Judgment J.S.Khehar, J. 1. The petitioner-management engaged the respondent- workman Jagtar Singh as a water carrier vide an order dated 25.4.1994. The aforesaid order is being extracted hereunder for facility of reference: Sh. Jagtar Singh s/o Sh. Ajit Singh c/o Sh. Lachman Singh, Special Assistant, Special Cell, Welfare-I, Mini Secretariat, Chandigarh is hereby appointed in the Head Office of Corporation at Chandigarh as Water Carrier on the dally wages rates fixed by the D.C. Chandigarh. His services can be terminated at any time without any prior notice. His services were dispensed with by an order dated 24.1.1995 as "no longer required." It is, therefore, that the petitioner was relieved from service. He was again appointed as a water carrier on 7.2.1996 and he continued to discharge his duties till 30.6.1997, when his services were again dispensed with in terms of his appointment letter (dated 12.7.1997), which incorporated the condition that "his services can be terminated at any time without any prior notice." Dissatisfied with the action of the petitioner-management in having terminating his services, the respondent workman issued a demand notice under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) dated 6.1.2000. On the failure of the conciliation proceedings the dispute raised by the respondent workman was referred for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.T. Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the Labour Court). The Labour Court by its award dated 22.8.2005 answered the reference in favour of the respondent-workman. While setting aside the order of his termination, the Labour Court ordered the reinstatement of the respondent workman with continuity in service and 50 percent back wages, with effect from the date of issuance of the demand notice i.e. 6.1.2000. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner management has impugned the award of the Labour Court dated 22.8.2005. 2. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the termination of the services of the respondent-workman, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be termed as retrenchment within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. In this behalf, reliance has been placed on Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, in order to contend that the letter of appointment of the respondent-workman clearly envisaged that "his services can be terminated at any time without any prior notice". In this behalf, reliance has been placed on Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, in order to contend that the letter of appointment of the respondent-workman clearly envisaged that "his services can be terminated at any time without any prior notice". Accordingly it is submitted that the services of the respondent-workman having been dispensed with in terms of the conditions of his appointment letter, his termination cannot be considered to be an act of retrenchment within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. It is not possible for us to accept the instant contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The broad parameters to be specified on a plea of the nature advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have been delineated by the Apex Court in S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager Karnataka 2003 (2) SCT 1013, wherein the Apex Court held as under: The termination of service of workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration. (ii) The employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end and on the expiry of the scheme or project; and (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract. (iv) The workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the above said terms by the employer at the commencement of employment. The engagement of a workman as a daily-wager does not by itself amount putting the workman on notice that he was being engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a particular length of time or upto the occurrence of some event, and, therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment was short-lived. The contract of employment consciously entered into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to the workman on the date of the commencement of the employment itself that his employment was short-lived and as per the terms of the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the contract and the scheme or project coming to an end. The. The. workman may not, therefore, complain that by the act of employer his employment was coming to an abrupt termination. To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the above said ingredients so as to attract the applicability of Sub-clause (bb) above said. In the case at hand, the respondent-employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of Sub-clause (bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily-wagers in a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of Sub-clause (bb), it has to be held that the termination of the services of the appellants amounted to retrenchment. Since the order of appointment of the respondent-workman neither expressed a specified tenure of employment nor depicted that the employment of the respondent-workman was for the execution of a definite work, it is not possible for us to accept the applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 3 The second contention of the learned Counsel is, that the post occupied by the respondent-workman was not sanctioned, and in the absence of a proper sanction, the petitioner had no right whatsoever to continue in employment. It is not possible for us to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The issue of sanction is irrelevant for a controversy raised under Section 25F of the Act. The mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Act are invoked as soon as an employee has rendered service in excess of 240 days in 12 calendar months. It is not a matter of dispute in the present controversy that the respondent-workman had actually and factually rendered service in excess of 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding his retrenchment. It is also not a matter of dispute that the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Act had not been followed at the time the services of the respondent-workman were retrenched. In view of the above, it is apparent that the action of the petitioner-management in terminating the services of the respondent-workman was in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act. 4. For the reasons recorded above, we find no infirmity in the impugned award of the Labour Court dated 22.8.2005.