Judgment :- K. Hema, J. 1. Some of the accused in a forest case when produced before the Trial Court made a statement to the Magistrate that they were assaulted etc. They sought for medical examination. The learned Magistrate recorded their statement, sent them for medical examination, took cognizance of the offence under S.323 IPC against the forest officials and issued summons to them. The forest officials entered appearance and they were enlarged on bail also. Thereafter, it was pointed out by the injured-respondents, who entered appearance through counsel, that there was some procedural irregularity since the sworn statements of the injured were not taken etc. Learned Magistrate after being satisfied that sworn statement was not taken, passed an order acquitting the accused, recording that the cognizance is withdrawn. 2. The Magistrate did not stop there. He was pleased to proceed with the case, took sworn statement of the injured, and issued fresh summons to the accused. At the second time, one more offence was included and some more accused were added up. The challenge in this case is that the entire procedure adopted by learned Magistrate is wrong and contrary to provisions of law. The Magistrate having once acquitted the accused after recording that the complaint is withdrawn, there is a bar under S. 300 in proceeding against the accused, it is contended. No doubt that the arguments advanced by learned counsel for petitioners do appear, on the first blush, to be quite impressive. I shall consider each and every point in detail. 3. Before that, facts are to be stated as follows: The petitioners are forest officials. Respondents 1 to 5 are accused in a forest offence (OR No. 13/1999) and they are the injured in this case. They were arrested and produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam in connection with the above crime. On their production, they made a statement to the Court that they were beaten up and ill-treated by forest officials and consequently, they developed stomach ache, chest pain and other complaints. One of them, namely, respondent No. 4 stated that he wanted to go to hospital. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also identified the forest officials who allegedly assaulted them and identified them by pointing out those persons from the Court hail. These were all done in the proceedings in O.R. 13 of 1999. 4. One of them, namely, respondent No. 4 stated that he wanted to go to hospital. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also identified the forest officials who allegedly assaulted them and identified them by pointing out those persons from the Court hail. These were all done in the proceedings in O.R. 13 of 1999. 4. On the basis of the statement made by respondents 1 to 5, the Court suo motu registered a case and cognizance of offences under Ss.343, 323 and 34 IPC was taken. A case was taken on file as C.C.140 of 1999 against the forest officials. The accused entered appearance. They were released on bail. Thereafter, respondents 1 to 5 herein filed vakalath and it appears that it was submitted by their counsel orally that there is a procedural irregularity in the registration of the case against petitioners. According to them, sworn statements of the complainants were not taken and the case was registered on the basis of the mere statements and hence there was procedural irregularity which needs to be corrected. Learned Magistrate perused records and found that sworn statements were not recorded before taking cognizance of the offences. It also found that it was a procedural irregularity which cannot be corrected at that stage and hence cognizance taken in C.C.No.140 of 1999 was "withdrawn" and the accused were acquitted. 5. Thereafter, the statement of the so-called complainants (respondents 1 to 5) which was recorded on the date of their production before the Trial Court was registered as C.M.P. No.3756 of 2000 and the case was posted for recording their sworn statements. Sworn statements of respondents 1 to 5 were recorded and thereafter, based on such statements etc., the Court found that offences under S.343, 323, 324 and 34 IPC were disclosed. The Court again took cognizance of the above offences and the complaint was taken on file as C.C. No.13/2001. Summons was again issued to petitioners who are six in number (originally there were only 3 accused but, at the second time of taking cognizance, 3 more accused were added up to the array of accused). 6. The petitioners are seeking intervention of this Court to quash entire proceedings in C.C. No.13/2001. Summons was again issued to petitioners who are six in number (originally there were only 3 accused but, at the second time of taking cognizance, 3 more accused were added up to the array of accused). 6. The petitioners are seeking intervention of this Court to quash entire proceedings in C.C. No.13/2001. The main contention raised by learned counsel appearing for petitioners is that the Court having taken cognizance once, and having acquitted the accused of the offences alleged against them, the Court is barred from proceeding with the case, in view of S.300 of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners also submitted that the case involved originally is one under S.323 and 343 of IPC and the case is a summons case and the procedure to be adopted is the procedure for summons case. Therefore, the acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate comes under S.257 Cr.P.C. S.257 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "257. Withdrawal of complaint.-- If a complainant, at any time before a final order is passed in any case under this Chapter, satisfies the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint against the accused, or if there be more than one accused, against all or any of them, the Magistrate may permit him to withdraw the same, and shall thereupon acquit the accused against whom the complaint is so withdrawn." 7. A reading of S.257 of the Code shows that if the complainant satisfies the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw the complaint against the accused, he may do so and shall record acquittal of the accused against whom the complaint is so withdrawn. Learned counsel also submitted that in cases where accused is acquitted under S.257 of Cr.P.C., he cannot be tried for the same offence again, in view of the bar under S.300 Cr.P.C. S.300 (1) provides that a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and acquitted of such offence while such acquittal remains in force, is not liable to be tried again for the same offence. 8. 8. The argument raised by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the petitioners entered appearance before the Court below on receipt of summons and on their appearance, since the case is a summons case, the trial has commenced and it has to be inferred that the petitioners have been tried. He has placed reliance upon the decision reported in N. Kandaswami Pillai and Another v. The Executive Officer (AIR 1947 Mad.306). It is held in the said decision that the trial of a summons case begins when the accused is brought before the Magistrate and not thereafter, even in a case where there is withdrawal of complaint. It is further held that withdrawal of complaint even before the accused is questioned under S.242 Cr.P.C. would amount to a trial and acquittal. 9. On a close perusal of records, in this case it cannot be said that this is a case which was "withdrawn" by the complainant and the accused were acquitted accordingly. In fact, there was no request from the complainant or the injured to "withdraw" the case and nowhere from the records, it is seen that any such request was made by any of the injured at any time before Court to "withdraw" the case. In Annexure IV order, the Trial Court recorded that the injured entered appearance and it was pointed out that there is procedural irregularity and according to Trial Court, it was to be set right. It is clear from the records that the intention of the complainant, was not to withdraw the case but to proceed with the case. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a request for withdrawal from the part of the respondents. S.257 of Cr.P.C. applies or can be invoked only in cases where the complainant requests for a "withdrawal”. 10. In this case, in the absence of any request from the so-called complainants, it cannot be said that the complaint is "withdrawn" and the acquittal falls under S.257 Cr.P.C. Even the Trial Court does not have a case that the complainant-injured had "withdrawn" the complaint. There is nothing on record to show that the complaint was "withdrawn" by any of the injured in this case. In the absence of a withdrawal of complaint by the injured, it cannot be said that the acquittal in this case falls under S.257 Cr.P.C. 11. There is nothing on record to show that the complaint was "withdrawn" by any of the injured in this case. In the absence of a withdrawal of complaint by the injured, it cannot be said that the acquittal in this case falls under S.257 Cr.P.C. 11. However, the fact remains that the accused were acquitted once, rightly or wrongly. The learned Magistrate recorded in Annexure IV order that the accused are acquitted. What is the effect of such an order of acquittal? Under which provision, such acquittal comes? On going through the records of this case, particularly, C.M.P. No. 3756/2000 which is the statement recorded by the Magistrate from the injured respondents 1 to 5 herein, it appears that they only made a statement of facts that they were injured, assaulted and they had some complaints of pain, physical discomfort etc. One of the injured also made a statement that he wanted to go to the hospital. They also stated that there was illegal confinement. Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under S.343 and 323 and 34 IPC based on such statement. 12. A close reading of the statement given by the injured will go to show that they had not made a specific request to the Court "to proceed against offenders". It cannot therefore be said that respondents 1 to 5 made a complaint to the Court "with a view to take action" under the Code. The statement made by them only constitutes allegations against forest officials which may constitute offences but it cannot he said that such statement was made by the injured to the Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code. It appears that they only disclosed what transpired and they also wanted to make arrangements for medical examination. The learned Magistrate accordingly sent them for medical examination also. 13. In the above circumstances, the statement given by respondents 1 to 5 may not amount to a "complaint" as defined under S.2(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It appears that they only disclosed what transpired and they also wanted to make arrangements for medical examination. The learned Magistrate accordingly sent them for medical examination also. 13. In the above circumstances, the statement given by respondents 1 to 5 may not amount to a "complaint" as defined under S.2(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. S.2(d) reads as follows: "2.(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report." It is clear from a reading of S.2(d) that "complaint" means an allegation made to a Magistrate either orally or writing, with a view to his taking action under the Code that some persons whether known or unknown have committed the offence. But, in the statement given by respondents 1 to 5, a crucial aspect is missing. There is nothing in the statement to show that respondents 1 to 5 gave the statement with a view to taking action under the Code. 14. It appears that the injured only wanted them to be medically examined and wanted to bring to the notice of the Court that they were assaulted by forest officials and also wrongfully confined, but they had not specifically requested the Magistrate to take action against forest officials under the Code. It cannot therefore he said that the statement given by respondents 1 to 5 was with a view to take action under the Code against petitioners. Therefore, such statement does not come under the definition "complaint" as defined under S.2(d) of the Cr.P.C. 15. But then, under which provision learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence on the date of production of respondents 1 to 5 in the Court? A reading of S.190 of the Code will he necessary to throw some light on this aspect. S.190 of the Code reads as follows: "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-s.(2), may take cognizance of any offence -- (a) upon receiving a complaint. S.190 of the Code reads as follows: "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-s.(2), may take cognizance of any offence -- (a) upon receiving a complaint. of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-s. (1) of such offences as are, within his competence to inquire into or try." 16. It is clear from S.190(1)(a) of the Code that the Magistrate may take cognizance upon a 'complaint'. Under S.190(1)(b), cognizance can be taken upon a 'police report'. As per S. 190(1)(c), upon 'information' from any person other than a police officer or upon his own 'knowledge' that an offence is committed also, the Magistrate may take cognizance of offence. From the discussions already made, it is evident that no 'complaint' from the respondents as defined under the Code is received by the Magistrate. Hence, Magistrate cannot he said to have taken cognizance of offence upon receiving a "complaint" falling under S.190(1)(a). The statement based on which the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance cannot be deemed to be a "complaint" as stated in S.190(1)(a) read with S.2(d) of the Code. 17. Can it be said that cognizance was taken upon an 'information' or upon the 'knowledge' of the Magistrate? The words “information" and "knowledge" are not defined under the Code. The meaning of the word 'information' as per the Dictionary meaning is "something told: knowledge". Applying the dictionary meaning to the statement given by respondents 1 to 5, it can be said to be information which learned Magistrate received from the injured about the commission of offence. There is evidently a distinction between "complaint" and "information". Learned counsel appearing for respondents relied upon the decision reported in Emperor v. Sheo Pratap Singh & Ors. (ILR Vol. There is evidently a distinction between "complaint" and "information". Learned counsel appearing for respondents relied upon the decision reported in Emperor v. Sheo Pratap Singh & Ors. (ILR Vol. LIII (Allahabad Series) wherein it is held thus: "The essential difference between a complaint and information is that a Magistrate acts on a complaint because the complainant has asked him to act, but in the case of information a Magistrate acts of his own accord and initiative. It is for this reason that in the latter case, S.191 requires that he must inform the accused that, the accused may be tried by another Court." 18. On the facts of this case, therefore, the statement given by the respondents to learned Magistrate can he taken only as "information" falling under S.190(1)(c). After recording the statement of the injured. Learned Magistrate proceeded suo motu to take cognizance of the offence under S.343, 323 and 34 IBC, even without a request to do so. Even though there is nothing in the statement of the injured to show that they made a statement with a view to take action. Magistrate took cognizance of offence. But such cognizance can he said to he cognizance on "information" and not on "complaint". A Magistrate is well empowered to take cognizance of an offence on a statement given by the injured treating it as an ‘information' falling under S.190(1)(c). 19. The next question is whether the Magistrate, on an information received by it under S.190(1)(c), is obliged to take sworn statement or not. A reading of S.200 Cr.P.C. is necessary to understand the position. The said provision reads as follows: "S.200. 19. The next question is whether the Magistrate, on an information received by it under S.190(1)(c), is obliged to take sworn statement or not. A reading of S.200 Cr.P.C. is necessary to understand the position. The said provision reads as follows: "S.200. Examination of complainant.-- A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses-- (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under S.192: Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under S.192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them." 20. It is clear from the said section itself that, recording of sworn statement is essential only if the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a ‘complaint'. Since, in this case, cognizance is not taken on a ‘complaint', but it was taken only on the basis of an ‘information' which falls under S.190(1)(c), there was no necessity as per law, for the Court to record sworn statement of the informant. Therefore, the failure in taking sworn statement cannot he said to be an illegality on the facts of this case, though the Trial Court was under a wrong impression that recording of sworn statement was necessary and the failure to record such statement amounted to illegality. 21. However, at a later stage, when it was brought to the notice of the Court that taking of cognizance without recording of sworn statement would amount to procedural irregularity, learned Magistrate, with abundant caution, proceeded to acquit the accused, by passing Annexure IV order. On going through Annexure IV order, it can be seen that what was done by the Court was to suo motu "withdraw the cognizance" taken by it. Learned Magistrate recorded that the cognizance is "withdrawn" and accused is acquitted, through there is no specific provision in the Code to withdraw the cognizance once taken. 22. On going through Annexure IV order, it can be seen that what was done by the Court was to suo motu "withdraw the cognizance" taken by it. Learned Magistrate recorded that the cognizance is "withdrawn" and accused is acquitted, through there is no specific provision in the Code to withdraw the cognizance once taken. 22. The next question which arises therefore, is as to what will be the effect of Annexure IV order passed by learned Magistrate in such circumstances? Was it illegal? Does it come under any of the provisions of the Code? It is relevant to note that the offences on which the Court has taken cognizance under S.190(1)(c) are summons cases and hence, the Court has to follow the procedure for summons cases. In such a situation, S.258 Cr.P.C. permits the Court to stop proceedings as stated in the said provision. Under S.258 Cr.P.C., the Court has power to stop proceedings in certain cases. The relevant section can be quoted hereunder: "S.258. Power to stop proceedings in certain cases.-- In any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. any other judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made of after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge." 23. A reading of S.258 of the Code shows that in any summons case instituted otherwise upon a "complaint", the Magistrate is empowered to stop the proceedings at any stage, without pronouncing judgment, after recording reasons for stopping the proceedings. I have already held that the case cannot be said stop be instituted upon a "complaint". It is instituted otherwise than upon a "complaint" defined under S.2(d) of the Code since Court took cognizance of offence upon "information" under S.190(1)(c) of the Code. Therefore, S.258 of the Code will apply to the facts of this case. The Court is empowered to stop the proceedings under S.258 of the Code, but it has to record reasons for the stoppage. But. Therefore, S.258 of the Code will apply to the facts of this case. The Court is empowered to stop the proceedings under S.258 of the Code, but it has to record reasons for the stoppage. But. if such stoppage of proceeding is made before recording of the evidence of the principal witnesses, the Court may release the accused under S.258 of the Code and such release shall have the effect of discharge. So, in a case where the Magistrate is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by him that the proceedings have to be stopped, he may do so, at any stage and if it is before recording evidence of principal witnesses, the Court may release the accused. In such case where accused is released before evidence is recorded, such release shall have the effect of a discharge. 24. The case at hand (at the time of passing Annexure IV order) is a summons case. As per Annexure IV order, it is clear that Court has decided to "release" the accused, though the specific expression used by the Court in the order is "acquittal" of the accused. As already held by me earlier, there was no "complaint' in this case as contemplated under S.2(d) of Cr.P.C., while producing the injured-accused in Court. The Court later decided to stop the proceedings and release the accused. Therefore, as per Annexure IV order, the Court has only stopped the proceedings and "released" the accused under S.258 Cr.P.C., by recording reasons in Annexure IV order, even though what was recorded is that the accused are acquitted and the cognizance is "withdrawn". But the use of wrong expression is of no consequence. It is the effect of what was actually done that matters. It has to be held that the Trial Court, after taking cognizance of offence under S.190(1)(c) has invoked S.258 of the Code and released the accused for reasons recorded. It will only have the effect of a discharge, as per S.258 of the Code. 25. However, later, the injured entered appearance in Court and expressed their intention to proceed against the accused. The Trial Court has therefore, at the subsequent stage, treated the very same statement as a complaint. It will only have the effect of a discharge, as per S.258 of the Code. 25. However, later, the injured entered appearance in Court and expressed their intention to proceed against the accused. The Trial Court has therefore, at the subsequent stage, treated the very same statement as a complaint. Once the Court is satisfied that such statement was given with a view to taking action under the Code that a person has committed offence, the Court can treat the statement as a "complaint". There cannot be any bar in doing so. But, earlier, the Court was not satisfied that such statement was given with a view to take action against the offenders and hence it was well within the jurisdiction to treat it as an "information" and proceed under S.190(1)(c) of the Code. 26. Anyway, the intention being made clear by the injured, though at a later stage that the statement is given with a view to take action against the offenders, the Court cannot be said to have committed an illegality in treating the same statement as a "complaint" and proceed to take cognizance of offences accordingly. The Trial Court also proceeded to record sworn statement under S.200 of the Code. There is no illegality in doing so, as per the provisions of the Code. 27. On recording the sworn statement the Court also found that some more facts are revealed from the sworn statements, disclosing involvement of offence under S.324 IPC also. It was also found that the names of three more persons were stated as accused. Since the names of those accused are also revealed in the sworn statement given by respondents 1 to 5, the Court included three more accused in the array of accused and proceeded against them. It is in this background that the Trial Court issued summons to the accused. 28. Though Trial Court has complicated the procedure, being confused about the steps which were to be taken at a particular stage. I do not find that the procedure adopted, resulted in such illegality which will vitiate the entire proceedings initiated against accused. The issuance of summons to the accused based on the statement given by respondents Ito 5 and also the sworn statements given by the said respondents and it cannot be said to be illegal. I do not find that the procedure adopted, resulted in such illegality which will vitiate the entire proceedings initiated against accused. The issuance of summons to the accused based on the statement given by respondents Ito 5 and also the sworn statements given by the said respondents and it cannot be said to be illegal. Since the accused can be treated only as 'discharged' under S.258 Cr.P.C. as already discussed by me earlier, there is also no bar for trial against them even for the same offence with the consent of the Court by which, he was discharged as per sub-clause (5) of S.300 of Cr.P.C. In this case as already stated by me earlier, the accused can only be deemed to have been "discharged" as per Annexure IV order and not "acquitted". The release of the accused under S.258 Cr.P.C. will only have the effect of a "discharge". If a person is discharged under the said section, the bar for trying such accused again would apply, only if he is being tried for the same offence. But in this case, such bar also will not apply because the accused is tried with the consent of the Court and they are tried for offence under S.324 1PC also. Evidently, the trial is proceeded, with the consent of the Court by which the accused was discharged under S.258(5) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the case of the accused/petitioners falls under S.300(5) Cr.P.C., and it cannot be said that there is any bar under S.300 Cr.P.C. The argument raised by learned counsel for petitioners in this regard is rejected with due respect. 29. It was strenuously contended that having gone through all the trauma of trial, acquittal etc., it would be an abuse of process of Court to ask the accused again to undergo the same trauma, once again. It was also submitted that petitioners are Forest officials, who are not guilty of the alleged offences and that they were falsely implicated etc. and therefore, this Court may take a lenient view in the matter for the purpose of securing ends of justice under S.482 Cr.P.C. On going through allegations in the complaint and what transpired before the Trial Court, I find that there is no full-fledged trial and no witnesses were examined. The accused were exempted through out the proceedings and they were not present before the Court on many occasions. The accused were exempted through out the proceedings and they were not present before the Court on many occasions. The Court has granted exemption to them under S.205 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the case was stayed by this Court and hence it cannot be said that the accused/petitioners were appearing before the Court and were undergoing the trauma of a long trial by making personal appearance. On the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore I am satisfied that if an order were to be passed, quashing the complaint or the proceedings initiated against petitioners, it will only result in miscarriage of justice. 30. But a serious question will arise as to what will be the effect of the alleged non-compliance of S.191 Cr.P.C. As per S.191, the Court is bound to ask the accused as to whether they want the case to be transferred. In this case, such a procedure is not seen adopted by the Court below, and the lower Court has not asked the accused as to whether the case has to be transferred. But, as per the records, immediately on taking cognizance of offence, the Trial Court, after granting bail to petitioners (and exempting them from personal appearance until further orders), addressed learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, requesting for transfer of the case. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has withdrawn the case from Judicial First Class Magistrate Court Devikulam and made over the case to Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Adimaly. Therefore, though petitioners were not specifically asked whether they required a transfer. There is substantial compliance of S.191 of Cr.P.C., and therefore on this ground also, it cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced. 31. Anyway, on the facts and circumstances of this case, I find that the order does not warrant interference. The order taking cognizance of offence against petitioners cannot be said to be illegal. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners submitted that the case is now pending before the judicial First Class Magistrate, Adimaly, but the incident allegedly occurred within the jurisdiction of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam. The case has to be tried by the Court which has the territorial jurisdiction and hence an order may be issued to transfer the case from Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Adimaly to Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Devikulam. The case has to be tried by the Court which has the territorial jurisdiction and hence an order may be issued to transfer the case from Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Adimaly to Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Devikulam. It is also pointed out that the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam, who has taken cognizance of the offence suo motu has already been transferred and the case happened to be transferred to Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Adimaly only on account of the request made by Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam to transfer the case, since Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam had initiated the proceedings, probably, by virtue of S.191 Cr.P.C. 32. It is not possible to issue a direction to transfer the case, since it will not come within the purview of this petition. Yet, there will be no bar for the petitioners to seek appropriate relief before the appropriate forum for transfer of the case, since the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam who has taken cognizance of offence has already been transferred, if a petition is filed for transfer, it will be considered in accordance with law, untrammelled by any of the observations made in this order. Petition is dismissed.