Judgment Surya Kant, J. 1. This criminal revision petition has been directed against the judgment and order dated 18/19 April, 1991 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Charkhi Dadri, holding the petitioner guilty of the offence under Sections 279, 337/304-A, IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months along with fine of Rs. 500.00 under Section 279, IPC, rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months under Section 337, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1500.00 in default whereof to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 304-A, IPC, as well as against the judgment dated 13-9-1991 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani whereby the petitioners appeal against the aforementioned judgment and order dated 18-19 April, 1991 was partly allowed to the extent that his sentence under Section 304-A, IPC was reduced from one year RI to 9 months RI and the fine was reduced from Rs. 1500.00 to Rs. 500.00 in default whereof he was directed to undergo RI for two months. However, the petitioners conviction and sentence under Sections 279, 337, IPC were kept intact. 2. The prosecution case in brief is that on 24-6-1985, the complainant-Om Parkash along with Satbir s/o Ganga Dutt (since deceased) was present near Puran Cinema by the side of bus stand at Charkhi Dadri when a car bearing No. DHB-5638 allegedly being driven by the petitioner in a rash and negligent manner came from the side of Loharu Road and firstly hit one Smt. Khazani and then Om Parkash and Satbir. The driver of the car, however, ran away with the car. The injured were taken to the General Hospital, Dadri where they were medico-legally examined and information was sent to the Police Station which led to the registration of the case on a statement made by injured -Om Parkash. One of the injured, namely, Satbir was referred to the Govt. Medical College & Hospital, Rohtak. Later on, the said Satbir unfortunately succumbed to the injuries he had suffered and, as a result of which Section 304-A, IPC was also added. The petitioner was arrested and put to trial. 3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses. The petitioner in his statement under Section 313, Cr. Later on, the said Satbir unfortunately succumbed to the injuries he had suffered and, as a result of which Section 304-A, IPC was also added. The petitioner was arrested and put to trial. 3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses. The petitioner in his statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. denied to have caused the accident in question and took up the plea that he was not driving the car at all. No defence evidence was, however, led by him. 4. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Judicial Magistrate held the petitioner guilty under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A, IPC and sentenced him accordingly, as referred to above. His conviction was also upheld by learned Additional Sessions Judge prompting him to approach this Court through this Criminal Revision Petition which was admitted on 20-9-1991 and the petitioner was directed to be released on bail to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani. 5. I have heard Shri U. D. Gaur, learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Yashwinder Singh, learned Assistant A.G. Haryana on behalf of the State and have perused the record with their assistance. 6. The main thrust of argument made by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that no legally admissible evidence has been produced by the prosecution to establish the petitioners identity as the driver of the delinquent vehicle. Shri Gaur contended that P.W. 1 Satbir Singh s/o Dariya Singh who was present at the spot and witnessed the accident, has categorically deposed that he was unable to recognize the driver of the car. Similarly, P.W. 2 (Lakshmi Narain s/o Hari Singh) who is also an eye witness to the occurrence, too has categorically deposed that he did not recognize and/or know as to who was driving the car in question. Shri Gaur then contended that though P.W. 3 (Constable Om Parkash), who is also the injured - complainant, has deposed that the car in question was being driver by the petitioner but in his cross-examination he has candidly admitted that, "he did not know Chuni Lal earlier nor had he seen him in the past", due to which he could not give description of the driver at the time of making his statement before the police. It is argued that the above named witness has identified the petitioner for the first time only while deposing in the Court. Similarly, P.W. 11 (Fateh Singh s/o Thakur) who claims to have seen the petitioner driving the car in question and causing the accident, has also admitted in his deposition that he had told this fact to the police, yet the petitioners name did not find mention in the FIR. Shri Gaur, then, contended that the statements of both P.W. 3 and P.W. 11 are hit by Section 162, Cr. P.C. for the reason that they have first time identified the petitioner in the Court only when they came for their respective depositions and since no test identification parade was conducted earlier, their statements cannot be relied upon against the petitioner. In this regard, reliance has been placed by him upon Kanan V/s. State of Kerala ), (ii) Manzoor V/s. State of U.P. ; (iii) Mohd. Iqbal M. Shaikh V/s. State of Maharashtra 1998 (2) RCR(Cri) 335 : 1998 Cri LJ 2537 and (iv) Balwan V/s. State of Haryana 1998 (3) RCR (Cri) 680 (P & H). 7. On the other hand, learned State Counsel argued that even if the statement of P.W. 3, Om Parkash, the injured-complainant is overlooked, yet there is overwhelming incriminating material against the petitioner including the statement of P.W. 11 (Fateh Singh s/o Thakur). According to the Learned State Counsel, P.W. 11 {Fateh Singh) has categorically deposed that he knew the petitioner earlier as the petitioner used to park his car on the bus-stop at Badhra (to ply as a taxi) and that he was a resident of village Kakroli though P.W. 11 did not know the petitioners fathers name. It was thus, contended that since P.W. 11 Fateh Singh knew the petitioner before the accident in question took place, neither any test identification parade was required nor his statement is hit by Section 162, Cr. P.C. Learned State Counsel made a pointed reference to a suggestion made by the petitioner to the aforesaid witness that he (the petitioner) did not use to park his car on the bus-stop at Badhra and/or the said witness had never met him in the past. 8. P.C. Learned State Counsel made a pointed reference to a suggestion made by the petitioner to the aforesaid witness that he (the petitioner) did not use to park his car on the bus-stop at Badhra and/or the said witness had never met him in the past. 8. It is well settled that identification of an accused for the first time in Court is no identification in the eyes of law and the accused shall be entitled for benefit of doubt provided that the witness who identifies the accused in the Court for the first time, is not known to him. The object of holding a test identification parade is to test the veracity of a witness on the question of his capability to identify an unknown person whom the witness may have seen only once. However, if the eye-witness already knows the accused by name or face, neither there is a necessity of any test identification parade nor the police showing the accused persons to such witness will have any material bearing on the prosecution case. The statement of such a witness who already knew the accused, therefore, will not be hit by Section 162, Cr. P.C. though it is a different matter altogether as to whether or not the statement of that witness otherwise inspires confidence and is worth accepting. If one reads the statement of P.W. 11 (Fateh Singh) within these parameters, there remains no doubt that he already knew the petitioner for a long period not only by name and face but also by the fact that the petitioner was a resident of village Kakroli. Statement of P.W. 11 - Fateh Singh, therefore, cannot be said to be hit by Section 162, Cr. P.C. 9. So far as the statement of injured-complainant Om Parkash (P.W. 3) is concerned, though he has deposed that he did not know Chuni Lal (petitioner) earlier and, therefore, did not mention his name in the statement on the basis of which FIR was registered, however, has further deposed that he knew the fact that the driver of the car was from village Kakroli. On a minute reading of the cross-examination of this witness, it is apparent that he knew the petitioner by face and also that he was a resident of village Kakroli but he did not know his name. On a minute reading of the cross-examination of this witness, it is apparent that he knew the petitioner by face and also that he was a resident of village Kakroli but he did not know his name. Thus, the statement of P.W. 3 also escapes from the rigorous of Section 162, Cr. P.C. For the aforementioned reasons, it appears that the Courts below have rightly held the petitioner to be the driver of the delinquent vehicle which caused the accident in question due to his rash and negligent driving. No exception can, thus, be made to the concurrent findings of fact returned by the Courts below especially while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. 10. However, there is another aspect of the matter. Much before the accident in question on 24-6-1985, the petitioner had retired from the Indian Army. With the passing of more than twenty years, he is now an old person at the twilight of his life. The learned State Counsel, on the basis of written instructions received by him informed that the petitioner has undergone actual sentence of about 15 days out of the total sentence of nine months RI and that no other criminal case is pending against him. The petitioner is a first time convict. Learned State Counsel has fairly stated that after the petitioner was released on bail by this Court on 20-9-1991, i.e. more than 14 years back, he has not misused the concession of bail in any manner. 11. This Court in various judgments including Vikram Singh V/s. State of Haryana 2003 (3) RCR (Criminal) 192; Manohar Lal V/s. State of Punjab 2004 (1) RCR (Criminal) 656; and Balbir Singh V/s. State of Haryana 2004 (3) RCR (Cri) 310, in somewhat similar circumstances where the accused were convicted for the offences under Sections 304-A, 338, 337 and 279, IPC, released them on probation on account of factors like : (i) having remained on bail for a sufficiently long period; (ii) accused not a previous convict and did not indulge in any criminal activity during the post conviction period; (iii) faced agony of trial for a considerable long period, and (iv) being the sole bread earner. 12. 12. Guided by these princilpes and having regard to the mitigating circumstances especially the petitioners age and the fact that this is the solitary offence attributed to him, it appears to be too inequitous to direct him to undergo the remainder of the sentence. The cause of administration of criminal justice can be very well served by putting the petitioner on probation for a period of one year instead of subjecting him to undergo the actual sentence. 13. Consequently, this criminal revision petition is partly allowed to the extent that while the petitioners conviction under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A, IPC is upheld, the sentence awarded to him is modified to the extent that instead of undergoing remainder of the actual sentence, the petitioner is directed to be released on probation on executing bonds to the tune of Rs. 25,000.00 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of SDJM, Charkhi Dadri, however, subject to the condition that the petitioner will deposit the amount of fine, if already not deposited, within one month of the receipt of a certified copy of this order. The petitioner is also directed to give an undertaking to keep peace and to be of good behaviour for one year and to appear and undergo sentence as and when called for. 14. With these modifications, the revision petition stands disposed of.