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2005 DIGILAW 1118 (PNJ)

Balbir Singh Makker v. Punjab Mandi Board

2005-10-24

NIRMAL YADAV, S.S.NIJJAR

body2005
Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. After arguing the matter for quite some time, when we were about to pronounce the orders, learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that respondent No. 6 had earlier filed a civil suit claiming that his parent committee was at Goniana which was opposed by the Mandi Board and was dismissed. Although the fact of dismissal of the suit was known to the petitioner at the commencement of the arguments, for reasons best known to him, he did not care to take the Bench into confidence till it became evident that the writ petition is likely to be dismissed. We would be fully satisfied in dismissing the writ petition and making some adverse comments with regard to the conduct of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. We, however, refrain from doing so considering the young age of the learned Counsel and with the hope that in future he would learn to make a candid disclosure of the relevant facts to the Bench at the relevant time. In the interest of justice, we adjourn this writ petition to enable the learned Counsel to place on record the pleadings of the Civil Suit together with the judgment of the civil court. 2. Adjourned to 14.1.2005. 3. Even after we had adjourned the matter, learned Counsel insisted that the observations made by us above, should be deleted. Therefore, we made some more enquiries about the nature of the suit which was filed by respondent No. 6. Learned Counsel at this stage, states that the aforesaid suit was not decided on merits. It was dismissed in default for non-prosecution. It is, therefore, not necessary to adjourn the hearing of the writ petition and the same can be disposed of on merits. 4. A perusal of Annexure P-2 makes it abundantly clear that the policy decision has been taken by the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board on 11.11.1982 for giving service benefits to the employees who are transferred from one Market Committee to another. As a policy, it was decided that such an employee will get benefits of that Committee where he was posted on 30.3.1982 (afternoon) or 1.4.1982 (forenoon). It is not disputed that respondent No. 6 was initially appointed by the Market Committee, Bhucho on 5.3.2004. He was promoted as Accountant from the post of Mandi Supervisor and posted at Market Committee, Goniana. It is not disputed that respondent No. 6 was initially appointed by the Market Committee, Bhucho on 5.3.2004. He was promoted as Accountant from the post of Mandi Supervisor and posted at Market Committee, Goniana. Thereafter, by an order dated 26.9.2005, he has been transferred to Market Committee, Giddarbaha with the observations that his present Committee shall be Market Committee at Goniana. In view of the aforesaid, it is not possible to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the present Committee of respondent No. 6 should be treated at Bhucho, the market committee in which he was initially appointed. 5. Time and again, it has been reiterated by the Courts that it is the bounded duty of all the Advocates to candidly disclose all the facts to the Court, especially when a writ petition is filed, claiming equitable relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is the bounded duty of every Advocate to disclose all known material facts, which may even seem to him to be against the interest of his client. After stating the facts, he is always at liberty to explain the same to nullify their adverse effect, if any. Non-disclosure entail the dismissal of the writ petition. This view of ours will find support from the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath. In the aforesaid case, Justice Kuldip Singh has observed as under: 7. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and prove it by the evidence." The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not process of the Court is being abused. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not process of the Court is being abused. Property grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 6. We may also notice the observations made in the case of Rondel v. Worsley (1967) 1 QB 443 at p.502. Lord Denning, while discussing the duty and the authority of the members of the English Bar has observed as follows: As an Advocate he is a minister of justice equally with the Judge. He has a monopoly of audience in the higher Courts. No one save he can address the judge, unless it be a litigant in person. This carries within a corresponding responsibility. A barrister cannot pick or choose his clients. He is bound to accept a brief for any man who comes before the courts".... He must accept the brief and do all he honorably can on behalf of his client. I say "all he honorably can" because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is the mouth piece of his client to say what he wants; or his tool to do what he directs. He is none of these things. He owes allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of truth and justice" .... "He must disregard the most specific instructs of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the Court. The code which requires a barrister to do all this is not a code of law. It is a code of honour. If he breaks it, he is offending against the rule of the profession and is subject to its discipline. 7. The code which requires a barrister to do all this is not a code of law. It is a code of honour. If he breaks it, he is offending against the rule of the profession and is subject to its discipline. 7. When the matter was taken in appeal to the House of Lords, it was observed as followed by Lord Reid (Rondel v. Worsley 1969 AC 191): Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue advance every argument, and ask every question, however, distasteful which he thinks will help his clients case. But as an officer of the Court, concerned in the administration of justice, he has an overriding duty to the Court, to the standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to a conflict with his clients wishes or with what his client thinks are his personal interests. 8. From the above, it becomes apparent that an Advocate has been placed on a very high pedestal. A very high standard of conduct is demanded of him. He is expected to do all that he honorably can on behalf of his client He has also an overriding duty to the High Court which has been stated to be paramount in nature. It is, therefore, his bounded duty to assist the Court in reaching the correct conclusion. In view of the above, we have no option, but to dismiss the writ petition.Dismissed.