Judgment R. C. CHAVAN, J. ( 1 ) THE Conservator of Forests, Chandrapur has challenged order, dated 28-10-2004, passed by the learned Additional Sessions judge, Chandrapur in Forest Appeal No. 66 of 2004 directing release of vehicle no. MZW 9833 to the respondent. ( 2 ) THE respondent is owner of jeep bearing Registration No. MZW 9833. On 22-7-2004 driver Rajkumar Bhkta had allowed the jeep to be used in collusion with others for transportation of 200 cubic meters of teak wood. The vehicle was stopped by the police and an offence was registered at Police Station, pombhuma against driver, cleaner and others. The police referred the matter to the Forest Officers. A forest offence was registered. A notice was issued by the authorised Officer and the Assistant Conservator of Forests on 3-8-2004 to the respondent and others to show cause as to why the vehicle in question should not be confiscated to the State under section 61-A of the India Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as the "forest Act" ). The respondent gave a reply stating that the driver had allowed the jeep to be used in collusion with others without any knowledge or connivance of the respondents. He therefore sought that the jeep be released. After receipt of this reply and after considering a material before him the Authorised Officer, passed order confiscating the vehicle on 6-9-2004. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED thereby the respondent had preferred Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 2004 before the Court of Sessions at Chandrapur. The learned Additional sessions Judge, to whom the appeal was assigned, heard both sides and upon consideration of the relevant provisions of law came to the conclusion that the persons incharge of the vehicle, i. e. driver and conductor, has diverted the vehicle for unlawful use. The learned Judge observed that this was done without the knowledge or connivance of the owner. He found that the owner could not have foreseen such unlawful use. The order confiscating the vehicle did not give any reason for coming to the conclusion that the vehicle was used with the consent or connivance or knowledge of the owner. Therefore, the learned Judge set aside order confiscating the vehicle and directed release of the vehicle. ( 4 ) WHEN the petition was admitted the petitioner Forest Department has sought stay of operation of the order, stay had been granted and is in force. Therefore, the learned Judge set aside order confiscating the vehicle and directed release of the vehicle. ( 4 ) WHEN the petition was admitted the petitioner Forest Department has sought stay of operation of the order, stay had been granted and is in force. ( 5 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The respondent, though duly served, was absent. ( 6 ) WE have examined the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions judge with reference to the requirements of law. The learned Additional Sessions judge had concluded that the person incharge of the vehicle had diverted the vehicle for unlawful use for transporting the forest produce. Having so concluded it was not open to the learned Judge to conclude that the vehicle could not have been confiscated because the owner had not connived at or did not have knowledge of such use. The provisions of Clause (2) of section 61-B of the indian Forests Act, 1927 are very clear. For the sake of easy reference we may reproduce the clause as under :"without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section ( 1), no order confiscating any tool, boat, vehicle or cattle shall be made under section 61-A if the owner of the tool, boat, vehicle or cattle proves to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that it was used in carrying the timber, sandalwood, firewood, charcoal or any other notified forest produce without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the tool, boat, vehicle or cattle and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. " (Emphasis supplied ). We had an occasion to consider the implications of this provision in Criminal writ Petition No. 106/2003 Ashok Gidwani and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others. After analysis of the relevant provisions we have concluded that it was not enough for the owner to show that the vehicle was used without his knowledge or connivance, he has to show that it was so used without the knowledge or connivance of even the person incharge of the vehicle. After analysis of the relevant provisions we have concluded that it was not enough for the owner to show that the vehicle was used without his knowledge or connivance, he has to show that it was so used without the knowledge or connivance of even the person incharge of the vehicle. ( 7 ) IN this case, it may be seen that in the respondents reply to the show cause notice issued by the Authorised Officer the respondent had himself stated that the jeep driver had in collusion with persons of criminal tendencies allowed the jeep to be loaded with teak wood. Thus, there can be no doubt that the person incharge of the vehicle, namely driver Rajkumar had not only allowed the vehicle to be used for transporting the forest produce illegally but had colluded in such user. As the provisions of section 61-B (2), reproduced above, would show that it is incumbent upon each of the persons namely, owner as well as person incharge of the vehicle, to take necessary precautions against the misuse. Therefore, in this case, since the respondent had failed to show before the Authorised Officer that the vehicle was used without his knowledge and the knowledge of persons incharge of the vehicle, the order passed by the competent Authority cannot be assailed. ( 8 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge too has observed in paragraph 8 that it can be seen from the record that person incharge of the vehicle had diverted the vehicle for unlawful use. He, however, fell into error in observing that the owner could not have foreseen such unlawful use and that the Authorised officer could not have concluded without giving any reason that the vehicle was used in commission of offence without consent of the owner. It seems that the learned Judge overlooked the significant change that had occurred in law relating confiscation of the vehicles used to facilitate commission of forest offences. Under section 52 of the Forest Act it may have been necessary for the Authorised officer to establish before ordering confiscation that the vehicle in question was misused with connivance or knowledge of the owner. However, section 61-A to G, particularly section 61-B (2), makes it clear that the burden to prove absence of knowledge of connivance rests on the owner. However, section 61-A to G, particularly section 61-B (2), makes it clear that the burden to prove absence of knowledge of connivance rests on the owner. ( 9 ) THE learned Additional Session Judge had observed that the order confiscating the vehicle passed by the Authorised Officer does not refer to the knowledge or connivance of the owner. Since the knowledge or connivance of the persons incharge of the vehicle is sufficient and since order dated 6-9-2004 clearly mentions that the driver and cleaner of the vehicle had settled the hire charges at Rs. 500/- carried teak wood in the jeep, the requirements of law were duly complied with. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent had, before the Sessions Court, placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Forest conservator and others vs. Sharad Ramchandra Kale, reported in (1998) 1 SCC 48 = AIR 1998 SC 2927 , wherein this Court had set aside the order of confiscation on the ground that the authorities had failed to establish that the owner of the truck knew that the truck was likely to be misused for transporting forest produce. Since the High Court had reached such a factual conclusion, on appeal, the Supreme Court did not find it proper to interfere with the finding. Apart from this, the decision in question does not make it clear whether the provisions of sections 61-A to 61-G of the Forest Act had become applicable when the confiscation in that case was made and if so, whether these provisions were brought to the notice of the Court. We believe that if the provisions had become applicable and had been brought to the notice of the Court, the Court would not have come to such a conclusion. ( 11 ) IN view of this, the petition deserves to be allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur in Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 2004 dated 28-10-2004 is hereby quashed and set aside and that order dated 6-9-2004 passed by the Authorised Officer confiscating jeep No. MZW 9833 is restored. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Petition allowed.