Judgment Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 22.1.1985 passed by the Additional District Judge, Kapurthala whereby appeal preferred by the appellant-plaintiffs against he judgement and decree dated 29.11.1983 passed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Sultanpur Lodhi dismissing their suit for declaration has been affirmed. 2. The facts as emerge from the record are that Amar Singh - respondent No. 1 filed a suit bearing No. 280 dated 4.12.1979 against Darshan Singh, Jagtar Singh, Amarjit Singh, Sukhdev Singh and Ors. for specific performance of an agreement in respect of land measuring 9 Kanais and 19 Marias. In the said suit, Amar Singh respondent No. 1 was represented by his counsel Shri V.K. Gupta and Shri Rajesh Kapoor whereas respondent No. 2 was represented by Shri Mohan Singh Nada Advocate, Kewal Singh respondent No. 4 by D.S. Josh Advocate whereas the present appellants Jagtar Singh, Amarjit Singh and Sukhdev Singh were represented by Shri Daljit Parshad Advocate. During the pendency of the said suit, a compromise was arrived at between the parties on 9.3.1981 when statements of the parties or their counsel were recorded and a decree was passed. The present appellants were not present in Court on that day when the compromise was effected. However, their brother Harbans Singh and their counsel Shri Daljit Parshad Advocate were present who had signed the compromise in the suit filed by Amar Singh and the said compromise is the result of fraud and as such is not binding on them. 3. Suit was contested by respondent No. 1 only who filed written statement denying the averments made by the appellants and stating that a valid and lawful compromise had been arrived at between the parties on the basis of which decree dated 9.3.1981 was passed and the said decree was binding on the appellants. On these pleadings, the following issues were framed: 1. Whether the decree dated 9.3.1981 is liable to be set aside as alleged in the plaint? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are barred by their own act and conduct from filing the present suit? OPD 3. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for? OPP 6. Relief. 4. OPD 3. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for? OPP 6. Relief. 4. Trial Court on appreciation of evidence led by the parties decided issues Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 against the appellants whereas issue No. 3 was decided in their favour and against the respondent-defendants. Consequently, the suit was dismissed. Appeal carried by the appellants was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kapurthala. 5. Learned Counsel for appellants submitted that the decree dated 9.3.1981 was liable to be set aside and both the Courts below have wrongly held the said decree to be valid. He placed reliance on Dalip Singh and Anr. v. Raj Mall and Ors. 1981 P.L.J. 298, Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel (1988-2) 94 P.L.R. 365 (S.C.), Sumer and Anr. v. Vijay Singh and Anr. (1990-1) 97 P.L.R. 350, Mohinder Singh v. Bakashi 1993 P.L.J. 59, and Chand Kaur v. Raj Kauri 1993(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 512, in support of his contentions. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents sharply responded to the submissions of the appellants and submitted that both the Courts have recorded a finding of fact that the decree dated 9.3.1981 was valid and legal and this Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not interfere in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below. He relied upon Jimshwardas (D) through LRs. and Ors. v. Smt. Jagrani and Anr., in support of his contentions. He submitted that in view of law laid down in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Ors. and Billu Singh v. Gurcharan Singh and Ors. (1987-2) 92 P.L.R. 460, even the counsel or the agent of a party is authorised to enter into compromise and the same shall be binding on the parties. I have heard counsel for the parties and have also perused the records. 7. and Billu Singh v. Gurcharan Singh and Ors. (1987-2) 92 P.L.R. 460, even the counsel or the agent of a party is authorised to enter into compromise and the same shall be binding on the parties. I have heard counsel for the parties and have also perused the records. 7. The trial Court while deciding issue No. 1, in para 12, has recorded as under:- After carefully considering the facts and circumstances of the case which have been discussed above in detail 1 am of the considered view that the compromise was arrived at bona fide by the counsel and the parties present and with their full consent and knowledge and it is binding upon the plaintiffs as well. It is accordingly held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove this issue. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 8. The lower Appellate Court affirmed the said finding and in para 14 of its judgment noted as under:- As I have already referred to above careful reading of the compromise in question and that too very minutely would go a long way to show that the suit of Amar Singh filed by him was decreed to the extent of one half out of the land comprised in plots A and B in Ex. P-2 on payment of Rs. 25,000/- on or before 30.4.81. As regards his claim regarding the remaining land in dispute comprised in plots C and D in Ex. C-2 stands dismissed. It was also agreed and ordered that there shall be left a rasta also two Karams in width etc. When the parties were so vigilant to getting their statements recorded meticulously besides the compromise having been reduced into writing along with detailed plan depicting the property, it cannot be said that this compromise is the result of misrepresentation or that the claim of the plaintiff Amar Singh in this suit was not satisfied. It is a case where the second part of Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. would be attracted and the plaintiffs cannot claim that this decree is not binding upon them simply because they had not signed it, especially when their counsel and their brother Harbans Singh who had been conducting the proceedings had signed the compromise and statement on their behalf. The findings of the trial Court on issue Nos. The findings of the trial Court on issue Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 are, therefore, affirmed, Nothing has been argued before me regarding the finding of issue No. 3 which also requires to be upheld. 9. The Apex Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwalas case (supra) in paras 40 and 43 had laid down as under:- 40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words in writing and signed by the parties, inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily mean, to borrow the language of Order III, Rule 1, C.P.C. any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying or acting as the case may be, made by the party in person. (Emphasis supplied). 43. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. As stated by Spencer-Bower & Turner in Res judicata, Second Edition, page 37: Any judgment or order which in other respects answers to the decision of a res judicata is nonetheless so because it was made in pursuance of the consent and agreement of the parties.... Accordingly, judgments, orders, and awards by consent have always been held no less efficacious, though doubts have been occasionally expressed whether, strictly, the formation of the estoppel in such cases is no presentation by conduct, rather than res judicata. 10. In view of the above, no illegality or perversity could be found in the judgments and decrees recorded by both the Courts below. Finding no merit in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. No costs. 11. Before parting with the judgment it needs to be noticed that respondent No. 1 had filed an application bearing CM. 10. In view of the above, no illegality or perversity could be found in the judgments and decrees recorded by both the Courts below. Finding no merit in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. No costs. 11. Before parting with the judgment it needs to be noticed that respondent No. 1 had filed an application bearing CM. No. 3738-C of 2001 under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for additional evidence during the pendency of this appeal whereby he wanted to produce grounds of appeal dated 7.4.1981 filed before District Judge, Kapurthala against the judgment and decree dated 9.3.1981 passed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Sultanpur Lodhi and a certified copy of order dated 28.5.1981 passed by the District Judge, Kapurthala vide which appeal filed by the present appellants was dismissed and certified copy of the order dated 4.1.1994 passed by the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Sultanpur Lodhi. Since the appeal has been dismissed, the application for additional evidence is rendered in fructuous and is disposed of as such.