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2005 DIGILAW 1220 (PNJ)

St. Kabir Institute Of Pharmaceutical And Technical Education v. Virat Verma

2005-11-30

RAJIVE BHALLA

body2005
Judgment Rajive Bhalla, J. 1. By way of the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners pray for quashing of the complaint dated April 18, 1998, and the summoning order dated February 3, 2001 (annexures P1 and P2). 2. The respondent was admitted as a student in St. Kabir Institute of Pharmaceutical and Technical Education, Fazilka, being run by the petitioners. On account of a change of policy, the respondents admission, was not recognised by the Government, and, therefore, he was unable to take the course. The petitioners despatched cheque No. 928568 dated September 11, 1997, for a sum of Rs. 35,000 as refund of the fee charged from the respondent. This cheque was dishonoured and led to the respondent filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Vide the impugned order dated February 3, 2001, the petitioners were summoned to stand trial. 3. Counsel for the petitioners contends that after the filing of the complaint, the petitioners have paid a sum of Rs. 35,000 to the respondent by way of a demand draft No. 236212 dated June 26, 1998. As acknowledgment of the receipt of the draft, the respondent has issued an acknowledgment that nothing was due from the college. On the basis of the aforementioned communication, counsel for the petitioners argues that as the respondents grievance stands redressed, the continuation of the complaint would be an abuse of the process of the law and an exercise in futility. The complaint and the summoning order are, therefore, liable to be quashed. 4. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that the correctness of the aforementioned documents, alleged to have been executed by the petitioners, cannot be determined in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is denied that the respondent issued any such receipt. It is contended that a perusal of the photostat copy, as also the translation thereof, reveals that the alleged acknowledgment receipt does not bear any date. It is further argued that the offence having been committed by dishonour of the cheque and the failure of the petitioners to pay money, as demanded in the notice of demand, served under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complaint and the summoning order should not be quashed. It is further argued that the offence having been committed by dishonour of the cheque and the failure of the petitioners to pay money, as demanded in the notice of demand, served under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complaint and the summoning order should not be quashed. It is also argued that the alleged receipt (annexure P4) is a part of the defence of the petitioners required to be established by adducing evidence before the trial court and, therefore, the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused the paper book, the complaint and the summoning order. As facts have already been narrated above, they do not merit repetition. The sole ground upon which counsel for the petitioners has prayed for quashing of the complaint and the summoning order is that after the filing of the complaint, the respondent has received entire payment and in acknowledgment thereof has executed a receipt annexure P4. In my considered opinion, the said plea cannot be the basis for a plea to quash the complaint/summoning order. A plea of discharge of liability, evidenced by a receipt is a plea of fact required to be established by proving payment of the amount due as also due execution of the receipt. This plea can only be established and proved by adducing evidence in support thereof. 6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no finding can be returned as to the genuiness or validity of the receipt (annexure P4) or as to the fact that the respondent has received the amount due. 7. In view of the above, I find no merit in the present petition, which is dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to raise all the pleas raised herein before the trial court at an appropriate stage.