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2005 DIGILAW 1175 (RAJ)

Ugam Dan v. State of Rajasthan

2005-04-20

GOVIND MATHUR

body2005
Judgment Govind Mathur, J.-By this writ petition, a challenge is given to the order dated 18.01.2002 passed by the Deputy Secretary, to the Government of Rajasthan, under the orders of His Excellency, Governor of Rajasthan and the order dated 14.08.2001 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Rule 23 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 and the order dated 24.09.1999 passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e., the Superintendent of Police, Barmer imposing the punishment of reduction with the minimum pay scale applicable to the post held by the petitioner. 2. The contention of Counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is absolutely a non-speaking and unreasoned order and the same has been passed without application of mind and in quite a mechanical manner. The findings given by the Disciplinary Authority are also not supported by the reasons as required to be given under Sub-rule 9 of Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. It is also submitted that the order passed by the Appellate Authority is also not in consonance with the provisions of the Rule 30 of the Rule of 1958. 3. Per contra, it is stated by Counsel for the respondents that regular disciplinary proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 was conducted against the petitioner and the Inquiring Authority after considering the entire evidence available on record found the petitioner guilty for the allegations levelled against him. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings and reasons given by the Inquiring Authority, therefore, there was no need to pass a speaking and reasoned order by the Disciplinary Authority. With regard to the order passed by the Appellate Authority, it is contended by the Counsel for the respondents that the Appellate Authority allowed an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, therefore, there was no violation of the provisions of Rule 30 of the Rules 1958. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 5. On perusal of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 24.09.1999, it is apparent that the Disciplinary Authority at the first reproduced the allegations levelled against the petitioner under the memorandum dated 110.1998 and thereafter it simply mentioned the events taken place during the enquiry. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 5. On perusal of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 24.09.1999, it is apparent that the Disciplinary Authority at the first reproduced the allegations levelled against the petitioner under the memorandum dated 110.1998 and thereafter it simply mentioned the events taken place during the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority further mentioned that a notice to show cause alongwith a copy of the enquiry report was served upon the petitioner. After recording the facts as stated above, the Disciplinary Authority has given his findings which are not at all supported by any reason. It is well settled that Disciplinary Authority while passing an order imposing punishment upon a civil servant is required to pass a speaking and reasoned order. The allegations for which employee is found guilty are required to be supported by the reasons based on the evidence available on record. No such reasons are available in the order impugned dated 24.09.1999. Sub-rule 9 of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 also puts a embargo upon the Disciplinary Authority to support the findings by specific reasons. The order impugned dated 24.09.1999 passed by the Disciplinary Authority is in violation of well settled principle of law i.e., the order passed by Disciplinary Authority should be speaking and reasoned order and also in violation of Sub-rule 9 of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. 6. The contention of the Counsel for the respondent to the effect that there was no need to pass a speaking and reasoned order in view of the fact that the Disciplinary Authority passed the order impugned in concurrence to the findings given to the Inquiring Authority is also not tenable in view of the law laid by this Court in the case of S.L. Gupta vs. LIC, reported in 2005 (4) RDD 861 (Raj), wherein this Court held as under :- “In normal course a speaking and reasoned order is required to be passed by every quasi judicial authority as it is a cardinal principle of rule of law. The action of the disciplinary authority is quasi judicial by nature, therefore, in order to enable the delinquent employee to know the reasons which weighed in the mind of the disciplinary authority in determining the guilt the order with reasons in support to the findings and conclusions is must. The action of the disciplinary authority is quasi judicial by nature, therefore, in order to enable the delinquent employee to know the reasons which weighed in the mind of the disciplinary authority in determining the guilt the order with reasons in support to the findings and conclusions is must. However, in the present case the stand taken by the respondents is that the order passed by the disciplinary authority is in concurrence to the findings given by the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry report which is having sufficient reasons, therefore, the order passed by the disciplinary authority need not to be a reasoned one. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 1987 (Supp) SCC 582, held that when the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the inquiring authority and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Inquiry Officer and given the same reasons for the findings. In the instant case, I am to see as to whether the above principles can be applied in the present set of facts. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , held that the inquiry report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a findings of guilty and with proposed punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi judicial inquiry if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is being available to the disciplinary authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion rules of natural justice would be affected. In view of this position of law, the inquiry report wherein an employee is found guilty, is adverse material to the delinquent employee. In the present case also the inquiry report alongwith the notice to show cause was given to the petitioner as an adverse material and the petitioner was required to meet the same by submitting a reply. The petitioner submitted a reply to the disciplinary authority and raised various objections with regard to denial of opportunity of defence and also with regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer. As I stated above that in the light of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. The petitioner submitted a reply to the disciplinary authority and raised various objections with regard to denial of opportunity of defence and also with regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer. As I stated above that in the light of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (Supra), the inquiry report is an adverse material. Therefore, the agreements to the findings by the disciplinary authority was tentative. The disciplinary authority after receiving the order and comments by the delinquent employee is always required to reach at its own findings and conclusions. The disciplinary authority is under an obligation to deal with the objections raised by the employee and he is required to prescribe findings and conclusions supported by the reasons. In a case where a copy of the inquiry report is supplied to a delinquent employee with a notice to show cause with regard to proposed punishment, the principle laid down in the case of Ram Kumar’s case (Supra), cannot be applied. These are not the case of agreement with the findings of Inquiry Officer but in these cases the inquiry report itself has been treated as an adverse material, as such it is all the more necessary for the disciplinary authority to record reasons in support of his findings and conclusions.” 7. In view of it, the order impugned dated 24.09.1999, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. I am not adjudicating the order passed by the Appellate Authority as the original order passed by the Disciplinary Authority itself is laconic and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. In view of the whatever discussed above, the order impugned dated 24.09.1999 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Barmer is hereby quashed, all the orders consequential there to also stands quashed. 9. No order as to costs.