( 1 ) HEARD Shri. Kothari, advocate holding for Shri. Ghare, Advocate for the petitioner and Shri. Wankhede, advocate for the respondent. ( 2 ) BY this writ petition filed under articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioner-employee challenges the dismissal order dated 29-12-1984, the order of labour Court dated 28-01-1988 granting him relief only of wages and denying reinstatement and also the order of Industrial Court in revision. ( 3 ) IT appears that the petitioner, who was working as Conductor, came to be dismissed from service by order dated 29-12-1984 with effect from 04-01-1985 for proved misconduct. The said dismissal was challenged by him before the Labour Court. The Labour Court in Complaint (ULPA) no. 180 of 1985 found departmental enquiry conducted by respondents against petitioner to be fair and valid on 17-12-1985. The matter was considered on merits by it on 25-01-1988 and it found that the findings of Enquiry officer were not perverse. It further found that the punishment of dismissal is not shockingly disproportionate. However, it further found that the authority which passed dismissal order was not competent authority and therefore, it proceeds to pass dismissal order itself. In that view of the matter, while declining relief of reinstatement, it granted relief of back wages for the period from 04-01-1985 till the date of its order dated 28-01-1988. Denial of reinstatement was challenged by the petitioner by filing Revision No. 13 of 1988 under Section 44 of MRTU and PULP Act before the Industrial court. The respondent-Maharashtra State road Transport Corporation also filed revision no. 35 of 1988 before the same Court questioning grant of wages to the petitioner. The learned Member of Industrial Court has considered both the revisions together and was pleased to dismiss them on 23-02-1993. Thus, the order of Labour Court as well as order of industrial Court, dismissing his revision are challenged by the petitioner and prayed for his reinstatement as a Conductor. ( 4 ) SHRI. Kothari, Advocate has invited attention of this Court to the discussion in this respect as contained in the impugned order of Labour Court in para 5 and has stated that as the dismissal order was not passed by the Competent Authority, it was void and as such, the Labour Court ought to have granted relief of reinstatement with full back wages to the petitioner. He contends that the Member of Industrial Court has also ignored this aspect of the matter. In support of his contention, he has invited attention of this Court to the judgment of the Honble apex Court in the case of M. S. R. T. Corpn. Vs. Mirja Khasim AH beg, reported at 1977 Lab. I. C. 272. He has further stated that once the dismissal is found to be bad, relief of reinstatement must follow. ( 5 ) SHRI. Wankhede, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the labour Court concluded that enquiry is fair and valid and findings recorded by the Enquiry officer are not perverse. He has contended that these findings of Labour Court are not challenged by the petitioner in Revision before the Industrial Court or in present writ petition. He contends that order of dismissal is passed by the officer of equivalent rank viz. Shri. Pardeshi, who was working as Divisional traffic Officer (Operation ). He contends that enquiry till the stage of submission of findings was conducted by Shri. Bokarde and as Shri. Bokarde was thereafter transferred, Divisional traffic Officer (Operation) Shri. Pardeshi became Competent Authority and he has passed that order as contemplated in Discipline and Appeal Rules which govern the employment of petitioner. He contends that the Labour Court found said dismissal order to be without authority and hence in view of provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, it itself has passed dismissal order on 28-01-1988. In that view of the matter, it has also granted petitioner, salary for the period from 04-01-1985 to 28- 01-1988. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing both the counsel, it is apparent that the petitioner has not contended that the enquiry conducted against him was not fair and valid. He has not challenged the fact that the misconduct is proved against him in departmental enquiry. His only contention is that the order of dismissal was/is issued by the authority was not competent to issue the same. The argument is not that the authority which has actually passed the order of dismissal was subordinate to the authority which has recorded the findings in disciplinary enquiry. The learned Member of Industrial Court has considered this aspect in para 4 of its judgment and has found that shri. The argument is not that the authority which has actually passed the order of dismissal was subordinate to the authority which has recorded the findings in disciplinary enquiry. The learned Member of Industrial Court has considered this aspect in para 4 of its judgment and has found that shri. Bokarde by name was appointed as competent Authority and as such the order passed by any other authority is not sustainable. Thus, the learned Member of industrial Court did not record a finding that the petitioner has been dismissed from service by an authority which is subordinate to competent Authority. In this background when the judgment of the Honble apex Court on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is seen, from para 13 thereof it is apparent that the employee concerned therein was employed by superintendent of Traffic Department of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad and after State reorganisation Act, 1956, he has been dismissed by authority which was subordinate to General Manager of Mysore Government road Transport Department. The Honble apex Court has found that Superintendent of the Traffic Department of erstwhile State of hyderabad was equivalent to General Manager of the Mysore Government Road Transport department and as the employee was dismissed by subordinate authority, it was held that the dismissal was not sustainable. It further appears that the order of dismissal by subordinate authority was challenged in appeal before the General Manager and the General manager dismissed that appeal of employee. The Honble apex Court has held that the consideration of that matter in appeal by competent Authority will not save the situation for the employer. The facts in the present case are entirely different. It is not demonstrated that the petitioner is dismissed from service by the authority which is subordinate to competent Authority. Moreover, there is one more angle to this case. The Honble apex court has considered the controversy in the light of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and also provisions of Section 115 (7) and 116 of State Reorganisation Act, 1956. Same provisions protect the service conditions which were available to employees before reorganisation of State. The Honble apex court has not considered the matter in the light of provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial disputes Act. Same provisions protect the service conditions which were available to employees before reorganisation of State. The Honble apex court has not considered the matter in the light of provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial disputes Act. ( 7 ) THE Labour Court has considered this issue in the light of provisions of Section 11-A of Industrial Disputed Act and has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of R. K. Nair Vs. General Manager, Bhilai Steel plant and Anr. , reported at 1977 Lab. I. C. 1079. In that ruling, the Division Bench of madhya Pradesh High Court has found that if there is any defect in the departmental enquiry, the employer can proceed further from the stage of such defect. Further, it is also held that the Labour Court in such circumstances can itself consider whether the charges are proved on the basis of material collected in domestic enquiry. The learned Member of industrial Court while dismissing the revision filed by the present petitioner as also respondent, has noticed in para 10 that the labour Court itself has considered the material available on record and thereafter has awarded the punishment. The approach of the Labour court in the matter is in accordance with law and there is nothing wrong or objectionable in it. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the unreported judgment of this Court in Writ Petition no. 2158 of 1988 decided on 21-11-1988. In this case, in para 7, the learned Single Judge of this Court has found that the Labour Court would get jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act when there is defective order and the order without jurisdiction or void order is not synonymous to invalid orders. It is to be seen that the dismissal order which the learned Single Judge has considered there, was passed contrary to section 73 (1) of Employees State Insurance act. It is thus clear that in view of said provision, the employer himself was not competent to pass that order and hence the order passed was without jurisdiction. This is not the position of present petitioner. It is thus clear that in view of said provision, the employer himself was not competent to pass that order and hence the order passed was without jurisdiction. This is not the position of present petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that the Divisional traffic Controller was not the competent authority to pass that order and he did not say that the employer is not at all competent to pass the order of dismissal. Hence, this unreported judgment of this Court has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 9 ) THE learned Labour Court has taken care of interest of the petitioner when it substituted its order as dismissal order on 28-01-1988. It has presumed that the petitioner has continued in service beyond his actual dismissal till 28-01-1988. Thus, Labour Court has not validated the original order of dismissal dated 04-01-1985 and has given petitioner wages for the period from 04-01-1985 to 28-01-1988. ( 10 ) THUS, I find that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. The orders passed are perfectly within the four corners of law. No case is made out for interference in writ jurisdiction. Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.