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2005 DIGILAW 1127 (ALL)

Ramji Gupta v. A. D. J.

2005-06-21

ANJANI KUMAR

body2005
ANJANI KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner, who is the tenant of the accommodation in question, which is a shop, against the orders passed by the prescribed authority as well as by the appellate authority under the provisions of the U. P. Act no. XIII of 1972. copies whereof are annexed as Annexures-3 and 8, respectively, to the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the present case are that the petitioner is tenant of two shops in the building in dispute of which admittedly the respondents 3 to 10 are the landlords. The landlord, namely, bhagwan Din filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (here-in-after referred to as the Act,) for release of the aforesaid shops with the prayer that the shops in possession and occupation of tenant-petitioner may be released in his favour, as he requires the shops in dispute to settle down his unemployed sons. During the pendency of the aforesaid release application before the prescribed authority, Bhagwan Din died and respondents 3 to 10 were substituted in place of Bhagwan Din. The petitioner-tenant denied the allegations made in the release application filed by the landlord and submitted that the landlord has no need what to say bona fide requirement of the shops in dispute, as two sons are already settled and the remaining two sons are not of mature age, which may demonstrate that they can establish and run the business, as alleged by the landlord in the release application. Before the prescribed authority, the parties have exchanged their pleadings and adduced the evidence. The prescribed authority after hearing learned Counsel for the parties have found that the need of the landlord is bona fide, but has held that the need of the landlord can be suitably met by releasing only one shop out of two shops in possession of the tenant-petitioner. On the question of comparative hardship, the finding has also been recorded by the prescribed authority in favour of the landlord. Thus, the prescribed authority by the order dated 12th February, 1998 directed the release of one out of two shops under the tenancy of the tenant-petitioner to be released in favour of the landlord. On the question of comparative hardship, the finding has also been recorded by the prescribed authority in favour of the landlord. Thus, the prescribed authority by the order dated 12th February, 1998 directed the release of one out of two shops under the tenancy of the tenant-petitioner to be released in favour of the landlord. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED thereby, the petitioner-tenant as well as the landlady filed appeals before the appellate authority. Rent Appeal No. 44 of 1998, Ramji Gupta v. Smt. Krishna Kumari and Ors. , has been filed by the petitioner-tenant and Rent Appeal No. 49 of 1998, Smt. Krishna Kumari and others v. Ramji Gupta, has been filed by landlady. Before the appellate authority same arguments were advanced as were advanced before the prescribed authority arid the appellate authority after considering the material evidence on record have affirmed the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority with regard to the bona fide need of the landlord. The appellate authority was satisfied with the order passed by the prescribed authority regarding release of one out of two shops will meet the requirement of the landlady. Thus, the findings of the prescribed authority has been affirmed by the appellate authority with regard to the bonafide need to the extent that out of two shops, one shop may be released and the order passed by the prescribed authority to this effect has been affirmed. On the question of comparative hardship, the appellate authority also affirmed the order passed by the prescribed authority and held that the tilt of the comparative hardship is in favour of the landlady. The appellate authority therefore dismissed both the appeals filed by the petitioner-tenant as well as by the landlady by the order dated 11th april, 2005. ( 4 ) IT is only the petitioner-tenant who has challenged the order passed by the prescribed authority as well as by the appellate authority and the landlady has not preferred any writ petition before this Court. Before this Court learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-petitioner reiterated the same arguments as were advanced before the prescribed authority and the appellate authority. On the question of bona fide need, the petitioner-tenant relied upon the observations of the appellate authority, wherein it has observed that the eldest son has since passed his LL. Before this Court learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-petitioner reiterated the same arguments as were advanced before the prescribed authority and the appellate authority. On the question of bona fide need, the petitioner-tenant relied upon the observations of the appellate authority, wherein it has observed that the eldest son has since passed his LL. B. examination and is engaged in the legal profession is clear from the fact that he attends the Court almost every day. The appellate authoritys observation that the son will set up a business and run the business suffers from the manifest error of law and it cannot be presumed that a person who is legally qualified to practise in law will enter into business. With regard to another son, it is submitted on behalf of petitioner-tenant that since second son has got a Government service during the pendency of the litigation, therefore his requirement also cannot be looked into for the purposes of bona fide requirement. It is further centended by learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant that with regard to two other sons as held by the prescribed authority that since they are not of mature age, therefore it cannot be presumed that the requirement of the shops in question for establishing their business. Thus, the need of the landlady cannot be said to be bona fide and at the most it can be said to be mere desire on behalf of the landlady. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlady argued that the application for release of the shops in dispute has been filed in the year 1993 and the appeal has been decided in the year 2005 and even assuming, though not admitted, that two other sons were not at the maturity age at the time when the release application was filed during the pendency of the litigation, they definitely attained the maturity age therefore the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority with regard to the bona fide need do not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Even assuming that two elder sons need are no more available to landlord because of the developments during the pendency of the litigation. Even assuming that two elder sons need are no more available to landlord because of the developments during the pendency of the litigation. On the question of comparative hardship, the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have arrived at the conclusion that the release of one shop out of two shops in occupation of the tenant-petitioner will meet the requirement of the landlady. It is settled law that this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappraise the evidence on record, nor arrive at the conclusion other than what has been arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority, as held by the Apex Court in the case in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 (2) AWC 1721 (SC) : 2004 (2) SCCD 890. ( 6 ) IN view of what has been stated above, I do not find any error, much less error apparent on the face of record in the orders impugned in the present writ petition, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. This writ petition therefore has no force and is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. . .