JUDGMENT H.S. BEDI, J. 1. This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 7187 of 2003 (Dr. B. Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others) and 18295 of 2003 (Dr. B. Singh v. Director C.B.I. and others) . The facts have been taken from Civil Writ Petition No. 18295 of 2003. 2. The writ petition has been filed purporting to be in public interest. The prayer in the writ petition is for a direction from this Court to respondents 2 to 9, who are various functionaries of the Government of Haryana, to seek the eviction of a large number of persons, who are stated to be encroaching on large tracts of Government property said to be worth Rs. 50 crores. Specific reference has been made to the encroachment of 10 Kanals 8 Marla of land belonging to the Haryana Urban Development Authority and 27 Kanals 1 Marla of land belonging to Municipal Council, Panchkula, situated in Village Haripur (District Panchkula), as detailed in Annexure P-1. It is the case of the petitioner that the persons, who have encroached upon the said land had raised shops and houses and had also constructed roads as a mean of ingress to their properties. It has been pleaded that despite some facile efforts on the part of the respondents to get the land freed, no fruitful result had come about. The prayer has accordingly been made that the C.B.I., respondent No.1 should be called upon to examine the question of encroachments on public property, to fix the responsibility of those, who had been entrusted with its welfare and to find out as to whether any individual/(s) had deliberately ignored and connived at the encroachments for corrupt motives. 3. Notice was issued to the respondents on 24-11-2003 by the 1st Division Bench comprising of Binod Kumar Roy, CJ and S.S. Saron, J. and copies of the writ petition were directed to be served on the government counsel for the respondents. The case then came up on 15-01-2004 before a Division Bench of B.K. Roy, CJ and Surya Kant, J. and it was directed that it be put up before a Bench of which the latter was not a member. It appears that while the matter was yet pending, respondent Nos. The case then came up on 15-01-2004 before a Division Bench of B.K. Roy, CJ and Surya Kant, J. and it was directed that it be put up before a Bench of which the latter was not a member. It appears that while the matter was yet pending, respondent Nos. 11 to 27 were impleaded as party-respondents on their applications, on the plea that they were not encroachers on the land in question but it had come down to them through their fore-fathers. 4. On the transfer of Chief Justice B.K. Roy from this Court, this matter first came up before a Division Bench of Chief Justice D.K. Jain and Hemant Gupta, J. on 28-04-2005, when it transpired that the petitioner, had addressed a letter to the latter that he lacked confidence in him and that he should not hear this case. It appears that in the meanwhile prior to 28-04- 2005, the petitioner had addressed two letters to one of us (Viney Mittal, J.), which alongwith their envelopes have been put on record as Mark ‘A’ and Mark ‘B’ in which he wrote that his case should not be heard by a Bench in which Viney Mittal, J. was a member. The Division Bench on 28-04-2005 ordered that this matter be put up on 09-05-2005 before some other Bench, and was put before us on 23-09-2005 and as the petitioner was not present, we adjourned the matter to 29-09-2005 making it clear that in case the petitioner did not turn up on that date, the question as to the continuance of the interim order would be taken up. On 29-09-2005, the petitioner appeared in Court and the case was adjourned to 4.10.2005 for arguments. On 04-10-2005, the petitioner did not put in appearance and was again adjourned to 18-10-2005. The petitioner however, filed C.M. No. 17174 of 2005 making a prayer that the writ petition should not be heard by a Bench in which one of us (Viney Mittal, J.) was a member. This application came up before us on 29-09-2005. We dismissed the application pronouncing an oral short order. However, when we were in the process of dictating the detailed order in the Chamber, we found from a perusal of the application that scandalous and obnoxious allegations have been levelled against one of us. This application came up before us on 29-09-2005. We dismissed the application pronouncing an oral short order. However, when we were in the process of dictating the detailed order in the Chamber, we found from a perusal of the application that scandalous and obnoxious allegations have been levelled against one of us. In this background, we orally re-called the order of dismissal of the application and in the interest of justice, adjourned the case to 04-10-2005 so as to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to withdraw the same. The main case was also listed for 04-10-2005, on which date the petitioner filed C.M. No. 17531 of 2005 in which he once again prayed that this matter should not be heard by one of us as he wished to seek his judicial remedies with respect to the fact that the order dated 29-09-2005 had been changed. In addition, the petitioner also filed an adjournment slip, which appears to have been wrongly dated as 05-10-2005, in which the following prayer was made:- “It is respectfully prayed that this case may please be adjourned till judicial remedy against order dt. 29-09-2005 in CM No. 17174 of 2005 in CWP No. 18295 of 2003 is exhausted. An application to this effect has been filed in this case.” 5. We accordingly vide order dated 04-10-2005 directed that C.M. Nos. 17174 of 2005 and 17531 of 2005 be taken up with the main writ petition on 18-10-2005. 6. The petitioner in addition filed C.M. No. 18005-06 of 2005 appending therewith Annexures P-R/1 and P-R/2 once again emphasizing that C.M. No. 17174 had been dismissed on 29-09-2005 and inquiry be instituted as to the circumstances under which the application has been relisted on 04-10-2005. The annexures aforesaid are communications addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court and to the Bar Council of India calling for an inquiry against the Bench for judicial impropriety. Alongwith this application, the petitioner also filed an adjournment slip dated 15-10-2005 making the following prayer :- “The petitioner has sent representation Annexures P- R/1 and P-R/2 to Hon’ble Chief Justice and Chairman BCI to investigate how order dt. 29-09-2005, pronounced in open court, dismissing CM No. 17173-74/05 in CWP No. 18295/03 disappeared w/o knowledge of petitioner. Alongwith this application, the petitioner also filed an adjournment slip dated 15-10-2005 making the following prayer :- “The petitioner has sent representation Annexures P- R/1 and P-R/2 to Hon’ble Chief Justice and Chairman BCI to investigate how order dt. 29-09-2005, pronounced in open court, dismissing CM No. 17173-74/05 in CWP No. 18295/03 disappeared w/o knowledge of petitioner. Till investigation is completed, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjourn this case as petitioner is failing to elicit sufficient faith to argue his case before a Hon’ble Bench in which Hon’ble Mr. Justice Viney Mittal is a member.” 7. The petition came up on 18-10-2005, on which date we declined the request for adjournment and as the petitioner had not put in appearance, reserved judgment. 8. We have advisedly chosen to detail the facts in extenso as we are of the opinion that the litigants of the kind represented by B. Singh are to be shut out at the very threshold as they do not justify the status that must be accorded to a genuine public interest litigant. 9. The venom which motivates the petitioner’s so called public interest is clearly discernible from certain facts, which need to be highlighted. One of our colleagues Surya Kant, J. was at the time in question Advocate General, Haryana. He appeared against B Singh petitioner on behalf of the State in several litigations that had been filed by the former. Upset by the stand taken by the Advocate General and fully cognizant of the fact that he was likely to be elevated to the Bench as his name was under active consideration for that purpose, he filed Civil Writ Petition No. 18508 of 2003 B. Singh v. Union of India and others purporting to be in public interest, basing his claim on some representation sent by one Ram Sarup to the President of India and several other senior functionaries and impleading the following respondents :- 1. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Govt. of India, New Delhi. 2. State of Haryana through Secretary, Law and Justice, Govt. of Haryana, Civil Secretariat, Haryana, Chandigarh. 3. State of Punjab through Secretary, Law and Justice, Govt. of Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Punjab, Chandigarh. 4. Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh through its Registrar General, Chandigarh. 5. Bar Council of India, through Chairman, 21, Rouse Avenue, (Near ITO) Institutional Area, New Delhi. of Haryana, Civil Secretariat, Haryana, Chandigarh. 3. State of Punjab through Secretary, Law and Justice, Govt. of Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Punjab, Chandigarh. 4. Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh through its Registrar General, Chandigarh. 5. Bar Council of India, through Chairman, 21, Rouse Avenue, (Near ITO) Institutional Area, New Delhi. 6. Bar Association of Punjab and Haryana High Court, through its President, High Court, Chandigarh. 7. Shri Surya Kant Sharma, Senior Advocate, House No. 33, Sector 10-A, Chandigarh.” 10. In the course of a rambling writ petition, he sermonised on the standards that the Judiciary should observe and the calibre of those entrusted with its responsibility, he made the following prayers :- “i) to Respondent No. 1 to investigate the allegations stated in Annexure P-1 & P-8; (ii) restraining Respondent No. 7 from performing any function as Advocate General, Haryana till investigations are concluded; (iii) directing Respondent No.5 to cancel the license of Respondent No. 7, if found guilty in investigation; (iv) praying for issuance of appropriate writ or direction to Respondent No. 4 to take up matter with appropriate authorities to with-hold further action in relation to elevation of Respondent No. 7 as Judge of High Court, till the investigation are concluded and; (v) to issue direction to Respondent No. 2 to provide due protection to the author of Annexure P-1 and P-8, who have come forward in the interest of justice, highlighting the serious allegations against respondent No. 7; vi) for declare the action of Respondent No. 2 by appointing Respondent No. 7 as Advocate General, Haryana, being; (A) violative of Article 165, 217 of the Constitution of India, in the light of laws laid down by the Supreme Court; (B) devoid of requisite sanctioned/recommendation of Hon’ble Collegium; (C) affecting the prestige of Bar Council of India and Bar Association of Punjab and Haryana; (D) detrimental to the image of judiciary and public faith in judiciary; OR any other writ, order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court deemed appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 11. This petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 19-12-2003 in limine with the following observations :- “The criticism by the petitioner is erratic and in fact is contradictory in terms. This petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 19-12-2003 in limine with the following observations :- “The criticism by the petitioner is erratic and in fact is contradictory in terms. If the petitioner has no grievance in regard to the procedure adopted and the same has been considered in its correct perspective by the concerned collegium, then petitioner can hardly raise any ancillary arguments. Having made representation to all concerned quarters just few days prior to the filing of the writ petition and some representation even subsequent to the filing of the petition, we are of the considered view that petitioner has not approached the Court bonafidely, fairly and with clean hands. Our this view is further fortified by the fact that certain litigation pending in this Court, has been referred to by Shri Ram Sarup in his affidavit dated 28-11-2003 (C.W.P. No. 10409 of 2003) which is being defended by respondent No. 7 in his capacity as Advocate General of the State of Haryana. The allegations in the affidavit of Shri Ram Sarup are patently perverse, suffer from vice of bias and temerity. It is apparent from the face of the record that the tendentious attitude of the petitioner is merely based upon persistent or reiteration of his frustration rather than facts. Sweeping allegations have been made against other former or sitting judges of this Court, previous Chief Justices of India and other high dignitaries with utter disregard to the expected standards of normal behaviour. Judges at all levels and all over are exposed or vulnerable to attack, unfounded criticism by one side or the other in every case that comes before them. In the present days it is applied even against the lawyers whose names are recommended for elevation to the Bench. It is an attempt to subvert and undermine the fair selection. It is not the prospective Judges who alone bear the brunt of this unfair criticism, but it directly and adversely affects the process of consideration. It certainly vitiates the healthy and fair environment, which itself is an essential feature of proper administration of justice. In terms of the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court primacy in matters of recommendation for appointment of judges to the Court rests with the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the prescribed collegium. It certainly vitiates the healthy and fair environment, which itself is an essential feature of proper administration of justice. In terms of the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court primacy in matters of recommendation for appointment of judges to the Court rests with the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the prescribed collegium. It is said that price of perfection is eternal vigilance, which is maintained. Despite such vigil being maintained and procedure in conformity with law being adopted at all relevant stages, still certain disgruntled persons act in a manner which is prejudicial to the independence of judiciary. In order to meaningfully ensure constitutional protection to and the independence of judiciary and to maintain its sanctity, it would be inevitable to reject such attempts right at the thresh-hold. Good sense or faith and responsible attitude towards functioning of basic institution, are the twin elementary obligations of every citizen. It is neither fair nor proper to attribute or ascribe any irresponsibility or bias to the high dignitaries in office who have a tremendous burden of making fair selection. Our system of justice is fundamentally based on formal notion of justice according to law, whether a person is fit to be inducted in the adjudicatory process of administration of justice in our country is a matter which must essentially fall exclusively in the domain of the specified authorities in the afore-noticed judgments. Whether a person on merit or character is fit or not to be appointed as a judge of the High Court, would again be a matter which shall fall beyond the well defined limits of judicial review in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We find no merit in this petition. The same is dismissed in limine.” 12. In the meanwhile, Surya Kant, J. was elevated to the Bench of this Court. B. Singh, however, still persisted in his efforts and filed a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court, in which the prayer was that Surya Kant, J. be restrained from acting as a Judge of this Court. This too was dismissed vide judgment reported as Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and others (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 363. 13. This too was dismissed vide judgment reported as Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and others (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 363. 13. We are, thus, fortunate in having before us the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well and we quote therefrom in extenso :- “The casual and cavalier fashion in which it appears to have been handled and of late attempted to be made ipse dixit in a laconic and lackadaisical manner compels us to draw the only inference that the petitioner is a busybody bent upon self-publicity sans any sense of responsibility unmindful of the adverse impact, at times it may go to create at the expense of decency and dignity of constitutional offices and functionaries and there is no element or even trace of public interest involved in the petition. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes or vendetta to bring to terms a person, not of one’s liking, or gain publicity or a facade for blackmail, the said petition has to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issues involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding the “public interest” aspect. Public interest litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be “publicity interest litigation” or “private interest litigation” or “politics interest litigation” or the latest trend “paise income litigation”. If not properly and strictly regulated at least in certain vital areas or spheres and abuse averted, it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance, as well as to malign not only an incumbent-to-be in office but demoralise and deter reasonable of sensible and prudent people even agreeing to accept highly sensitive and responsible offices for fear of being brought into disrepute with baseless allegations. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and concrete or credible basis for maintaining a cause before court and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. The credibility of such claims or litigations should be adjudged on the creditworthiness of the materials averred and not even on the credentials claimed of the person moving the courts in such cases. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration.” AND AGAIN “12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, courts must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.” 14. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.” 14. The Court observed that the locus standi and credibility of a public interest petitioner had to be examined on three parameters, they being :- “(i) the credentials of the applicant; (ii) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (iii) the information being not vague and indefinite.” 15. It was further observed that the Court has to balance the interest of the public with the credibility of the person filing the litigation and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others cannot be tolerated. The Court also reiterated with approval the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-record Association v. Union of India. (1933) 4 SCC 441 that “the growing tendency of needless intrusion by the strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the judiciary under the garb of public interest litigation and reckless allegations and vitriolic statements against the Judges, cannot be tolerated and that the action of these busybodies must be ruthlessly shut out.” The Court finally observed that the petition deserved to be dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- but while expressing the hope that the petitioner would mend his ways and would not hazard such vexatious litigations in future, dismissed it with Rs. 10,000/- as costs. The observations in Dr. B. Singh’s case (supra) have been reiterated in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. , (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 349 and Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 136. 16. The question of locus standi and the status of a public interest litigant was elaborately discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheela Barse v. Union of India and others (1988) 4 Supreme Court Cases 226. In this case Sheel Bause filed a petition in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Public Interest with respect to the violations of Constitutional and Statutory rights of Children in this Country. The Supreme Court issued several directions calling for some remedial measures which were undoubtedly required on the question. Sheela Barse, however, upset at the prolonged procedures and perceived indignities in these proceedings moved an application for the withdrawal of the writ petition being the dominus litus. The Supreme Court issued several directions calling for some remedial measures which were undoubtedly required on the question. Sheela Barse, however, upset at the prolonged procedures and perceived indignities in these proceedings moved an application for the withdrawal of the writ petition being the dominus litus. The Bench dismissed the application emphasizing that the status of a public interest litigant was in fact that of an informant and that after the matter had come to the cognizance of the Court, it was for the Court to continue with the proceedings and the litigant could claim no indefeasible right to withdraw the same. The Court quoted the following portion of the application:- “While the litigants have entitlements the court has decision making powers. However, the court’s special powers do not make it more equal, nor do they make the court the fountain head of justice. The citizen-petitioner coming to court on behalf of fellow citizens whose rights are violated by the State is certainly an equal participant and not a subsidiary of the institution. Institutions are made by the conduct and the quality of work and output of the persons who man it. My application No. 3128/88 records the conduct of persons who man it. This record is not a slur on the institution of the judiciary but a critique perhaps, of a dysfunctional institution. The Court dealt with the institutions by observing that:- “It is true that the parties who seek justice at the hands of the court are neither its subordinates or subsidiaries. But the notion of an equal participation, in its practical applications, presents difficulties and cannot be stretched to the point where the court could share the responsibility and the powers that go with it, of regulating the proceedings of the court with any of the parties before it. In the existing system, the parties who seek recourse to courts have to submit themselves to the jurisdiction and discipline of the court. Their conduct, in relation to the proceedings, is liable to be regulated by the court. This is not a matter of expression or assertion of any superiority but is merely a necessity and a functional imperative. 35. In the existing system, the parties who seek recourse to courts have to submit themselves to the jurisdiction and discipline of the court. Their conduct, in relation to the proceedings, is liable to be regulated by the court. This is not a matter of expression or assertion of any superiority but is merely a necessity and a functional imperative. 35. The second ground on which withdrawal is sought is, therefore, wholly insubstantial and proceeds on what appear to be certain subjective susceptibilities of the applicant which, to the extent they are irreconcilable with the discipline of the court, cannot be countenanced. 36. The third ground is that the proceedings are brought as a “voluntary action” and that applicant is entitled to sustain her right to be the “petitioner-in-person” in a public interest litigation and that the proceedings cannot be proceeded with after delinking her from the proceedings. This again proceeds on certain fallacies as to the rights of a person who brings a public interest litigation. Any recognition of any such vested right in the persons who initiate such proceedings is to introduce a new and potentially harmful element in the judicial administration of this form of public law remedy. That apart, what is implicit in the assertion of the applicant is the appropriation to herself of the right and wisdom to determine the course the proceedings are to or should take and its pattern. This cannot be recognised. In the present proceedings thecourt has already gone through and has initiated an elaborate exercise as indicated in the orders excerpted earlier. The petition cannot be permitted to be abandoned at this stage. Only a private litigant can abandon his claims.” 17. Implied in these pithy words is the clear message that the function of a public interest litigant is primarily to make the Court cognizant of certain facts that require consideration and that the result thereof cannot be taken as personal to him. The prayer for withdrawal of the writ petition was declined and the Court proceed with the case. 18. We are not unmindful of the fact and it has been so held repeatedly,that public interest litigation has been designed to serve a great public purpose, more particularly with regard to those, who are legally, socially and financially deprived. The prayer for withdrawal of the writ petition was declined and the Court proceed with the case. 18. We are not unmindful of the fact and it has been so held repeatedly,that public interest litigation has been designed to serve a great public purpose, more particularly with regard to those, who are legally, socially and financially deprived. This principle, however, cannot be applied to those litigants, whose very credibility is suspect and who use this forum to ventilate and to espouse their personal grievances. As a corollary, it must inevitably follow that a litigant suing in public interest must confine himself within certain well recognized parameters and if heover steps these, he loses his exalted status and must be treated as an ordinary litigant with the question of his locus standi coming to the fore. 19. In the background of the above legal position, we now co-relate and examine the three issues, which had been highlighted by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Dr. B. Singh’s case (supra) to the facts of the present case. 1) The credentials of the applicant 20. In addition to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which we have quoted above in the case of B. Singh himself, we have examined the written statement of respondent Nos. 10, 12 to 14 filed in Civil Writ Petition No. 7187 of 2003. For reasons of accuracy, we reproduce verbatim the preliminary objections:- “1 That petitioner has filed the present petition claiming it to be a public interest litigation. However, besides this writ petition, petitioner has also filed following other writ petition/cases against this very department which are either pending adjudication or stand disposed off. Subject mater in most of these writ petitions is overlapping and repetitive. List of the court cases of Dr B. Singh (He is also known as Balwan Singh), his relatives and known persons filed in the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana, High Court, Chandigarh. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sr. CWP NO. CWP NO. Title Status No. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 CWP No.7254 of 2000 1- Sandhu Ranbir Singh & Others Vs. State of Haryana Pending 2 CWP No.6357 of 2000 1-Sh. Balwan Singh S/o Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana Decided 3 CWP No.876 of 2001 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana Decided 4 CWP No.9010 of 2001 Smt. Minna D/o Malwinderjit Singh R/o Vill. Saketri Vs Government of India & others Decided 5 CWP No.2076 of 2001 Dr. B. Singh Vs Govt. of India & others Decided 6 CWP No.10145 of 02 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & others Decided 7 CWP No.15303 of 02 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana& others Pending 8 CWP No.1055 of 03 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & others Pending 9 CWP No.1740 of 03 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & others Pending 10 CWP No.302 of 03 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & Others Pending 11 CWP No.3789 of 03 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & Others Pending 12 CWP No.5464 of 03 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & others Pending 13 CWP No.6809 of 03 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & others Pending 14 CWP No.18557 of 01 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & Others Pending 15 CWP No.11431 of 2000 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana Decided 16 CWP No.7649 of 2003 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana & Others Pending 17 CWP No.7187 of 2003 Dr. B. Singh Vs State of Haryana Pending 18 COCP No.563 of 2001 Beacon Charitable TrustVs. Decided in CWP No. 7254 of 2000 Geeta Parkash D.T.P., Panchkula 19 COCP No.815 of 2001 Haryana Co-op Joint Farming Society Vs. in CWP No 7254 of 2000 Geeta Parkash D.T.P. Panchkula Decided 20 COCP No.702 Ram Singh S/o Sh. Gulsagar Decided 21 CWP No.19628 of 2001 Dr. B. Singh Vs State Pending List of cases in Ld. Decided in CWP No. 7254 of 2000 Geeta Parkash D.T.P., Panchkula 19 COCP No.815 of 2001 Haryana Co-op Joint Farming Society Vs. in CWP No 7254 of 2000 Geeta Parkash D.T.P. Panchkula Decided 20 COCP No.702 Ram Singh S/o Sh. Gulsagar Decided 21 CWP No.19628 of 2001 Dr. B. Singh Vs State Pending List of cases in Ld. Trial Courts 22 418 of 1995 Haryana Co-op Joint Farming Society Vs. State of Haryana Pending 23 2-417 of 1995 Beacon Charitable Trust Vill. Saketri Vs. State of Haryana Pending 24 3-1294 of 1994 Haryana Co-op Joint Farming Society Ltd. Decided Vill Saketri Vs. State of Haryana - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. That it is most humbly submitted that, it is very necessary to bring in the knowledge of this Hon’ble Court that none of these above stated writ petitions has been filed by the petitioner in public interest. Rather the same have been filed for vested and motivated reasons. In fact, it is very important to bring in the notice of this Hon’ble Court that these writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner to save himself from the legal actions pending against him by different authorities. 3. That petitioner floated a cooperative house building society namely “The Shivalik Environ Cooperative House Building Society Ltd Saketri and through this society he defrauded the members of the society and as a result he has been held guilty along with others for causing deficiency in the assets of the society amounting to Rs.10,36,10,737/- and the recovery of this amount from the petitioner and others in equal proportion ordered by Addl. Registrar cum Chief Auditor, Cooperative Societies, Haryana vide his order dated 17.2.03 the copy of this order is annexed as R-1. 4. That as a matter of fact, petitioner was an employee of Haryana State Electricity Board from where he was dismissed from service on account of various lapses committed on his part. Registrar cum Chief Auditor, Cooperative Societies, Haryana vide his order dated 17.2.03 the copy of this order is annexed as R-1. 4. That as a matter of fact, petitioner was an employee of Haryana State Electricity Board from where he was dismissed from service on account of various lapses committed on his part. The order of the dismissal in question is annexed with this statement as annexure R-II. 5. That even criminal cases vide FIR No. 60/97 dated 1.5.97, P.S. North Chandigarh; FIR No. 331 dated 1.8.01, Sector-5 Panchkula and FIR No.517 dated 17.12.2000 Sector-5 Panchkula were registered against him. 6. That it is very pertinent to state here that the record of the petitioner whether in service or outside the service has never been clean. He has always been found involved in illegal activities or unwarranted acts. 7.That from narration of facts stated above, it is clear that these numberous writ petition filed by the petitioner for personal reasons. Firstly petitioner has designed to secure an order in any of these writ petition which may help him in action pending against him before different authorities and secondly since the department has not cooperated with him against the law to trouble and harass the government officers working in their respective departments. 8.That reference to periphery control Act is by and large subject matter of most of these writ petitions also clearly shows the personal motive of the petitioner because that land related to the cooperative society plotted by the petitioner and others, unauthorised palatial buildings of Haryana Cooperative Joint Farming Society Ltd Saketri and Beacon Charitable Trust and other family properties are situated within the purview of controlled area. Close relatives of petitioner are associated with Haryana Cooperative Joint Farming Society and Beacon Charitable Trust. The photograph of these buildings is annexed as R-III. These buildings are in close proximity to the outer side of phirni of village Saketri that is why he is pleading for extension of Lal dora so that the same be exempted from the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952. 9.That periphery control Act is by and large subject matter of most of these writ petition also clearly shows the personal motive of the petitioner, because the land related to the cooperative society plotted by the petitioner and other family properties are situated with the purview of controlled area.” 21. 9.That periphery control Act is by and large subject matter of most of these writ petition also clearly shows the personal motive of the petitioner, because the land related to the cooperative society plotted by the petitioner and other family properties are situated with the purview of controlled area.” 21. A replication was also filed by the petitioner in which the broad facts mentioned above have not been denied expect the fact that FIR No.517 dated 17.12.2000 had been quashed. 22. It is also relevant that in Annexures P-R/1 and P-R/2 appended with C.M.No.17174 of 2005, the petitioner has given his academic qualifications as BE. CE, F.I.E. M.A. (Psy, Ph.Soc.) M. Com. Ph. D (Psychology), LLB, LLM, Ph.D (Law) and has prayed for initiating an inquiry with regard to the judicial impropriety of this Bench and then has gone on the write page after page spewing venom against one of us, in the course of a rambling set of allegations, all of which have no bearing on the merits of the case. It is also relevant that finding that the Bench was not willing to transfer the case, the language used in the applications for transfer/adjournments became progressively more intemperate and threatening. We are of the opinion that to accept the applications would amount to an acquiescence to intimidation and blackmail and to give the petitioner a carte balanche to spew vitriol against those Judges, whom he perceives would not give an order of his choice. In para 10 of the said application, it has been pleaded by the petitioner that the had filed more than 50 public interest litigations raising public issues, which if not decided would make the public loose faith in the Judiciary and would frustrate the very purpose of law. We have reproduced above the written statement of some of the respondents and also the observations of the Division Bench of this Court and of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The extent of public interest,which the petitioner is seeking to protect, can be gauged there from without any further comment. 2 and 3: Prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him and the information being not vague and indefinite : 23. The extent of public interest,which the petitioner is seeking to protect, can be gauged there from without any further comment. 2 and 3: Prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him and the information being not vague and indefinite : 23. It may be mentioned here that the prayer in the writ petition, as already mentioned above, is for the removal of the encroachments said to have been made in and around the periphery of the Union Territory, Chandigarh and State of Haryana. These allegations have been denied by the private respondents, who have pleaded that there was no encroachment on their part as they were holders of the property through generations. The applications for transfer of the case from this Bench have absolutely no connection with the merits of the controversy in the writ petitions. We reiterate that no person can be allowed to besmirch the reputation of a Judge on wholly irrelevant considerations and that it is not open to a public interest litigant, who is in the nature of a first informant and must have no personal interest in the litigation to resort to subterfuge and to make an attempt to intimidate the Bench by all means open to him. It bears reiteration that the petitioner had made and attempt to over reach the Ist Division Bench at the first instance and when the matter came up before this Bench, a similar attempt has been made with respect to this Bench as well. 24. The allegations made by the petitioner are clearly contemptuous and call for strict action. We had, at one moment, toyed with the idea of initiating contempt proceedings against him but we have refrained from doing so as this action would give him the publicity that he is clearly inviting and so assiduously seeks. We have accordingly chosen to adopt the way suggested by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The petitioner has been dubbed as a ‘busy body’ a `masked phantom’ working for personal gain and `meddling with the judicial process,’ all of which require that such matters should be rejected at the very “threshold”. 25. We have accordingly chosen to adopt the way suggested by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The petitioner has been dubbed as a ‘busy body’ a `masked phantom’ working for personal gain and `meddling with the judicial process,’ all of which require that such matters should be rejected at the very “threshold”. 25. We once again emphasize that a public interest litigant, who is motivated exclusively by public interest must be given due deference and consideration but an unscrupulous litigant cannot be permitted to vitiate the discipline of the Court and to compromise the integrity of the Judicial system under the guise of a public interest litigation. To succumb to the threats implicit in the applications made by the petitioner, would be to destroy the very fabric, which we have a duty and obligation to protect. 26. In Dr. B.Singh’s case (supra),the Hon’ble Supreme Court had itself observed that it was imposing only Rs. 10,000/- as costs with the hope that the petitioner would mend his ways and not resort to such vexatious litigations in future. We observe that this hope has been clearly belied by the petitioner. He is clearly recalcitrant and incorrigible. 27. We accordingly dismiss these writ petitions and further direct that no public interest litigation filed by the petitioner shall be entertained by the High Court Registry. The order be got noted from the Additional Registrar (Judicial) forthwith and copies of the judgment be appended to all pending Public Interest Litigations filed by B. Singh-Petitioner. -