JUDGMENT U.C. Maheshwari, J. This appeal is preferred u/s 100 of the CPC by the appellant-defendant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 26-4-2002 passed by the 12th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Appeal No. 25-A/01 by which the judgment and decree dated 28-2-2001 passed by the IIIrd Civil Judge, Class-JJ, Jabalpur in Civil Original Suit No. 41 l-A/98 regarding dismissal of the suit has been set aside by decreeing the suit of respondent. The factual matrix of the case are that respondent had filed a suit for eviction in respect of first floor of the house No. 954 to 957 situated at Lakarganj, Belbagh, Jabalpur against one Rameshwar Prasad, the brother of the appellant by impleading the appellant as defendant No. 2 as sub-tenant. On demise of Rameshwar Prasad the appellant has also contested the matter as legal representative of his brother. According to the plaint deceased-defendant said Rameshwar Prasad was the tenant @ Rs. 80/- per month. The suit was filed along with some other grounds available under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (for short the Act), including the ground of section 12(1)(f) of the said Act, for non-residential bona fide genuine requirement regarding running business of bakery of the respondent, on the ground of insufficiency of the available accommodation on ground floor in the same house. It is also said that respondent is not having any other alternative suitable accommodation of his own. It is also pleaded that accommodation was remained in possession of the deceased defendant and the appellant for the purpose of residence and for their profession of dancing and singing. In written statement the defendants had admitted the alleged tenancy in such premises but the grounds for eviction as mentioned by the respondent in the plaint have been denied. In addition it was pleaded that earlier a suit for eviction bearing Civil Original Suit No. 312/86 was filed by the respondent against the appellant and her brother by alleging the grounds of section 13(1)(a), (b), (c) and (g). The arrears of rent, sub-tenancy, nuisance and requirement of the accommodation for repairing. Such suit was dismissed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Jabalpur on 9-12-1986 on which an appeal was preferred by the respondent. During pendency of such appeal by enhancing the rent the appeal was withdrawn by the respondent without any order on merits. The arrears of rent, sub-tenancy, nuisance and requirement of the accommodation for repairing. Such suit was dismissed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Jabalpur on 9-12-1986 on which an appeal was preferred by the respondent. During pendency of such appeal by enhancing the rent the appeal was withdrawn by the respondent without any order on merits. Thus, the decree of the trial Court had become final between the parties and also having the force of res judicata and prayed for dismissal of the suit. After framing the issues the evidence was recorded on appreciation of it, the suit was dismissed by the trial Court by virtue of section 11 of the CPC by holding that earlier judgment and decree between the parties are binding but simultaneously findings on grounds of bona fide genuine requirement, nuisance and requirement for reconstruction of the house were given in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, while the ground of sub-tenancy was decided against the respondent. On appeal, the appellate Court has held that the ground of bona fide genuine requirement was not taken in earlier suit. Thus in subsequent suit on such ground the section 11 of CPC the principle of res judicata was not applicable with this finding by allowing the appeal of respondent the decree regarding dismissal of the suit was set aside and by confirming the findings on the aforesaid ground of section 12(1)(f) of the Act the suit of respondent has been decreed, hence this appeal was preferred by the defendant. It is not in dispute that during pendency of the suit in the trial Court principal defendant No. 1 Rameshwar Prasad died. The suit remained continued against the appellant defendant No. 2 as she was the only legal representative of the deceased defendant against whom the right to sue was survived. This appeal was admitted for final hearing by order dated 4-4-2005 on following substantial question of law :- Whether a decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act could have been passed without pleading and proof that the accommodation was let out for non-residential purpose? Learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Nitin Agrawal has submitted that as per pleadings of the respondent the principle defendant was inducted in the premises for residential purpose and the suit was filed for requirement of nonresidential purpose. Learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Nitin Agrawal has submitted that as per pleadings of the respondent the principle defendant was inducted in the premises for residential purpose and the suit was filed for requirement of nonresidential purpose. Such suit could not have been decreed in the absence of pleadings and evidence regarding bona fide genuine requirement for residential purpose which was not the case of the respondent. In this regard he also referred paras 4 and 7 of the plaint and submitted that according to respondent the appellant was inducted in the premises for residential purpose and subsequently the profession of dancing was started by the appellant. In such circumstances it is manifestly clear that the appellant was inducted for residential purpose and the suit was filed for non-residential purpose. Thus, the decree is not sustainable under the law. In support of his contention, he has also cited some decided cases. It was also submitted that the judgment and decree passed in earlier suit was not considered with proper prospects by the appellate Court and prayed for setting aside the decree of the appellate Court along with, findings of both the Courts below regarding genuine requirement u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act by allowing his appeal. Responding the aforesaid arguments of the appellant, Learned Counsel for the respondent Mr. A. K. Jain by referring paras 4 and 7 of plaint has submitted that pleadings regarding composite tenancy have been pleaded in the plaint and the case is also contested with aforesaid understanding by both the parties. He also referred para 3 of the written statement in which the fact of composite tenancy, has been admitted by the appellant and the deceased-defendant by saying that they are the tenant for residential as well as for dancing and singing profession from the very inception of the tenancy. Thus, such admission is binding against the appellant and cannot be permitted to raise this question at the first time in appeal. Moreover, she is estopped to challenge it. Thus, such admission is binding against the appellant and cannot be permitted to raise this question at the first time in appeal. Moreover, she is estopped to challenge it. It was also submitted that the findings in respect of relationship of landlord and tenant in which the purpose of tenancy is also included are findings of facts the concurrent findings on the ground of bona fide genuine requirement u/s 12(1)(f) is also a finding, of the facts, therefore, such findings could not be disturbed or interfered u/s 100 of the CPC at the stage of Second Appeal and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. Having heard the Learned Counsels for the parties, for the purpose of considering their submissions, I have examined the record of the Courts below as well the impugned judgment and decree. As per judgment and decree dated 9-12-1986 the earlier suit for eviction C.O.S. No. 312/86 was not filed by the respondent on the ground mentioned u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act for bona fide genuine requirement regarding non-residential need. This ground was taken only in subsequent instant suit. Thus, the principle of res judicata was wrongly adopted by the trial Court in dismissing the suit while on holding the ground of bona fide, genuine requirement in favour of the respondent the suit ought to have been decreed. Therefore, appellate Court has not committed any error in decreeing the suit by holding that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the case. Accordingly the finding of trial Court regarding section 12(1)(f) has been upheld by the appellate Court. On re-examining the case in view of the question as framed in this appeal mere reading the paras 4 and 7 of the plaint shows and justifies that the tenancy was remained for composite purpose. The residential and non-residential both although in para 4 it is stated that accommodation in question was given for residential purpose but it was remained in tenancy for dancing profession purpose also. This composite tenancy was not only pleaded by the respondent but as per para 3 of the written statement the appellant and deceased defendant had also admitted it by saying that the accommodation was taken for residential purpose and also for profession of dancing and singing since the beginning of tenancy, they have been using this premises for this composite purpose. The case was also contested by both the parties with the aforesaid understanding and this question was never raised by the appellant in both the Courts below. Thus in view of the pleadings of plaint and admission of the appellant in written statement appellant cannot be permitted to raise this question at the first time in appeal. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Smt. Gitarani Paul Vs. Dibyendra Kundu alias Dibyendra Kumar Kundu, in which it was held as under :- We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties. The trial Court and the lower appellate Court concurrently found that there was no surrender of tenancy rights by the EJauries to the father of Dasrathi Dutta defendant No. 2. It was also found by the said Courts that the sale deed of the land by the Bauries to the appellant-plaintiff was valid and binding. The title of the appellant-plaintiff to the land in dispute having been proved she was entitled to a decree for possession. The High Court fell into error in ignoring the concurrent findings of the Courts below and accepting the appeal on an issue which was neither raised nor argued before the Courts below. In view of the aforesaid dictum appellant cannot be permitted to raise such objection at this stage. Even otherwise appellant is estopped to challenge her admission in the written statement as per principle of estoppel as defined u/s 115 of the Evidence Act and such admission is binding against her u/s 21 of Evidence Act. Even otherwise the finding regarding relationship as landlord and tenant which includes the purpose of tenancy has been found proved by the Courts below in between respondent and appellant. Such finding being finding of fact is not open for correction or interference at the stage of second appeal in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Kalyan Singh v. Ramswaroop and another reported in 7996 JLJ 247 in which it was held as under:- The contention of the Learned Counsel for the appellant is that it was not established that the appellant was a tenant of Smt. Gyasibai and that he was a tenant of the two sons. We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted in view of the findings of the two Courts below and such finding of fact is not open to challenge before this Court in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. In view of the aforesaid it is held that the tenancy of the accommodation was remained for composite purpose and in such case on proving the need for any purpose non-residential or residential the decree for eviction can be passed against the tenant as laid down by this Court in the matter of Jagdish Kumar v. Jagdishchandra reported in 1982 JLJ 319 in which it was held as under :- It is thus clear that even though it is established that a landlord requires a part of an accommodation let out and that that requirement is for the purpose for which the accommodation was let out, a landlord became entitled to seek eviction from the entire accommodation, provided the other conditions specified in clause (e) or (f) of section 12(1) of the Act are satisfied. .... As a result of aforesaid discussion, it emerges that when a landlord has made out a case for eviction from apart of the premises let out, a decree for eviction from the extra premises can be passed. Our answer to the question referred to us is that in case of a composite tenancy, if it is established that the landlord requires that non-residential part of the accommodation or residential part of the accommodation, a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed. The same question was again answered by this Court in the matter of Parasram v. Balkishan reported in 1984 M.P.R.C.J. (N.75) in which it was held as under:- So far as the bona fide requirement of non-residential purpose is concerned, it is no doubt true that the plaintiff though in his plaint has come up with a case that he needs the suit accommodation for starting his own business, in his examination-in-chief he has stated that it is required for his son Ramprasad, who is living separately from him. However, in his cross-examination he has also admitted that he himself would start the milk shop therein. Therefore, on this point admittedly there is no uniformity in the statements of plaintiff and his pleading. However, in his cross-examination he has also admitted that he himself would start the milk shop therein. Therefore, on this point admittedly there is no uniformity in the statements of plaintiff and his pleading. Thus, even if this part of the requirement u/s 12(1)(f) has not been satisfactorily proved, still as pointed above, the plaintiff has proved his requirement in respect of the residential accommodation and even in case of composite tenancy the decree for eviction can be passed. Now the case laws cited by the appellant are taken up for consideration one by one. In the matter of Niranjan Singh v. Shrikrishna reported in 1964 MPLJ Note 33 : 1963 JLJ (S. No.) 282. The accommodation was given only for residential purpose and was used for non-residential purpose with this background the case was decided which is not the circumstances here. The case laws reported in 7979 W.N. II 195 (Note) in the matter of Smt. Shanti Devi Vs. Smt. Kamlabai, in the matter of Shanti Devi v. Smt. Kamla Bai and Others are also decided on the same tune. Thus, they are also not applicable to the case at hand. In the matter of Laxmi Prasad v. Shrideo Janki Raman reported in 1973 MPU 842 it Was decided that the property was let for business purpose cannot be got evicted for deity on other purpose. Such situation are not available here. In reported case in Keshav Kumar Swarup Vs. Flowmore Private Limited, in the matter of Keshav Kumar Swamp v. Flowmore Private Limited the Apex Court has held that premises let out for only residential purpose then, it could not be evicted for contrary purpose. Thus, it is also not applicable in the matter of composite tenancy as held in the case at hand. In the reported case Busching Schmitz Private Limited Vs. P.T. Menghani and Another, in the matter of Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani and another was also decided on the question of that the suit was filed for that purpose for which the tenant was not inducted. Therefore this is also not helpful to the appellant. The case reported in 1990 JLJ 692 in the matter of Ramrao v. Dr. Therefore this is also not helpful to the appellant. The case reported in 1990 JLJ 692 in the matter of Ramrao v. Dr. Prem Kumar Sinha in which it was decided that the mere using of some part of the accommodation for other purpose for which the tenant was not inducted does not change the purpose of tenancy which is not the situation here. The case reported in M.P. Sethurama Menon Vs. Thaiparambath Kunhukutty Amma's daughter, Meenakshi Amma and Others, in the matter of M.P. Sethurama Menon v. Thaiparambath Kunhukutty Amma 's daughter Meenakshi Amma and Others has been decided on the basis of Kerala Building (Land and Rent Control) Act, 1965 in which trade and business have been interpreted but it does not speak anything regarding the profession of dancing and singing is not profession of earning, the place of this activity is covered under the definition of residential purpose. Thus, aforesaid all citations are not beneficial to the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of said composite tenancy when the findings of both the Courts are examined then it is apparent that bona fide genuine requirement of the respondent for non-residential purpose for which he is not having any other alternate accommodation has been found proved and this is so called finding of fact. The same does not give rise to a question of law much less the substantial question of law. Thus, this question is not open for reconsideration as per section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this respect the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Dr. Ranbir Singh Vs. Asharfi Lal, is directly applicable in which it is laid down as under :- 14. Sub-section (1) of section 100 of the CPC contemplates that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, Sub-section (4) of section 100 further provides that when the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. But it may be pointed out that the High Court formulated no such question of law on basis of which it proposed to interfere with the findings of facts. But it may be pointed out that the High Court formulated no such question of law on basis of which it proposed to interfere with the findings of facts. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. There is a plethora of case law in support of this view. To quote a few, references may be made to the decision in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar wherein this Court took the view that even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure and the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. This view has been reiterated by this Court in Bagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur. This being the position, the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for the well reasoned findings recorded by the Courts of fact. Therefore the aforesaid substantial question as framed is answered in negative against the appellant as a result of which the decree passed by the appellate Court is hereby affirmed. Resultantly the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to the costs. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Final Result : Dismissed