ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. The petitioner was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the year 1977 in the District Judiciary. In the year 1995, he was suspended and proceeded against in a departmental enquiry. The District and Sessions Judge, Damoh appointed a Judicial Magistrate as an Enquiry Officer to conduct departmental enquiry against the petitioner. It is averred in the petition, the Enquiry Officer without following the due procedure as contemplated under the M.P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short the Rules) conducted the enquiry. As alleged, he was deprived of getting necessary documents. Such witnesses who were inimically disposed towards the petitioner were produced and the principle of natural justice was not followed. It is asserted that the respondent No. 2 was totally annoyed with the petitioner as the wife of the petitioner made complaints against the Disciplinary Authority to the High Court. The enquiry took one and half years and eventually it was concluded. Being aggrieved, the petitioner had filed W.P. No. 3180 of 1998 which was withdrawn. Thereafter the respondent No. 2 passed an order on 3-8-1998 compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred an appeal. The Appellate Authority vide Annexure.P12 dated 2-7-1999 rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 2. According to the writ petitioner, the order passed vide Annexure.P12 is a non-speaking order and that itself warrants its lanceting. It is further urged that the order of compulsory retirement as contained in Annexure.P11 suffers from immense irregularities warranting its quashment. It is the stand in the writ petition that the principles of natural justice were not followed during the enquiry and, therefore, the order of punishment has to pave the path of vitiation. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by the answering respondents 1 and 2 contending inter-alia that the enquiry was conducted as per rules and in conformity with the principles of natural justice. It has been pleaded that except Charge Nos. 2 and 8, all other charges were proved either fully or in part. It is contended that the enquiry report is based on material evidence on record and adequate reasons have been given by the Enquiry Officer to arrive at the conclusion. It has been pleaded that except Charge Nos. 2 and 8, all other charges were proved either fully or in part. It is contended that the enquiry report is based on material evidence on record and adequate reasons have been given by the Enquiry Officer to arrive at the conclusion. The Disciplinary Authority, upon perusal of the testimony of the witnesses and the documents brought on record and upon consideration of the entire record, concurred with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, the petitioner was asked to show cause for removal but eventually, he was compulsorily retired. The other allegations made in the petition have been controverted. 4. I have heard the petitioner Mohammad Idris and Mr. Satyendra Patel, Learned Counsel for the respondents. 5. The petitioner has raised four contentions, namely, the Enquiry Officer has not followed the appropriate procedure and, therefore, the report is vitiated and as a logical corollary the concurrence by the Disciplinary Authority has also become untenable; that the charges though have been treated to have been proven, in actual facts, there is no evidence and hence the order of punishment is per se illegal; that the appellate authority has passed an order in a mechanical manner without ascribing any reason and that makes the order of the Appellate Authority absolutely susceptible; and that none of the authorities have taken care of the nature of the charges and imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement, as a consequence of which the doctrine of proportionality has been given a go-bye. 6. The Learned Counsel for the respondents has supported the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and canvassed that there had been no illegality in conducting of the enquiry and the concurrence of the Disciplinary Authority with the same cannot be found fault with. It is urged by him that the principles of proportionality has been kept in view inasmuch as the Disciplinary Authority though issued a show cause of removal, eventually passed the order of compulsory retirement and the said action goes a long way to show that the punishment imposed is commensurate with the charges proven. 7. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar, I have carefully perused the enquiry report, the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the order passed by the Appellate Authority. 7. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar, I have carefully perused the enquiry report, the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the order passed by the Appellate Authority. One of the grounds, which has been raised with vehemence by the petitioner is that the Appellate Authority has passed an order which is not a speaking one. In this context, I may refer with profit Rule 27(2) of the Rules, which reads as under : 27. Consideration of appeal.- (1)................ (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider,- (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the records; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe, and pass orders - (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty : or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case : Provided that - (i) the Commission shall be consulted in all cases where such consultation is necessary; (ii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 10 and an inquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 19, itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry, make such orders as it may deem fit. (iii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 10 and an inquiry under Rule 14 has already been held in the case the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed, make such order as it may deem fit. (iv) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16, of making a representation against such enhanced penalty. The language in which the rule has been couched has immense significance. Indubitably, the Appellate Authority has the sacrosanct duty to perform. Application of mind in the capacity of quasi-judicial authority is the sine qua non while disposing of the appeal. 8. The question of any kind of irregularity, illegality, proportionality of punishment can always be better appreciated by the Appellate Authority. The submission of the petitioner is that the Appellate Authority was required to ascribe cogent and germane reasons while dealing with the appeal and not to dismiss the appeal by an order which is laconic and cryptic. The petitioner has placed immense emphasis on the manner in which the appeal has been dealt with. It is propounded by him that the Appellate Authority by mere reference to the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority has dismissed the appeal. Submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that absence of reason by the Appellate Authority while dealing with the appeal makes the order untenable as delineation of appeal necessitates of giving reasons. The ascribing of reason is imperative since any authority that sits on appeal over the impugned order has a sacrosanct duty to deal with the grievance of the person who has preferred the appeal. The Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction to re-appreciate evidence brought on record, documents proven as well as to the sphere of applicability of doctrine of proportionality. The power of quasi-judicial scrutiny is irrefragably and indubitably more than the basic conception of judicial review. If an order of the Appellate Authority does not disclose any kind of reason, it would be an anathema to the fundamental concept of natural justice. The power of quasi-judicial scrutiny is irrefragably and indubitably more than the basic conception of judicial review. If an order of the Appellate Authority does not disclose any kind of reason, it would be an anathema to the fundamental concept of natural justice. The doctrine of audi alteram partem in its quiescentalness encapsules, engulfs and inheres in it the basic concept of giving reasons, for reason is the life and soul of the order. In the absence of life and soul, the order is bound to be treated as unsustainable, indefensible and pregnable. In this Context, I may refer with profit to the decision of Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SCW 751 wherein in paragraphs 7 to 9, it has been held as under: 7. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless (See Raj Kishore Jha vs. State of Bihar and others, 2003 (7) Supreme 152 ). 8. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen vs. Amalgamated Engineering Union, 1971 (1) All ER 1148 observed "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. vs. Crabtree, 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice." Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity, the emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx," it can, by its silence render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. 9. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. 9. The above position was highlighted by us in State of Punjab vs. Bhog Singh, 2004 (1) SCC 547 .In the case of Cyril Lasrado vs. Juliana Maria Lasrado and another, (2004) 7 SCC 431, the Apex Court in paragraph 11 observed thus: 11. Reasons introduce clarify in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court's judgment not sustainable. In this regard, I may also refer with profit to the decision rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Jesus Sales Corporation, (1996) 4 SCC 69 . In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court was dealing with the concept of affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. While dealing with the said facet, their Lordships expressed the view as under: 5. The High Court has primarily considered the question as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the principles of natural justice. In that connection, several judgments of this Court have been referred to. It need not be pointed out that under different situations and conditions the requirement of compliance of the principle of natural justice vary. The Courts cannot insist that under all circumstances and under different statutory provisions personal hearings have to be afforded to the persons concerned. If this principle of affording personal hearing is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals and applications are disposed of by the competent authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose of the same. If this principle of affording personal hearing is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals and applications are disposed of by the competent authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose of the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial mind over the grievances made by the appellants or applicants concerned, but it cannot be held that before dismissing such appeals or applications in all events the quasi-judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the applicants, as the case may be. When principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed on any appeal or application, it does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if in his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the applicant to be heard because of special facts and circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open to such authority to decide the appeal or the application only after affording a personal hearing. But any order passed after taking into consideration the points raised in the appeal or the application shall not he held to be invalid merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been afforded. This is all the more important in the context of taxation and revenue matters. When an authority has determined a tax liability or has imposed a penalty, then the requirement that before the appeal is heard such tax or penalty should be deposited cannot be held to be unreasonable as already pointed out above. In the case of Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi it has been held by this Court that such requirement cannot be held to be harsh or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution so as to declare the requirement of pre-deposit itself as unconstitutional. In the case of Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi it has been held by this Court that such requirement cannot be held to be harsh or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution so as to declare the requirement of pre-deposit itself as unconstitutional. In this background, it can be said that normal rule is that before filing the appeal or before the appeal is heard, the person concerned should deposit the amount which he has been directed to deposit as a tax or penalty. The non-deposit of such amount itself is an exception which has been incorporated in different statutes including the one with which we are concerned. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4-M says in clear and unambiguous words that an appeal against an order imposing a penalty shall not be entertained unless the amount of the penalty has been deposited by the appellant. Thereafter the third proviso vests a discretion in such appellate authority to dispense with such deposit unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose in its discretion into consideration the undue hardship which it is likely to cause to the appellant. As such it can be said that the statutory requirement is that before an appeal is entertained, the amount of penalty has to be deposited by the appellant; an order dispensing with such deposit shall amount to an exception to the said requirement of deposit. In this background, it is difficult to hold that if the appellate authority has rejected the prayer of the appellant to dispense with the deposit unconditionally or has dispensed with such deposit subject to some conditions without hearing the appellant, on perusal of the petition filed on behalf of the appellant for the said purpose, the order itself is vitiated and is liable to be quashed being violative of the principles of natural justice. I have referred to the aforesaid decisions only to indicate that the authorities which are deemed to be quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial mind over the grievances made by the appellant. The applicability of judicial mind requires giving of due consideration. A singular line order or the order which does not reflect any kind of applicability of judicial mind cannot withstand scrutiny. The applicability of judicial mind requires giving of due consideration. A singular line order or the order which does not reflect any kind of applicability of judicial mind cannot withstand scrutiny. By the aforesaid, it may not be understood that an elaborate order is to be passed but what is required is that the order must reflect there has been application of judicial mind. Such reflection cannot be perceived unless some reasons are ascribed. Therefore, ascribing of reasons while disposing of the appeal is an imperative. In the case at hand, on a bare look on the order passed by the Appellate Authority, it is perceptible that no reason has been ascribed. In the absence of reasons, the said order has to pave the path of vitiation and accordingly the same is quashed. As a logical corollary, the matter stands remitted to the Appellate Authority to consider all the facets raised in the appeal including the issue relating to the proportionality of punishment. 9. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.