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2005 DIGILAW 1086 (MP)

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. Sant Kumar Nahar

2005-10-20

AJIT SINGH, R.S.JHA

body2005
JUDGMENT Jha, J. -- The petitioners have filed this petition challenging the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") passed in Original Application No. 784/ 1999 dated 21.10.2002. It is the contention of the petitioners that the Tribunal has wrongly allowed the Original Application, filed by the respondent No. 1, and granted relief of special disability leave and consequential benefits thereto. The facts of the case are that the respondent No. 1. who is a Safai Karmachari working in Kendriya Vidyalaya No. 1. GCF, Jabalpur, was assaulted by one Gulab Singh on 18.2.1997 at 9:00 a.m. resulting in server head and leg injuries on account of which, the respondent No. 1 had to be hospitalized and therefore he could not attend his duties from 18.2.1997 to 2.3.1997 and for a further period or 10 weeks, which was advised by the doctor after his discharge from the hospital. The respondent No. 1 applied for special disability leave for this period, which was rejected by the petitioners. Being aggrieved by the rejection the respondent No. 1 had approached the Tribunal by filing T.A. No. 21/1999. The Tribunal vide order dated 19.8.1900 directed the petitioners to conduct the issue. Alter enquiry the petitioner again rejected the application of the respondent No. 1 for grant of special disability leave. The respondent No.1 being aggrieved by the rejection filed O.A. No. 784/1999 which has been allowed by the Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 21.10.2002. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the interpretation of Rule 44 (1) or Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") as made by the Tribunal based on the judgment of the apex Court in the case of General Manager, B.E.S.T undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes, AIR 1964 SC 193 is incorrect as the judgment or the apex Court related to the Workmen's Compensation Act and the analogy or that Act cannot be bon-owed for interpretation of Rule 44 (1) of the Rules. Learned counsel on the contrary has relied upon the judgment as reported in the case of Employees' Stale Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costs, 1996 ACJ 1281 to canvass his arguments that the Rule is to be interpreted restrictively and strictly. Learned counsel on the contrary has relied upon the judgment as reported in the case of Employees' Stale Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costs, 1996 ACJ 1281 to canvass his arguments that the Rule is to be interpreted restrictively and strictly. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the grant of special disability leave is restricted to cases where the disability is a result of injuries received by the employee in the discharge of his official duties only as provided by Rule 44 (1) of the Rules and as the respondent No.1 did not receive injuries while discharging his official duties the benefit of Rule 44 (1) of the Rules cannot be granted to him. The counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends that the object intention and the language of Rule 44 (1) of the Rules is wife enough to cover the situation in question and therefore the Tribunal has rightly allowed his application. Rule 44 (1) of Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 reads as under: "'The authority competent to grant leave may grant s:)ccial disability leave to a Governmcnt servant (whether permanent or temporary) who is disabled by injury intentionally inflicted or caused in, or in consequcncc of the duc performance of his official duties or in consequence of his official position." A perusal of the language of the Rule makes it abundantly clear that the Rule is not restricted in its application to injuries which arise in the performance of official duties alone and the language of the Rules is wide enough to include all injuries "caused in or in consequences of', the discharge of "official duties or in consequences ofhis official position ". Thus, it is clear the an employee is entitled to the benefit ofspecial disability leave in case he is disabled by injuries caused not just in the perfollllance of his official duties but also in consequence of his official position. It is an admitted fact that the respondent No. I was present inside the premises of the Kendriya Vidyalaya as a consequence of his official position and was also there to perform his official duties. It is also not disputed that he sustained the injuries during this period. It is an admitted fact that the respondent No. I was present inside the premises of the Kendriya Vidyalaya as a consequence of his official position and was also there to perform his official duties. It is also not disputed that he sustained the injuries during this period. As is also evident from a perusal of the record and the statements ofrespondent No.1, Shri Gulab Singh who is also an employee of Kendriya Vidyalaya and the Principal of the School that there was some pre-existing dispute between respondent No. I and Shri Gulab Singh relating to and connected with their duties in the school. It is, therefore, established without doubt tbat the respondent No. I was disabled due to injuries received as a consequence of his official position and while he was on duty. This Court is of the considered view tbat the language of Rule 44 (I) of the Rules itself is wide enough to cover the case of respondent No.1 even if the contention of counsel of the petitioner regarding incorrect application of the ratio of the judgment of the apex Court in case of Mrs. Agnes (ihid) by the Tribunal, is accepteJ. As we bave held that the respondent No. I is entitled to grant of special disability leave under the provisions 'of Rule 44 (1) of the Rules, we do not think it necessary to decide the academic issue as raised by the petitioners regarding non-applicability of the judgment in M,: Agnes.~ case and the applicability of the judgment in Francis De Costa~' case for the purpose of interpreting Rule 44 (I) of the Rules as the language of the Rule is wide enough to cover the case of respondent No. I. In view of the above, the petition fi led by the petitioners. is dismissed. The petitioners are directed to grant special disability leave and all consequential benefits to the respondent No. I within a period of three months from today. There shal1 be no order as to costs.