JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This is plaintiffs appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) challenging the findings on the issue concerning the period of limitation as the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant has been found to be barred by the learned lower Appellate Court while reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court. On the other issue relating to the recovery of amount due to the plaintiff- appellant, the findings of the trial Court have been affirmed and it has been found that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/- along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 1.8.1983. Therefore, the following question of law would arise for determination :- "Whether the defendant-respondents had acknowledged the liability to pay the dues of the plaintiff-appellant by writing to it on 7.12.1983 (Ex. P- 10) and subsequently by finally refusing the payment of the amount on 14.8.1986 (Ex. P-11)?" 2. Facts in brief necessary for disposal of the controversy raised in the instant appeal are that the plaintiff-appellant has filed Civil Suit No. 176 of 1988 on 1.9.1986 for recovery of Rs. 1,81,000/- being 10% balance payment of the price of the equipments 300 KVA generating sets and security etc. It was pleaded that the plaintiff-appellant entered into an agreement with the defendant-respondents for supply of a generating set to the defendant- respondents. In terms of the agreement, a sum of Rs. 35,000/- was deposited by the plaintiff-appellant with the defendant-respondents as security. The generating set was supplied and the defendant-respondents made payment of Rs. 6,30,000/-, withholding the balance payment of Rs. 70,000/-. Accordingly, a request was made for making the balance payment to the plaintiff-appellant but the defendant-respondents finally refused to make the payment vide letter dated 14.8.1986 (Ex. P-11). The defendant-respondents, namely, Haryana Agro Industries Corporation raised a preliminary objection inter alia that the suit was barred by time and on merits, it was alleged that the generating set was not installed as per terms and conditions of the agreement. It was further asserted that withholding of Rs. 70,000/- and security deposit of Rs. 35,000/- deserve to be forfeited on account of the default committed by the plaintiff- appellant. 3. It was further asserted that withholding of Rs. 70,000/- and security deposit of Rs. 35,000/- deserve to be forfeited on account of the default committed by the plaintiff- appellant. 3. Both the Courts below have recorded the findings in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on merits and it would be apposite to advert to the findings as recorded by the lower Appellate Court and the same read as under :- "11. The appellant was seeking interference with the finding in relation to issue No. 1-A primarily on the ground that as the execution of the contract was delayed, therefore, the plaintiff-respondent was not entitled to the amounts claimed by them. On going through the record, it is apparent that the delay in the installation of the generator was occasioned by the respondents own failure to provide the infrastructure which would enable the plaintiff to instal the same. The generator was supplied on 3.1.1983 and the cable was purchased as late as on 11.5.1983. The installation was completed by 24.5.1983 and the generator was commissioned on full loan on 20.7.1983. In these circumstances, the trial Court was right in opining that the delay of about four weeks could not be taken into consideration as the same was occasioned by the conduct of the respondent itself. It had, therefore, accepted the claim of the plaintiff to the extent of Rs. 1,25,000/- and decided this issue accordingly. The finding of the trial Court in relation thereto has, therefore, to be affirmed." However, there is a conflict of opinion between the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court concerning the period of limitation. On the aforementioned issue, the trial Court while deciding in favour of the plaintiff-appellant has held as under :- "10. Issue No. 1-A : At the time of arguments, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that plaintiff had been requesting the defendant to make the payment of the amount in question to the plaintiff. Vide Ex. P-10, the defendants informed the plaintiff that the matter regarding payment was under consideration of the defendants. Finally, vide Ex. P-11 dated 14.8.1986 the defendants stated that the plaintiff was not entitled to any payment and therefore cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff on 14.8.1986 and the present suit filed on 29.8.1986 is within time. 11. P-10, the defendants informed the plaintiff that the matter regarding payment was under consideration of the defendants. Finally, vide Ex. P-11 dated 14.8.1986 the defendants stated that the plaintiff was not entitled to any payment and therefore cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff on 14.8.1986 and the present suit filed on 29.8.1986 is within time. 11. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendants that Ex. P-11 is not an acknowledgment and hence the suit of the plaintiff merits dismissal being barred by time. It also merits dismissal because the last payment was made by the plaintiff in March, 1983 and that the plaintiff should have filed the suit for recovery within three years i.e. by March, 1986 and the present suit filed on 29.8.1986 is barred by time. 12. I do not find any merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the defendants. The generator set was installed and finally commissioned on 2.7.1983. Plaintiff had been requesting the defendants to make the payment and vide Ex. P-10 plaintiff was informed that the matter regarding payment was under consideration and finally vide Ex. P-11 dated 14.8.1986 plaintiff was informed that no payment was due by the defendants. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff for the first time on 14.8.1986 i.e. when the defendants finally refused to make payment of any amount. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff on 29.8.1986 is within time." 4. The aforementioned findings, however, have been reversed by the learned lower Appellate Court by placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of State of Punjab and another v. Sham Lal Gupta, 1971 PLR 166 and two judgments of Patna High Court. The observations of the lower Appellate Court in this regard read as under :- "12. The second issue relates to limitation and was framed in view of an amendment sought by the defendants. The trial Court relied upon Ex. P-11 to come to the conclusion that the request of the respondent had been rejected finally on 14.8.1986 and, therefore, the suit was within time. A perusal of the said document indicates that para 2 thereof deals with the request of the plaintiff-respondent for release of balance payment regarding which an adverse decision had been conveyed already to the plaintiff. P-11 to come to the conclusion that the request of the respondent had been rejected finally on 14.8.1986 and, therefore, the suit was within time. A perusal of the said document indicates that para 2 thereof deals with the request of the plaintiff-respondent for release of balance payment regarding which an adverse decision had been conveyed already to the plaintiff. The third paragraph requests the plaintiff for refund of a sum of Rs. 22,000/- after adjustment of balance amount of Rs. 90,000/- on account of 10% amount of the generator set. In these circumstances neither the contents of para 2 nor those of para 3 can be taken to be an acknowledgement of the liability of the appellants to pay any sum to the respondent. The mere fact that the plaintiff had received letter Ex. P-10 dated 7.12.1983 indicating that "I am to inform you that some points which need clarifications are under investigation. As soon as the matter is cleared we shall be in a position to release your payment", would be of no assistance for letters intimating that the matter is under consideration and the decision thereon would be communicated in due course do not amount to an acknowledgement within the purview of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. In this view of mine, I derive support from the law laid down in 1971(73) PLR 166 State of Punjab v. Sham Lal Gupta (supra). In view of this and in view of the fact that taken independently Ex. P-11 is merely a letter repudiating the liability, the same can, by no stretch of imagination, be held to be an acknowledgment of the liability to pay as has been held in AIR 1971 Patna 229, Baidyanath Mandal and others v. The Coal Purchase and Inspection Agency (P) Ltd. and AIR 1923 Patna 298. No other document having been brought to my notice to show how the suit which was filed on 1.9.1986 would be within limitation, the contract having been completed on 24.5.1983. The finding in relation to issue No. 1-A will have to be reversed." 5. Mr. Adish Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that the plaintiff-appellant has been insisting on the defendant-respondents for payment and has written a number of letters. He has referred to letter dated 7.12.1983 (Ex. The finding in relation to issue No. 1-A will have to be reversed." 5. Mr. Adish Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that the plaintiff-appellant has been insisting on the defendant-respondents for payment and has written a number of letters. He has referred to letter dated 7.12.1983 (Ex. P-10) addressed to the defendant-respondents which was sent by the plaintiff-appellant in reply to letter dated 25.9.1983 and a telegram dated 11.10.1983. According to the learned counsel, this letter admits the jural relations between the parties which is that of debtor and creditor. According to learned counsel, an inference can be safely drawn to the effect that the defendant-respondents had acknowledged the liability to the plaintiff-appellant, although it has sought time to release the payment. He has also drawn my attention to the column concerning subject in letter Ex. P-10 which clearly mentions purchase order with regard to generating set. In support of his submission, apart from relying on Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for brevity, the Act) and the explanation appended to the section, learned counsel has placed firm reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Assam State Co-operative Marketing & Consumer Federation Ltd. and others, (2004)12 SCC 360. Learned counsel has then pointed out that Ex. P-11 dated 14.8.1986 is the final refusal by the defendant-respondents to make the payment due to the plaintiff-appellant. According to the learned counsel, the suit was filed immediately thereafter on 1.9.1986 which has to be considered within the period of limitation of three years. 6. Despite the fact that the case was called twice, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents. The appeal is pending since 1998 and it cannot brook any further delay. Even otherwise, the issue involved is not so complicated and contentious so as to adjourn the case. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and perusing the record, I am of the considered view that the suit filed by the plaintiff- appellant was within limitation. It would be appropriate to make a reference to Section 18 of the Act which reads as under :- "18. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and perusing the record, I am of the considered view that the suit filed by the plaintiff- appellant was within limitation. It would be appropriate to make a reference to Section 18 of the Act which reads as under :- "18. Effect of acknowledgement in writing :- (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation - For the purposes of this section - (a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right, (b) the word "signed" means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, and (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right." A perusal of the aforementioned provision would show that if before the expiry of the prescribed period for a suit in respect of any property or right, there is a written acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right in writing against whom such right or property is claimed, then a fresh period of limitation is to be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Explanation (a) appended to the section further shows that such an acknowledgment would be regarded as sufficient, though it may omit to specify the exact nature of the property or right or such an acknowledgment may assert that the time for payment was not ripe or it is accompanied by refusal to pay. According to the explanation, it is further clear that such an acknowledgment may be coupled with a claim to set off. The acknowledgment might be signed personally or by an agent. The aforementioned provision came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) on which firm reliance has been placed by the plaintiff-appellant. Holding that in such cases of acknowledgment a liberal construction is required to be adopted, learned Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti in para 15 has observed as under :- "15. The statement providing foundation for a plea of acknowledgment must relate to a present subsisting liability, though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. The words used in the acknowledgment must indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor. The intention to attempt such jural relationship must be apparent. However, such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and need not be expressed in words. A clear statement containing acknowledgment of liability can imply the intention to admit jural relationship of debtor and creditor. Though oral evidence in lieu of or making a departure from the statement sought to be relied on as acknowledgment is excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. Courts generally lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though an acknowledgment shall not be inferred where there is no admission so as to fasten liability on maker of the statement by an involved or far-fetched process of reasoning. [See Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria, [AIR 1961 SC 1236] and Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluminium Corpn. of India Ltd. (1971) SCC 67]. [See Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria, [AIR 1961 SC 1236] and Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluminium Corpn. of India Ltd. (1971) SCC 67]. So long as the statement amounts to an admission, acknowledging the jural relationship and existence of liability, it is immaterial that the admission is accompanied by an assertion that nothing would be found due from the person making the admission or that on an account being taken something may be found due and payable to the person making the acknowledgment by the person to whom the statement is made." 8. If the aforementioned provisions are applied to the facts of the present case, it is evident that there was acknowledgment of liability in letter dated 7.12.1983 (Ex. P-10). It would be appropriate to reproduce the contents of aforementioned letter signed by the Chief Engineer on behalf of the Managing Director of the Corporation and the same read as under :- "No. TA-I-83/8237 Dated :- 7.12.83 M/s. Vijay Tractors Corporation, Vijay Bhawan, Vijay Nagar, Bijnor-246701. SUBJECT : PURCHASE