Judgment ( 1 ) LEAVE granted. The appellant married the respondent on 16-5-1999 in Mangalore. She lived with the respondent for about seven months after which she left for bangalore. According to the appellant she left because of the conduct of her husband and because her economic circumstances required that she should take up a job. She has since been employed in Bangalore. ( 2 ) ON 17-6-2002 the appellant filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights in Bangalore. The respondent appeared and on 22-8-2003 conciliation proceedings were commenced between the parties. In the meanwhile, the respondent had already filed a suit in Mangalore against the appellant for divorce. The appellant made an application under Section 8 of the Divorce act, 1869 to the High Court of Karnataka for transfer of the respondents suit from Mangalore to Bangalore. The High Court rejected the application for transfer on the ground that Section 8 of the 1869 Act did not allow the High court to transfer a suit to any District Court not having territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of dispute. It is not in dispute that the parties had got married in Mangalore and had last resided together in Mangalore. The High court appears to have been moved by the fact that the Bangalore Court would not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the respondents suit. Being aggrieved the appellant has preferred this appeal. ( 3 ) WE are of the view that the High Court has erred in the construction of section 8 of the 1869 Act which provides as follows: "8. Extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court-The High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, remove and try and determine as a court of original jurisdiction any suit or proceeding instituted under this Act in the Court of any District Judge within the limits of its jurisdiction under this Act. Power to transfer suits.-The High Court may also withdraw any such suit or proceeding, and transfer it for trial or disposal to the Court of any other such District Judge. " it needs to be emphasised that the High Court is required to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under the section. The question is whether the phrase "any other such District Judge" occurring in the second portion of section 8 means any District Judge which would otherwise have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. " it needs to be emphasised that the High Court is required to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under the section. The question is whether the phrase "any other such District Judge" occurring in the second portion of section 8 means any District Judge which would otherwise have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. ( 4 ) THE basis of the High Courts decision is the definition of the words "district Court and District Judge" in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the Act. These two sub-sections read as follows: "3. (2) district Judge.-district Judge means a Judge of a Principal civil Court of original jurisdiction however designated: (3) district Court.--district Court means, in the case of any petition under this Act, the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act the marriage was solemnised or, the husband and wife reside or last resided together" ( 5 ) THE High Court appears to have overlooked the words with which section 3 begins, namely, "unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context". In the context of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the high Court it is clear that the word "district Judge" would mean what the definition expresses viz. any Judge which was a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The territorial limit in sub-section (3) is, as the sub-section itself denotes, only for the purpose of determining the ordinary jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under the Act. ( 6 ) IF the power of the High Court is to be construed as being limited to transfers within the territorial limitations of a District Judge, it would defeat the object and express purpose of Section 8 and render it virtually nugatory. The power to transfer a proceeding within the territorial limits of a District is exercisable even by a District Judge under Section 24 of the Code of Civil procedure. The intention behind Section 8 of the Act is to give the High court an overriding power to transfer a suit or any proceeding initiated under the Act from the Court of one District Judge to any other District Judge within its jurisdiction. The words "its jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction of the High Court. The intention behind Section 8 of the Act is to give the High court an overriding power to transfer a suit or any proceeding initiated under the Act from the Court of one District Judge to any other District Judge within its jurisdiction. The words "its jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore when by the second portion of Section 8 the High court has been given the additional power of transferring any such suit or proceeding for trial and disposal to the court to any other such District Judge, it is a reference to a District Judge within the territorial limits of the High court. The transferee court does not necessarily have to have territorial jurisdiction to try the transferred proceeding or suit. The only limitation is that the Court to which the suit is transferred must be a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 3 sub-section (2 ). ( 7 ) THE decision of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Syndicate Bank v. K. Gangadhar which was based upon Section 24 of the code of Civil Procedure, does not appear to be correctly decided. The High court, therefore, erred in rejecting the application for transfer on the ground of its inability to transfer a proceeding from Mangalore to Bangalore. ( 8 ) WE could have on this ground remanded the matter back to the High court. However, considering the nature of the disputes between the parties and the further delay that would be caused by such remand, we consider the merits of the appellants case as made out by her in the application for transfer. ( 9 ) SOME of the grounds for such transfer relate to the pendency of the suit at Bangalore. Prima facie it appears to us that under the Divorce Act of 1869 the Bangalore District Judge would not have the jurisdiction to entertain any original proceedings in the facts of this case. We are told that an application for dismissal of the suit on the lack of jurisdiction has already been filed by the respondent and is pending. Hence, we do not make any further observation which might jeopardise the appellants defence to such application. ( 10 ) THE second ground is that the appellant does not have the financial ability to attend hearings at Bangalore (sic Mangalore ). Hence, we do not make any further observation which might jeopardise the appellants defence to such application. ( 10 ) THE second ground is that the appellant does not have the financial ability to attend hearings at Bangalore (sic Mangalore ). We, therefore, propose to direct the respondent to pay for the appellants expenses to go to bangalore (sic Mangalore) and to stay there for every hearing that may be fixed, at the rate of Rs. 3,000. 00 per trip. It is being made clear that the costs must be sent by the respondent to the appellant prior to any hearing. ( 11 ) THE appellant has also expressed an apprehension of danger to her life at the hands of the respondent as well as two ladies alleged to be living with the respondent "and/or who are working with the respondent". The allegation is wholly bereft of any particulars nor is it supported by any evidence. We are unable to accept such a bare allegation in the absence of any material in support thereof. ( 12 ) IT is finally stated that the appellant did not have any house at mangalore where she can go and reside during the hearing of the case. We have already allowed for the expenses of the appellant in connection with the hearing. If the amount is insufficient the appellant is at liberty to pray to the district Court at Mangalore for enhancement of the amount. ( 13 ) HAVING regard to the merits of the case we dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the High Court on other grounds. No costs.