1. This revision petition under section 115 of the CPC is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.9.2003 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Imphal Manipur in Judicial Case No.18/2002 (Ref: Judl. Misc.Case No.17/2002 and O.S. No.32 of 1997) for rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing the accompanying miscellaneous application for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 11.9.2000 passed in O.S. No.32 of 1997. 2. Heard Mr. A. Nilmani Singh, learned sr. counsel assisted by Mr. A. Bimol Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 3. A short factual matrix will be sufficient for deciding the present civil revision petition. The case of the petitoner is that the defendant/present petitioner contested the O.S. No.32 of 1997 by appointing 4(four) learned Advocates, namely S/Shri 1. Y. Babu Saheb, 2. Jagajit, 3 Th. Ashokumar and 4. L. Dhaneshwor. The petitioner had full trust on the Advocates appointed by her that they would appear on her behalf before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Imphal in all the dates fixed for proceeding of the said O.S. The petitioner is a patient suffering from chronic cervical spondylosis with essential hypertension and frozen shoulder(R) besides her physical weakness and infirmity due to old age. And she has been suffering from sickness for the last about 8 years and confined almost all the time to bed due to her long illness. The petitioner also has been suffering from mental shock and agony due to sudden and tragic death of her only son Lourembam Chandramani Singh. on 22.11.1999. Only on 4.2.2002 the present petitioner came to know that the said O.S. No.32 of 1997 was proceeded ex parte and ultimately passed the ex parte decree against her when she was confronted by the respondent no.2 at the suit premises that the plaintiff of the O.S. No.32 of 1997 had obtained the ex parte decree against her. Soon after she came to know about the passing of the ex parte decree against her, she contacted her counsels mentioned above but her counsels did not give any specific reply about the O.S. No.32 of 1997. As such, she without further delay, appointed new counsel and requested them to find out the exact stage and position of the said O.S.No.32 of 1997. As such, she without further delay, appointed new counsel and requested them to find out the exact stage and position of the said O.S.No.32 of 1997. Her newly appointed counsels only on 6.2.2002 informed the petitioner that the said O.S. No.32 of 1997 had been proceeded ex parte and decreed ex parte on 11.9.2000. Thereafter the petitioner through her counsels filed a misc. application being Judl.Misc.Case No.18 of 2002 for condoning the delay in filing another misc. application ,i.e. Judl.Misc.Case No.17 of 2002 for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 11.9.2000 passed in O.S. No.32 of 1997 and for deciding the said O.S. on merit. The said Judl.Misc. Case No.18 of 2002 is supported by 9 (nine) documents, out of which 8 are the medical certificates issued by the medical specialist who had attended the petitioner indicating that the petitioner had been suffering from chronic cervical spondylosis with essential hypertension and frozen shoulder (R) beside her physical weakness and infirmity for a number of years, i.e. more particularly from December, 1997. And another document is the death certificate issued by the Registrar, Department of Anaesthsiology, RIMS, Imphal to the effect that Shri L. Chandramani Singh, the only son of the petitioner died on 22.11.99. To the said Judl. Misc. Case No.18 of 2002, the plaintiff/present respondents filed the written objection denying the statements of the petitioner mentioned in the said Jud.Misc.Case No.18 of 2002. The grounds taken in the written objection were that everybody are suffering and the ground of suffering could not be the ground for not attending the court and that the lawyers engaged for her had the bounden duty to appear for her before the court in connection with the said O.S.No.32 of 1997 on all the dates fixed for proceeding of the same suit. Failure on the part of her conducting counsels to appear before the court in connection with the said O.S.No.32 of 1997 shall be the ground for condoning the delay. 4. The learned trial court, after hearing of both parties, passed the present impugned order dated 18.9.2003 in Judl. Misc. Case No.18 of 2002 rejecting the prayer for condonation on the ground that according to her reasons stated by the petitioner for condoning the delay of 487 days is not sufficient. In the present revision petition, the learned sr. 4. The learned trial court, after hearing of both parties, passed the present impugned order dated 18.9.2003 in Judl. Misc. Case No.18 of 2002 rejecting the prayer for condonation on the ground that according to her reasons stated by the petitioner for condoning the delay of 487 days is not sufficient. In the present revision petition, the learned sr. counsel submits that (1) the learned trial court had committed an error of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order, (2) the impugned order was passed in fragrant violation of the principles and proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court and (3) over and above, the findings of the learned trial court in the impugned orders being patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. Therefore, the learned sr. counsel submits that the revision petition is to be allowed. 5. The learned sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu and others - vrs - Gobardhan Sao and others, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 held that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. And also that there cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in overjubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. The learned sr. counsel also further cited the decision of the Apex Court, in G. Ramegowda, Major and Others - v - Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore & Ors, reported in (1988) 2SCC 142, had already made a decision that if there is negligence , deliberate or g ross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on that particular of its own special facts. However, the expression“ sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals. 6. Delay shall be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to the parties who seek the condonation of delay. The further, submissions of the learned sr. counsel is that from the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above cited cases, it is crystal clear that in order to do substantial justice, the delay in preferring the appeal or application are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to the parties seek condonation of delay and his, further, submissions is that in the case in hand, it is very much clear that there is no gross negligence or deliberate in action on the part of the petitioner inasmuch as the said medical certificates show very clearly that the petitioner had been suffering from the said diseases for a number of years. In her application for condonation of delay, i.e. Judl.Misc. case No.18 of 2002 she had specifically and very clearly stated that she had been suffering during the said relevant period and as a result thereof, she could not contact her conducting counsels and also she had believed that they would be discharging their duties by appearing on her behalf before the trial court on all dates fixed for proceeding of the said O.S. The learned sr. counsel also further submits that the innocent party, i.e. the innocent petitioner had done everything in her power at the expectation that her conducting counsel should not commit any omission and misdemeanour on their part. And further, the petitioner should not suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission and misdemeanour of her conducting counsel. In this regard, the learned sr. counsel cited a decision of the Apex Court in Rafiq and another -v- Munshilal and another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 wherein the Apex Court held that the parties should not suffer for the inaction of their conducting counsel. In this regard, the learned sr. counsel cited a decision of the Apex Court in Rafiq and another -v- Munshilal and another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 wherein the Apex Court held that the parties should not suffer for the inaction of their conducting counsel. The relevant portion of the para-3 (of AIR) in Rafiq and another(supra) is quoted below: “3 * * * * * * * However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs.200/- should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr.A.K.Sanghi.” 7. The said ratio of the Apex Court laid down in Rafiq and another(supra) had been followed by this court (Division Bench) in Nirmal Das Gupta -v - Prasanta Das Gupta and others, reported in AIR 1985 GAUHATI 3 and held that the appellant could not be penalized for the counsel's sickness or negligence. Para-5 and 6 (of AIR) in Nirmal Das Gupta(supra) are quoted hereunder: “5. The present case fairly and squarly falls within the four corners of Rafiq (supra). The appellant engaged his lawyer, reposed confidence in him that he would do the rest of the things in the appellate Court where his presence was not at all necessary which, in fact, is the finding of the learned Judge and it was due to the negligence or slackness on the part of the advocate that the appeal was dismissed for default. The party had done everything within his power to effectively prosecute the appeal and by rejecting the appeal the person guilty of slackness or negligence was not penalized, but the punishment was visited upon the appellant who left the charge of the case, in supreme confidence, to his lawyer. We cannot watch lazily if an innocent litigant suffers injustice because he had chosen an advocate who was slow, slack or negligent. Therefore, we allow, this appeal, set aside the impugned orders, recall the order of dismissal. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the Court of the Assistant Dist. Judge and be disposed of according to law. If there was any stay order, it will continue till disposal of the appeal by the learned Judge. 6. Who should pay the cost to the respondent at this end? We have held that the appellant was not responsible because he has had done whatever was possible within his mite and was within his power. The cost of the appeal which we assess at Rs.150/- payable to the respondents should be recovered from the learned advocate who absented himself. The right to execute this order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. Senapati.” 8. The learned sr. counsel submits that for the reasons mentioned above, the learned trial court had committed the fragrant violation of the principles of proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court in passing the impugned judgment and order dated 18.9.2003 and thereby resulting to error of jurisdiction in exercise of her power in passing the impugned judgment and order. The further case of the petitioner is that the power of High Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C. could be exercised when the learned trial court had acted in exercise in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In the present case, not only the mistakes committed by the learned trial court infragrant violation of the principles of proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court and this court but also the learned trial court acted with material irregularity in passing the impugned judgment and order. The learned sr. In the present case, not only the mistakes committed by the learned trial court infragrant violation of the principles of proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court and this court but also the learned trial court acted with material irregularity in passing the impugned judgment and order. The learned sr. counsel also further submits that the revisional court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the appreciation of the evidences of the trial court, but the revisional power can be exercised while findings of the trial court is sufferred from perversity. In other words, the revisional court, i.e. the High Court, in exercise of power under Section 115 of the CPC can interfere with the order of the trial court if the findings made by the trial court is based on no evidence. In the above factual background, the learned sr. counsel submits that the findings of the learned trial court in the impugned judgment and order is based on no evidence, therefore, this High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under section 115 of the CPC can interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned trial court. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as on perusal of the materials on records and also after carefully applying my mind in the cases cited by the learned sr. counsel, I am of the considered view that the petitioner could make out sufficient reasons for condonation of the delay of 487 days in filing the accompanying miscellaneous application for setting aside of the ex parte decree dated 11.9.2002 passed in O.S.No.32 of 1997 9. For the reasons above, the impugned order dated 18.9.2003 passed in Judl.Misc.Case No.18 of 2002 is set aside. As a result thereof, the delay of 487 days in filing the said Judl.Misc.Case No.17 of 2002 is condoned and the learned trial court is directed to heard the said Judl.Misc.Case No.17 of 2002 on merit after giving proper notice to both parties. 10. With the above observations and directions, this revision petition is allowed. No costs. 11. Registry is directed to send down the lower court records immediately.