J U D G M E N T Though served, respondents did not put in appearance. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. Father of the revision petitioner obtained a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the respondents for removing the ridge and from excavating a channel. Alleging that in violation of the said decree, respondents excavated a channel and removed the ridge, revision petitioners filed E.P.No-24 of 2002 seeking a direction to the respondents to restore the removed ridge and to close the channel and for arrest the respondents for violation of the decree passed against them. Respondents filed a counter inter alia contending that the E.P. is barred by time. Holding that the remedy of the revision petitioners is to file a separate suit for mandatory injunction, but not an E.P. for restoration of the status quo ante, while negativing the contention of the respondents that the E.P. is barred by time, the executing Court dismissed the E.P. Hence this revision. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that in view of Rule 32(5) of Order 21 of CPC, the executing court has power to order restoration of status quo ante in a decree for perpetual injunction also and contended that in any event the court below was in error in not considering the question whether there is violation of the decree of injunction passed against them and if they are liable to be arrested or not, when the first revision petitioner filed his affidavit swearing to the fact about the violation of decree of injunction passed by the court. 5. 5. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of Rule 32(5) of Order 21 CPC, the court has power to order restoration of status quo ante, in execution of a decree for perpetual injunction because of division bench of this court in EVURU VENKATA SUBBAYYA v. SRISHTI VEERAYYA AND OTHERS(1) held that in view of the language employed in Sub Rule 5 of Rule 32 of Order 21 C.P.C. it applies only to decrees for mandatory injunction, as the word “injunction” therein is qualified by the words “has not been obeyed” and since the said rule lays down that in the event of disobedience of the injunction the Court may direct ‘the act required to be done may be done’ so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, which can apply only to a mandatory direction and since a prohibitory injunction would be not to do an act and since a mandatory injunction is a command to do a positive act and since a prohibitory injunction is a negative one”. 6. Since the decree obtained by the father of the revision petitioner is a decree of prohibitory injunction but not a mandatory injunction, the executing court dismissing the prayer for restoration of status quo ante in view of the ratio in the above decision of the division bench needs no interference. 7. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that the executing court was .in error in not considering the prayer for arrest of the respondents for violation of the decree of perpetual injunction. The court belowwhile rightly overruling the objection of the respondents that the E.P. is barred by time, in view of article 136 of the Limitation Act an application for enforcement of a decree granting perpetual injunction shall not be subjected to any period of limitation should have considered the question whether respondents violated the decree passed against them or not and disposed of the E.P. on merits. Since it failed to do so I remit the case to the executing court for considering the question whether respondents violated the decree of injunction passed against them or not by affording an opportunity to adduce evidence to both parties. The civil revision petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. --X—