Judgment ( 1 ) BY this petition under articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India the petitioner, Municipal Council, Bhandara constituted under the provisions of maharashtra Municipal Councils, Village panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "municipalities Act") has challenged the award dated 14-2-1992 passed by Labour court at Bhandara in IDA Reference Number 4 of 1988. ( 2 ) THE challenge argued is on two counts. First is that the employee that is respondent (deceased, now through his legal heirs) had already challenged his dismissal from service after departmental inquiry in an appeal before Regional Director of Municipal administration and adverse order passed by appellate authority, by filing a Writ Petition before this Court. Said Writ Petition was dismissed and as the matter attained the finality, it was not open to the deceased to move any other forum as order of High Court operated as res-judicata. The second challenge is that the employee moved in conciliation after five years and therefore he could not have been given back wages even for said period. The grounds are stated in the beginning itself so as to avoid irrelevant facts and prolixity. ( 3 ) THE deceased was working as a sanitary Inspector since 2-12-1962. He was issued charge-sheet for several acts of indiscipline, and a regular departmental inquiry was conducted against him. He was ultimately dismissed by the Administrator of municipal Councils on 4-12-1982 under section 79 of the Municipalities Act. Deceased challenged this order by filing appeal before Regional Director of Municipal administration vide appeal number 3/82-83 and the said authority was pleased to dismiss the appeal on 16-4-1983. He then filed Writ petition No. 1773/1983 before this Bench and challenged the charge-sheet, inquiry proceedings and order of punishment; and he sought relief of reinstatement with back wages and continuity. The High Court was pleased to issue notice and ultimately dismissed the Writ Petition on 20th August, 1983 in motion. The deceased thereafter instituted conciliation proceedings before the labour Officer under section 2 (1) (a) of industrial Disputes Act for same purpose which ultimately resulted in reference being made to Labour Court, Bhandara in due course. The High Court was pleased to issue notice and ultimately dismissed the Writ Petition on 20th August, 1983 in motion. The deceased thereafter instituted conciliation proceedings before the labour Officer under section 2 (1) (a) of industrial Disputes Act for same purpose which ultimately resulted in reference being made to Labour Court, Bhandara in due course. In the meanwhile he also filed a complaint under section 28 read with item 1, schedule IV of Maharashtra Recognition of trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971 (referred to as "mrtu Act") for quashing departmental inquiry and for reinstatement with continuity and back wages. The said complaint was registered as U. L. P. Complaint No. 29 of 1947 (sic) and as it was delayed, application for condonation of delay was also moved. It appears from paragraph 7 of this application that a review of order of High Court rejecting writ Petition also came to be rejected on 21-3-1985. In said complaint the petitioners raised grievance about pending reference proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and pointed out bar created by section 59 of mrtu Act. The complainant came to be dismissed on 26-11-1987. In reference proceedings, before conciliation officer similar objection was raised but the said authority made reference and during pendency of this reference, employee expired on 29-9-89. The Labour Court at Bhandara found that departmental inquiry was vitiated and therefore quashed the order of dismissal dated 4-12-1982 by its award dated 14-2-1992, and it directed payment of back wages to the legal heirs of deceased employee for the period from his termination till his death. The present Writ Petition challenging said award has been admitted for final hearing by this court on 3rd March, 1993 but interim relief has been refused. ( 4 ) IT appears that after rejection of interim relief, the present respondents namely the legal heirs of deceased employee filed u. L. P. Complaint Number 1479 of 1994 for implementation of the award dated 14-2-1992 under item 9 of Schedule IV of MRTU Act. It was allowed on 19th March, 2002 and Writ petition No. 325 of 2002 filed by Municipal council against it was rejected by this court on 28-8-2003. It was allowed on 19th March, 2002 and Writ petition No. 325 of 2002 filed by Municipal council against it was rejected by this court on 28-8-2003. Advocate Kaptan appearing for petitioner states that the reference proceedings were initiated on 20-5-1987, i. e. , more than five years after the order of dismissal and in view of this fact the Labour court could not have granted relief of back wages. He submits that it is nothing but putting premium upon the laches of the deceased. He relies upon the judgment of hon'ble Apex Court reported at 2002 (9) SCC 549 , particularly paragraph 3 thereof in support of this proposition. He further argues that the prayers made in Writ Petition no. 1773/1983 and the prayers made in U. L. P. complaint were same and hence, decision dated 20 August, 1983 in above Writ Petition operated as res judicata. For this proposition he relies upon the judgment of Apex Court reported at 1999 SCC (L and S) 1083. He further alleges that the Labour Court has wrongly placed upon petitioner burden to show that departmental inquiry is fair and proper. ( 5 ) ADVOCATE M. P. Jaiswal who appears for legal heirs/present respondents contended that no objection about res judicata was raised before Labour Court in MRTU complaint. He further states that such objection was raised in conciliation proceedings and when, despite it reference was made, order making reference was never challenged. He contends that similar objection was raised in Writ Petition No. 325 of 2002 which was filed against the decision of Industrial Court to implement the award and that Writ Petition has been dismissed. He therefore argued that the same logic should also apply to the plea being repeated in present petition and the conduct of petitioner is not proper and they have yet not implemented the award yet. He urges that their Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. He further points out that the award delivered by Labour Court does not suffer from any jurisdictional error and the documents to the (sic) demonstrate application of principle of res judicata were not produced before the Labour Court. He states that the scope of jurisdiction in Writ petition and in reference proceedings is materially different and therefore the arguments of petitioner are misconceived. He states that the scope of jurisdiction in Writ petition and in reference proceedings is materially different and therefore the arguments of petitioner are misconceived. He points out that the order of dismissal was challenged before appellate authority and the order of appellate authority was questioned before High Court in writ petition and hence scope of jurisdiction available to High Court was very limited. He states that High Court has dismissed the petition by one word prder in liminae without any reason. He relies upon judgment of Delhi High Court reported at 2000 Labour Industry Cases 2915 in support. He points out that in judicial review in Writ jurisdiction the High Court will not substitute its wisdom in the matter of punishment and scope of examination will be limited while in view of section 11-A of industrial Disputes Act the scope of scrutiny by Labour Court is much wider and different. He therefore states that the point of res judicata needs to be rejected. About grant of back wages and delay, he points out that this aspect is considered by Labour Court in paragraph 9 of its award and because of delay only deceased has been awarded 50% back wages and therefore no interference is possible in the matter in writ jurisdiction. He relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble apex court at 1981 (2) SLR 550 (paragraph 7); 1989 (1) CLR 71 (paragraph 8), to state the limitations on the jurisdiction of High Court in writ matters. He also argues that the documents cannot be produced for the first time before this court in writ jurisdiction to demonstrate perversity in the impugned award and for that he relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble apex Court reported at 1990 (1) clr 448 (paragraph 13 ). ( 6 ) IN reply, counsel for petitioner relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble apex court reported at 2004 (8) SCC 262 , paragraph 15 to state that recourse to parallel remedy is also not possible. ( 7 ) IT is admitted position that the order of High Court dismissing Writ Petition on 20 August, 1983 is a non-speaking order delivered in motion hearing and as such said order cannot operate as res judicata here. The position in this respect is settled in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at 1978 (3) SCC 119 and AIR 1989 SC 1764 , paragraph 24. The position in this respect is settled in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at 1978 (3) SCC 119 and AIR 1989 SC 1764 , paragraph 24. Said paragraph 24 reads as under :- "24. It thus becomes clear that when a Writ Petition after contest is disposed of on merits by a speaking order, the question decided in that petition would operate as res judicata, but not a dismissal in liminae or dismissal on the ground of laches or availability of alternative remedy. The High Court and the courts below, therefore, were not right in throwing out the suit of the appellant on the ground of res judicata. " ( 8 ) IT is thus clear that the earlier order of High Court cannot operate as res judicata. Hence there is no question of taking recourse to parallel remedy because the doctrine of election also has no application if ambit and scope of two remedy is different as has been held by Hon'ble apex Court in air 1994 SC 2151 , paragraph 15. Said paragraph states that :- "15. The Doctrine of Election clearly suggests that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the party to whor the said remedies are available has the option to elect either of them but that doctrine would not apply to cases where the ambit and stupe of the two remedies is essentially different. To hold otherwise may lead to injustice and inconsistent results. Since, the Corporation must be held entitled and given full protection by the Court to recover its dues it cannot be bound down to adopt only one of the two remedies provided under the Act. In our opinion the corporation can initially take recourse to section 31 of the Act but withdraw or abandon it at any stage and take recourse to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act, which Section deals with not only the rights but also provides a self- contained remedy to the corporation for recovery of its dues. If the Corporation chooses to take recourse to the remedy available under section 31 of the Act and pursues the same to the logical conclusion and obtains an order or decree, it may thereafter execute the order or decree, in the manner provided by section 32 (7) and (8) of the Act. The explanation however, may withdraw or (sic) Act. If the Corporation chooses to take recourse to the remedy available under section 31 of the Act and pursues the same to the logical conclusion and obtains an order or decree, it may thereafter execute the order or decree, in the manner provided by section 32 (7) and (8) of the Act. The explanation however, may withdraw or (sic) Act. A 'decree' under section 31 of the Act not being a money decree or a decree for realisation of the dues of the Corporation as held in air 1978 SC 1765 (1979) (supra), recourse to it cannot debar the Corporation from taking recourse to the provisions of section 29 of the Act by not pursuing the decree or order under Section 31 of the act, in which event the order made under section 31 of the Act, would serve in aid of the relief available under Section 29 of the Act. " ( 9 ) THE question of delay has been specifically looked into by the Labour Court and the Labour Court has attributed said delay to the deceased. Therefore only it has granted him 50% back wages. It cannot be overlooked that the deceased was required to rush to the Court of law to challenge wrongful and illegal action of petitioner. Departmental enquiry conducted against him is itself found to be vitiated by the Labour Court. Learned court has further found that copy of High court order and also petition was not produced before him to examine issue of res judicata. No fault can be found even with this reasoning. Hence application of mind by labour Court in this respect is neither perverse nor suffering from any jurisdictional error. ( 10 ) THERE is no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.