Judgment J.S.Narang, J. 1. The petitioner joined the service with Punjab Police Force on July 23, 1979. It was on January 29, 1991, he requested for leave to his immediate superior and in turn was asked to meet the higher superior, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mukatsar, but he was not available as he had gone out on account of duty. The petitioner came back and joined his duty on April 24, 1991. Subsequently, he met with an accident on account of over turning of the government Canter on May 11/12, 1991. It has been averred that on May 13, 1991, his departure report was duly recorded. 2. In this regard, an inquiry was ordered and that Mr.Karnail Singh was appointed as an Inquiry Officer vide order dated July 8, 1991. The inquiry proceedings were completed and the inquiry report dated 23.8.1991, was duly submitted. A show cause notice dated September 7, 1992, was issued and served upon the petitioner on October 24, 1992. He submitted a reply to the aforestated. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order No. 26066-71 dated 5,2.1993. Aggrieved of this order, a statutory appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority, which was dismissed by an order dated November 16, 1993. The aforestated two orders have been made the subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 3. It has been averred that the order of dismissal as also the rejection of the appeal are illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and are violative of principles of natural justice as the petitioner had not been given the effective opportunity of being heard before passing of the order of dismissal. By virtue of the order of dismissal, the period of absence i.e. from January 21, 1991 to April 24, 1991 (a total of 85 days), has been treated as not on duty and his pay and allowances for this period have been forfeited. This act, on the part of the respondents is confiscatory in character and is directly hit by Article 31 of the Constitution of India. It is also the plea that pursuant to proviso to Rule 16.24(1)(ix) of the Punjab Police Rules , the personal hearing had not been accorded to the petitioner. It is the settled law that a person can not be condemned unheard and especially if the personal hearing is provided statutorily. 4. It is also the plea that pursuant to proviso to Rule 16.24(1)(ix) of the Punjab Police Rules , the personal hearing had not been accorded to the petitioner. It is the settled law that a person can not be condemned unheard and especially if the personal hearing is provided statutorily. 4. The petition was admitted to Division Bench by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated January 15, 1996, upon the reference having been made to the dicta of this Court rendered in re: State of Punjab v. Parkash Chand Constable 1992(1) S.L.R. 174. 5. The respondents have contested the petition by way of filing a detailed written statement. It is the plea that the petitioner remained uriauthorisedly and illegally absent for almost three months without permission and without indicating any cogent reason in regard to the illness of his wife. He had also not produced any convincing material during the inquiry proceedings to prove that he tried to get his leave sanctioned from his superior competent officer. In fact, no medical man had been produced who had actually treated the illness of hi" wife. It is also the stand of the respondents that he had been duly served with a notice dated November 18, 1992, requiring him to appear for personal hearing before the punishing authority and that the date had been duly notified as November 26, 1992. which had been noted under his own signatures but still did not appeal before the punishing authority. The police force is a disciplined force and that remaining absent from duty is considered as gross misconduct especially when the police was engaged in protecting the law and order situation in the State of Punjab in the surcharged atmosphere by fighting and controlling the terrorist activities, it is also the plea that proper procedure as envisaged under the Punjab Police Rules and instructions had been followed and that no violation whatsoever of Rule 16.24(1)(ix) of the Punjab Police Rules, was ever made as the petitioner had been given the due opportunity of being heard and which was availed of by him by making written submissions, which were duly considered as is indicative from the order of dismissal passed by the punishing authority. So far as not treating the period of absence from duty as leave of the kind due, a correct order has been passed in this regard as the petitioner was absent from duty without leave having been sanctioned and that the absence would be termed as unauthorised and illegal. The basic principle that "No work No pay" has been adhered to as the willful absence on the part of the petitioner was at his own instance. It is the settled law that if anybody remains absent willfully, unauthorisediy and illegally, in such circumstances the delinquent official is not entitled to the salary. The order is not at all confiscatory in character and or is violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner had not been accorded effective opportunity of being heard as envisaged under proviso to Rule 16.24(1) (ix) of the Punjab Police Rules . Mere service of show cause notice upon the petitioner would not be enough and if a reply has been submitted, the opportunity of being heard in person to substantiate and elaborate his pleas in the reply is necessarily required. The punishing authority is required to apply its mind to the reply submitted by the delinquent official and this would be only possible if the personal hearing is granted to the deliquent official. In the instant case, no such opportunity having been granted, the order of dismissal suffers from the rigour of the aforestated rule, therefore, is not sustainable under law. In the instant case, no such opportunity having been granted, the order of dismissal suffers from the rigour of the aforestated rule, therefore, is not sustainable under law. Rule 16.24(1)(ix) of the Punjab Police Rules , reads as under: 16.24: Procedure in departmental enquiries: (1) The following procedure shall be followed in the departmental enquiries:- (i) to (iii) xxx xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx xx (ix) No order of dismissal or reduction in rank shall be passed by an officer empowered to dismiss a police officer or reduce him, in rank until that officer has given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, provided that this shall not apply: a) where a police officer is dismissed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge;or b) where the officer empowered to dismiss him or reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that officer in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that police officer an opportunity of showing cause 7. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court rendered in re; Avlar Singh v. State of Punjab 1950 S.L.J. 151. It is the settled law that personal hearing is to be effective and not superficial. The delinquent official must understand the charge and thereafter should be heard in regard to the defence taken by him. He has also placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in re: Bhup Singh v. State of Haiyana 1998 S.L.J. 639. 8. After considering reply, the delinquent official has to be called and has to be heard in regard to the pleas taken by him in the reply. In the instant case, the petitioner did submit his reply but he was never given the opportunity to substantiate his pleadings. Reliance has been placed upon the Single Bench judgment of this Court in re; State of Haryana and Ors. v. Surjan Singh 1990(2) S.L.R. 88. 9. It has been further argued that the impugned order of dismissal does not indicate that remaining absent from duty is a misconduct which can be termed as "gravest act". Reliance has been placed upon the Single Bench judgment of this Court in re; State of Haryana and Ors. v. Surjan Singh 1990(2) S.L.R. 88. 9. It has been further argued that the impugned order of dismissal does not indicate that remaining absent from duty is a misconduct which can be termed as "gravest act". It is the settled law that for terming it to be the gravest act, the utmost gravity and gross flagrance should be indicative from the order. The perusal of. the order shows that absence from duty has not been held to be a gravest act of misconduct. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in re: Parkash Chands case (supra). In this regard a pointed reference has been made to para 10 of the aforestated judgment, which reads as under:- 10. Keeping in view what has been said above, the argument of the counsel for the respondent does not appear to be unexceptionable. It is essential for the Punishing Authority to applying its mind and to record a specific finding as to whether the conduct of the delinquent official which has been complained of is of such a grave nature that it must lead inflexibly to his dismissal. As already indicated above, reliance has also been placed by the respondent on Gurdev Singhs case 197(5(2) S.L.R. 442 (supra), in which the respective scope of Rules 16.2 and 16.24(1) were discussed. It was held by the learned single Judge that it was incumbent upon the Punishing Authority to record a finding that the misconduct attributed to the delinquent official was the gravest act of misconduct and in the absence of such finding the order could not be sustained. in Baldev Singh Ex. Constables case 1985(3) S.L.R. 657 (Punj. & Hary.) (supra) which overruled Gurdev Singhs case, aforesaid, interpretation of Rule 16.2 was not involved but the aforesaid decision was rendered on the basis of the interpretation put on Rule 16.24(1). We are, therefore, of the view that Gurdev Singhs case 1976(2) S.L.R. 442 (supra) in so far as it deals with interpretation of Rule 16.2 still holds the field. We have gone through the matter independently as well and find that the aforesaid decision is not the correct law and needs to be reiterated to the above extent. We are, therefore, of the view that Gurdev Singhs case 1976(2) S.L.R. 442 (supra) in so far as it deals with interpretation of Rule 16.2 still holds the field. We have gone through the matter independently as well and find that the aforesaid decision is not the correct law and needs to be reiterated to the above extent. The order impugned herein does not indicate that the punishing authority was alive to the requirement of Rule 16.2 and it has not recorded any finding that the act of the respondent amounted to the gravest act of misconduct which required his dismissal from service. The order is, therefore, unsustainable and the judgment of the lower appellate Court is correct to that extent. 10. In the instant case, the impugned order of dismissal is silent in this regard as no observation has been made that the conduct of the delinquent official i.e. the petitioner, complained of was of such a grave nature and warrants punishment not less than dismissal. Thus, in view of the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Parkash Chands case (supra), the petition deserves to be allowed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued in the alternative that the petitioner had rendered almost 15 years of service and that the claim of the petitioner having earned pension has not been kept in view and that the order of dismissal without protecting such right would amount to subjecting the petitioner to double jeopardy. It was mandatory on the part of the punishing authority to have kept in view the relevant rules especially Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Service rules vide which the petitioner would be entitled to the pension, having rendered more than ten years service. 12. On the other hand, the stand of the Government is that the petitioner absented himself from duty unauthorisedly, illegally and without the permission of the competent authority. He remained absent for three months and did not send any intimation regarding the illness to the place of his posting nor informed his senior officer in this regard. He also did not produce any convincing material during the inquiry proceedings to prove that any effort had been made by him for getting the leave sanctioned from the competent authority. He remained absent for three months and did not send any intimation regarding the illness to the place of his posting nor informed his senior officer in this regard. He also did not produce any convincing material during the inquiry proceedings to prove that any effort had been made by him for getting the leave sanctioned from the competent authority. However, the plea set up i.e. the wife had been taken ill, as it had been informed by one Munshi Ram (Palledar). This man had never ever appeared before the departmental inquiry to prove the aforestated fact. It has also been averred that the petitioner had been issued a show cause notice No. 200022/B dated 18.11.1992, requiring him to appear before the Punishing Authority for personal hearing on November 26, 1992 despite having received the notice, he did not appear personally to establish his in-corrigibility, which was far too obvious from the previous record, which was produced before the Inquiry Officer and which has been duly noticed in the Inquiry report dated August 23, 1991, copy Annexure P1. The adverse entries have been noticed which, read as under:- 1. As per order book No. 3573/82 15 days punishment was given due to negligence in duty in jail. 2. As per order book No. 529/83 warning and 15 days drill punishment was given due to negligence. 3. Serious warning was given on account of absence from 6.6.1989 to 20.6.1989. 4. Five years earned was reduced/cut vide order No. 16533-37-B dated 25.9.1990 with order book No. 282/1.10.1990 on account of remaining absent 30.11.1989 to 13.4.1990. Vide order book No. 1444/89, 13 days was granted without pay from 6.6.1989 to 20.6.89. Later on vide order No. 3182/63 this leave was treated in long leave. Vide order No. 2228/90 leave without pay was availed for 1.7.1990 and 3.7.1990. 13. The petitioner had been served the charge sheet and he was directed to give the list of witnesses but he submitted an application on August 7, 1991, that he does not wish to produce any defence witness in the departmental inquiry. However, he had submitted reply to the charge sheet taking up certain pleas but the same had not been substantiated by way of oral or documentary evidence. However, he had submitted reply to the charge sheet taking up certain pleas but the same had not been substantiated by way of oral or documentary evidence. The charges had been duly proved against the petitioner for having remained absent for a total of 85 days six hours and five minutes from January 9, 1991 to April 24, 1991. It has also been mentioned that the delinquent official absented himself from Sentry duty on May 13, 1991 from Police Sta-tion Sadar Malout vide report No. 5 dated May 13, 1991. He reported for duty in Police Lines, Faridkot vide Rapat No. 9 dated 17.6.1991. A separate inquiry had been recommended from remaining absent from duty without permission and also in an unauthorised manner w.e.f. May 13, 1991 to June 17, 1991. However, it has not been disclosed either by the petitioner or by the respondents as to whether any inquiry had been initiated, if so, with what result. But the fact of the matter is that the petitioner again absented himself for a period of more than one month without the leave having been sanctioned. 14. Learned Additional Advocate General, has argued that the police force and that a constable cannot absent himself from duty without the sanction of the competent authority. He has drawn our attention to Rule 8.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, whereby leave cannot be claimed as of right; the authority empowered to grant it, may refuse or return it is in the public interest or in accordance with any duly authorised disciplinary rule. In the instant case, the petitioner had never given cogent reasons for being absent from duty, the plea set up that his wife had been taken ill and in this regard the information was alleged to be given by one Munshi Ram but no documentary evidence in this regard has been produced before the Inquiry Officer nor Munshi Ram had been produced as a witness to establish the plea taken by the delinquent official. Apart from this, the conduct of the petitioner is far too obvious that he had earned "serious warning" on account of absence from duty from June 6, 1989 to June 20, 1989. Subsequently, he again remained absent from 30.11.1989 to April 14, 1990. On this account, petitioners, five years earned service had been reduced/cut vide order No. 16533-37-B dated September 25, 1990. Subsequently, he again remained absent from 30.11.1989 to April 14, 1990. On this account, petitioners, five years earned service had been reduced/cut vide order No. 16533-37-B dated September 25, 1990. (It may be noticed that the inquiry report has been produced by the petitioner, copy whereof has been appended as Annexure P1 from where these facts have been referred to by the learned Additional Advocate General). It has been further argued that this punishment does not seem to have been challenged by the petitioner. It is obvious that the petitioner is a habitual absenteeism and did not deserve any leniency on any ground. The plea that the petitioner had earned a number of appreciation letters would not dilute the habitual act of absentees, if the circumstances and the facts are disclosed supportable by documentary as well as oral evidence, the authority would be required to apply mind necessarily. In a given case where the facts are far too obvious and do not require any determination and are coupled with the habitual absenteeism, the act of such delinquent would fall within the ambit of gravest misconduct. In the case at hand, the petitioner has never ever been able to establish his act and conduct in a manner which would warrant that the conclusion drawn by the Punishing Authority was incorrect. 15. Learned Additional Advocate General, has argued that so far as the dicta in Parkash Chands case (supra) is concerned, would not be applicable in the present facts of the case. The petitioner in the instant case had suffered serious warning for having remained absent from June 6, 1989 to June 20, 1989 and thereafter suffered punishment of reduction of five years service vide order dated 25.9.1990 by remaining absent without any reason w.e.f. November 30, 1989 to April 13, 1990. This reflects the work and conduct of the petitioner to be incorrigible. Thus, the petitioner is certainly not fit to be kept in the disciplinary force. Learned Additional Advocate General had drawn our attention to a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in re: Constable Om Parkash v. State of Haryana 1995(3) S.C.T. 170. It may be noticed that-by this judgment a bunch of writ petitions had been dealt with and that some of them had been dismissed and in regard to some petitions the relief had been granted according to the facts noticed therefrom. It may be noticed that-by this judgment a bunch of writ petitions had been dealt with and that some of them had been dismissed and in regard to some petitions the relief had been granted according to the facts noticed therefrom. The facts which are almost para materia have been taken from C.W.P. No. 7433 of 1993 (Raj Kumar v. State of Haryana). In this case, the petitioner had remained absent from duty for a period of 4 months 12 days 3 hours. He had been described as a habitual absentee. He had not completed 20 years qualifying service for pension, therefore, his length of service was not taken into consideration. He also continuously remained absent even during the inquiry, therefore, no personal hearing was required to be given. In that case also, no evidence in defence was produced by him to support his supposed plea of illness. Thus, by keeping in view the ratio of the decision rendered by the Hon ble Division Bench, the aforesaid petition was ordered to dismissed. 16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book as also the documents appended therewith. We had also directed the production of the record by our order dated September 21, 2005. The record has been produced and we have perused the same. We shall refer to the same subsequently in the judgment. 17. The petitioner admittedly remained absent from duty on a number of occasions. He was given serious warning in the year 1989 for remaining absent from duty for 13 days i.e. from June 6, 1989 to June 20, 1989. This perhaps did not deter the petitioner and he again absented himself from duty for almost five months i.e. from November 30, 1989 to April 13, 1990. For this absence, he earned the punishment of forfeiture of service i.e. five years earned service was reduced/cut vide order No. 16533-37-B dated September 25, 1990. It has also been noticed that for the earlier period of 13 days absence, he was granted leave without pay and later on this leave was treated as long leave. The petitioner had availed leave without oay for July 1, 1990, July 3, 1990 as well. The conduct of the petitioner in this regard is not very appreciable. It has also been noticed that for the earlier period of 13 days absence, he was granted leave without pay and later on this leave was treated as long leave. The petitioner had availed leave without oay for July 1, 1990, July 3, 1990 as well. The conduct of the petitioner in this regard is not very appreciable. Police force is a disciplinary force and the official is required to act meticulously and in such force leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right as per Rule 8.2 of the Punjab Police Rules . An official earns leave for the time spent on duty as per the tabulation provided under the rules but claiming the same would also depend upon the rules applicable in this regard. The petitioner has not spelt out anywhere as to whether he has claimed this leave as hospital leave, casual leave or earned leave. The approach has been very casual and not explicit and as per the rules applicable in this regard. 18. The opportunity of being heard, which has been provided under Rule 16.24(1) (ix) is not to be read in isolation. No doubt, it is the rule that a person cannot be condemned unheard and that the rule of audi altrem partem, is applicable in all such cases. In this regard, to satisfy ourselves that the due opportunity was granted to the petitioner or not, the record pertaining to the case of the petitioner had been asked for, which had been produced. The perusal of the same shows that the petitioner had been served with the show cause notice, which was received by the petitioner on October 24, 1992 and pursuant thereto, no reply had been submitted. Further, a communication dated November 18, 1992, was sent to the petitioner indicating that he must submit his written reply by November 23, 1992 and if he wants to substantiate his written pleas, he may appear before the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) on or before November 26, 1992 and further endorsement had been made that if no reply is submitted by him within the prescribed time or he does not appear before the SSP, then further proceedings would be taken. The perusal of the record shows that the hearing was again adjourned and the intimation in regard thereto was sent to him for making the submissions in writing on or before December 24, 1992. The perusal of the record shows that the hearing was again adjourned and the intimation in regard thereto was sent to him for making the submissions in writing on or before December 24, 1992. He submitted written submissions along with the written reply, both was dated December 24, 1992, vide which he has categorically stated that he shall appear before the learned SSP on or before December 28, 1992 and if he is unable to appear then further proceedings may be taken. The perusal of the record shows that after making written submission he did not appear before the learned SSP and that the impugned order of dismissal was passed on February 5, 1993 and that copy thereof was received by the petitioner on February 8, 1993. 19. We have also perused the character roll of the petitioner which had been produced before us. The petitioner had earlier suffered an inquiry in regard to the charge of having remained absent from duty with effect from November 3, 1989 to April 14, 1990 (incorrectly November 30, in Annexure P1). Pursuant thereto five years service had been forfeited and as a result thereof five increments had been reduced from the salary. However, to grant continuity in service, the leave of absent without pay had been granted. This was an act of leniency on the part of the respondents. The case of the petitioner is definitely distinct from Parkash Chands case (supra). In the instant case, the petitioner had earlier suffered forfeiture of five years service for having remained absent from duty for almost six months. Again he absented himself from duty for 85 days without getting his leave sanctioned; meaning thereby the petitioner is certainly "habitual absentee". The act on the part of the delinquent has to be read as "gravest misconduct". The Punishing Authority has categorically noticed that the petitioner had been given the opportunity for defending himself before the Inquiry Officer but despite the opportunity he has not been able to establish the supportable reasons for his conduct. The act on the part of the delinquent has to be read as "gravest misconduct". The Punishing Authority has categorically noticed that the petitioner had been given the opportunity for defending himself before the Inquiry Officer but despite the opportunity he has not been able to establish the supportable reasons for his conduct. The Punishing Authority has also observed that after having gone through very carefully the inquiry file, the daily proceedings, statement of allegations, statements of the witnesses, charge sheet, inquiry report and the show cause notice as also the statement made by the delinquent official, the opinion formed by the Inquiry Officer cannot be ignored easily and if such opinion is ignored, this would effect the other police personnel and that the police department is a disciplined force and such conduct on the part of one police official would affect the other police employees naturally. Thus, keeping in view the fact that if an employee remained absent without reason then to dismiss him from the department is not at all incorrect and that the delinquent official remained absent for three months and he has committed misconduct and that the punishment proposed pursuant to the show cause notice is justified. The very fact that the inquiry file had been duly examined by the Punishing Authority and obviously the Punishing Authority had noticed the incorrigible acts on the part of the petitioner for having remained absent from duty not once but twice; once for 13 days for which serious warning was administered and secondly for a period of almost six months because of which the petitioner had earned forfeiture of five years service vide order dated 25.9.1990. All these facts noticed by the Punishing Authority concluded one fact that the act and conduct of the petitioner does fairly and squarely fall within the ambit of "gravest misconduct". So far as Parkash Chands case (supra) is concerned, it has been decided on the facts of that case as in that case the petitioner had absented himself from duty for a period of almost 32 days but in the instant case the petitioner had been administered serious warning in the first instance and on the second occasion had suffered forfeiture of five years service and that five increments had been withdrawn. However, continuity of service was granted while granting leave without pay. However, continuity of service was granted while granting leave without pay. The petitioner was not able to mend himself and gain absented from duty without the leave having been sanctioned for another period of 85 days. We have also perused the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in Om Parkashs case (supra) whereby such similar petition i.e. C.W.P. No. 79844 of 1993 (Raj Kumar v. Slate of Haryana), has been dismissed and in that case the petitioner had absented himself for 12 days and three hours on the first occasion and four months on the second occasion. In the instant case the petitioner absented himself for 13 days in the first instance, six months in the second instance and 85 days in the instance under challenge. No reasons has been made out for granting indulgence under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20. We have also pondered over the matter with regard to the opportunity of being, heard as claimed under Rule 16.26(1)(ix) of the Punjab Police Rules . We are of the considered opinion that sufficient opportunity had been granted to the petitioner at the time of joining the inquiry proceedings and subsequently when the show cause notice was served by the Punishing Authority and that he had made written submissions and had also indicated that if he does not appear in person before the learned SSP, the appropriate proceedings be taken. The perusal of the impugned order of dismissal shows that the learned SSP has dealt with each and every written submission of the petitioner, which is more than the opportunity of personal hearing, The proviso, as has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which has been reproduced above, does not require that after the show cause and upon making the written submissions, the delinquent is again required to be given another personal hearing. The written submissions dealt with in the right and correct perspective, would certainly entail the application of mind by the Punishing Authority. In the instant case, upon perusal of the record, we are satisfied that sufficient opportunity had been granted to the petitioner at all levels and that he was clear in his mind so far as his own conduct is concerned. 21. In the instant case, upon perusal of the record, we are satisfied that sufficient opportunity had been granted to the petitioner at all levels and that he was clear in his mind so far as his own conduct is concerned. 21. In view of the above, we find no infirmity, illegality or the order suffering from the rigour of the rule of prudence and the police rules applicable. The principle of aitdi allreni pariem has also been correctly adhered to. 22. So far as the claim of claiming pension is concerned, the same merits dismissal as the period of five years permanent service was forfeited and it is not discernible as to whether the said order had been challenged, if so, with what result. By reduction of the service by five years would render the service of the petitioner to be less than ten years. In any case, learned counsel for the petitioner lias not been able to make cogent submissions in this regard. Thus, the claim of the petitioner in this regard also deserves to be rejected. 23. No merit. Dismissed. 24. The original record is ordered to be returned to Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, the learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab.