JUDGMENT The facts in these two appeals are substantially similar and the question that falls for consideration is also common. Therefore these two appeals are clubbed and heard together and they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. State of Andhra Pradesh and its officers who are defendants in the suits O.S. Nos.51/1994 and 69/93, filed these appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgments and decrees dt. 29-1 0-1999 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda in decreeing the suits of the plaintiff/s filed for recovery of compensation for the land taken by the defendants with interest. 3. The relevant facts, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of these appeals lie in a narrow compass. 4. The first defendant issued Notification on 21-6-1969 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the act") proposing to acquire Ac.8-38 guntas in S.Nos.820, 821,825 and471 for the purpose of construction of Camp division of Nagarjuna Sagar canals at Mattampalli village. Out of it the father of the plaintiff in OS No.51/94 owns Ac.4-13 guntas. By invoking urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with enabling the Land Acquisition Officer to take possession of the acquired property and accordingly on issuance of draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act and got published the same in the District Gezette on 23-8-1996 possession was taken. Thereafter award enquiry was commenced under Section 9 of the Act on 4-2-1970 by the third defendant. The father of the plaintiff in O.S. No.51/94 appeared and requested to allot land in lieu of compensation. Since neither the alternate land was given nor compensation was paid, he requested the authorities to return his land. In the meantime when the purpose of acquisition is over Government vacated certain land. The father of the plaintiff in O.S. No.51/94 filed W.P No.7820/86 for issuing appropriate direction to the Land Acquisition Officer for passing an award, which was disposed of by order, Ex.A-1, by this Court on 2-6-1987, directing the Land Acquisition Officer to finalize the award proceedings within two months from the date of the order. The father of the plaintiff in O.S. No.51/94 filed W.P No.7820/86 for issuing appropriate direction to the Land Acquisition Officer for passing an award, which was disposed of by order, Ex.A-1, by this Court on 2-6-1987, directing the Land Acquisition Officer to finalize the award proceedings within two months from the date of the order. The fact remains that no such award was passed, but the authorities requested the father of the plaintiff to take back the land instead of compensation, for which he gave consent, Thereafter on the directions of the second respondent. Mandal Revenue Officer, Mattampally returned AC.2-28 guntas of land out of AcA-13 guntas by duly recording the proceedings under a cover of panchanama Ex-A-2 dt. 3-5-1988. Similarly, through the very same notification, an extent of AC.1-23 guntas in S.No.825 belonging to the first plaintiff and AC.2-13 guntas in S.No. 821 belonging to the second plaintiff in OS No.69/93 was proposed to acquire for the same purpose as mentioned supra. They also requested to allot alternate land in lieu of compensation. As their efforts either to get alternate land or to receive compensation failed they filed W.P. No. 13572/87 before this Court, which was disposed of by its order dt. 6-12-1988. EX.A-3 directing the respondents there in to return the acquired land to the plaintiff after initiating the withdrawal proceedings under Section 48 of the Act within 8 weeks from the date of order, On failing to implement the said order by the defendants, the plaintiffs filed CC No.598/89. On filing said contempt case, the Mandal Revenue officer Mattampalli returned Ac.O-20 guntas in S.No.821/B and AC.O-22 guntas in S.No.821/C to plaintiff NO.1 by keeping balance extent of Ac.1-11 guntas, and Ac.O-35 guntas in S.No.825/D and AC.0-09 guntas in S, No.825/F to plaintiff No.2 by keeping the balance extent of AC.0-19 with them and under a cover of Panch an am a dt. 17-7-1992, EX.A-2. In the site retained by the defendants, MDO, MRO and other offices have already been constructed. In view of the same, they filed the suits seeking compensation/damages @ Rs.5,000/- per gunta, and other benefits as provided under the Act, from the defendants as they were deprived of the land belonging to them, which was taken possession, without following due process of law. 5. In view of the same, they filed the suits seeking compensation/damages @ Rs.5,000/- per gunta, and other benefits as provided under the Act, from the defendants as they were deprived of the land belonging to them, which was taken possession, without following due process of law. 5. The appellants- defendants in O.S. No.51/94 while resisting the claim of the plaintiff admitted the fact of acquisition and taking possession of the acquired land. They further contended that they already assigned alternate land to the plaintiffs father in O.S. No. 51/94 to an extent of AC.2-28 guntas in S,No.332 in the year 1973 in exchange of the land proposed for acquisition, which is in his possession and thereafter, the plaintiff was in possession of the said property. Apart from the same, they returned Ac.2-28 guntas of vacant land which was covered by the notification. Thus, the plaintiff has been in possession of land admeasuring Ac. 4-56 guntas, which is more than the land acquired (Ac. 4-13 guntas) from the plaintiff, therefore question of payment of compensation by way of damages, for the land retained by them, does not arise. Similarly, plaintiffs in O.S. No. 69/93 were handed over vacant land available out of the acquired land to an extent of Ac. 1-02 guntas and AC.1-04 guntas out of Ac.2-20 guntas and the fathers of the plaintiffs were assigned AC.2-20 guntas each in the year 1973 apart from handing over of vacant land from the total extent of land acquired by them. Thus, the plaintiffs have been in possession of the land i.e., Ac. 3-22 and Ac. 3-24 guntas respectively, which is more than the land acquired. 6. On the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the identical issues for trial which read thus. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim the damages of the suit land as prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim statutory benefits, which are available under the Land Acquisition Act from the date of dispossession of the suit lands? 3. To what relief. 7. In order to prove the claim in O.S. No.51/94, the plaintiff himself examined as P.W.1. He got examined three persons who purchased sites near and around the land retained by the Government as P.Ws.2 to 4. 3. To what relief. 7. In order to prove the claim in O.S. No.51/94, the plaintiff himself examined as P.W.1. He got examined three persons who purchased sites near and around the land retained by the Government as P.Ws.2 to 4. An ex-employee of Survey and Land records who prepared EX.X-1 map showing the location of the land retained by the Government where MRO and MDO offices situate. Exs.A-1 to A-7 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff. Mandal Revenue Officer, Mattampalli was examined as D.W.1 in both the suits. Apart from· him, the Sub-Registrar of Huzurnager was examined to produce basic value registers as C.W.1 in both the suits. Through him, Exs.C-1 and C-2were marked in both the suits. Exs.A-1 to A-7 were marked on behalf of the plaintiffs in as No. 69/93. Exs.B-1 to B-9 and EX.X-1 were marked on behalf of the defendants in as NO.51/94. Exs.B-1 to B-7 and Exs. X-1 to X-3 were marked on behalf of the defendants in O.S. No. 69/93. 8. The trial Court after analyzing the oral and documentary evidence adduced before it decreed the suits fixing the market value @ Rs.3,000/- pergunta for the balance extent of land which was not handed over possession out of land acquired, and ascertained the damages, after deducting 30% towards developmental charges payable to the plaintiff/ s with interest. Hence, these appeals by the defendants. 9. Learned government Pleader for appeals makes two fold submissions. It was firstly urged that the suits· as such filed are not maintainable since the Land Acquisition Act is a self contained code and rights and liabilities, if any arising out of acquisition proceedings, have to be resolved as per the said Act and since the land was acquired by initiating land acquisition proceedings any right to claim compensation should be under the said Act, which provides initiation of land acquisition proceedings, holding of enquiry, determination of the compensation payable by the Government and if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation, the Act vests power in the Collector to refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. For the said proposition, he relied upon the following Judgments. 1. D. Gopala Kishan Rao v. District Collector, Adilabad1. 2. State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao.2 3. Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukum Singh3. 4. For the said proposition, he relied upon the following Judgments. 1. D. Gopala Kishan Rao v. District Collector, Adilabad1. 2. State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao.2 3. Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukum Singh3. 4. State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar.4 It was nextly urged that when the owners of the land were assigned land in lieu of compensation, they are not entitled to any further compensation/damages as claimed. In spite of voluminous evidence produced evidencing assignment in favour of the father of the plaintiff/s by way of compensation, the lower Court brushed aside the said evidence and proceeded to determine the compensation, which is not based on the evidence, therefore the same is liable to be set-aside and the plaintiffs have to work out their remedies as are avaliable under the Act. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents plaintiffs while sustaining the judgments under appeals contended that in the absence of any plea of maintainability of suits and issue framed in that regard nor raising any additional ground, defendants cannot, first time, take plea of maintainability of suit. In the absence of any express bar or implied bar of ousting jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those which are expressly or impliedly barred. Once defendants have acquired the land by initiating acquisition proceedings under the Act and on their failure to pass award within two years, proceedings will become lapse under Section 11-A of the Act. Further when the High Court in W.P. No.1357/87 directed the defendants to return their land after initiating land acquisition proceedings under Section 48 within 8 weeks and made it clear that if the withdrawal proposals are not initiated within the above stipulated time, Section 4(1) notification shall be deemed to have been quashed and consequently the land will have to be redelivered back to the petitioners. Once proceedings are quashed, possession of the defendants becomes illegal, and unauthorized, therefore, Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suits. 11. In view of the submissions made on either side, the points that emerge for consideration in these appeals are: 1. Whether the suit for compensation/damages for taking the plaintiff/s property without following due process of law under Land Acquisition Act is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiff/s or their predecessors-in-title was/were assigned alternate land in lieu of compensation payable? 11. In view of the submissions made on either side, the points that emerge for consideration in these appeals are: 1. Whether the suit for compensation/damages for taking the plaintiff/s property without following due process of law under Land Acquisition Act is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiff/s or their predecessors-in-title was/were assigned alternate land in lieu of compensation payable? If so, they are not entitled to compensation/damages? 12. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction on Courts to try all civil suits unless barred, which reads as under: 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a Civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 13. It is appropriate to consider the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the light of the three decisions, right from Privy Council to Supreme Court namely, (1) Secretary of State v. Mask and Co.5 Firm Radha Krishan v. Ludiana Municipality and Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.7 14. The facts in the case of Privy Council i.e., Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.5 are that the suit filed for recovery of excess amount collected from the plaintiff by levying duty on a tariff value was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore holding that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and on appeal High Court of Judicature at Madras allowed the appeal. On further appeal, Privy Council upon considering Sections 188 and 191 of Sea Customs Act, 1878 held that it is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well established that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It was further held that by Ss. It is also well established that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It was further held that by Ss. 188 and 191 a precise and self contained code of appeal is provided in regard to obligations which are created by the statute itself, and it enables the appeal to be carried to the supreme head of the executive government and where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it, the party must adopt the form of remedy given by statute and allowed the appeal setting the judgment of the High Court and restored the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. 15. Justice K. Subba Rao (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in a leading case in Firm Radha Kishan (6 supra) considering Section 9 of CPC held that a suit in a Civil Court will always lie to question the arbitrary action where State or its officers abuses its power under statute. Or does not act under the Act but in violation of provisions and deprive the citizen of their property. (emphasis is of mine). 16. In the classic decision of Dhulabhai (7 supra) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court after considering a number of cases, summarized the principles relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) XXXXX. (4) XXXXX. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies. (6) XXXX. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. 17. It is well settled that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to establish his contention. It is Enquiry well settled that a statute ousting,-the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be strictly construed. Where such a contention is raised, it has to be determined in the light of the words used in the statute, the scheme of the relevant provisions, the object and purpose of the enactment etc. In case of doubt as to the jurisdiction, the court should lean towards· assumption of jurisdiction. Where statutory enactments only create rights or liabilities without providing forums for remedies, any person having a grievance that he has been wronged or his right is being affected, can approach a Civil Court on the principle of law that wherever there is a right, there is a remedy (Ubi jus ibi remedium). Where statutory enactments only create rights or liabilities without providing forums for remedies, any person having a grievance that he has been wronged or his right is being affected, can approach a Civil Court on the principle of law that wherever there is a right, there is a remedy (Ubi jus ibi remedium). In Raja Ram v. Union of India8 the Supreme Court stated as under: "Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognized by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided without expressly excluding the Civil Courts jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an. element of election to the persons of inherence," 18. It is not in dispute on issuing notification under Section 4(1) of the Act proposing to acquire the land and on publishing Section 6 declaration, the Land Acquisition Officer can take possession of the property and on such taking possession the land absolutely vests in the State. A right of the citizen, if any, is only to participate in the award enquiry on issuance of notice under Section 9 and put forward his claim. Thereafter on conducting enquiry into the said claim made by the land owner, the Collector can proceed with the award enquiry and pass award under Section 11. Section 11-A envisages passing an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition shall lapse. On passing such award and on giving intimation of the same to such persons interested under sub-section (2) of Sec.12 as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made, award is final and conclusive between the Collector and persons interested in law. On passing such award and on giving intimation of the same to such persons interested under sub-section (2) of Sec.12 as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made, award is final and conclusive between the Collector and persons interested in law. If any person who has not accepted/ satisfied with the award may make an application within six weeks or two months from the date of award under Section 18 seeking reference, if present or from the date of service of notice under Section 12(2) as the case may be. On such reference, it is for the Civil Court to decide the compensation payable to the land owner. In case there is dispute with regard to the title of the property acquired or there are rival claims, Collector can deposit the amount with the Civil Court and refer such dispute under Section 30 for the decision of the Court. 19.1t is appropriate to notice Sec. 52 of the Act to decide the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit, which reads as under. 52. Notice in case of suits for anything done in pursuance of Act: No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced or prosecuted against any person for anything done in pursuance of this Act, without giving to such person a months previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding, and of the cause thereof, nor after tender of sufficient amends. 20. A plain reading of the above Section makes it crystal clear that no suit or other proceeding shall be commenced or prosecuted against any person for anything done in pursuance of the Act without giving one month previous notice in writing of the intended proceedings and of the cause thereof. In other words, it recognizes right citizen to move Civil Court against wrongdoer by giving prior notice of intended action. 21. Admittedly, the suits are not filed questioning the acquisition proceedings, on making award, for apportionment of the compensation between the plaintiffs and any other person interested. In other words, it recognizes right citizen to move Civil Court against wrongdoer by giving prior notice of intended action. 21. Admittedly, the suits are not filed questioning the acquisition proceedings, on making award, for apportionment of the compensation between the plaintiffs and any other person interested. Pleadings and the evidence let in by the parties clearly indicate that provisions of the Act have not been complied with by the defendants and they in utter disregard to the provisions of the Act deprived the plaintiffs of their property, by taking possession on issuing notification and declaration under the Act without payment of compensation for the lands acquired and passing of award. 22. In the present case, the plaintiffs are not questioning the award passed nor questioning the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the ACT nor taking possession of the property, as such. In view of the same, the reliance placed by the learned Government pleader on the judgment of this Court in D. Gopala Kishan Rao (1 supra) is misplaced to the facts of the present case. In the said case pending acquisition proceedings suits were filed to declare them as absolute owners and they are entitled to receive total compensation in the event of passing of an award by the Land Acquisition Officer. Since the Land Acquisition Officer is authorized to determine the rights of the parties including right to receive compensation, remedy available to the persons who are claiming compensation is only to participate in the award enquiry and if they are not satisfied with the determination of rights, the remedy is provided under Section 30 or 18 as the case may be. This Court allowed the writ petitions holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court bars to take such enquiry, namely, determination of the rights of the parties and to receive compensation. 23. The judgments in Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (2 supra) and Dhruv Green Field Ltd. (3 supra) are decided on a different context. In the case of Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao the Supreme Court specifically observed that where the prescribed authority or tribunal under statute does not comply with the provisions of the relevant statute or does not act in conformity with the basic rules of judicial procedure, the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be excluded. In the case of Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao the Supreme Court specifically observed that where the prescribed authority or tribunal under statute does not comply with the provisions of the relevant statute or does not act in conformity with the basic rules of judicial procedure, the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be excluded. The Supreme Court in the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. (3 supra) while considering the provisions of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 held that the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred in respect of the matter decided by the Assistant collector, but also observed that where there s no express bar, but statutory provisions imply exclusion of jurisdiction, exclusion still cannot be inferred unless the statute also provides an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy. In the instant case, when the Land Acquisition Officer took possession of the property no award as such is passed in spite of plaintiffs obtaining a rule form this court to pass such an award the provisions of Act have not been complied with, namely, passing an award and dertmination of compensation. Had been the Land Acquisition Officer determined compensation by passing award, the remedy of the plaintiff is to seek reference under Section 18 for enhancement of compensation, for the land which they have been deprived of by invoking the provisions of the Act. Once the Land Acquisition Officer failed to pass award, there is no other remedy for the plaintiff/s except to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as they were unlawfully deprived of their property. More so, Sec.52 also recognizes the right of the land owner to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by issuing one month prior notice of intended action. In view of the same, it is difficult to accede to the submission of the learned Government pleader that Civil Court will not have Jurisdiction to entertain the suits and it is accordingly rejected. 24. It was nextly argued that in view of assignment of land in lieu of compensation, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any compensation, qua damages for the part of the land as referred to above. 24. It was nextly argued that in view of assignment of land in lieu of compensation, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any compensation, qua damages for the part of the land as referred to above. There is incongruity of the pleadings and evidence let in by the defendants that sufficient lands were assigned to them, namely when the plaintiff/s filed WPs in the High Court no such plea was taken that petitioner/s or their predecessors in-title were assigned alternate land in lieu of compensation and award has not been passed to the said effect. But in the written statement, they have taken plea that alternate land was given to the father of the plaintiff in OS No.51/94 Had there been any agreement that plaintiffs father agreed to receive alternate land in lieu of compensation, defendants will necessarily obtain a consent letter or pass award to the said effect. D.W.1 admitted that they have not filed any proceedings to show that land was given as an alternate land and no such record is available and that they have not paid damages for the land used by them to the 3 plaintiff. Even assuming the defendants plea is accepted that plaintiffs were assigned alternate land, when admittedly in 1970, they have not re-delivered possession of the property which was not required for the purpose for which it was taken before 1998. Only after writ petitions are disposed of, there was an offer to re-deliver the property which was not utilized after retaining the portion of the land where office buildings have come up, and in 1998 under a panchanama lands were delivered. If that be the case, there was no proposal for the plaintiff/s to accept the alternate land in the year 1970 as pleaded by the defendants nor there is any possibility their accepting said proposal. Further when alternate land was assigned in lieu of compensation, necessity of re-delivery of the property, which was not required for the purpose, which it was acquired, will not arise and the same had not been properly explained. When admittedly more extent of land was acquired under notification, which was in possession of the defendants, no prudent person will accept lesser area towards compensation. When admittedly more extent of land was acquired under notification, which was in possession of the defendants, no prudent person will accept lesser area towards compensation. In the absence of any evidence let in by the defendants that alternate land was assigned in favour of the plaintiff/s or predecessors-in-title, the submission of the learned Government Pleader that alternate land was given to the plaintiff/s in lieu of compensation and suits, as such filed claming compensation/damages are not maintainable, cannot be accepted and it is accordingly rejected. 25. Except the above submission the Government Pleader has not advanced any arguments as to the manner in which determination of compensation/damages asked for deprivation of the property by the plaintiffs, Admittedly cause of action for claiming damages arises only in the year 1998 when the defendants retained a part of the land which was covered by office buildings and returned the un-utilised land. Damages, if any, have to be ascertained for the lands retained by the defendants as on the date as they have expressed their inability to redeliver the entire property. Exs.A-4 to A-7 clearly disclose that the property was sold 5, 6 months after re-delivery of the property at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per gunta but the lower Court basing on the location of the property. Where MDO and MRO offices situate, surrounded by roads, bus-stand, police station and residential school etc., fixed the market value at Rs. 3,000/- per gunta and ascertained the damages, after deducting 25% towards developmental charges payable to the plaintiff/s. In view of the same, no infirmity is discernible to the finding arrived at by the trial Court in fixing the damages. 26. The appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs.