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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 113 (HP)

Asha Kumari v. State of H. P.

2005-04-29

M.R.VERMA

body2005
JUDGMENT : M.R. Verma, J. This petition under Sections 397/401 Criminal Procedure Code is directed against the order dated 4.1.2005 passed by the learned Special Judge, Chamba whereby a charge under Sections 420, 218, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B.Indian Penal Code against the petitioner has been ordered to be framed with a further prayer for quashing the criminal proceedings against the petitioner in exercise of the powers of this Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 2. Briefly stated the case of the prosecution is that the petitioner and the co-accused conspired with each other pursuant to the conspiracy tampered forged the revenue records qua the land measuring 85.10 bighas situate at Mauza Jandrighat Bhatyat (now Chuwari). The said land was initially owned by Prem Singh and after coming into force of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 this land was declared surplus and vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh in the year 1976. However, the revenue record was tampered with and Piar Singh, Arjun Singh, Bemi Ram, Narvada Devi, Nand Lal and Laxmi Devi were recorded as non occupancy tenants of the said land in the Jamabandi for the year 1977-78. After protracted litigation at various revenue forums the aforesaid persons were declared non-occupancy tenants and on land measuring 67.3 big has proprietary rights were conferred upon them vide mutations attested on 23.6.1987 and 8.12.19878. Thereafter who Wills purporting to be executed by Arjun Singh and Piar Singh were fabricated by co-accused Brijendra Singh in his favour. As a consequence co-accused Brijendra Singh succeed to their share in the aforesaid land. The petitioner is alleged to have obtained three General Power of Attorneys on 29.1.1993 and 30.1.1993 from Narvada Devi, Nand Lal and Bemi Ram authorising her to sell their land in favour of her husband i.e. co-accused Brijendra Singh for consideration. On the basis of the said General Power of Attorneys the petitioner made two sales in favour of Brijendra Singh. On the basis of the said General Power of Attorneys the petitioner made two sales in favour of Brijendra Singh. Based on these facts the precise allegations against the petitioner and the co-accused in the case are that they conspired to get the wrong entries made in the revenue records and to secure illegal orders regarding conferment of proprietary rights in favour of the family servants of co-accused Brijendra Singh who finally managed to become the owner of the land in question of virtue of purchase and fictitious Wills and this having been done by the co-accused. The petitioner procured by procuring the fake General Power of Attorneys and sold the land in favour of her husband co-accused Brijendra Singh, Arjun Singh was alive when the Will and made operative and is still alive and living in District Alwar, Rajasthan. The forged Wills and the General Power of Attorneys were thus used to grab the aforesaid land. The learned Special Judge found that "close scrutiny of the evidence collected during investigation of the case leaves no doubt in the mind of the Court that the prosecution has succeeded to prove a prima-facie case for the commission of the offences by the accused persons" and accordingly directed framing of the charges against the petitioner and the co-accused under Sections 420, 218, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner has preferred the present petition with a further prayer for quashing the criminal proceedings against her in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court on the grounds that a fair opportunity of being heard was denied to her and in fact there is no material to direct farming of a charge against her. 3. The State filed reply to the petition thereby controverting the challenge in the petition to the framing of the charge as also the claim for quashing of the criminal proceedings. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy Advocate General for the State and have also perused the records. 5. 3. The State filed reply to the petition thereby controverting the challenge in the petition to the framing of the charge as also the claim for quashing of the criminal proceedings. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy Advocate General for the State and have also perused the records. 5. It was contented by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Special Judge had denied the right of the petitioner to be defended by a pleader of her choice and an opportunity of being heard before directing the framing of the charge which vitiate the impugned order regarding framing of the charge against her. It was further contended that at the time of alleged vesting of the land in the State and the entries in the revenue records having been made in favour of the tenants the petitioner was not married at Chamba and was in Madhya Pradesh in the house of her parents, therefore, the question of her having conspired to grab the land by getting the revenue records forged, as alleged, did not arise. 6. On the other hand, the learned Deputy Advocate General contended that before passing of the impugned order directing framing of the charge against the petitioner and others, the learned Special Judge had heard the parties, therefore, the contention that the petitioner was not given an opportunity of being heard is without any merit and substance and that the material on record discloses a prima-facie case against the petitioner and the co-accused. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be faulted with. 7. A perusal of the zimini orders of the Court below reveals with arguments on charge in the case were heard for the first time by the predecessor-in-office of the present Special judge, Chamba on 6.12.2003 and the case was listed for orders on 12.12.2003. It is evident from order dated 12.12.2003 that the then learned Special Judge noticed that during investigation statements of a few witnesses were recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code but at the time of supply of the copies of the documents relied upon by the prosecution to the accused persons copies of such statements though forming part of the chargesheet and relied upon by the prosecution were not supplied to the accused persons. Therefore, the copies of such statements were ordered to be supplied to the accused persons and were supplied after lunch session on the same day and the case was adjourned for re-arguments which were heard on 3.1.2004 and the case was ordered to be listed on 14.1.2004 for orders on which date the order could not be announced, therefore, the case was adjourned to 7.2.2004 for orders. 8. On 7.2.2004 the trial Court observed and ordered as follows; 'The main allegations against accused Brijender Singh are that he in connivance with revenue officials and others had got mutated the land of the State of Himachal Pradesh in his favour by adopting fraudulent means. However, from the documents filed by the accused persons under Section 239 Criminal Procedure Code it appears that a civil suit bearing No.42/1997 wherein these very transactions have been challenged by plaintiff Rakesh Pathania etc., the State of Himachal Pradesh by virtue of its written statement had taken the plea that all these fraud has been committed nor the revenue officials have connived with said Brijender Singh. The Civil suit is still pending with the Sub Judge, Dalhousie. Similarly, in civil writ petition bearing number 1732/1995, the State of Himachal Pradesh and the Collector, Chamba, had taken the plea that all these revenue transactions were effected lawfully and subsequently mutations in favour of Brijender Singh were also lawful. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the State has taken two contradictory stands, one in this criminal case and the other in the said civil suit and the writ petition. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor is directed to clarify the stand of the State. So put up on 15th March, 2004 as prayed by the learned Public Prosecutor." 9. The requisite clarification/reply of the State was not filed on the date fixed i.e. on 15.3.2004 and the case was adjourned to 5.4.2004 for filing of such reply. In the meanwhile, the then Presiding Officer of the Court was transferred and the present Special Judge took over. The reply, however, was not still filed despite directions vide orders dated 26.4.2004, 19.5.2004 and 4.6.2004. In the meanwhile, the then Presiding Officer of the Court was transferred and the present Special Judge took over. The reply, however, was not still filed despite directions vide orders dated 26.4.2004, 19.5.2004 and 4.6.2004. Instead on 12.7.2004 the prosecution came forward with the submissions that the State does not intend to file the clarificatory reply and had moved an application for seeking permission of the Court for further investigation of the case under Section 173 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter remained pending for consideration of such application. However, in the meanwhile, directions continued to be issued to the State to clarify its stand as directed vide order dated 7.2.2004. A reply was finally filed on December 4, 2004. The trial Court then posted the case for consideration of charge on 8.12.2004. On 8.12.2004 an objection was taken on behalf of the co-accused Brjendra Singh that copy of the reply filed by the State pursuant to the order dated 7.2.2004 was not supplied to him and in the absence of supply of such a copy it was not possible to argue the case on his behalf. The Court allowed co-accused Brjendra Singh to inspect the records. Before inspection of the records arguments were heard but the counsel representing co-accused Brijendra Singh who was then representing the petitioner also submitted that he would make further submissions after inspecting the records i.e. the reply filed by the State. The matter was thus ordered to be listed on 10.12.2004. On the said date the counsel representing the petitioner, who was to make further submissions before charge, was not present and the telegraphic request of the petitioner for adjournment of the case on the ground of illness of her mother was turned down. Bailable warrants were ordered to be issued against the petitioner. Her presence could be secured on 4.1.2005 when Mr. D.P. Malhotra, who was representing the petitioner, pleaded no instructions to appear on behalf of the petitioner and one more accused. At the same time petitioner also moved an application for adjournment on the ground that she wanted to be defended by a pleader of her choice and that she was represented by M/s. D.P. Malhotra, Nareshwar Singh Chandel and Vineet Gautam but they had shown their inability to conduct the case for the reasons best known to them and she had requested Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate to plead her case and he had agreed to accept the brief and plead her case but not before 21.2.2005, therefore, a prayer was made to adjourn the case for 23.1.2005 so that the petitioner's counsel, as engaged, could appear for and defend her. The Court, however, declined the request for adjournment while observing that only brief arguments had remained to be heard after inspection of the reply filed by the State but no fruitful purpose was going to be served by allowing the application for adjournment. The Court without hearing the brief submissions for which it had already granted time proceeded to observe that the reply filed by the State does not disclose any new fact which may be necessary to consider at pre-charge stage and thus the trial Court concluded that there was no necessity or legal requirement to hear the brief submissions on the reply filed by the State. The application was thus dismissed as devoid of any merit. After the application of the petitioner for adjournment was dismissed she submitted before the trial Court that at 8.12.2004 she was not present and Mr. D.P. Malhotra was not her 'arguing counsel' as she intended to engage a Senior Advocate. This version of the petitioner, however, did not find favour with the trial Court because of appearance of Mr. D.P. Malhotra for the petitioner on 8.12.2004. Be it stated here that it is evident from the contents of order dated 8.12.2004 That Mr. D.P. Malhotra at the first instance had submitted that he was not in a position to argue the case on charge and co-accused Brijendra Singh also moved an application that the case on his behalf is to be argued by Mr. Nareshwar Singh Chandel who could not reach Chamba on that day and had prayed for adjournment. The request for adjournment, was disallowed and Mr. D.P. Malhotra then submitted that he was ready to argue the case on behalf of the accused persons including the petitioner and addressed arguments but with the reservation that he wanted to make further submissions on 10.12.2004 after inspection of the records. The case was then ordered to be listed on 10.12.2004. As per the zimini orders of the subsequent dates maintained by the trial Court such. The case was then ordered to be listed on 10.12.2004. As per the zimini orders of the subsequent dates maintained by the trial Court such. opportunity for making further submissions after inspection of the records appears to have been given to the petitioner, on 4.1.2005 when Mr. D.P. Malhotra, Advocate, pleaded no instructions on behalf of the petitioner who moved an application for adjournment on the ground that she intended to be defended by a counsel of her choice. Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate, who had agreed to plead for her but could not appear before 20.1.2005. The trial judge, however, declined the prayer for adjournment by observing that Mr. D.P. Malhotra had already advanced the arguments on charge and only brief submissions after inspecting the reply filed by the State on 4.12.2004 were required to be made and that there was nothing in the reply which required consideration. The petitioner again requested orally for adjournment to enable the Counsel of her choice to argue the case and also produced certified copies of orders dated 23.12.2004 and 27.12.2004 passed by this Court in Criminal Revision No.199/2004 which were ordered to be placed on the file. It may be pointed out that in the order dated 27.12.2004 this Court had observed that the petitioner "is at an absolute liberty to urge all the points before the trial Court and to bring to the notice of the trial Court all the facts (if not already done)". At this stage the submissions regarding reply filed by the State on 4.12.2004 were yet to be heard. The adjournment was, however, declined. The petitioner then moved another application averring therein that since she had been denied the opportunity of being heard and to engage a counsel of her choice, therefore, her faith in the trial Court was shaken and her case might be transferred to some other Court or she be given opportunity to move the High Court for the purpose. The trial Court ordered that it had no power to transfer the case and the petitioner might move the transfer application before the High Court, if so advised, and proceeded to dictate the order qua framing of the charges against the petitioner and the co-accused. 10. The trial Court ordered that it had no power to transfer the case and the petitioner might move the transfer application before the High Court, if so advised, and proceeded to dictate the order qua framing of the charges against the petitioner and the co-accused. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts it is apparent that the trial Court vide order dated 7.2.2004 had noticed that the State in two different litigations had taken two contradictory stands about the factual position of the case, therefore, the State was called upon to reconcile its stand to which the State reluctantly filed a reply. Thereafter, the trial Court itself afforded opportunity for making submissions before charge in view of the reply filed by the State in which prima-facie the State had shown its inability to reconcile its varying stands as noticed by the trial Court On the day when the case was listed for making short submissions on this aspect of the matter the counsel for the petitioner pleaded no instructions and the petitioner herself moved an application on the ground that she wanted to be defended by a counsel of her choice but no adjournment was granted and the trial Court proceeded to ignore that aspect of the case which it itself had noticed and about which it demanded clarification from the State and which aspect even according to the reply of the State was of vital importance and to hear submission on which the Court itself had given of a adjournment. Therefore, declining to hear the petitioner on the said aspect and to adjourning the case to enable arguments/submissions in this regard by the counsel of her choice are the lapses clearly shown to have been committed by the trial Court. It is also clearly made out by the impugned order itself that the petitioner had clearly and unambiguously expressed that she had lost faith in the trial Court and wanted her case to be transferred to some other Court for which she had prayed for adjournment to enable her to move the High Court in the matter which was also declined. 11. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India guarantees a right to arrested person to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. This right is absolute and does not depend on any other law. 11. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India guarantees a right to arrested person to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. This right is absolute and does not depend on any other law. A person arrested and put on his defence against a criminal charge which may result in penalty is thus entitled to the right to defend himself with the aid of a pleader of his choice and such right is not extinguished even if the arrested person is on bail. The right of a person accused of an offence before a criminal Court and against whom proceedings are initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure to be defended by a pleader of his choice is reiterated even by the provisions of Section 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Denial of such a right of the accused thus is not only violative of the provisions of Section 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but is also violative of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India (See: State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Shobhara & Others ( AIR 1966 SC 1910 )). 12. It may also be pointed out that this right continues throughout the trial of a case before a criminal Court and does not come to an end when he engages a counsel. It is open to him to reconsider his decision and to engage another counsel of his choice. If the accused indicates his desire to change the counsel the Court trying his case is under an obligation to provide him a fresh opportunity for the purpose. 13. In Rajendra Gandhi v. State of Maharashtra (1989 CRt. L.J. 1073), Bombay High Court while dealing with the subject has held as under. "16. Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution confer a fundamental right and give a fundamental guarantee. It is, therefore, the duty of the Courts to see that the right is kept fundamental and that the fullest scope is given to the guarantee. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution lay down the procedure that has to be followed when a man is arrested. It is, therefore, the duty of the Courts to see that the right is kept fundamental and that the fullest scope is given to the guarantee. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution lay down the procedure that has to be followed when a man is arrested. They ensure four things; (a) right to be informed regarding grounds of arrest, (b) right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice, (c) right to be produced before a Magistrate with 24 hours, and (d) freedom from detention beyond the said period except by order of the Magistrate. Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution enshrine the valuable rights of the accused. It is a cardinal principle of administration of justice that an accused must be presumed to be innocent till his guilt is proved and he is convicted by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The Courts have to see that a person accused of any crime gets full opportunity to defend himself. Clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution reads thus: "22. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice." The language used in Article 22 (1) of the Constitution is so plain and clear that it does not admit of any other interpretation, than what it means on plain reading. It has been stated in clear terms that the accused is entitled to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Therefore, it can never be contended that an accused cannot choose a legal practitioner to defend himself. The right of an accused person to defend himself by a Counsel of his choice does not come to an end when he engages a Counsel. It is open to him to reconsider his decision and to engage another Counsel of his choice. If he indicates his desire to change the Counsel, the Court trying his-case is under an obligation to provide him a fresh opportunity for this purpose. Any other view taken could render the right as wholly illusory." 14. It is open to him to reconsider his decision and to engage another Counsel of his choice. If he indicates his desire to change the Counsel, the Court trying his-case is under an obligation to provide him a fresh opportunity for this purpose. Any other view taken could render the right as wholly illusory." 14. The ratio of the case (supra) fully supports the view I have taken hereinabove that right of an accused to be defended by a counsel of his choice is a constitutional right which cannot be denied. There cannot be any doubt that violation of such a right of the accused will vitiate the order against the accused which may come into being as a result of such violation 15. As already: stated hereinabove, the trial Court which has listed the case before it for short submissions to be made before passing orders regarding charge and the counsel earlier engaged by the petitioner having pleaded no instructions and the petitioner having informed the Court of her intention of engaging a counsel of her choice to defend her having refused an opportunity to the petitioner to get the submissions made through the counsel of her choice has violated the provisions of Section 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the impugned order is illegal and cannot be sustained 16. In view of the provision of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Special Judge while trying a criminal case, as in hand, has to follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate and such procedure is contained in Sections 338 to 343 and 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are material for the purpose of discharging the accused or framing a charge against him are relevant for the purpose of the present discussion and read as under : "239. Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are material for the purpose of discharging the accused or framing a charge against him are relevant for the purpose of the present discussion and read as under : "239. When accused-shall be discharged-If upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing." "240. Framing of charge-(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried." 17. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that before determining whether accused is to be discharged or charge is to be framed against him, the Court has to give an opportunity of being heard to the prosecution and the accused and, if necessary, the accused can be examined by the Court and has to consider the police report and the documents sent therewith and then pass an order either discharging the accused if the allegations against him are found to be groundless or to frame a charge against the accused if it is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. In case, the opportunity of being heard is not afforded to the prosecution or the accused, the right of being heard will thereby be denied to the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, which will vitiate the order which may be passed without hearing them or either of them. 18. In case, the opportunity of being heard is not afforded to the prosecution or the accused, the right of being heard will thereby be denied to the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, which will vitiate the order which may be passed without hearing them or either of them. 18. As already concluded hereinabove, the trial Court had posted the case for brief submissions to be made on behalf of the petitioner and after having passed such an order the Court could not decline the opportunity to the accused of being heard on the assumption that it was not necessary to hear further submissions of the petitioner for which time was granted to her and in the absence of any clarification the effect thereof by itself would have been an important aspect for consideration. Thus the opportunity of being heard, as contemplated under the aforesaid Sections having been denied to the accused, the impugned order is vitiated and is liable to be set aside on this around also 19. In Bimal Chand Dhandhia v. State (1976 CRI. L.J. 1594), the Calcutta High Court has taken a similar view while holding as under. "it is well-settled principle of law and when a certain procedure is prescribed for doing an act, such act must be done in accordance with the procedure so laid down or not at all. Under the provisions of Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 the Magistrate is required to take into consideration the documents referred to under Section 173 of the Code, to examine the accused if he considers it necessary and to hear both sides before coming to an opinion whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether it can be presumed that the accused has committed any offence for which he can be tried by him. The documents referred to in Section 173 of the Code also must relate to such documents which can be subsequently translated into evidence at the time of trial. In the present case, the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate failed to proceed in accordance with the procedure established by law in framing the charges against the accused persons. The documents referred to in Section 173 of the Code also must relate to such documents which can be subsequently translated into evidence at the time of trial. In the present case, the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate failed to proceed in accordance with the procedure established by law in framing the charges against the accused persons. In such circumstances, I am of the view that although two of the accused persons are not before me, the charges framed against all the accused persons must be set aside and the matter must be reconsidered by the Ld. Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of law." 20. It may also be pointed out here that the trial Court despite observing that it was the close scrutiny of the evidence collected during investigation of the case which led it to hold that the "prosecution having succeeded to prove facie case for the commission of the offences by the accused persons," apparently has not applied its mind to the relevant records. In this regard a reference may be made to the charge framed against the petitioner wherein the first head of charge it has been said that being MLA of Banikhet Constituency during 1984 to 1990 and 1994 to 2001, the petitioner alongwith the co-accused agreed to commit the offence of cheating and got entered the names of her family servants, namely lachhmi Devi, mother of Narvada Devi, Nand Lai, Behmi Ram, Pair Singh and Arjun Singh, in the revenue record by tampering the said record in connivance with the revenue officials co-accused in the case. In fact, it is the case of the prosecution that the names of the aforesaid persons were illegally and fraudulently inserted in the revenue records during the years 1973 and 1974 by making fictitious entries in the Khasra Girdawari and Patwar Roznamcha which finally figured in the Jamabandi for the year 1977-78 whereas as per the contents of the complaint on the basis of which the matter was enquired into and ultimately FIR was lodged, it is admitted case of the complainant that the petitioner was married to co-accused Brijendra Singh in the year 1978. If so, atleast as per the admission of the complainant in the complaint, the petitioner was not married to co-accused Brijendera Singh till 1978 and there is no evidence that before her marriage she was not residing in her parents' house in Madhya Pradesh as is her case but was residing in Chamba with her prospective-in-laws. Therefore, it cannot prima facie he held that she was a conspirator in bringing about the fake entries in the revenue records in the year 1973-74. These facts as emerge from the records have been completely ignored by the trial Court from being considered while framing the charges and that is why in the first head of charge against co-accused Mehar Singh relevant for the period 1970 to 1975 the petitioner has been mentioned as a co-conspirator with him amongst others without any basis. 21. A perusal of the charge framed against the petitioner reveals that said Mehar Singh has been mentioned as a co-conspirator with the petitioner when the role attributed to him regarding making incorrect entries in the revenue records had been accomplished by the year 1975. The allegation of the petitioner having connived in forging the revenue 3 records along with other accused persons are contained in the second and third head of charge also. Fourth head of charge is simply that the petitioner with the co-accused agreed to commit the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating and there in no mention of material particulars. Even in the last head of charge the particulars of the used forged documents as genuine documents has not been mentioned. Had the record been carefully gone into the particulars of the record allegedly forged and then knowingly used for the purpose of cheating could be and should have been ascertained from the record and mentioned in the charge. This having not been done is indicative of the fact that there had been no proper application of mind by the trial Court to the material placed before it. 22. This having not been done is indicative of the fact that there had been no proper application of mind by the trial Court to the material placed before it. 22. The petitioner has been mentioned as a co-conspirator in the charge framed against other accused persons for the illegal acts allegedly committed during the period commencing from 1974 whereas existence of the petitioner on the scene of conspiracy atleast before 1978 prima facie appears to have been ruled out by the contents of the complaint that the petitioner was married in Chamba in the year 1978. 23. A perusal of the charges framed against the co-accused suffer from the same defects as the charge against the petitioner thereby rendering the charges framed against the accused persons as incapable of being properly understood. Once the prosecution had made specific allegations about forging specific documents by specific persons and using them as genuine for the purpose of cheating then in the event of coming to the conclusion that material placed before the Court prima facie substantiate the allegations and disclose grounds for proceedings against the accused, the material particulars of forgery/forged documents used as genuine should have been mentioned in the relevant heads of charges against the accused persons to enable them to understand as to what they are alleged to have forged and What they are alleged to have used for the purpose of alleged cheating. 24. In view of the above, the charges framed against other accused persons being vague and mentioning the petitioner as a co-conspirator therein even before her marriage without material to prima facie show that before her marriage she was residing at Chamba cannot be sustained, therefore, the order dated 4.1.2005 framing charges against the petitioner and other co-accused deserves to be set aside as a whole and the case deserves to the remanded so that the matter is reconsidered after hearing the parties and a conclusion (s) is arrived at after due application of mind to the material on records. Such course is necessary in the interest of justice and fair play and supportable by the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Bimal Chand's case (supra) wherein the charges framed against two of the co-accused persons who had not opted to file criminal revision against such orders were set aside in view of the setting aside of the charge framed against the petitioner accused therein. 25. At this stage the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had lost faith in the learned Special Judge Chamba because of denial of opportunity to her to engage a counsel of her choice and to make the further submissions for which the case was listed on the date of passing of the impugned order and she had made it clear by making an application and oral submissions before the trial Court, therefore, case may be transferred to some other Court. 26. Be it stated that justice must not only be done but should also appear to have been done. In a case as in hand where the Court-framed charges against the petitioner declining her request to be represented by a counsel of her choice and making further submissions before charge for which time was granted a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that she would not get a fair trial in that Court seems to be well founded so as to justify transfer of case to another Court. 27. In view of the above, the revision petition is allowed and the order dated 4.1.2005 directing the framing of charges against the petitioner and the co-accused is set aside and the charges framed against them are quashed. The case is remanded and transferred from the Court of the learned Special Judge, Chamba to the Court to (sic-of) learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala with the directions to proceed in the matter in accordance with the provisions of Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and dispose of the case in accordance with law keeping in view the provisions of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution. 28. The petitioner herein and the petitioner in the connected revision petition which has become infructuous by virtue of the orders hereinabove passed are directed through their counsel to appear before the transferee- Court on June 6, 2005. 29. 28. The petitioner herein and the petitioner in the connected revision petition which has become infructuous by virtue of the orders hereinabove passed are directed through their counsel to appear before the transferee- Court on June 6, 2005. 29. The records of the case received from the Court of the learned Special Judge, Chamba be sent directly to the transferee Court under intimation to the learned Special Judge, Chamba.