Judgment B. R. GAVAI, J. ( 1 ) RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. Shri Barve, the learned counsel, waives notice on behalf of the respondent. By consent, heard finally. ( 2 ) THE present petition is directed against the communication addressed by the respondent, thereby cancelling the Long Term Group Janata Personal accident Policy, issued in favour of the officers and employees of the petitioner no. 1 herein and further seeks a declaration that the respondent is bound with the commitment to keep the policy alive for a period of 10 years, as per the memorandum of Understanding dated 14th September, 1999. ( 3 ) THE facts in brief giving rise to the filing of the present petition, are as under : the petitioner No. 1 is the Government of India Undertaking wherein more than 61,000 workers and about 2,500 officers are employed. The petitioner nos. 2 to 7 are the various Unions of the workers and officers working with the petitioner No. 1. The respondent herein is a Government of India Undertaking and engaged in the business of general insurance. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the petitioners herein that one lady employee of the petitioner No. 1 met with an accident in or about January, 1999. It is the submission of the petitioners that after the said accident, the representative of the respondent approached the petitioner No. 1 and submitted a proposal for insuring the employees of the petitioner No. 1 under Group Janata Personal Accident insurance Policy (hereinafter referred to as the JPA Policy ). It is further the contention of the petitioners that it was represented that the JPA Policy can cover the risk for the period ranging from 1 year to 15 years. It is further the case of the petitioners that after prolonged negotiations of the petitioners with the respondent and taking into consideration the social security measures and the interest of the employees, the petitioner No. 1 agreed to insure initially 2,500 officers of the petitioner No. 1. In the negotiations, it was agreed that the Policy would cover the risk for a period of 10 years. The petitioner No. 1, accordingly, paid the premium to the respondent @ Rs. 8187- per executive on 10-3-1999. The petitioner thereafter deducted the said amount of premium from the salaries of the said executives. In the negotiations, it was agreed that the Policy would cover the risk for a period of 10 years. The petitioner No. 1, accordingly, paid the premium to the respondent @ Rs. 8187- per executive on 10-3-1999. The petitioner thereafter deducted the said amount of premium from the salaries of the said executives. ( 5 ) IT is the contention of the petitioners that the representatives of the respondent thereafter time and again met the officers of the petitioner No. 1 so as to persuade them to cover non-executive employees also under the JPA Policy. It is further the contention of the petitioners that for that purpose, the representatives of the respondent visited various Area Officers within the jurisdiction of the petitioner No. 1 and also met the representatives of various unions so as to persuade them to come under the purview of the said JPA Policy. It is further the contention of the petitioners that the respondent submitted a comparative statement to the petitioner No. 1 pointing out therein that the proposal given by the respondent is comparatively much better than the proposal given by the other Insurance Companies. ( 6 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that after prolonged negotiations, it was agreed that the coverage of the said JPA Policy would also be extended to all the employees of the petitioner No. 1. On 14th September, 1999, the terms and conditions agreed between the parties i. e. the petitioner Nos. 1 to 6 and the respondent, were reduced into Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as the MOU) which was signed by the petitioner Nos. 1 to 6 and the respondent. It is the case of the petitioners that in the said MOU, it was specifically agreed that the coverage of the said JPA Policy will be for a period of ten years commencing from 15-3-1999 and it was agreed that one time premium would be charged for the employees @ Rs. 403/- and for the spouse @ rs. 81/. It was agreed in the said MOU that since the premium was fixed at rs. 403/- and since initially, the premium recovered from the officer was @ rs. 818/-, the balance of the premium received in excess was to be refunded to the said officers. Accordingly, on 14-9-1999, the petitioner No. 1 paid an amount of Rs. 81/. It was agreed in the said MOU that since the premium was fixed at rs. 403/- and since initially, the premium recovered from the officer was @ rs. 818/-, the balance of the premium received in excess was to be refunded to the said officers. Accordingly, on 14-9-1999, the petitioner No. 1 paid an amount of Rs. 2,90,99,714/- to the respondent towards the premium for 61,163 non- executive employees of the petitioner No. 1. It is, thus, the case of the petitioners that total amount of Rs. 3,11,44,714/- was paid to the respondent. ( 7 ) THE Branch Manager of the respondent sent communication dated 16th august, 2002 to the petitioner No. 1, thereby proposing to cancel the said JPA policy and to refund the premium of the amount subject to the condition as contained in the Policy. Vide communication dated 19th August, 2002, the petitioner No. 1 pointed out to the respondent that the risk of the employees of the petitioner No. 1 was covered as per the MOU dated 14-9-1999. It was the contention of the petitioner No. 1 that no Policy was issued by the respondent. It was, therefore, pointed out by the petitioner No. 1, in the said communication, that since the coverage of the said JPA Policy was for a fixed period of 10 years, same could not be cancelled prior to expiry of the said period of 10 years. However, without taking into consideration the said communication, the respondent cancelled the JPA Policy with effect from 15-9-2002 vide communication dated 29th August, 2002. Vide another communication dated 4th september, 2002, the respondent informed the petitioner No. 1 that in terms of condition No. 5 of the Terms and Conditions of the Policy, the respondent was entitled to cancel the JPA Policy and as such the said JPA Policy was rightly cancelled. Being aggrieved by the cancellation of the said policy vide communication dated 29th August, 2002, the petitioners have approached this court by way of present petition. ( 8 ) HEARD Shri Mehadia, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Shri m. G. Barve with Shri A. J. Pophali, the learned counsel for the respondent. Being aggrieved by the cancellation of the said policy vide communication dated 29th August, 2002, the petitioners have approached this court by way of present petition. ( 8 ) HEARD Shri Mehadia, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Shri m. G. Barve with Shri A. J. Pophali, the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 9 ) SHRI Mehadia, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the respondent herein, after one of its employees met with an accident in the month of January, 1999, had approached the petitioner No. 1 to cover the accident risk of its executives and employees under the said JPA Policy. He further submitted that initially, on 10th March, 1999, it was agreed that the risk of accident of its executive shall be covered under the said JPA Policy. He further submitted that thereafter the respondent addressed various communications to the petitioners thereby representing that the proposal given by the respondent Company for covering the risk of its employees was the most advantageous one. He further submitted that not only this, but the senior officers of the respondent held discussions with the representatives of the various Unions and explained them the scheme in detail and persuaded them to accept the scheme for coverage of all employees working in W. C. L. He submitted that the respondent on more than one occasions, represented to the petitioners, that the said JPA Policy would cover the risk for a period of 10 years from 15-3-1999 to 14-3-2009. He submitted that it was also represented that the said JPA Policy was much more advantageous as compared to the Personal Accident Policy and, therefore, the employees of the petitioner No. 1 should accept the said JPA Policy. He further submitted that not only this, but the officers of the respondent extensively toured all the areas of W. C. L. in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh so as to convince the officers and the employees in those areas to accept the JPA Policy. He further submitted that not only this, but the officers of the respondent extensively toured all the areas of W. C. L. in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh so as to convince the officers and the employees in those areas to accept the JPA Policy. He further submitted that the General Manager and the Regional Manager of the respondent and the top executives of General Insurance Company had a meeting with the manager of the petitioner No. 1 and Steering Committee Members for giving correct picture of JPA Policy as proposed for W. C. L. He further submitted that on all occasions, it was specifically represented that the coverage of the Policy would be for a period of ten years. He submitted that after a prolonged persuasion by the respondent and detailed negotiations, MOU dated 14th september, 1999, was arrived at between the petitioners Nos. 1 to 6 and the respondent. He submitted that as per the terms and conditions under the said mou, in addition to covering the risk of the employees of the petitioner No. 1 for an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- towards accident, the respondent had also agreed to cover the risk of spouses of the employees for an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/ -. It was also agreed that one time premium of Rs. 403/- per employee was to be charged and for spouses an additional premium of an amount of Rs. 81/- was to be charged. He submitted that the employees and their spouses were to be covered automatically under the said scheme, whose premium had been deducted and deposited by Management to the Insurance Company and the persons concerned were entitled to receive the amount on the basis of the certificate issued by the W. C. L. authority even without the Certificate being issued by the insurance Company. He further submitted that as per clause 13 of the MOU, though it was decided that the periodical review of the Scheme can be made between the officials of the respondent and the Union/management representatives of the W. C. L. However, it was agreed that there shall be no change/review of the period and the amount insured. He further submitted that as per clause 13 of the MOU, though it was decided that the periodical review of the Scheme can be made between the officials of the respondent and the Union/management representatives of the W. C. L. However, it was agreed that there shall be no change/review of the period and the amount insured. ( 10 ) SHRI Mehadia, therefore, submitted that the respondent had on umpteen number of occasions, represented to the petitioners that the coverage of the JPA policy shall be for a fixed period of 10 years and in no case, the said period shall be changed. He further submitted that acting on that representation, the petitioners had accepted the said JPA Policy and paid the premium. He, therefore, submitted that it was not permissible for the respondent to resile from the said promise and arbitrarily cancel the said JPA Policy prior to the expiry of the period of 10 years. ( 11 ) SHRI Mehadia relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of m/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in AIR 7979 SC 621. To counter the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the dispute between the parties arises out of the contractual matters and as such, this Court should not exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, he submitted that since the respondent is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of india, even in contractual matters, it is required to act fairly and reasonably and if its actions are arbitrary or unreasonable, then this Court would not be precluded from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this submission, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ABL International Ltd. and anr. vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and ors. reported in JT 2003 (10) SC 300. ( 12 ) SHRI Barve, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the petition. He submitted that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondent arises out of purely contractual matter. vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and ors. reported in JT 2003 (10) SC 300. ( 12 ) SHRI Barve, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the petition. He submitted that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondent arises out of purely contractual matter. He submitted that the respondent, in terms of the condition No. 5 of the Terms and Conditions of the Policy, has an unequivocal right to cancel the Policy for any reason. He submitted that the respondent, exercising the right available to it under Condition No. 5, has cancelled the JPA policy. He, therefore, submitted that since the respondent has exercised right available to it, the remedy, if any, available to the petitioners is under the ordinary law and not under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 13 ) ON merits, Shri Barve submitted that section 64vb (3) of the Insurance act, 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) provides that any refund of premium which may become due to the Insured on account of cancellation of policy, shall be paid by the Insurer directly to the Insured by cross cheque or pay order or by Postal Money Order and the proper receipt shall be obtained by the insurer from the Insured. He, therefore, submitted that the statute itself permits the remainder of the premium to be refunded for the remaining period of the policy on pro-rata basis. He, therefore, submitted that if the statute permits the cancellation and when the respondent is willing to pay the said amount as required under section 64 VB (3) of the said Act, no fault could be found with the action of the respondent. He submitted that as a matter of fact, the respondent, vide communication dated 29th August, 2002, has itself offered to refund the premium on pro-rata basis, for the residual period and hence the respondent has complied with the requirement of law. ( 14 ) SHRI Barve further submitted that clause 13 of MOU is not in conflict with the Condition No. 5 of the terms and conditions of the JPA Policy. He submitted that the MOU provides that the period of JPA Policy shall not be reduced. ( 14 ) SHRI Barve further submitted that clause 13 of MOU is not in conflict with the Condition No. 5 of the terms and conditions of the JPA Policy. He submitted that the MOU provides that the period of JPA Policy shall not be reduced. He, however, submitted that it is nowhere provided in the MOU that the policy cannot be cancelled. He, therefore, submitted that since the right to cancel the Policy, which is available under Condition No. 5, has not been specifically taken away in MOU, the respondent will have to be deemed to have reserved their right to cancel the Policy. He further submitted that the cancellation of policy and reduction of period of policy are two different terms having different connotations. He submitted that by the impugned communication, the respondent has not reduced the period of Policy, but cancelled it and, therefore, no fault could be found with the action of the respondent as it is in accordance with the condition No. 5. He further submitted that the MOU, at the most, could be termed as a proposal and not the terms and conditions of the JPA Policy and as such, even if there is something in the MOU, it shall not have any effect if it is inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the JPA Policy. He submitted that even from the endorsement dated 14th September, 1999, it is clear that what has been extended to the employees of the petitioner No. 1 and their spouses is the coverage under the said JPA Policy. He submitted that even though there is a mention in the said endorsement to the MOU dated 14-9-1999, the said MOU will have to be construed as a proposal and not what is granted under the policy. ( 15 ) SHRI Barve, the learned counsel, also attacked the conduct of the petitioners. He submitted that the employees of the petitioner No. 1 have all the while enjoyed the benefits under the terms and conditions under the said JPA policy and only after the cancellation, it is said that the petitioners are not bound by the terms and conditions of the JPA Policy. He submitted that on no occasion, the petitioners have raised a question regarding the applicability of the conditions of the said MOU. He submitted that on no occasion, the petitioners have raised a question regarding the applicability of the conditions of the said MOU. Only after the cancellation of the said JPA Policy, a reliance is sought to be placed on the said MOU. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioners, who are changing their stands, are not entitled to equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 16 ) SHRI Barve further submitted that there is no question of any promise being made by the respondent to the petitioners and as such the principle of promissory estoppel is not applicable to the facts of the present case. He further submitted that the cancellation of the JPA Policy in question is on the basis of the policy decision taken by the respondent to cancel all Long Term JPA Policies for sum assured above Rs. 1,000,000/- and which were issued prior to May, 1999. He further submitted that in pursuance to the said policy decision, the JPA Policy issued to Credit to Credit Co-operative Society of the employees of Nagpur regional Office of the respondent has also been cancelled. He, therefore, submitted that since the cancellation of the JPA Policy is on the basis of the policy decision taken on all India level, there was no scope for interference by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 17 ) SHRI Barve, the learned counsel for the respondent, relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. , amritsar vs. The Hariford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1288 , unreported judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of pune District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, Writ Petition No. 1399 of 2002, and the order of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yavatmal District Central Co-operative Bank and others vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , Writ Petition No. 3715 of 2002. ( 18 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, we will first dealt with the question regarding the tenability of the present petition on the ground of non- exercise of alternate remedy. Ltd. , Writ Petition No. 3715 of 2002. ( 18 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, we will first dealt with the question regarding the tenability of the present petition on the ground of non- exercise of alternate remedy. ( 19 ) IT is not in dispute that the respondent is a Government of India undertaking and as such a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of India. The factual position is also not disputed by the parties to the present petition. It is also not necessary to record any evidence for determining the issues between the parties. ( 20 ) IN the case of ABL International Ltd. (cited supra) the appellant before the Apex Court, had approached the respondent Corporation to cover the risk arising out of the export of Tea made by the appellant as per the assigned contract so as to insure the risk of payment of consideration that was involved in the said contract of export. After considerable correspondence between the parties, the respondent No. 1 therein, had issued a comprehensive risk policy effective from 23rd September, 1993 to 30th September, 1995. The Kazakhstan government, as required under the contract, also gave an irrevocable guarantee that in the event the Corporation, for any reason whatsoever, was unable to meet its obligation of payment due under the contract, said Government would make payment to the exporter in US Dollars. Initially, the payment of consideration was agreed to be made by the barter of goods. However, later on, it was agreed that the consideration amount for the goods received was to be by way of US dollars. However, the said Kazak Corporation failed to make payment and though the Kazakhstan Government had agreed to pay the amount of balance consideration, did not fulfil its part of the guarantee given in the contract due to lack of funds. On the failure of Kazakhstan Government to fulfil its part, the appellant made claim against the first respondent therein which had covered the said risk of compensating the loss suffered by it by the non-payment of the consideration amount for the supply of Tea made to the Kazak Corporation. On the failure of Kazakhstan Government to fulfil its part, the appellant made claim against the first respondent therein which had covered the said risk of compensating the loss suffered by it by the non-payment of the consideration amount for the supply of Tea made to the Kazak Corporation. However, the first respondent therein rejected the claim of the appellant on the ground that the appellant had changed the terms of the contract of payment without first consulting it and, therefore, it had no obligation to compensate the appellant for the loss suffered by it. This alleged change of terms of the contract, according to the first respondent, was due to the fact that the appellants had rejected the barter offer made by the Kazak Corporation and had opted for cash payment in US dollars which according to the first respondent, was not the mode of payment contemplated in the contract between the exporter and the Kazak corporation. Though, in spite of further correspondence, the respondent No. 1 reiterated its right to repudiate the claim, the ABL Corporation filed writ petition before the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court praying for cancellation of the letter of repudiation. The learned single Judge of the Calcutta high Court came to a conclusion that though the petition involved a dispute regarding contractual obligation, the respondent No. 1 being Government under the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, was bound by the terms of the contract and therefore, for such non-performance, writ was maintainable and as such allowed the writ petition and issued a writ and directions as prayed for by the said ABL International Ltd. In an appeal by the respondent No. 1 therein, the appellate Bench of the calcutta High Court reversed the finding and held that the claim of the ABL international Ltd. involved the disputed questions of facts which could not be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellate Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved thereby, the said ABL International Ltd. approached the Apex Court. The appellate Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved thereby, the said ABL International Ltd. approached the Apex Court. The respondent-Export Credit Corporation of India Ltd. had contended before the Apex Court that since the writ petition arises out of the contractual matter and since there were disputed questions of facts involved in the matter, and that since the writ petition was in the nature of money claim, the remedy to the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution was not available and as such the appellate Bench had rightly dismissed the writ petition. After considering various pronouncements of the Apex Court on this issue, the Apex Court negatived this contention and observed thus :"26. Therefore, this objection must also fail because in a given case it is open to the writ Court to give such monetary relief also. 27. From the above discussion of ours, following legal principles emerges as to the maintainability of a writ petition :- (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of facts arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. 28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power (See : Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and ors. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power (See : Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and ors. , JT 1998 (7) SC 243 : 1998 (8) SCC 1 ) and this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. " ( 21 ) IN the facts of the present case, as we have already observed hereinabove that the respondent is an instrumentality of the State, that there are no disputed questions of facts involved which require adducing of evidence, that petition pertains to the rights of more than 63,000 employees employed in the various areas of the petitioner No. 1 and further that for the reasons to follow, we find that the action of the respondent is not reasonable and as such violative of mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, we are not inclined to accept the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent regarding tenability of the petition. ( 22 ) WE now consider the merits of the matter. The case of the petitioners is principally based on promissory estoppel. By various pronouncements of the apex Court, it has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is also equally applicable to the executive action. The Apex Court in the case M. P. Sugar Mill (cited supra) has held thus :"19. When we turn to the Indian law on the subject it is heartening to find that in India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. "it can be seen that the Apex Court has in unequivocal terms held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is also recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. It is also held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied to the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Considering the position of law as pronounced by English Courts and the american Courts and the pronouncements of the Apex Court, the Apex Court concluded in para 24 as under :"24. The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Govt. would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Art. 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever, high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned; the former is equally bound as the later. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith"? It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith"? Why should the Government not be held to a high "standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with its citizens"? There was a time when the doctrine of executive necessity was regarded as sufficient justification for the Government to repudiate even its contractual obligations, but, let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court, this doctrine was emphatically negatived in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case ( AIR 1968 SC 718 ) and the supremacy of the rule of law was established. It was laid down by this Court that the government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. " ( 23 ) HOWEVER, the Apex Court itself made an exception regarding the applicability of the said doctrine of promissory estoppel to the governmental action. The Apex Court further observed in para 24 as under :". . . . . . But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot, as Shah, J. , pointed out in the Indo-Afghan agencies case, claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise "on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency", nor can the Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it" on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances". If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. " ( 24 ) PRINCIPLE of law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of M. P. Sugar Mill (cited supra) has been approved by the various pronouncements of the apex Court including in the case of Union of India and others vs. Godfrey philips India Ltd. reported in AIR 1986 SC 806 and in the case of Sharma transport vs. Government of A. P. and others reported in 2002 (2) SCC 188 . ( 25 ) IT can, thus, be seen that the Government, like an ordinary citizen, if makes a promise knowing or intending that it will be acted upon by the promisee and in fact, the promisee acts relying on it and alters his position, Government will be held to be bound by the promise if the promise is enforceable against the government at the instance of the promisee. It is also crystal clear that in such matters, the Government would stand on the same footing as the private individual. It is also well settled that since the said doctrine is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. When the Government is in a position to show that having regard to the facts subsequently transpired, it will be inequitable to hold a Government by the promise made by it to the promisee and if the public interest would be prejudiced, if the Government is required to carry out the said promise, the Courts would have to balance the public interest in the government carrying out the promise made to the citizen, which had made the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise is required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. ( 26 ) IN the backdrop of this principle, we will have to examine the facts of the present case. ( 26 ) IN the backdrop of this principle, we will have to examine the facts of the present case. However, in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary that the foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine. The Apex Court in the case of Sharma Transport (cited supra) in para 13 observed thus :"there is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. "in the light of the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, we have to examine the pleadings in the petition and the material placed on record by the petitioners in support of the petition. ( 27 ) THE petitioners have specifically averred in paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 of the petition that the officers of the respondent had time and again contacted the petitioner No. 1 and the representative of petitioner Nos. 2 to 7, inducing them to accept the policy issued by the respondent. It is further averred in the petition that the representatives of the respondent have toured the entire area within the jurisdiction of the petitioner No. 1 and held discussions with the Area Managers, representatives of the various Unions in the areas, pointing out to them the benefits of accepting the policy issued by the respondent. It has also been further specifically averred by the petitioners that a clear and unambiguous representation was made to the petitioners that the period of JPA Policy would be for 10 years and that the said conditions would not be under review. It is, thus, the contention of the petitioners that relying on the said promise, the employees of the petitioner No. 1 were induced to accept the said JPA Policy by paying premium from their salaries. It is, thus, the contention of the petitioners that relying on the said promise, the employees of the petitioner No. 1 were induced to accept the said JPA Policy by paying premium from their salaries. It is further the contention of the petitioners that after detailed and prolonged negotiations, the terms and conditions as agreed between the parties were reduced into writing by the MOU which was duly signed by the parties and that the said MOU clearly provided that in no case the term of the JPA Policy would be reduced for a period of less than 10 years. It has also been averred by the petitioners that the petitioner No. 1 in fact, accepted the proposal of the respondent by way of social security measure so as to protect the interest of its employees and officers. It is the contention of the petitioners that acting on the promise of the respondent, 63,748 employees had accepted the said jpa Policy and paid one time premium for the period of 10 years. It is, therefore, submitted that the respondent now cannot be permitted to resile from the promise made by it to the petitioners. ( 28 ) VIDE their communication dated 10th February, 1999 addressed by the branch Manager of the respondent, the respondent sent a proposal to the Director of the petitioner No. 1 for coverage of its employees under the said JPA Policy. The relevant portions from the said communication reads thus :"recently we came to know through the local daily that one of your lady Officer met with the road accident on heavy vehicular Traffic road, just nearby to your office. Moreover your Executive, Staffs and workers are working in high Hazard conditions. No doubt you are taking care of your Employees by providing various Financial Aid Schemes and free Medical Facilities, even though, when a Employee succumb to the injuries or suffered serious bodily injuries his family needs more financial help. Our company has devised a novel JANATA PERSONAL ACCIDENT policy with maximum financial benefits with minimum premium. " ( 51 ) RULE is, accordingly, made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.