Judgment :- ( Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.1.2002 made in A.S. No.77 of 2001 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry reversing the judgment and decree dated 18.10.2001 made in O.S.No.213 of 2001 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry.) The appellants are the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit who have lost before the lower appellate court. 2. Respondent 1 & 2/plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S.No.213 of 2001 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry for bare injunction claiming to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. The appellants/defendants 1 and 2 resisted the suit by filing written statement. The trial court having analysed the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side found that the plaintiffs have not made out any case for granting permanent injunction against the defendants and therefore dismissed the suit. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the plaintiffs filed the appeal before the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry in A.S.No.77 of 2001. Learned District Judge after perusing the recorded evidence and upon hearing both sides rendered a judgment allowing the appeal having held that the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that therefore they are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. Hence, the Second Appeal. 4. The contentions of the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs in the plaint are briefly as follows:- (a) The suit properties originally belonged to the plaintiffs' great grand father Appavoo Gramani by virtue of a notarial sale deed dated 18.2.1921. After his death, the plaintiffs' grand father Rangasamy @ Govindasamy was in possession and enjoyment of the same from 1936 onwards. During the life time of Rangasamy @ Govindasamy under a registered partition deed dated 28.12.1995, the properties were divided among himself, his sons Palaniraja, Dhandapani and his grand sons, plaintiffs 1 to 2 and another and since then 'B' and 'C' schedule properties allotted to the plaintiffs were in their possession and enjoyment. (b) The plaintiffs obtained patta for the suit properties and they have been paying land taxes for the same. The Village Administrative Officer had also issued certificate of possession of the suit properties. (b) The plaintiffs obtained patta for the suit properties and they have been paying land taxes for the same. The Village Administrative Officer had also issued certificate of possession of the suit properties. The second plaintiff sold a portion of his share in favour of one Krishnan, his wife and daughter under a registered sale deed dated 27.1.2000 and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. (c) While so, the defendants attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession of the suit properties as well as that of the purchasers without having any manner of right or title to the same. The defendants have also complained to the police and they have filed a petition before the Settlement Officer, Survey and Land Records, Pondicherry for modification of the patta existing in the name of the plaintiffs. The Settlement Officer dismissed the petition and thereupon the defendants filed the suit in O.S.No.362 of 2000 against the plaintiffs and others. The application for interim injunction filed by the defendants in the said suit against the plaintiffs was also dismissed. The defendants were attempting to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession of the suit properties. Hence, the suit. 5. The averments in the written statement filed by the appellants herein/defendants 1 and 2 and the 3rd defendant and adopted by the defendants 4 to 6, are briefly as follows:- (a) These defendants deny that the suit properties were in the possession and enjoyment of Rangasamy @ Govindasamy from 1936 and that there was a partition between the said Rangasamy @ Govindasamy on the one hand and Palaniraja, Dhandapani and Manohar and the plaintiffs on the other wherein the suit properties fell into the share of the plaintiffs. The defendants also deny that the partition deed dated 28.12.1995 was executed among the said persons. (b) The suit properties along with other properties of the deceased Appavoo Gramani devolved upon the lineal descendants of the said four sons and there was no partition entered into between the sons of Appavoo Gramani in respect of the suit properties. Therefore the said Rangasamy @ Govindasamy had not derive exclusive title over the suit properties as alleged in the plaint, for the reason that their father Palaniraja was alive at that time. Therefore the said Rangasamy @ Govindasamy had not derive exclusive title over the suit properties as alleged in the plaint, for the reason that their father Palaniraja was alive at that time. Similarly, after the death of Rangasamy @ Govindasamy, his 1/4th share in the suit property was inherited by the said Palaniraja along with his younger brother Dhandapani and his eldest sister Saraswathi. Consequently, the said Palaniraja had only 1/12th share therein. Hence, the plaintiffs have exclusive rights in the said undivided 1/12th share and hence the suit is not maintainable. (c) The plaintiffs have brought out a self serving document styled as partition deed to defeat the rights of the defendants. The defendants 1 to 6 have challenged the mutation of the revenue records and aggrieved by the order of Settlement Officer, Pondicherry, they have also filed an appeal before the Director of Survey, Land Records and Settlement, which was pending. The certificate issued by the Village Administrative Officer regarding possession is not legally valid. (d) Since the plaintiffs did not have any exclusive title to the suit properties, they could not have conveyed the properties in favour of the said Krishnan, his wife and daughter under the sale deed dated 27.1.2000. Therefore the said document does not create any title in favour of the purchasers. The suit for injunction without any division of the properties by metes and bounds is not maintainable. (e) The defendants are co-owners and in joint possession of the suit properties and hence the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. Since the plaintiffs attempted to demolish the compound wall enclosing the suit properties, the defendants prevented the same. The suit filed by them in O.S.No.362 of 2000 against the plaintiffs and their brother Manohar has nothing to do with the adjudication of the claim of parties in the present suit. The present suit without seeking any relief for declaration of title is legally unsustainable. 6. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed by the trial court:- (1) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of property for more than 30 years? (2) Whether the defendants on 4.6.2001 had attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession of the suit property as alleged in the plaint? (3) Whether the defendants as co-owners are in joint possession of the suit properties? (2) Whether the defendants on 4.6.2001 had attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession of the suit property as alleged in the plaint? (3) Whether the defendants as co-owners are in joint possession of the suit properties? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants with respect to the suit properties? (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a judgment and decree as prayed for? (6) To what other relief or reliefs the parties are entitled? 7. On the side of the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs, the 2nd plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and 3 other witnesses as P.Ws.2 to 4 and documents Exs.A-1 to A-16 have been marked. On the side of the appellants/defendants, the 2nd defendant has been examined as D.W.1 and 3 other witnesses examined as D.Ws.2 to 4 and documents Exs.B-1 to B-24 have been marked. Exs.X-1 and X-2 third party's documents have also been received in evidence. 8. Learned Subordinate Judge after analysing the recorded evidence and the arguments of both sides, held on the above issues as follows:- The plaintiffs have not proved their possession of the suit property for more than 30 years; the defendants had not interfered with such possession of the suit properties by the plaintiffs; the defendants are in joint possession of the suit properties in their capacity as co-owners; the plaintiffs are not entitled for a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants; therefore they are not entitled to the decree as prayed for and thus the suit is dismissed with no costs. 9. In the appeal before the first appellate court, the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry on the basis of the recorded evidence framed the point for determination as follows:- Whether the judgment and decree dated 18.10.2001 passed in O.S.No.213 of 2001 by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry is erroneous and is liable to be set aside? 10. On the basis of the evidence on record and after hearing the arguments of both sides, the learned District Judge held that the plaintiffs have proved their better title and possession of the suit properties by virtue of Exs.A-1, A-3, A-5 to A-10 and that therefore they are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. Thus the District Judge allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 11. Thus the District Judge allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 11. Heard Mr.T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr.R.Gandhi, learned senior counsel for the respondents. 12. Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the first appellate court failed to note that after the death of Appavoo Gramani, the properties devolved upon his four sons, namely Natesa Gramani, Rangasamy @ Govindasamy Gramani, Rathinavel Gramani and Ramachandra Gramani. Similarly, the plaintiffs' father is entitled to only 1/12th share in the suit properties as he is one of heirs of the Rangasamy @ Govindasamy Gramani and further they have no right in the properties during the lifetime of their father as the customary Hindu Law is applicable to Pondicherry. It is explained even in the plaint or in evidence how the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title got exclusive possession of the suit properties after the death of the original owner Appavoo Gramani, as there was no documentary evidence adduced to prove possession from 1936 onwards. In Ex.A-3 partition deed, the suit properties were not included and the same position continued even as on the date of filing the plaint, i.e., 13.6.2001. Similarly, there was no revenue or public record produced to show the exclusive possession of the suit properties either by Rangasamy @ Govindasamy or by the plaintiffs. Exs.A-6 to A-10 are under challenge in the appellate forum, i.e., Director of Survey, Land Records and Settlement, Pondicherry and the said proceeding is pending disposal. The patta is not a title deed to the property and therefore the settlement court is not barred from arriving at an independent conclusion. The joint patta standing in the name of co-owners was changed behind the back and no notice was issued before the change was effected. The correctness of the findings of the trial court on various issues had not been considered by the first appellate court. 13. In the above circumstances, the following substantial questions of law have been formulated by this Court for consideration:- (a) Whether the suit for injunction is maintainable against the co-owners? (b) Whether the first appellate court failed to deal with the correctness of the findings of the trial court on various issues by framing appropriate points for determination under Order 41 Rules 30 and 31 C.P.C.? (b) Whether the first appellate court failed to deal with the correctness of the findings of the trial court on various issues by framing appropriate points for determination under Order 41 Rules 30 and 31 C.P.C.? (c) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are liable to be set aside as prayed for? 14. The parties to this Second Appeal may be referred to hereunder as they were arrayed before the trial court. 15. Admittedly, the appellants/defendants 1 and 2 and respondents3 to 6/defendants 3 to 6 are the grand sons and the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the great grand sons of Appavoo Gramani (since deceased). The suit properties and other properties originally belonged to Appavoo Gramani by virtue of notarial sale deed dated 18.2.1921, Ex.A-1 and the Tamil translation of the same is Ex.A-2. Similarly, it is not disputed that Appavoo Gramani had four sons, namely, Natesa Gramani, Rangasamy @ Govindasamy Gramani, Rathinavel Gramani and Ramachandra Gramanhi and all the four sons died leaving behind the plaintiffs and the defendants and other heirs. The plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the great grand sons and defendants 1 to 6 are the grand sons of Appavoo Gramani. The following pedigree will be useful to appreciate the facts and evidence of the case:- APPAVOO GRAMANI (Died in 1936) | | ------------------------------------------------------ | | | | | | | | NATESAN RANGASAMY @ RATHINAVELU RAMACHANDRAN GRAMANI GOVINDASAMY GRAMANI GRAMANI (Died in 1965) GRAMANI (Died in 1969) (Died in 1967) | (Died in 1977) | | | | | | --------------- | | SUSEELA | | | | | | | | KOTHANDA LAKSHMANA | ---------------------------- RAMAN SAMY | | | | | (D1) (D2) | | | | | | GOPALA JAYARAMAN RAJA PARTHA | SAMY GOPAL SARATHI | (D3) (D4) (D5) (D6) | | -------------------------------------------- | | | | | | PALANIRAJA DHANDAPANI SARASWATHI | | | ---------------------------------------------- | | | | | | GOPALAKRISHNAN SOWRIRAJAN @ MANOHAR @ @ RAVI SOUNDAR RAJAN MUTHUKUMARASAMY (P1) (P2) 16. The second plaintiff had examined himself before the trial court as P.W.1 and the documents under Ex.A-1 to A-16 were marked through him. The second plaintiff had examined himself before the trial court as P.W.1 and the documents under Ex.A-1 to A-16 were marked through him. At the outset, it is relevant to point out that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 representing the branch of Palaniraja have laid the suit for permanent injunction on the basis of the partition deed Ex.A-5 dated 28.12.1995 claiming that they are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by virtue of the said partition deed. 17. But, on the contrary, Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel for the appellants has pointed out with reference to the genealogy referred to above that the said partition deed was entered into between the grand father of the plaintiffs, Rangasamy @ Govindasamy Gramani on the one hand and his sons Palaniraja and Dhandapani and the grand sons through the said Palaniraja, namely, plaintiffs 1 and 2 and their brother, namely, Manohar @ Muthukumarasamy and contended that the other heirs of Appavoo Gramani, namely, defendants 1 to 6, daughter of Rangasamy @ Govindasamy Gramani, namely, Saraswathi and the only daughter of Ramachandra Gramani, namely, Suseela was not made parties to the said partition deed. 18. In this context, he has pointed out the following recitals in Ex.A-5 in support of his further contention that since the existence of joint family consisting of the sons and grand sons of Appavoo Gramani is admitted, the partition deed is not complete without the other co-sharers joining with the parties to the document referred to above in executing the same. The relevant recitals in Ex.A-5 read as under:- "eh';fs; midtUk; xnu FLk;gj;ijr; nru;e;j ,e;J mgpgf;j FLk;gj;ijr; nru;e;jtu;fs;/ eh';fs; midtUk; ,Jehs;tiu xnu Tl;LFLk;gkhf ,Ue;J thH;f;if elj;jp te;njhk;/ ,dpnky; eh';fs; midtUk; xnu Tl;Lf;FLk;gkhf ,Ue;J thH;f;if elj;jg; gpupag;glhjf; fhuzj;jpdhYk;. eh';fs; midtUk;; jdpjjdpna ,Ue;J thH;f;if elj;j tpUk;g[tjhYk;. ,e;j gpuptpidg; gj;jpuk; K:yk; eh';fs; ghfg;gpuptpid bra;Jf; bfhs;StJ vd;dntd;why;. ,jdoapy; fz;l brhj;jhdJ. g[Jit mlkhd fhge;J gPnuhtpy; 18/2/1921y; Mu;/tp/101 bghypnah 249 be. 102y; gjpag;gl;l fpuag; gj;jpug;go v';fspy; 1tJ egu;pd; Jfg;gBUk;. 2. 3. eh';fs; midtUk;; jdpjjdpna ,Ue;J thH;f;if elj;j tpUk;g[tjhYk;. ,e;j gpuptpidg; gj;jpuk; K:yk; eh';fs; ghfg;gpuptpid bra;Jf; bfhs;StJ vd;dntd;why;. ,jdoapy; fz;l brhj;jhdJ. g[Jit mlkhd fhge;J gPnuhtpy; 18/2/1921y; Mu;/tp/101 bghypnah 249 be. 102y; gjpag;gl;l fpuag; gj;jpug;go v';fspy; 1tJ egu;pd; Jfg;gBUk;. 2. 3. egu;fs; ghllBUk; kw;Wk; 4 Kjy; 6 egu;fspd; je;ij tHp ghl;lDkhd mg;ght[ fpuhkzp mtu;fshy; fpuak; th';fp Mz;L mDnghfpj;J te;J i& mg;ght[ fpuhkzp mtu;fs; ve;jtpjkhd rhrdKk; vGjp itf;fhky; fhykhfptpl;lg; goahy; i& mg;ght[ fpuhkzp mtu;fspd; rl;lg;goahd thupRjhuu; vd;fpw Kiwapy; v';fSf;F brhe;jkhdJk; v';fSila bghJ mDnghfj;jpy; tug;gl;lJk; ,jdoapy; Fwpg;gplg;gl;lJkhd fPH;f;fz;l brhj;jhdJ." Hence, relying upon the said recitals, learned senior counsel for the appellants has rightly contended that the partition deed under Ex.A-5 is not a complete partition so as to confer exclusive right and title on the plaintiffs with reference to the suit properties. 19. Further, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the evidence of P.W.1, the second plaintiff in the cross-examination to the effect that he is not aware of the history of the family of his great grand father Appavoo Gramani, as he was born only on 12.8.1970. P.W.1 has further admitted candidly that the property covered by Ex.A-5 is a coconut thope wherein motor pump set is in existence and that he is not aware whether the electric service connection still stands in the name of the first defendant. But, on the contrary, the evidence of the second defendant as D.W.1 and that of the Assistant Engineer, Electricity Department as D.W.3 coupled with Exs.B-12 to B-14, demand notices and receipts for payment of electric charges would go to show and prove that in fact the electric service connection for the motor pump set in the well existing in the suit properties still stands in the name of the first defendant. Therefore there is some force in the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that even though the defendants have got subsisting rights over the suit properties, the said partition deed Ex.A-5 was executed unilaterally by the grand father of the plaintiffs and his sons and grand sons without any reference to the other co-sharers entitled to have a share in the properties. 20. Since the other heirs of Appavoo Gramani are not parties to the said partition deed, this Court is of the considered view that the same is not binding on the defendants who represent the branches of other sons of Appavoo Gramani. 20. Since the other heirs of Appavoo Gramani are not parties to the said partition deed, this Court is of the considered view that the same is not binding on the defendants who represent the branches of other sons of Appavoo Gramani. Similarly, it is needless to mention that Ex.A-5 is only a self serving document created to serve the purpose of the plaintiffs in filing the suit. 21. Mr.R.Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents would strenuously contend that the plaintiffs have established their exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties on the basis of Exs.A-6 to A-10, namely, Chitta Adangal Certificate issued by the Village Administrative Officer and order passed by the Settlement Officer, Survey and Land Records, Pondicherry dated 27.3.2001. However, the fact remains that the order of the Settlement Officer under Ex.A-10 had been questioned by the defendants before the Director of Settlement, Directorate of Survey, Land Records and Settlement, Government of Pondicherry, who after considering the rival claims, passed an order dated 19.9.2003 to the effect that in view of the pendency of this Second Appeal in this Court, the appeal petition preferred by the defendants has to be dismissed. Hence, learned senior counsel for the appellants has pointed out rightly in my opinion that as per the orders passed by this Court in C.M.P.Nos.4448 and 4449 of 2002, status quo as on the date of suit has to be maintained and it follows that the respondents 1 and 2 therein have been restrained from making any alienation of the suit properties. In view of the above circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the order passed by the Settlement Officer under Ex.A-10 is therefore of no consequence in so far as the claim of the plaintiffs that they are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties in their own rights by virtue of the partition deed under Ex.A-5. 22. Ex.A-3 is the certified copy of the partition deed dated 9.9.1936 executed in French language and translated version in Tamil is Ex.A-4. In Ex.A-3, the suit properties are neither included nor allotted to the plaintiffs' grand father Rangasamy @ Govindasamy. 22. Ex.A-3 is the certified copy of the partition deed dated 9.9.1936 executed in French language and translated version in Tamil is Ex.A-4. In Ex.A-3, the suit properties are neither included nor allotted to the plaintiffs' grand father Rangasamy @ Govindasamy. In this context learned senior counsel for the appellants has drawn the attention of this Court to the specific recitals in Ex.A-4 in support of his further contention that the existence of the joint family consisting of Appavoo Gramani and his sons and that the joint family properties were available for partition is admitted by Rangasamy @ Govindasamy under whom the plaintiffs herein claimed exclusive title to and possession of the suit properties. The relevant recitals are as follows:- mg;ght[ fpuhkzp Mfpa ehd;. vdf;F gpw;fhyk; vdf;Fg; gpwe;j vd; kfd;fSf;F mtu;fs; mtu;fs; thH;;fifapy; ve;j rr;rut[k; ,y;yhky; ,Uf;f cj;njrpj;J vd; kdg;g{u;tkhf mtu;fsF;F g[Jit rptpy; rl;;lg;go fz;Ls;s 1075 tpjpg;go ehd; nkw;go jw;nghJ ,Uf;Fk; bk$hupl;oa[s;s Fkhuu;fSf;Fk; ikdhupl;oaha; ,Uf;Fk; Fkhuu;fSf;Fk; xt;bthUtUf;Fk; jdpj;jdpahf ,d;W njjpapy; nkw;go behj;nju; Kd;ghft[k; rhl;rpfs; Kd;ghft[k; vGjpf;bfhLj;j ghfg;gpuptpid gj;jpuk;/ 23. Further it is an admitted fact that the suit properties were not the subject matter of partition in the above said documents under Exs.A-3 and A-4. However, the fact remains that the joint family consisting of Appavoo Gramani and his 4 sons (vide) Exs.A-3 and A-4 owned the properties covered by the said documents as well as the suit properties. Hence, learned senior counsel, Mr.T.R.Mani has contended that in view of the general rule of succession as per the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs cannot be considered as heirs of Rangasamy @ Govindasamy for the simple reason that the plaintiffs' father Palaniraja was alive on the date of suit and subsequently also. Hence, he has contended in my opinion rightly that in any event during the life time of their father, his sons, the plaintiffs' herein have no right of inheritance and that therefore they cannot seek the relief of permanent injunction as against the defendants who are co-owners of the properties. 24. In this context, learned senior counsel for the appellants has drawn the attention of this Court to the decisions, NAIR SERVICE SOCIETY LTD v. K.C. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1165 ) and MADHAVAN NAMBIAR v. NARAYANAN NAIR (1970 K.L.T. 653). 24. In this context, learned senior counsel for the appellants has drawn the attention of this Court to the decisions, NAIR SERVICE SOCIETY LTD v. K.C. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1165 ) and MADHAVAN NAMBIAR v. NARAYANAN NAIR (1970 K.L.T. 653). The ratio of the decision AIR 1968 S.C. 1165 is that a person in possession could not sustain that possession as against the original owner of the property. Similarly, it was held in 1970 K.L.T. 653 as follows:- "It is well-settled that a co-owner, who is in possession holds it for himself as well as on behalf of the other co-owner or co-owners if they are out of possession." 25. Therefore it was held in the said decisions that the suit filed by the co-owner for permanent injunction against the other co-owners is not maintainable in law. In view of the ratio laid down in the said decisions, this Court is inclined to accept the contention put forth by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and hold that the suit filed by the plaintiffs for permanent injunction against the defendants is not maintainable. 26. Further, learned senior counsel Mr.T.R.Mani has argued that it was not explained either in the plaint or in the evidence as to how the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title got exclusive possession of the suit properties after the death of the original owner Appavoo Gramani. According to him, there is no scrap of paper filed by the plaintiffs to show their claim of possession between 1936 when the partition deed under Exs.A-3 and A-4 had come into existence and the date of the suit. Though it is asserted by P.W.1, the second plaintiff in his evidence that his grand father Rangasamy @ Govindasamy was in exclusive possession of the suit properties, there is no documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiffs in support of such contention. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel, Mr.T.R.Mani, apart from the self-serving partition deed under Ex.A-5 wherein the other branches were intentionally excluded, there is no document produced by the plaintiffs in support of their claim. In view of the above factual aspect of the matter, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Principal District Judge had failed to appreciate the above facts and circumstances while rendering the judgment in the first appeal. 27. In view of the above factual aspect of the matter, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Principal District Judge had failed to appreciate the above facts and circumstances while rendering the judgment in the first appeal. 27. Moreover as has been rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, Exs.A-6 to A-9 being the documents covered by the proceedings of the Director of Survey, Land Records and Settlement cannot help advance the case of the plaintiffs. Similarly, apart from the said documents, only the self serving evidence of the second plaintiff as P.W.1 regarding the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties is available on record. In this context, it is relevant to point out that the learned Principal District Judge has wrongly placed strong reliance on Exs.A-6 and A-7 Chitta extracts and also Ex.A-10, order of the Settlement Officer to come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Further, he held that no document had been produced to show that any appeal as against the order under Ex.A-10 has been preferred by the appellants herein. However, since there is no controversy about the appeal preferred by the appellants before the Director of Survey, Land Records and Settlement in the proceedings referred to above, such finding arrived at by the first appellate court has to be negatived. 28. As has been rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, the opinion of the Revenue Authorities with reference to their right to immovable property is not conclusive and that the civil court is not barred from adjudicating the question of title to the same. For this position, he has referred me to the Division Bench decision of this Court, KUPPUSWAMI NAINAR v. THE REVENUE OFFICER (1995 (1) M.L.J.426) wherein the ratio has been laid down as under:- "No provision is brought to our notice in the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate upon the question of title relating to immovable property. Revenue Officers in a patta proceedings may express their views on the question of title, but such expression of pinion or decision is not conclusive and it is only intended to support their decision for granting patta." 29. Revenue Officers in a patta proceedings may express their views on the question of title, but such expression of pinion or decision is not conclusive and it is only intended to support their decision for granting patta." 29. So also, learned senior counsel for the appellants has cited the decision, NAVALSHANKAR ISHWARIAL DAVE AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS ( AIR 1994 S.C. 1496 ) wherein the statement of law on this aspect is reiterated that mutation of name in Revenue Records is not evidence of title, though it may be relevant for other purposes. Similarly, he has relied upon another decision of the Apex Court in SWAMI v. INTDER KAUR AND OTHERS ( 1996 (6) S.C.C. 223 ) wherein it was held as follows:- "Mutation of a property in the Revenue Records does not create or extinguish the title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question." 30. Hence, having regard to the dictum of law referred to above, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiffs cannot said to have occurred exclusive title to and possession of the suit properties on the basis of the documents, Exs.A-6 to A-10. 31. Similarly, since the documents under Exs.A-6 to A-9 were dealt with in the said appeal and inasmuch as they are of recent origin, this Court is of the considered view that mere production of those documents could not in any event establish that the plaintiffs were put in exclusive possession of the suit properties by virtue of the partition deed Ex.A-5. It follows necessarily that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove the exclusive possession of the suit properties on the date of the suit on the basis of Exs.A-6 to A-10 has to be upheld. 32. Learned senior counsel for the appellants has drawn my attention to the judgment rendered by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry and contended rightly in my opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge has analysed the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side with reference to the relevant issues framed in the suit and rendered the findings. 32. Learned senior counsel for the appellants has drawn my attention to the judgment rendered by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry and contended rightly in my opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge has analysed the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side with reference to the relevant issues framed in the suit and rendered the findings. But, on the contrary, a careful scrutiny of the judgment rendered by the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry in the first appeal would indicate clearly that he had not cared to frame proper points for consideration as mandated by Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. It is in these circumstances, this Court is inclined to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants and hold that the manner in which the learned Principal District Judge dealt with the appeal is not proper in the circumstances referred to above. 33. Mr.R.Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has however relied on the following decisions, namely, 1) HAMIDA AND OTHERS v. MD. KHALIL ( 2001 (5) S.C.C. 30 ); and (2) VEERAYEE AMMAL v. SEENI AMMAL ( 2002 (1) S.C.C. 134 ) in support of his contention that in the Second Appeal, the findings of the first appellate court cannot be reversed by reappraisal of the evidence just because another view is possible. 34. Per contra, Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions under Order 42 and Section 100 C.P.C. in support of his contention that this Court is empowered to interfere with the findings of the first appellate court if such findings are perverse both on the question of fact as well as on a point of law. As has been rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, this Court is entitled to arrive at a different conclusion in this case (vide) Section 100 C.P.C. for the simple reason that the conclusions reached by the lower appellate Court were not based on the evidence recorded by the trial court and therefore he has cited the ratio laid down in SATYA GUPTA v. BRIJESH KUMAR ( 1998 (6) S.C.C. 423 ) in support of such contention. Considering the dictum of law enunciated in the decisions cited by either side, this Court is of the view that in this case, since the first appellate Court had neither framed relevant point for consideration or decided the case in a proper perspective on the basis of the recorded evidence and inasmuch as the learned District Judge rendered a conflicting judgment which in the considered opinion of this Court is perverse as the evidence on record is quite contrary to such findings, the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants is acceptable. In view of such circumstances, this Court is unable to endorse the view expressed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents. 35. For the aforesaid reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed with costs throughout setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry in A.S.No.77 of 2001 dated 30.1.2002 and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S.No.213 of 2001 dated 18.10.2001 are restored. In view of the above findings, the parties to this appeal are directed to file a comprehensive suit for partition within six months, if so advised, in order to bring finality to the dispute among themselves in respect of their family properties.