( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure being aggrieved by a Judgment and Decree dated 27-4-2004 made in A. S. No. 192 of 2002 on the file of the learned additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) at Guntur, wherein the Judgment and Decree dated 9-9-2002 made in O. S. 860 oi 1997 on the file of the learned II Additional senior Civil Judge, Guntur, dismissing the suit, was reversed. ( 2 ) THE appellant is the defendant. Respondent No. 1 is the plaintiff (since died and respondents 2 to 5 were brought on record as his legal representatives), who filed the suit in O. S. No. 860 of 1997 seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. The parties are bereinatter referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. ( 3 ) IT is Ihe case of the original plaintiff that out of the suit schedule property of 248 square yards, his father purchased 225 square yards under a registered sale deed dated 25-2-1936 from one Sakala mutyam. Himself along with his brother were owning the property adjoining from north to south and a partition was effected between his father and the children of his father s brother, namely, Ameer Ali, after his death on 6-7-1957 under a registered parti- lion deed. The defendant is also a party to the said partition, in which 23 square yards of land was allotted to his father and to the east of the plaint schedule land, the defendants family was allotted the site, and they have constructed a house upto the border of the plaint schedule property. After the death of his father, himself and his sister partitioned their property under a registered partition deed dated 6-7-1971 and in that partition, he was allotted with the plaint schedule property and ever since he had been in possession and enjoyment of the same. As he was working as a Government servant at various places, the property was kept vacant and some garbage was thrown into the site by the neighbours; thereby causing nuisance. Therefore, the defendant and some others made an application to the local authority on 24-5-1976 and the municipal authorities sent a Memo to him on 25-4-1977 to construct a compound wall around the plaint schedule site. Therefore, the defendant and some others made an application to the local authority on 24-5-1976 and the municipal authorities sent a Memo to him on 25-4-1977 to construct a compound wall around the plaint schedule site. While the things stood thus, he leased out the site to one Abdul Khaleel of Siraj Steel Industries, but he vacated the same later. It is also stated that he was the Mutawalli of a wakf, which is having 20 acres of land situated at the outskirts of the Guntur town. The defendant and his brothers wanted to sell away the same claiming to be a personal property and in that connection, he filed a suit in O. vs. No. 21 of 1991 on the file of the learned iii Additional District Judge, Guntur. In view oi filing of the said suit, the defendant bore grudge against him and obstructing for the enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Hence, the suit. ( 4 ) THE defendant filed a detailed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. It is inter alia stated that since the subject-matter relates to immovable property, the suit for bare injunction is not maintainable. The plaintiff has no title over the suit schedule property. The sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff is subsequent to the partition deeds and as such, it is not binding on the defendant. The deiendant has been residing in the suit property for the last 4 decades and it is known to each and everybody in the locality. The first plaintiff or any one of the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit properly at any point of time. The report of Advocate Commissioner also establishes that the plaintiff has no possession over the suit site. The alleged correspondence between the first plaintiff and the Municipal Corporation has no bearing and it is not binding on the defendant. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for? 2. To what relief? before the trial Court, in support of their case, the plaintiffs examined P. Ws. 1 to 4 and got marked Exs. A1 to A63 and on behalf of the defendant, D. Ws. 1 to 5 were examined and Exs. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for? 2. To what relief? before the trial Court, in support of their case, the plaintiffs examined P. Ws. 1 to 4 and got marked Exs. A1 to A63 and on behalf of the defendant, D. Ws. 1 to 5 were examined and Exs. B1 to B28 were marked. Exs. XI to X12 were also marked. After elaborate consideration of both oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they are in possession of the suit property and, therefore, not entitled for permanent injunction and thus dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal being A. S. No. 192 of 2002 on the file of the learned IX additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), guntur. The Appellate Court, after reappreciation of the entire evidence on record and on perusal of the Judgment and decree of the trial Court, has come to a different conclusion and held that from Exs. A1 to A3 it is clear that the defendant never denied the title of the plaintiffs anywhere and as the defendant is intervening with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs, they filed the suit for permanent injunction. It is also seen from Exs. A1 to a63 that the plaintiffs proved their title and possession over the plaint schedule property by the date of filing of the suit and also on the date of obtaining ex parte temporary injunction. Further, it is clear from the physical features stated by the Commissioner in his report that the construction of thatched hut and taking the electricity supply from the defendant s house into the plaint schedule property are also new one and thus it can be said that the defendant encroached into the plaint schedule property only after filing of the suit. Holding as such, the appeal was allowed directing the defendant to hand over the suit schedule property to the plaintiff and to restore the status quo ante and thus granted permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men from interfering with plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Challenging the same, the present Second Appeal is filed. Holding as such, the appeal was allowed directing the defendant to hand over the suit schedule property to the plaintiff and to restore the status quo ante and thus granted permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men from interfering with plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Challenging the same, the present Second Appeal is filed. ( 6 ) THOUGH the appellant raised as many as five substantial questions of law, he pressed into service only the following substantial question of law for consideration of this Court:"whether the lower appellate Court was justified in allowing the appeal and directing the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property without there being any such amendment seeking recovery of possession, either during the pendency of the suit or the appeal, in a suit for bare injunction?" ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant firstly contended that the respondent-plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit schedule property and secondly, the suit is only for perpetual injunction against the respondents restraining them from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Even if there is some evidence to show that during the pendency of the suit the appellant has dispossessed the respondents, unless and until a proper amendment petition is filed seeking amendment of the plaint and prayer thereof, the question of granting the relief of restoration of the status quo ante and granting permanent injunction does not arise. In this regard, the learned counsel relied a Judgment of this Court reported in chantapatla Arvind Babu v. K. Balakristamma, AIR 1992 Andh Pra 399 in which it was held that only in an apphca tion filed under Order XXXIX, Rule-, i and 2 in C. P. C. praying for temporary injunction, it has to be established inter alia that the applicant has a prima facie case; but, in the main suit, it is necessary to prove that the plaintiff is in possession failing which, suit for injunction has to be disimissed on that ground alone. He also submitted thai neither possession of the respondent-plaintiffs is proved nor the respondents are on titled for any injunction muchless restora tion of status quo ante. He also submitted thai neither possession of the respondent-plaintiffs is proved nor the respondents are on titled for any injunction muchless restora tion of status quo ante. ( 8 ) PER contra, Sri S. Srinivas Roddy, learned counsel for the respondents, con tended that the suit was filed on 15-9-1997 and an ex parte temporary injunction was granted on 17-9-1997. A telegram was is sued to the defendant not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the respoadrnt plaintiffs on 23-9-1997, on which date the defendant raised hut in suit schedule pi op erty. Since, the defendant had violated the orders passed by the Court under Order xxxix, Rule 2-A of C. P. C. to punish the defendant and also to remove the hut erected on 23-9-1997 were filed. These I. As , of course, were not taken up and the suit ii self was disposed of. A cumulative effect of the evidence on record and conduct of the defendant would show that the defendant bent upon not only interfering with the possession of the respondent-plaintiffs, but also violating the Orders of the Court. It is on the basis of the evidence, the appellate Court found that the respondents were dispossessed during the subsistence of the temporary injunction; therefore, the respondents are also entitled for restoration oi their possession, since it was proved that they are in possession of the property as on the date of filing of the suit, apart from permanent injunction against the appellant. There is no necessity of any petition being filed tor amendment of the plaint and the prayer thereof. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon the Judgment reported in Sh. Abdul Hakim v. Habib Khan, AIR 1998 Raj 157 wherein it was held in a suit for declaration when the plaintiff was dispossessed from the shop in dispute pending the suit, amendment in plaint for seeking relief of restoration of possession is not necessary and the order directing the defendant to handover possession to plaintiff and to be store status quo ante is proper. He further submitted that the said judgment arose out of an interlocutory application, but the very same principle is also equally applicable for the final orders passed in a suit for bare injunction. He further submitted that the said judgment arose out of an interlocutory application, but the very same principle is also equally applicable for the final orders passed in a suit for bare injunction. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents also relied upon the Judgment reported in kavita Trehan v. Balsara Hygiene Products, 1994 (5) SCC 380 : ( AIR 1995 SC 441 ) and drawn attention to paragraphs 16, 21 and 22, which read as under (Paras 13, 15 of air) :" 16. The Law of Restitution encompasses all claims founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment. restitutionary claims are to be found in equity as well as at law . Restitutionary law has many branches. The law of quasi-contract is "that part of restitution which stems from the common in- debitatus counts for money had and received and for money paid, and from quantum meruit and quantum valebat claims. "21. Section 144, C. P. C. incorporates only a part of the general law of restitution. It is not exhaustive. (See Gangadhar v. Raghubar dayal, AIR 1975 All 102 (FB) and State of andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Manickchand jeevraj and Co. , Bombay, AIR 1973 AP 27 ). 22. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of S. 144. Section 144 opens with the words "where and insofar as a decree or an. order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose. . . . . ". The instant case, may not strictly fall within the terms of S. 144; but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every Court. " and submitted that having found that the plaintiffs were in possession of the property as on the date of filing of the suit, if restoration or restitution of the possession is not ordered, it amounts to unjust enrichment and encouraging the persons, who violate the law. Therefore, the restoration of possession to the plaintiffs is automatic and there is no necessity of any amendment being carried out in this regard in the plaint. Therefore, the restoration of possession to the plaintiffs is automatic and there is no necessity of any amendment being carried out in this regard in the plaint. ( 10 ) IN the other Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in Jamaluddin v. Mirza quader Baig, 1995 (1) Andh LT 115 it was held that for restoration of possession to the tenant, who was dispossessed by the landlord from the suit premises forcibly in violation of the orders of interim injunction, there is no necessity of filing a petition under S. 144 of C. P. C. The Court can restore possession in exercise of its inherent powers under S. 151 of c. P. C. ( 11 ) IN another decision cited in behalf of the respondents in Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar sun, AIR 1986 Cal 220 it was held that when the plaintiff in a suit for permanent injunction and declaration of tenancy was forcibly dispossessed in violation of the interim injunction, the civil Court can invoke its inherent powers to grant temporary mandatory injunction by directing the police to restore possession. Taking inspiration from the said decision, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that for doing justice, the. Court need not go into the technicalities and the. technicalities cannot prevent the Court in doing justice in exercise of inherent powers. Order XXXIX, Rule 2a lays down a punitive measure for the purpose of compelling a party to comply with the orders of injunction. The process as contemplated by the said provision may or may not be ultimately effective, but, in any event, the procedure laid down in Order XXXIX, rule 2a, C. P. C. is incapable of granting an immediate relief to a party, who has been forcibly dispossessed in violation of an order of injunction and in such a case, the court is not powerless to grant the relief to the aggrieved parly in exercise of its inherent powers. ( 12 ) IN yet another Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in Kailash Chand Gupta v. Rukam Singh yadav, AIR 1998 MP 310 , it has been held that when the defendant violates an order of interim injunction granted by the trial court securing the possession of the plaintiff and forcibly dispossesses the plaintiff, the Court can pass an order of mandatory injunction under S. 151 of C. P. C. for restoration of possession to the plaintiff. ( 13 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the entire evidence on record and also the Judgments of the Courts below. ( 14 ) INSOFAR as the possession of the respondenl-plaintiffs as on the date of filing of the suit is concerned, the appellate Court at paragraph 28 of its Judgment held as under :"28, It is also clear from the report of the commissioner that she found a thatched hut in the suit schedule site opposite to the defendants tiled house and there are Eucalyptus trees of 3 or 4 years age and 7 neem trees out of which one is big, others are small and aged about 3 to 4 years. The commissioner s report further reveals the material used for the construction of the thatched house appears to be old of 2 to 3 months and hut also is that of the same age. Inside the hut and the roof appears to be smoke sticken as there are no roads inside the suit site. And in point 4 of the Commissioner report further reveals that the central part of the thatched house is that are eucalyptus tree including the poles is eucalyptus tree in all the 4 corners. The poles appear to have been aged about 3 or 4 months. There is a electricity wire provided with plug from the old tiled house of the defendant. And the wire appears in the thatched hut appears to be of about one month use. There is no wall in between the suit site and the defendants site. Therefore, it is clear from the report of the Commissioner that all the constructions and removal of the trees in the plaint schedule are of new one. And the wire appears in the thatched hut appears to be of about one month use. There is no wall in between the suit site and the defendants site. Therefore, it is clear from the report of the Commissioner that all the constructions and removal of the trees in the plaint schedule are of new one. Therefore, it can be presumed that the respondent highhandedly occupied the possession of the plaint schedule property after filing of the suit, taking advantage that he is an employee working at another place. " ( 15 ) FROM the above, it is clear that the lower appellate Court found that the 1st respondent-original plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, the lower appellate court directed the appellant to hand over the suit schedule site to the respondents and also directed to restore the status quo ante and granted permanent injunction. There is no creditworthy evidence adduced by the appellant-defendant and the evidence of D. Ws. 2 to 4 cannot be believed. D. W. 2 is a neighbour of the defendant, D. W. 3 is defendant s son s father-in-law and d. W. 4 is the tenant of the defendant. Even the trial Court recorded a finding that the defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the property in some extent only. The lower appellate Court after reappreciation of the entire evidence on record held that exs. Al to A63 prove that the plaintiff is the owner and is in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit and the thatched hul and electricity supply from the defendant s house to the said hut are new one and that the plaintiff was dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. The said finding of fact is based on the evidence on record and there arc no grounds to interfere with the said finding of fact in the Second Appeal under Section 100 of C. P. C. 18a. The said finding of fact is based on the evidence on record and there arc no grounds to interfere with the said finding of fact in the Second Appeal under Section 100 of C. P. C. 18a. I am in complete agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant have no relevance to the facts of this case and they are the cases wherein it was found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property as on the date of filing of the suit and as such, in those cases it was held that the plaintiff is not entitled for injunction and the proper remedy available to him was to file a suit for recovery of possession or amend the plaint accordingly. Whereas, in this case, there is a categorical finding that the original plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit and a thatched hut was constructed and electricity supply was given to it from the defendant s house and they are all new one i. e. after filing of the suit. On reappraisal of the entire evidence on record, this Court is of the view that the lower appellate Court has not committed any error in coming, to the conclu sion that the appellant-defendant violated the interim injunction and forcibly entered into the possession of the suit schedule property during the subsistence of the ad interim injunction. Therefore, as held by the apex Court, which was followed by various high Courts in the Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, which are referred to above, that since the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit schedule property during the subsistence of the interim injunction granted by the trial court, the Court can order for restoration of possession though not under S. 144, but under S. 151 of C. P. C. Therefore, the lower appellate Court rightly held that the respondent-plaintiffs are entitled for restoration of the status quo ante and also for permanent injunction. ( 16 ) IN view of the above, there was no necessity for the respondent-plaintiffs to amend the plaint seeking restitution or restoration or recovery of possession of the suit schedule property. ( 16 ) IN view of the above, there was no necessity for the respondent-plaintiffs to amend the plaint seeking restitution or restoration or recovery of possession of the suit schedule property. Thus, the substantial question of law raised by the learned counsel for the appellant pales into insignificance. The Second Appeal is, therefore, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed; but, without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.