 18th November, 1997 to consider Mr. K.K. Morab, the rule making authority had to clarify the position by making further amendment in the Rules of 1980 by notification dated 1st May, 1998. Mr. Yadav cited the 'decision of the Supreme Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Mr. Triloki Nath Khosa and others [ (1974) 1 SCC 19 ] and submitted that a contention raised on behalf of the respondents in that case that an Assistant Engineer whether he was a Diploma holder or a Degree holder should be considered for promotion to a higher post, but the contention was turned down by the Supreme Court and the rule, which confined the choice for promotion from amongst only Graduates, was upheld by the Supreme Court. 5. Mr. Rajendra Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondent No.2, submitted that the respondent No.2 had been promoted to the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department in the year 2001 and that the respondent No.2 was, before such promotion a Chief Engineer (Civil) in the Public Health Engineering Department. 5. Mr. Rajendra Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondent No.2, submitted that the respondent No.2 had been promoted to the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department in the year 2001 and that the respondent No.2 was, before such promotion a Chief Engineer (Civil) in the Public Health Engineering Department. He submitted that water supply is essentially a civil engineering subject and since water supply is the primary job of the Public Health Engineering Department, the rule making authority was right in making the provision in the Rules of 1980 that only Chief Engineers (Civil) in the Public Health Engineering Department can be considered for promotion as Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Yogesh Kumar and others v. Govt. of NCT Delhi and others [2003(1) MPWN 120 = (2003) 3 SCC 548 ] in which the qualification of Teacher's Training Certificate stipulated in the advertisement for recruitment to the post of Assistant Teachers in Primary Schools of Municipal Corporation was upheld as not being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar [ AIR 1958 SC 538 ], the Supreme Court considered at length the meaning of the right to equality before law and equal protection of law guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution and laid down some principles which have to be borne in mind by Courts while determining the validity of a statute challenged on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the said decision, the Supreme Court, in particular, held that there is always a presumption in favour of the Constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it was not Constitutional. In the said decision, the Supreme Court further held that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. In the said decision, the Supreme Court further held that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. In the said decision, the Supreme Court also observed that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of Constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. 7. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles as laid down by the Supreme Court. for determining the validity of a statute challenged on the ground of violation of Art 14 of the Constitution, we may now examine the facts of the present case and the impugned rule. It is not in dispute that in the Rules of 1980 as originally framed, consideration for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department was confined to only Chief Engineers (Civil). By the notification dated 28th May, 1994 however. Schedule IV to the Rules of 1980 was amended and in the English version of the said notification, it appeared that besides of Chief Engineer (Civil). Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) would also be considered for promotion as Engineer-in-Chief. Thereafter, when Mr. K. K. Morab approached the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal in OA No. 76 of 1993 and contended that Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) was also eligible for being considered for promotion and Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department and yet he was not considered the Tribunal passed an order directing the State Government to consider also the case of Mr. K.K. Morab in accordance with the Rules. The State Government then issued the impugned notification dated 1st May 1998 excluding Chief (Electrical & Mechanical) for consideration for the post of Engineer-in-Chief. K.K. Morab in accordance with the Rules. The State Government then issued the impugned notification dated 1st May 1998 excluding Chief (Electrical & Mechanical) for consideration for the post of Engineer-in-Chief. The question which we have to decide is as to whether such exclusion of Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) from consideration from promotion as Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department is based on an intelligible differentia and further as to whether such intelligible differentia has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Rules of 1980. 8. Chief Engineer (Civil) is a person who is promoted from amongst the lower cadre of Civil Engineers and he has experience and knowledge in civil engineering in the Public Health Engineering Department. Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical), on the other hand, is promoted from amongst the lower cadres of Electrical or Mechanical Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department and has expericnce in electrical or mechanical works. Obviously, there is a differentia which divides Chief Engineer (Civil) and Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) in the Public Health Engineering Department into two different classes. We have therefore, no doubt that the classification between Chief Engineer (Civil) and Chief Engineer (Electrical and Mechanical) is based on an intelligible differentia. The object sought to be achieved by the Rules of 1980 as amended is to find out suitable persons for filling up the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department. It is not in dispute that in the Public Health Engineering Department the bulk of the work relates to water supply and sanitation projects and such works of water supply and sanitation projects require the services of mostly Civil Engineers and not Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. In the Public Health Engineering Department there is also requirement of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers but the work of such Electrical and Mechanical Engineers mostly relates to the installation of equipment and machines installed for purposes of water work, and sanitation in the Public Health Engineering Department and the maintenance thereof. The work of such Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department is much less as compared to the work of Civil Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department. The work of such Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department is much less as compared to the work of Civil Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department. This would be further clear from the fact that the cadre strength of Civil Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department is 447 whereas the cadre strength of Electrical and Mechanical branches in the Public Health Engineering Department is only 86. All these facts would go to show that there is a rationality in making a provision in the Rules of 1980 that the highest technical or professional post in the Public Health Engineering Department would be manned by a Civil Engineer and not by an Electrical & Mechanical Engineer. There is, therefore, a rational nexus between the intelligible differentia and the object sought to be achieved by the Rules and it is difficult to hold that the impugned amendment which excludes Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) from consideration for promotion as Engineer - in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department is irrational, arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 9. In State of Mysore v. Krishna Murthy and others (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that if the facts of a particular case disclose no rational distinction between the members of what is found to be really a single class no class distinctions can be made in selecting the best and in such a case, Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution must be held to be violated. In the said case, the Supreme Court had found that Accounts Clerks had come into one integrated service from two different sources but the impugned amendment to the Rules of 1959 made a distinction between the two classes of Clerks who had been recruited from two different sources for the purpose of promotion and on these facts, the Supreme Court held that the two classes of Clerks are not really different and there was no rational distinction between the members of the two classes when two cleasses of Clerks had integrated into one service. But in the present case, as we have seen, the two classes of persons namely Chief Engineer (Civil) and Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechnical) are entirely different, one having knowledge and experience in Civil Engineering in the Public Health Engineering Department and the other having knowledge and experience in Electrical and Mechanical field. But in the present case, as we have seen, the two classes of persons namely Chief Engineer (Civil) and Chief Engineer (Electrical & Mechnical) are entirely different, one having knowledge and experience in Civil Engineering in the Public Health Engineering Department and the other having knowledge and experience in Electrical and Mechanical field. Hence, the present case is distinguishable from the case of State of Mysore v. Krishna Murthy and others. 10. In Chandigarh Administration v. K.K. Jerath (supra), the Rules contemplated three wings -- Civil, Electrical and Mechanical and also Superintending Engineer (Civil), Superintending Engineer (Electrical) and Superintending Engineer (Mechanical). In the Rules, there was no mention that for the post of Chief Engineer, only Superintending Engineer (Civil) will be considered for promotion. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the Rules do not provide that the post of Chief Engineer is to be filled in by Superintending Engineer (Civil) only and the Rules contemplated three wings--Civil, Electrical and Mechanical and as officials of all the three wings were the members of the service, the consideration for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer cannot be confined to only Superintending Engineer (Civil). In the present case, as we found the Rules of 1980 as originally framed provided for consideration of only Chief Engineer (Civil) for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department and the Rules as amended by the impugned notification dated 1st May 1998 also provides for consideration of only Chief Engineers (Civil) for promotion as Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration v. KK Jerath (supra), therefore, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. In Swapan Kumar v. Tapas Chakravorty and others (supra), the High Court having found that Inspectors of Factories (Chemical) perform the same duties and functions as Inspectors of Factories of other wings comprising of mechanical experts and civil experts, held that electrical, mechanical, civil and chemical wings should form part of one cadre and further directed the same pay scales to be given to all types of Inspectors of Factories. The Supreme Court while agreeing with the High Court that there could be one cadre of electrical, mechanical, civil and chemical expe11s, held that the directions of the High Court would amount to revising the cadre, which was not within the competence of the High Court. The Supreme Court further held that laying down conditions of service of employees could be done either by the State Legislature under Article 309 of the Constitution or the State Government under the Proviso to Art 309 of the Constitution. In the said said case, the Supreme Court however held that the State Government should apply its mind to this aspect of the matter as a strong case for a common cadre had been made out. 12. It was next submitted by the petitioner that by notification dated 28th May 1994, the Rules of 1980 were amended and a right was conferred on persons holding the post of Chief Engineer (Electrical and mechanical) in the Public Health Engineering Department for consideration for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department and the impugned amendment by the notification dated 1st May 1998 seeks to extinguish that right and this was not permissible under the law. In support of this submission, the petitioner cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1974 SC 259 ], State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant [ AIR 1981 SC 1990 ], and Union of India and others v. S.L. Dutta and another [ AIR 1991 SC 363 ] 13. Mr. Sanjay Yadav, learned Government Advocate for the State and Mr. Rajendra Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.2, on the other hand, submitted that the State Government has powers under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to amend the Rules relating to conditions of service of State Government servants and such powers are subject to only constitutional limitations and merely because the chances of the petitioner for being promoted to the post of Engineer- in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department are taken away by the impugned amendment of the Rules of 1980 under the said Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the impugned rule cannot be held to be illegal. 14. We find full force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. Yadav and Mr. 14. We find full force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. Yadav and Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents, that the power of the Governor under the Proviso to Art, 309 of the Constitution to frame rules is subject to only the Constitutional provisions. As the opening words of Article 309 of the Constitution indicate, the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State can be regulated by Acts of the appropriate legislature 'subject to provisions of the Constitution'. The Proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution states that until such provision is made for regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of person appointed to public service and post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State by an Act of the appropriate Legislature, the President or the Governor, as the case may be, may direct making of rules regulating such recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to service and post under the Union of the State. Hence, the power to make a rule regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to service and post in connection with affairs of the Union or any State is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Unless a rule or an amendment to such rule made under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution is shown to be violative of the provisions of the Constitution, the Court cannot strike down such a rule or amendment to the rules as ultra vires. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that the impugned amendment to the rules made by the notification dated 1st May 1998 is ultra vires inasmuch as it takes away the chances of the petitioner for promotion as Engineering-in-Chief in the Public Health Engineering Department is misconceived. 15. In the case of R.S. Deodhar (supra) cited by the petitioner, a contention was raised that the Proviso to section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1959 provided that the service conditions of Tehsildars of the Ex-Hyderabad State would not be varied without the prior concurrence of the Central Government. 15. In the case of R.S. Deodhar (supra) cited by the petitioner, a contention was raised that the Proviso to section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1959 provided that the service conditions of Tehsildars of the Ex-Hyderabad State would not be varied without the prior concurrence of the Central Government. The Supreme Court found that the Rules of July 1959 did not really vary the service conditions of the petitioner in that case to his disadvantage and only reduced the chances of his promotion and held that the Rules of 1959 impugned in the said case were not in violation of the Proviso to section 115 of the said Act. In the instant case, as we have seen the power of the Governor to make Rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed in connection with affairs of any State are wide enough to amend or vary any rules and such power is only subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Deodhar (supra), therefore, is of no assistance to the petitioner. 16. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant (supra) cited by the petitioner, a similar question arose as in the case of R.S. Deodhar (supra) and the Supreme Court held that mere chances are not conditions of service and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service, therefore, the Proviso to section 115(7) of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 was not attracted. As we have discussed above, the Governor has powers under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, not only to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of any person appointed in connection with the affairs of the State but also to amend of such rule and such power is only subject to provisions of the Constitution. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. 17. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. 17. In the case of Union of India v. S.L. Dutta (supra), cited by the petitioner, there was a change of policy in the matter of promotion of Air Vice Marshal to the post of Air Marshal in the Air Force and such change of policy reduced the promotional chances of officiers in the Navigation stream in flying branch of Air Force qua the other branches and the respondents in that case challenged the said change of policy in the matter of promotion before the Guahati High Court. The Guahati High Court allowed the writ petition holding inter alia that the new promotion policy was not framed after in-depth study and directed that the case of the said respondents be considered on the basis of the previous policy. The Supreme Court held that by the change of promotion policy, only the chances of promotion of Air Vice Marshals in the navigation stream were affected but the Court cannot interfere with such change of policy. The Supreme Court, in particular, observed that the Courts should not interfere when the validity of particular policy is questioned and all the more so, where the material for formulating such policy are of a highly technical or scientific nature. The Supreme Court further observed: "....... These are matters regarding which judges and the lawyers of Courts can hardly be expected to have much knowledge by reason of their training and experience...." We fail to see as to how this decision in any way can come to the aid of the petitioner. Rather, this decision establishes the law that as to what would be a policy or rule with regard to promotion is within the domain of the Legislature or the State Government and so long as the law made by the Legislature or rule made by the State Government lying down the provisions relating to the promotion does not transgress the constitutional limitations, the Court cannot interfere with such law or rule merely because the Court has a different perspective and has a different opinion than that of the Legislature or the State Government. Hence, the second contention of the petitioner that the impugned amendment to the Rules of 1980 takes way the chances of promotion of the petitioner and, therefore, is illegal, has no merit. 18. The petitioner finally submitted that the impugned amendment by notification dated 1st May 1988 is vitiated by mala fide inasmuch as the said amendment was made to over-come the order passed by the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal, Bhopal Bench in OA No. 76 of 1993 delivered on 19.11.1997. The law is well settled that a legislative act cannot be challenged on the ground of mala fide but can be challenged on the ground that it violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. As we have held above, the amendment to the Rules of 1980 by the impugned notification dated 1st May, 1998 so as to exclude Chief Engineers (Electrical & Mechanical) from consideration for promotion to the post of Engineer-in-Chief of the Public Health Engineering Department and confining the consideration to the Chief Engineers (Civil) is based on a reasonable classification and is not discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hence we cannot strike down the notitication dated 1st May, 1998 only on the ground that it was prompted by the order dated 19.11.1997 of the Tribunal in OA No. 76 of 1993. Once the State Government had the power to make the impugned rule under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and such power was exercised within the constitutional limitations and not in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Court will not strike down impugned rule only on the ground that the rule had also the effect of overcoming of the order of the Tribunal in a particular case. 19. We do not therefore find any merit in this writ petition and we accordingly dismiss the same. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the' parties shall bear their own costs. ....................